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 Abstract 
 
7KLVWKHVLVLVDQHQTXLU\LQWRWKHSUREOHPRI%DUWK¶VXQQDWXUDOH[HJHVLV3UHYLRXVDWWHPSWV
WR DFFRXQW IRU WKHGLVWLQFWLYHQHVVRU VWUDQJHQHVVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVKDYHHPSKDVLVHG LWV
theological character or its context in Church dogmatic tradition. This thesis judges this 
approach inadequate; in place of theological or dogmatic principles, this thesis searches 
for a basic hermeneutical SULQFLSOH ZKLFK ZLOO UHQGHU %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LQWHOOLJLEOH DQG
constructive. 
 
It is argued that this basic hermeneutical principle is that human subjectivity is 
predetermined by trans-individual structures of sin, self-deception and self-interest. This 
means that apparently impartial or spontaneous perceptions or judgements are 
predetermined by deep structureVRIVLQFRQFHDOHGIURPRXUDZDUHQHVV%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\LV
intended to expound what it means to speak of salvation through Christ in view of this 
trans-individual, trans-VXEMHFWLYH QDWXUH RI VLQ %DUWK¶V EDVLF KHUPHQHXWLFDO SULQFLSOH LV
constructively compDUHG ZLWK 51LHEXKU¶V FRQFHSW RIFRUSRUDWH VHOI-deception, and with 
the thought of H.-G.Gadamer, who recognised that human subjectivity is predetermined by 
structures which transcend immediate awareness. 
 
In consequence, Barth held that apparently impartial or critical interpretations of Scripture 
serve to reinforce hidden structures of culturally ingrained forms of sinful self-interest. This 
is illustrated by means of a case study of Christ and Adam ZKLFK UHSUHVHQWV %DUWK¶V
mature interpretation of Romans ,WLVGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDW%DUWK¶VFRQFHUQZDVZLWKKRZ
interpretations of Romans 5 were covertly determined by the corporate self-deception of 
the West in the context of the Cold War and western anti-communism. 
 
)LQDOO\ LW LV DUJXHG WKDW %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ and scriptural interpretation were closely 
grounded in his early political involvement and in his reaction to the outbreak of the First 
World War.  
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
The occasion for this thesis 
 
Ever since I first became interested in Karl Barth as a theologian, I have been struck by the 
profoundly unnatural character of so much of his scriptural exegesis. It has often seemed 
to me that his exegesis must be an acute embarrassment for his supporters on the one 
hand, and an all too easy target for his critics on the other. The occasion for this thesis, 
WKHQLVWRLQYHVWLJDWHZLWKDVPXFKFODULW\DQGKRQHVW\DVSRVVLEOHWKHSUREOHPRI%DUWK¶V
unnatural exegesis.1 
 
7KHXQQDWXUDOFKDUDFWHURI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV LQLWVHOIUHTXLUHVH[SODQDWLRQ,W LVSHUSlexing 
KRZDWKHRORJLDQRI%DUWK¶VVWDWXUHDQGFRJHQF\FDQSUHVHQWXVZLWKVRPDQ\WRUWXRXVRU
simply unconvincing instances of biblical exegesis. But there is an even more severe 
difficulty arising from this problem, which is that Barth consistently claimed that his 
theology was based specifically on the Bible; and not only that, but he seemed to claim that 
his theology was derived from the Bible to the exclusion of other channels such as reason, 
tradition or human experience. If, then, his interpretations of the Bible are so 
unconvincing, what does this mean for a theology which claims to be so specifically based 
RQ WKH %LEOH" ,W LV TXLWH XQGHUVWDQGDEOH WKDW VRPH KDYH XVHG WKH XQWHQDELOLW\ RI %DUWK¶V
exegesis to demonstrate the sheer impossibility of basing theology so exclusively on the 
Bible.2 
 
,QGHHG ZKHQ IDFHG ZLWK WKH GLIILFXOWLHV RI GHIHQGLQJ %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LQ GHWDLO LW KDV
struck me more and more that here we seem to have an intractable difficulty. No 
µIXQGDPHQWDOLVW¶ KDUPRQLVDWLRQ QR PHGLDHYDOallegorising, no Rabbinic midrash seems to 
SUHVHQW D PRUH VHYHUH SUREOHP WKDQ WKH PRUHEHZLOGHULQJH[DPSOHVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV
                                                        
1
 ,ZRXOGDJUHHZKROHKHDUWHGO\ZLWKWKHFRPPHQWRI-RKQ%RZGHQZKHQKHZULWHVµ³8QQDWXUDO´LVLQIDFW
an adjective which comes constantly to PLQGDVRQHUHDGV%DUWK¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ«>+@HLVZKHQKHLVQRW
EHLQJVHOHFWLYHIRUFHGWRJUHDWOHQJWKVLQGHDOLQJZLWKVRPHRI>6FULSWXUH¶V@OHVVUHZDUGLQJSDVVDJHVLQDQ
DWWHPSWWRH[WUDFWWKH³PHDQLQJ´¶Karl Barth (London: SCM Press, 1971), p 115.) 
2
 7KLV LV WKH SULQFLSDO DUJXPHQW RI -DPHV %DUU¶V ERRN Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), and is also the argument of John Bowden in the aforementioned book Karl Barth. 
2 
 
Because of this, I have been especially interested in seeing how those who have studied 
%DUWK¶V VFULSWXUDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ KDYH responded, whether directly or indirectly, to the 
problem that it seems more or less impossible to agree with or accept the detailed 
conclusions of his exegesis. 
 
, ZRXOG EHJLQ ZLWK WKH JHQHUDO FRPPHQW RI WKH µ<DOH VFKRRO¶ ZULWHU 0DU\ .DWKOHHQ
Cunningham. +HUFRPPHQWLVWKDWSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVRI%DUWK¶VVFULSWXUDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQG
exegesis have focused almost exclusively on the general hermeneutical statements to be 
IRXQG LQ KLV ZULWLQJV 2U WR SXW LW DQRWKHU ZD\ PRVW VWXGLHV KDYH IRFXVHG RQ %DUWK¶V
more WKHRUHWLFDO VWDWHPHQWV DQG KDYH LJQRUHG WKH LVVXH RI %DUWK¶V DFWXDO H[HJHWLFDO
practice.3 This is relevant to my own concern, for I would say that it is understandable, 
                                                        
3
 Mary Kathleen Cunningham, What is Theological Exegesis? Interpretation and Use of Scripture in Karl 
%DUWK¶V 'RFWULQH RI (OHFWLRQ 3HQQV\OYDQLD 7ULQLW\ 3UHVV ,QWHUQDWLRQDO  µ3UHYLRXV WUHDWPHQWV RI
WKLVLVVXHKDYHWHQGHGWRIRFXVRQ%DUWK¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHPDUNVZLWKDSSHDOVWRKLVH[HJHVLVVHUYLQJ only 
as illustration. This essay, by following the reverse procedure of subordinating attention to his 
hermeneutical remarks to a careful analysis of his exegetical practice, attempts to shed new light on a topic 
that has long since been the source of conWURYHUV\DPRQJ%DUWKLQWHUSUHWHUV¶S,QDQHQGQRWHDIWHUD
OLVW RISUHYLRXVVWXGLHVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV&XQQLQJKDPFRPPHQWV µ7KHVLJQLILFDQW IHDWXUHRIDOO WKHVH
ZRUNVLVWKHLUSULPDU\IRFXVRQ%DUWK¶VPRUHWKHRUHWLFDOKHUPHQHXWLFDOUHPDUNVUDWKHr than on his actual 
H[HJHWLFDOSUDFWLFH¶SQ,QKHUOLVWRIWKHHDUOLHUVWXGLHVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV&XQQLQJKDPOLVWVWKH
following: J.M.Robinson (ed.), The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology: Volume One (Richmond, Virginia: 
John Knox Press, 1968); 56PHQG µ1DFKNULWLVFKH 6FKULIWDXVOHJXQJ¶ LQ (%XVFK HG Parrhesia: Karl 
Barth zum achtzigsten Gerburtstag, (Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1966), pp 215-(-QJHOµ7KHRORJ\
DV0HWDFULWLFLVP¶LQKarl Barth: a Theological Legacy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), pp 70-82; 
0:DOODFH µ.DUO %DUWK¶V+HUPHQHXWLF$:D\EH\RQG WKH ,PSDVVH¶ Journal of Religion 68 (1988), pp 
396-410; M.Wallace, The Second Naïvete: Barth, Ricoeur, and the New Yale Theology (Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1990); B.Mc&RUPDFN µ+LVWRULFDO-&ULWLFLVP DQG 'RJPDWLF ,QWHUHVW LQ .DUO %DUWK¶V
7KHRORJLFDO([HJHVLVRIWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQW¶LQ%XUURZV5RUHPHGBiblical Hermeneutic in Historical 
Perspective: Studies in Honor of Karlfried Froehlich on his Sixtieth Birthday (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
*(LFKKRO]µ'HU$QVDW].DUO%DUWKVLQGHU+HUPHQHXWLN¶LQ5XGROI)UH\HWDOHGAntwort: Karl 
Barth zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1956), pp 52-68; Lindemann, Karl 
Barth und die kritische Schriftauslegung (Hamburg-Bergstedt, 1973); F.-:0DUTXDUGW µ([HJHVH XQG
'RJPDWLN LQ.DUO%DUWKV7KHRORJLH¶LQ5HJLVWHUEDQGWRDie Kirchliche Dogmatik of Karl Barth (Zürich: 
Evangelischer Verlag, 1970), pp 651-76. Some of these I will be looking at in more detail in the course of 
P\WKHVLVIRUWKHPRPHQW,ZLOOVLPSO\HQGRUVH&XQQLQJKDP¶VFRQFHUQWKDWWKHVHZULWHUVDSSHDUWRVKRZ
OLWWOHLQWHUHVWLQWKHGHWDLOVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV 
3 
 
JLYHQ WKH SUREOHPV DVVRFLDWHGZLWK WKHGHWDLOVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV WKDW LQTXLULHV LQWo his 
exegesis have focused on his apparently more fruitful and illuminating general statements. 
$QG \HW WKHUH LV FOHDUO\ VRPHWKLQJ XQVDWLVIDFWRU\ DERXW WKLV )RU LI %DUWK¶V WKHRUHWLFDO
statements about scriptural interpretation or exegesis are valid and illuminating, one would 
surely expect this to be borne out in the way he applies these general principles in practice 
DQG LQ GHWDLO +HQFH WKH SUREOHPDWLF QDWXUH RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHWLFDO SUDFWLFH VKRXOG VXUHO\
become the object of careful investigation. And so, when writers such as Mary 
Cunningham - and also, from the same school, Paul McGlasson4 - call for attention to the 
DFWXDOGHWDLOVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVWKLVLVVXUHO\DSRVLWLYHVLJQ 
 
And yet, in the cases of both Cunningham and McGlasson, what strikes me is that they do 
not WXUQWRWKHGHWDLOVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVIRUWKHUHDVRQZKLFKFRQFHUQVPH$VLQGLFDWHG
my concern is that a focus on the general, theoretical statements fails to come to grips with 
WKHVHYHUHGLIILFXOWLHVRI%DUWK¶VDFWXDOH[HJHWLFDl practice; but it is clear that this is not the 
principal concern of either writer.  
 
For it appears to me that they do not ask the straightforward question of whether we can 
VHULRXVO\DFFHSWWKHGHWDLOVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVRUKRZWRUHVSRQGWRWKHSUREOem that, on 
the whole, we find ourselves simply unable to accept them; and indeed, on the occasions 
when we can accept at least some RI %DUWK¶VFRQFOXVLRQV WKLV VHHPV WREHPRUHGXH WR
fortuitous coincidence than to any broader or more profound methodological affinity. It 
seems to me that McGlasson and Cunningham do not take account of this problem any 
PRUH WKDQ GR WKH SUHYLRXV VWXGLHV RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV ZKLFK IRFXV RQ KLV JHQHUDO RU
theoretical statements. 
 
Indeed, it appears to me that these writers (McGlasson and Cunningham) are far from 
FRPPLWWLQJ WKHPVHOYHV WR WKHGHWDLOVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVQRUGR WKH\ UHIOHFWRQZKHWKHU
                                                        
4
 P.McGlasson, Jesus and Judas: Biblical Exegesis in Barth (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1991), p 2: 
µ7KHIDFWLVWKHEHVWZD\WRFRPHWRJULSVZLWK%DUWK¶VSRVVLEOHFRQWULEXWLRQWRFRQWHPSRUDU\WKHRORJLFDO
hermeneutics is to focus on his actual biblical exegesis, rather than [on] the less clear contours of his few 
hermeneutical statements. And that is the aim of the present work. I have not, however, attempted to 
FRQYHUW%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLQWRDKHUPHQHXWLFDOV\VWHP7KDWLV,KDYHDWWHPSWHGDQDQDO\VLVRIWKHELEOLFDO
exegesis as exegesis and not as the embodiment or manifestation of DQXQGHUO\LQJKHUPHQHXWLF¶ 
4 
 
and to what extent we could affirm the details as correct. Rather, just as much as the other 
writers whom they criticise, they also are concerned to discover general hermeneutical or 
WKHRUHWLFDO LQVLJKWV LQ%DUWK¶VZULWLQJV7KH UHDOGLIIHUHQFH LV WKDW WKH\EHOLHYH ULJKWO\RU
ZURQJO\ WKDW WKH\ FDQ ILQG JHQHUDO KHUPHQHXWLFDO SULQFLSOHV HPERGLHG LQ %DUWK¶V DFWXDO
exegetical practice which are other than those stated by Barth himself in his own explicit 
hermeneutical or theoretical statements. This rightly invites the criticism of Bruce 
McCormack, who remarks that it would surely make more sense to take our orientation 
IURP%DUWK¶VRZQ explicit statements of his hermeneutical principles.5 
 
Now, a principal question which occupies McGlasson and Cunningham is whether and to 
what extent Barth should be understood as reading Scripture as a kind of realistic 
narrative. In this, they are takiQJWKHLURULHQWDWLRQIURPHDUOLHUZULWHUVRIWKHµ<DOHVFKRRO¶
especially Hans Frei,6 David Kelsey7 and David Ford.8 7KLVYLVLRQRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLH
as a narrative reading of Scripture) is certainly not adopted uncritically by either 
Cunningham or MF*ODVVRQ LQSDUWLFXODU,WKLQNWKHPDLQSXUSRVHRI0F*ODVVRQ¶VWKHVLV
LVWRDUJXHWKDWWKHµQDUUDWLYH¶DSSURDFKWR%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLVRQH-sided, and needs to be 
complemented with an acknowledgement of the rôle of conceptual analysis.9 
                                                        
5
 µ7KHVR-FDOOHG³<DOH6FKRRO´UHDFWLQJDJDLQVWWKHDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHFRQFHQWUDWLRQRIOLEHUDOVRQ%DUWK¶V
theoretical statements on hermeneutics, looked almost completely away from such statements in order to 
focus attention XSRQ %DUWK¶V DFWXDO H[HJHVLV RI 6FULSWXUDO SDVVDJHV ,Q GHIHQVH RI WKLV SURFHGXUH LWZDV
frequently pointed out that Barth himself had said that the proper order was first exegesis and then 
hermeneutics (as an a posteriori reflection on a prior engagement with texts). But such a defense fails to 
convince. Once Barth has done the work of reflecting on the hermeneutics implicit in his exegetical 
procedures, ought we not to take such theoretical statements seriously? We might wish to repeat the 
experiment, pDVVLQJWKURXJKKLVH[HJHVLVWRKLV³WKHRU\´WRVHHLIWKH³WKHRU\´LVMXVWLILHGE\KLVSUDFWLFH
%XW VXUHO\ WKDW ZRXOG VWLOO UHTXLUH FORVH DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH ³WKHRU\´ DV ZHOO"¶ 7KLV SDVVDJH LV IRXQG LQ
0F&RUPDFN¶V LQWURGXFWLRQ WR 5LFKDUG %XUQHWW¶V Karl BarWK¶V 7KHRORJLFDO([HJHVLV7KH+HUPHQHXWLFDO
Principles of the Römerbrief Period (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), p vii.) 
6
 Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1974), pp vii-
viii. 
7
 D.Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (London: SCM Press, 1975), pp 39f. 
8
 D.F.Ford, %DUWK DQG *RG¶V 6WRU\ %LEOLFDO 1DUUDWLYH DQG 7KHRORJLFDO 0HWKRG RI .DUO %DUWK LQ WKH
Church Dogmatics )UDQNIXUW DP 0DLQ 9HUODJ 3HWHU /DQJ  '))RUG µ%DUWK¶V ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ  of 
WKH%LEOH¶ LQ6:6\NHV HGKarl Barth: Studies of his Theological Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), pp 55-87. 
9
 Jesus and Judas, pp 8-9; p 133. 
5 
 
 
However, all such questions about the general pattern RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVWHQGDV,KDYH
indicated, to lead away from the question of the unnatural character of the actual details; 
and so I will not consider this line of enquiry any further at this point. But there is an area 
in which I believe McGlasson and Cunningham come closer to my own concern, namely 
where they consider the rôle of theological commitment LQ%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV,WKLQN,FDQ
VD\DW OHDVWSURYLVLRQDOO\ WKDW WKHPDLQUHDVRQZK\%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVFRPHVDFross as so 
unnatural is because so often it seems to be a statement of his own dogmatic position 
rather than an attempt to establish the meaning of the text itself. And so, when 
Cunningham and McGlasson raise the question of the rôle of theological commitment, this 
is where I think they come closest to the issue which I am seeking to address in this thesis. 
 
7DNLQJ &XQQLQJKDP¶V ZRUN ILUVW LI , XQGHUVWDQG KHU FRUUHFWO\ VKH DSSHDUV WR FRQFOXGH
WKDW %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV GLIIHUV IURP FRQWHPSRUDU\ FULWLFDO H[HJHVLs because it incorporates 
certain theological commitments which are absent from the more detached or technical 
DSSURDFK RI VWDQGDUG H[HJHWLFDO VFKRODUV ,Q KHU DQDO\VLV RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV RI WKH
prologue of John, she is able to indicate a certain amount of overlap between Barth and 
standard critical exegesis; however, her analysis only serves to show that Barth does not 
share underlying methodological principles with these scholars, because he assumes a prior 
theological commitment which is not assumed by WKHµWHFKQLFDO¶VFKRODUV- specifically that 
6FULSWXUH LV PHDQW WR EH UHDG DV D XQLILHG ZLWQHVV WR LWV µWUXH REMHFW¶ ZKLFK LV -HVXV
Christ.10 
 
The obvious question is how Cunningham can claim to discover a specific theological 
commitment or dogmatic principOH XQGHUO\LQJ %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLVZLWKRXWGHDOLQJZLWK WKH
SUREOHP WKDW WKLV VXJJHVWV WKDW %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV KDV EHHQ SUHGHWHUPLQHG DQG KHQFH
distorted, by prior dogmatic decisions. In fact, Cunningham clearly believes that she can 
SODFH %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK LQ a positive light, by claiming that his method of incorporating 
theological commitment into his exegetical practice enables him to serve more effectively 
the faith and preaching of the church - more effectively, that is, than is the case in normal 
                                                        
10
 What is Theological Exegesis?, p 75; p 83. 
6 
 
critical exegesis which does not incorporate any such faith commitment.11 In saying this, 
&XQQLQJKDPVHHPVWREHGHSHQGHQWRQ*+XQVLQJHUDOVRRIWKHµ<DOHVFKRRO¶ZKRPDNHV
an almost identical point in his work on Barth.12 
 
Hunsinger and Cunningham are undoubtedly correct when they draw attention to the vital 
VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH FORVH LQWHUUHODWLRQ RI GRJPDWLF DQG H[HJHWLFDO FRQFHUQV LQ %DUWK¶V
exegesis. It is undeniable that in modern times there has developed in theology a  
conscious distinction between the question of theological truth on the one hand and 
exegesis or the historical task of determining the meaning of the biblical text on the  
other.13 $UJXDEO\ WKH SULQFLSDO UHDVRQ ZK\ %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV VHHPV VR XQQDWXUDO WR RXU
critical consciousness is because he appears to go back behind this development and 
                                                        
11
 See What is Theological Exegesis?, Sµ7KHUHVXOt of this tight interweaving of dogmatic interest and 
biblical interpretation is a kind of theological exegesis that elicits the opprobrium of technical scholars 
while offering fresh and captivating insights into the Christian message that are designed to serve the 
SUHDFKLQJRIWKHFKXUFK¶- DQGDOVRSµ«>:@KHQWKHJRDORIH[HJHVLVLVWRVHUYHWKHSUHDFKLQJRIWKH
church, such a theological approach can, in the hands of a skilled practitioner such as Barth, yield results 
that are far more captivating aQG HQGXULQJ WKDQ DQ\ PHUHO\ KLVWRULFDO UHDGLQJ PLJKW DFKLHYH¶ )RU P\
present purposes, we can pass over the problem that not only historical-critical exegesis but also 
dogmatic/theological considerations often seem remote from the pastoral or preaching situation.) 
12
 G.Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth 1HZ<RUN2[IRUG2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVSµ7KH
result, in the hands of a master like Barth, can be a hermeneutic of close textual readings richly informed 
by doctrinal considerations not immediately suggested by the text itself but rather by a deepened 
appreciation for the larger dogmatic or hermeneutical context. Derived from a complex of exegetically 
based doctrines and doctrinally based exegesis, it is the sort of reading which can be the despair of 
OLWHUDOLVWV DQG WHFKQLFLDQV ZKLOH \HW HQKDQFLQJ WKH IDLWK DQG SUHDFKLQJ RI WKH FKXUFK¶ ,W ZRXOG VHHP
likely that it is Cunningham who is dependent on Hunsinger rather than vice versa, as the relevant 
remarks do not appear in the earlier version oI &XQQLQJKDP¶V HVVD\ RI  LH KHU 3K'GLVVHUWDWLRQ
µ.DUO %DUWK¶V ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG 8VH RI (SKHVLDQV  LQ KLV 'RFWULQH RI (OHFWLRQ $Q (VVD\ LQ WKH
5HODWLRQRI6FULSWXUHDQG7KHRORJ\¶<DOH8QLYHUVLW\ 
13
 For summaries of this historical development, see W.Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of 
Science (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976), pp 381-*(EHOLQJ µ7KH0HDQLQJRI³%LEOLFDO
7KHRORJ\´¶LQWord and Faith (London: SCM Press, 1963), pp 79-::UHGHµ7KH7DVNVDQG0HWKRGV
of ³1HZ7HVWDPHQW7KHRORJ\´¶LQ50RUJDQHGThe Nature of New Testament Theology (London: SCM 
Press, 1973), pp 68-116; H.Räisänen, Beyond New Testament Theology (London: SCM Press, 1990). Also 
significant here is F.Watson, Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1997), pp 2f. 
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attempts to carry out the tasks of dogmatics and exegesis simultaneously. His exegesis can 
perhaps be read as a protest against such a distinction as it has developed in theology. 
 
However, this is not in itselI DQ DGHTXDWH GHIHQFH RI %DUWK¶V SURFHGXUH )RU ZH FDQQRW
help thinking that there is a good reason why contemporary theological discipline requires 
a distinction between theological commitments and exegetical study. At issue is the 
problem of objectivity LQHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHWH[W)RULIRXUJUDVSRIWKHWH[W¶V
meaning is limited or decided in advance by prior theological commitments, then this 
would seem to be fatal to an objective assessment of the meaning of the text itself. The 
profoundly FRXQWHULQWXLWLYH FKDUDFWHU RI PXFK RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV VHHPV LI DQ\WKLQJ WR
underline the importance of making the modern distinction between exegesis and 
dogmatics. It seems to me that for as long as we pass over the difficult question of whether 
we caQ DFWXDOO\ DFFHSW WKH GHWDLOV RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV RU PRUH WR WKH SRLQW KRZ ZH
respond to the fact that we cannot accept them), then we are far from providing an 
adequate response to this problem.14 
 
It is, I believe, worth taking a slightly closer look aW0F*ODVVRQ¶VFRPPHQWVRQWKHVDPH
type of problem, simply because, as we will see, he seems more aware that there is a 
problem involved here. Now, McGlasson also identifies the important consideration that 
Barth seeks to read the Scriptures as a witness to a unified theological theme. But, 
significantly, he observes that when and where Scripture shows evidence of being too 
GLYHUVH WR ILW ZLWKLQ %DUWK¶V VFKHPH WKHQ KH %DUWK VLPSO\ VD\V WKDW WKH SUREOHPDWLF
elements of Scripture should be brought into relDWLRQWRWKHµFHQWUDO¶FRQWHQWRUZLWQHVVRI
                                                        
14
 cf James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, pp 202-µ7KHFRXQWOHVVSDJHVRIZHDULVRPHLQHSW
and futile exegesis in the Church Dogmatics, especially the later volumes, were only a testimony to the 
fact that the Bible cannot be used theologically when the work of biblical scholarship is brushed aside. 
%DUWK RIIHUHG QRWKLQJ WR WKDW VFKRODUVKLS DQG LQ WKH HQG DFKLHYHG QRWKLQJ IRU LW « >7@KH ODWHU \HDUV
showed that the justification of Barthian theology depended upon philosophical considerations and 
DUJXPHQWVIURPWKHKLVWRU\RILGHDVDQGQRWXSRQWKH%LEOH¶-DPHV%DUUKDVUHFHLYHGFULWLFLVPVIRUWKLV
from F.Watson (Text and Truth, especially pp 246- DQG $&7KLVHOWRQ µBarr on Barth and Natural 
7KHRORJ\$3OHD IRU+HUPHQHXWLFV LQ+LVWRULFDO7KHRORJ\¶Scottish Journal of Theology 47 (1994), pp 519-
DQG\HW,WKLQNWKDWQRWRQO\WKHFRQWHQWEXWHYHQWKHWRQHRI%DUU¶VFULWLFLVPVDUHSHUKDSVPRUHMXVWLILHG
than is allowed by either Watson or Thiselton. 
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Scripture. At this point McGlasson candidly observes that Barth seems quite untroubled 
that he is thereby running the risk of imposing an alien principle of his own devising onto 
the text. He comments as follows RQ%DUWK¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWDOO6FULSWXUHPXVWEHUHDGDVD
witness to divine revelation: 
 
For the present, however, I should like to identify a conceptual-exegetical move sometimes made in 
%DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV ZKLFK UHQGHUV WKH FRQFHSW ZLWQHVV >WR GLYLQH UHYHODtion] more elastic than it 
otherwise might be. Firstly, not every strand of biblical witness is straightforwardly witness. It is 
necessary to realise, however, that when this is the case - when, that is, a passage of the Bible 
appears unrelated to the central biblical function - it is exegetically to be brought into relation to this 
function. Or rather, it is exegetically to be recognised that it has already assumed this function by its 
presence in the Bible despite its immanent characteristics. For example, when arguing against the 
concept of the analogy of being in natural theology in [CD II/1], Barth concedes the presence in the 
%LEOHRI VHYHUDOSDVVDJHVHJWKHµ1DWXUH3VDOPV¶VXVSLFLRXVO\OLNHQDWXUDOWKHRORJ\DQGGHYRLG
therefore, of any witness to a fact of divine revelation ([CD II/1,] pp 97-176). They are numerous 
HQRXJKWRFRQVWLWXWHDµVLGHOLQH¶WRWKHµPDLQOLQH¶RIWKH%LEOLFDOZLWQHVV%DUWK¶VVROXWLRQ"4XLWH
simply to insist that, when expounding such passages, they must always be systematically 
subordinated in intent and meaning to the main line of biblical witness. They are witness, because 
they must be brought into relation to witness. Or rather, it must be seen that they have been brought 
into such a relation; Barth never once, to my knowledge, offers an exegesis of a biblical passage that 
suggests it must be made to bear witness. He rather at times suggests that great care must be taken to 
recognise the place of a passage in the Bible as a whole, lest the concealed relation of a passage to 
the biblical witness remain unnoticed.15 
 
As indicated, I have laid particular emphasis on this passage because of the unusual 
FDQGRXU ZLWK ZKLFK 0F*ODVVRQ GUDZV DWWHQWLRQ WR DQ REYLRXV SUREOHP LQ %DUWK¶V 
exegesis. This seems to me to contrast with Cunningham and Hunsinger, who, so far as I 
can tell, do not see a problem here at all. The problem is simply that, in different ways, 
Barth appears quite frankly to be imposing his own theological scheme on the Bible, while 
at the same time evincing an untroubled assurance that he is simply being true to the Bible 
itself. If I understand correctly, McGlasson states that it is beyond the purpose of his  
                                                        
15
 Jesus and Judas, p 21. 
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thesis to attempt a response to this problem - but, clearly, such a limit is not adequate to 
my own purposes.16 
 
We seem to find the same kind of difficulty in the exposition of Bruce McCormack, who is 
RILQWHUHVWSDUWO\EHFDXVHKHFRQVFLRXVO\ZULWHVRXWVLGHRUHYHQDJDLQVW WKHµ<DOHVFKRRO¶
which we have considered thus far, but also because of his sustained argument that Barth 
was specifically concerned with the historical task of establishing the original meaning of 
WKHVFULSWXUDODXWKRUV0F&RUPDFNKDVDUJXHGWKLVODVWSRLQWDJDLQVWUHFHQWµSRVWPRGHUQ¶
interpretations of Barth which claim that his exegesis was EDVHG RQ µDQWL-KLVWRULFDO¶
principles and was therefore opposed to the traditional exegetical principle of establishing 
the intention of the author.17 7KLV LV RI LQWHUHVW WR PH EHFDXVH WKH µSRVWPRGHUQ¶
interpretations of Barth could at least make sense of WKH IDFW WKDW %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV
frequently does not, so far as we can tell, correspond to the intentions of the biblical 
DXWKRUV 0F&RUPDFN¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW %DUWK ZDV QRW DQWL-historical and not opposed to 
µDXWKRULDO LQWHQWLRQ¶ ZRXOG VHHP WR UDLVH DJDLQ WKH question - KRZ LV LW WKDW %DUWK¶V
interpretations nevertheless do not reflect the meaning of the authors? And yet 
McCormack does not consider this latter question, and I think this is because he adopts a 
VLPLODUFRPSURPLVHWRWKHµ<DOHVFKRRO¶FRQFHUQLQJWhe rôle of theological commitment. 
                                                        
16
 This is my understanding of a passage in Jesus and Judas (pp 40-1) where McGlasson alludes to the 
VDPH SUREOHP µ%DUWK RIIHUV KLV H[HJHVLV RI WKH %LEOH DV D ZLWQHVV WR WKH :RUG RI *RG DV LI HYHU\ERG\
could see that thLVLVMXVWZKDWWKH%LEOHLWVHOIREYLRXVO\UHTXLUHV¶0F*ODVVRQJRHVRQWRFRPPHQWµ7KH
ZRUOGRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVRIWKH%LEOHLVVRODUJHWKDWLWLQFOXGHVwithin it the reasons for entering it. Or, it 
is so small that it drives away all but the partisan few. In suggesting these two different ways of seeing the 
ORJLF RI %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK ZH KDYH FRPH XS DJDLQVW D ZDOO VHSDUDWLQJ WZR FRPSUHKHQVLYH YLVLRQV RI
DUJXPHQWJHQHUDOO\LWFDQQRWEHWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQWREUHDFKWKLVZDOO¶0F*ODVVRQVHHms to 
be saying that Barth assumes as self-evident that his theology is biblical, without allowing for any 
independent or impartial investigation into the Bible to see if this assumption is correct - and that the 
problem of the circular and alienating natuUHRIWKLVUHDVRQLQJLVEH\RQGWKHVFRSHRI0F*ODVVRQ¶VSUHVHQW
investigation. (I think that in the passage under consideration McGlasson may be alluding to a 
µSRVWOLEHUDO¶ FRQFHSWLRQ LQ ZKLFK WKHRORJLFDO WUXWK LV QRW GHSHQGHQW RQ H[WHUQDO XQLYHUVDO FULWHUia, but 
rather on internal criteria only.) 
17
 %0F&RUPDFNµ+LVWRULFDO-&ULWLFLVPDQG'RJPDWLF,QWHUHVWLQ.DUO%DUWK¶V7KHRORJLFDO([HJHVLVRIWKH
1HZ 7HVWDPHQW¶ SS -5; B.McCormack, .DUO %DUWK¶V &ULWLFDOO\ 5HDOLVWLF 'LDOHFWLFDO 7KHRORJ\ 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp 232-UHIHUULQJWR0:DOODFHµ.DUO%DUWK¶V+HUPHQHXWLF$:D\
%H\RQGWKH,PSDVVH¶ 
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The fact is, I believe that McCormack and the other writers reviewed so far show an 
LQDGHTXDWHDZDUHQHVVRIWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQµREMHFWLYLW\¶LQVFULSWXUDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQG
WKH U{OH RI µWKHRORJLFDO FRPPLWPHQW¶ In McCoUPDFN¶V FDVH LW LV DUJXHG WKDW %DUWK
remained committed to the principle of authorial intention in his understanding of 
scriptural interpretation, and this would seem to mean that for Barth there is a possibility 
of objective knowledge of the meaning of scriptural texts. However, McCormack also 
DUJXHV WKDW DFFRUGLQJ WR %DUWK WKHUH ZDV QR VXFK WKLQJ DV WUXO\ µREMHFWLYH¶ H[HJHVLV
because all exegesis involves some kind of prior dogmatic principles or presuppositions. 
Even in critical exegesis (or especially there) one cannot eliminate presuppositions as such; 
the only thing one can do is to choose which presuppositions one wishes to use. According 
to McCormack - if I understand him correctly - Barth chooses a specific presupposition 
drawn from the witness of the Church, namely that God has spoken in history.18 
McCormack then claims that this allows Barth to reach at least an approximate objectivity 
in interpreting Scripture. 
 
0\SRLQWLV,GRQRWVHHKRZDSULQFLSOHRUSUHVXSSRVLWLRQZKLFKLVDYRZHGO\µSDUWLDO¶DQG
GUDZQ IURP D VSHFLILF UHDGLQJ FRPPXQLW\ FDQ OD\ FODLP WR DQ\ VXFK µREMHFWLYLW\¶
0F&RUPDFN LV ZH PD\ VXSSRVH VWURQJO\RSSRVHG WRDQ\ µSRVWPRGHUQ¶HSLVWHPRORJLFDO
RSWLRQ ZKLFK ZRXOG XQGHUVWDQG WKH µPHDQLQJ¶ RI D WH[W VROHO\ DV WKH SURSHUW\ RI D
particular reading community. So he seems to be forced to alternate between claiming on 
the one hand that Barth has adopted his presupposition as a responsible member of the 
Church (i.e. in loyalty to a given reading community) and claiming on the other hand that 
Barth has derived his presupposition from the Scripture (or New Testament?) itself. And 
yet it is very hard to understand why beliefs and traditions in the sphere of the Church 
VKRXOG LQ DQG RI WKHPVHOYHV JLYH DQ µREMHFWLYH¶ YLHZ RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI 6FUipture. Put 
another way: it is hard to understand why the hidden presuppositions of historical- 
                                                        
18
 Naturally, this presupposition does not seem very dramatic, and could surely be consistent with a 
historical-critical approach. However my present point is not whether such a conclusion about the meaning 
of Scripture could be reconciled with a historical-critical approach; my concern rather is with 
0F&RUPDFN¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWLWLVLQIDFWGHULYHGIURPWKHZLWQHVVLQJµ&KXUFK¶ 
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FULWLFLVP VKRXOG EH ODEHOOHG µVXEMHFWLYLVW¶ ZKHUHDV WKH IDLWK FRPPLWPHQW ZKLFK LV LQ OLQH
ZLWK&KXUFKWUDGLWLRQLVWHUPHGµREMHFWLYH¶LHLQOLQHZLWK6FULSWure.19 
 
0\ DUJXPHQW KHUH LV QRW ZLWK WKH DFFXUDF\ RI 0F&RUPDFN¶V SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V
position but rather with the fact that he seems to be positively recommending it without 
seeming to notice the severe difficulties involved in such an approach. Throughout my 
DQDO\VLVRIWKHYDULRXVV\PSDWKHWLFUHVSRQVHVWR%DUWK¶VH[HJHWLFDOWKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFH,GR 
not believe I have found an adequate response to the problem that when Barth incorporates 
prior theological commitments or presuppositions into his exegesis, then this must on the 
face of it invalidate any claim to exegetical objectivity. I cannot help but sympathise with 
-DPHV%DUU¶VDUJXPHQWLQKLVLQDXJXUDODGGUHVVZKHQKHVWDWHVWKDWµQRRQHFDQDGYDQFHRU
establish an opinion within biblical study on the grounds that he has the right 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQV¶20 
                                                        
19
 A few quotations from Mc&RUPDFN¶V HVVD\ µ+LVWRULFDO-&ULWLFLVP DQG 'RJPDWLF ,QWHUHVW¶ ZLOO EH
VXIILFLHQW HYLGHQFH RI WKLV XQUHVROYHG DPELJXLW\ µ)URP WKH YHU\ EHJLQQLQJ RI KLV KHUPHQHXWLFDO
revolution, Barth was thoroughly convinced that a neutral, disinterested exegesis was an impossibility. 
Many factors, both historical and cultural, condition our attempts to understand the meaning of Scripture. 
Barth was also convinced, however, that although these factors can never be completely eliminated, we do 
enjoy a freedom within limits to choose which among them we would like to hear above all others. For the 
interpreter of the Scriptures of the Church, the choice was clear: it is the voice of the Church which was to 
provide that one conditioning factor above all others to which the interpreter should happily look for 
JXLGDQFH¶ SS - µ%DUWK¶V WKHRORJLFDOH[HJHVLVRI WKH%LEOHQHYHUSUHWHQGHG WREH LPSDUWLDO«,WVHW
RXW WR EH SDUWLDO WR RSHUDWH IURP WKH VWDQGSRLQW RI D GHILQLWH GRJPDWLF LQWHUHVW <HDUV RI ³LPSDUWLDO´
exegesis had tDXJKW %DUWK«WKDW ³LPSDUWLDOLW\´ ZDV QR JXDUDQWHH RI REMHFWLYLW\«7KH UHVXOWV RI VXFK
³LPSDUWLDOLW\´KDGEHHQVXEMHFWLYLVPDQGLWZDVSUHFLVHO\IRUWKHVDNHRIDPRUHJHQXLQHREMHFWLYLW\WKDW
Barth sought to be partial. Every exegete operates with some kind of dogmatic interest. The question is, 
which dogmatic interest is appropriate to the New Testament? Which is most likely to produce a faithful 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVDFUHGWH[WVRIWKH&KXUFK"¶Sµ:DVKHJXLOW\RILPSRVLQJDGRJPDWLFDSULRUL
on the New Testament? He himself would have said that his dogmatic interest was derived in an a 
posteriori manner. It was something which he thought he had learned, in a provisional form at least, from 
the New Testament itself. It was something which was also reinforced in him by his attempts to hear the 
YRLFHRI WKH&KXUFK LQ WKHSDVW HWF¶ S)XUWKHURQWKLVFI0F&RUPDFN Dialectical Theology, p 
348.) 
20
 Does Biblical Study Still Belong to Theology? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p 14. I have no doubt 
WKDW %DUU ZDV WKLQNLQJ RI %DUWK DOWKRXJK SHUKDSV QRW RQO\ RIKLPZKHQKHZURWH WKHVHZRUGV%DUU¶V
argument is important, for (as he recognises) it does not follow that because we necessarily bring 
presuppositions to a text, then we are therefore justified in actively embracing certain presuppositions in 
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,W WKHUHIRUHVHHPVWRPHWKDW IRUDPRUHDGHTXDWHDSSURDFKWRWKHSUREOHPVRI%DUWK¶V
exegesis, we need a careful study of the meaning of subjectivity and objectivity, or of the 
rôle of the subject-object relation, in his theology and exegesis. Above all, my question is 
- why is it that Barth seems to think he can counter the subjectivism he believes he finds 
concealed within previous critical exegesis with the sheer assertion of traditional Christian 
belief - or even with the assertion of his own dogmatic principles? Why, in other words, is 
a hidden subjectivism of liberal critical exegesis to be seemingly replaced with an open 
VXEMHFWLYLVPRI&KULVWLDQRUHYHQµ%DUWKLDQ¶EHOLHI"21 
 
This, then, is my programmatic statement of the line of enquiry to be undertaken in this 
thesis. But before I proceed to fill out this basic statement with certain methodological 
UHPDUNV,ZRXOGOLNHWRPHQWLRQRQHIXUWKHUKLJKO\VLJQLILFDQWVWXG\RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV
During WKHFRXUVHRIP\UHVHDUFK WKHUHDSSHDUHGDIXOO OHQJWKVWXG\IURP0F&RUPDFN¶V
own school (i.e. Princeton Theological Seminary) entitled .DUO %DUWK¶V 7KHRORJLFDO
Exegesis: the Hermeneutical Principles of the Römerbrief Period, written by Richard 
Burnett. This work seems to me to be considerably more promising than previous studies 
RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV DQG , KDYH PDGH H[WHQVLYH XVH RI LW LQ WKH ODWHU SDUWV RI P\ WKHVLV
+RZHYHU LQ VSLWH RI P\ DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI %XUQHWW¶V DFKLHYHPHQW , VWLOO ILQG WKDW P\ RZQ
concerns are not adequately addressed in his work. First of all, Burnett does not give any 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the sense of a loyalty to a given faith-tradition or theological approach (Does Biblical Study Still Belong to 
Theology?, pp 13-14). I mention this because McCormack seems in one or two places to be hinting that 
%DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG LQ WHUPV RI WKH µKHUPHQHXWLFDO FLUFOH¶ LQ ZKLFK SURYLVLRQDO
presuppositions are progressively corrected through engagement with details. It seems to me that 
FRPSDULQJ%DUWKZLWKVRPHVXFKYHUVLRQRIWKHµKHUPHQHXWLFDOFLUFOH¶FDQRQO\ZRUNLIRQHSOD\VGRZQWKH
tenacity of his theological commitments in his exegetical practice; these commitments are certainly not 
progressively corrected through engagement with details. On the contrary, as McGlasson observes (see 
DERYH WKH HQWLUH GLIILFXOW\ ZLWK %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LV WKDW KH DOORZV KLV a priori dogmatic principles to 
predetermine the handling of details. 
21
 Of course, it is a controversial question whether Barth is a faithful interpreter of the tradition of the 
Church. My point here is, even if he is a faithful interpreter of Church tradition, this would not entitle him 
to read Church tradition back into Scripture itself. The problem would of course be exacerbated if (as has 
been claimed) he was also distorting the trDGLWLRQ RI &KXUFK GRJPD FI 3$YLV µ.DUO %DUWK 7KH
5HOXFWDQW9LUWXRVR¶Theology 86 (1983), pp 164-171.) 
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WUHDWPHQW RI WKH SUREOHPV LQYROYHG LQ %DUWK¶V DFWXDO H[HJHWLFDO SUDFWLFH +LV ZRUN LV LQ
SDUW D UHDFWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH WHQGHQF\ RI WKH µ<DOH VFKRRO¶ ZKLFK GRHV HPSKDVLVH %DUWK¶V
exegetical practice; Burnett consciously returns to the previous approach of emphasising 
%DUWK¶VJHQHUDOKHUPHQHXWLFDOVWDWHPHQWV:KHUHDV,EHOLHYHKHLVULJKWWRGRWKLVLWLVRQO\
natural that this approach does not lead him to consider the serious difficulties associated 
with the details RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV6HFRQGO\ , ILQGDVEHIRUH WKDW WKHUH LVQRDGHTXDWH
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ%DUWK¶VFRPPLWPHQW WR WKHPHDQLQJRI WKH WH[W
itself and his prior theological commitments. $QGVRDOWKRXJK,EHOLHYH%XUQHWW¶VVWXG\WR
be far more promising than previous studies, this by no means nullifies the need for the 
present study. 
 
I will now proceed to make some comments on the methodological procedure of this 
thesis. 
 
The Case Study: Christ and Adam 
 
As indicated in the title of my thesis, I have chosen to make use of a case study in the 
FRXUVHRIP\HQTXLU\LQWRWKHSUREOHPVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV)RUWKLV,KDYHFKRVHQ%DUWK¶V
short book Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5.22 The principal reason for 
P\FKRLFHLVWKDWWKLVERRNSURYLGHVDYLYLGH[DPSOHRI%DUWK¶VXQQDWXUDOH[HJHVLV- that is, 
of where Barth appears to impose his own dogmatic principles onto a text, whilst using 
arguments which lack even superficial plausibility.  
 
There are, of course, difficulties in employing such a narrow base to assess the nature of 
%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVDVVXFK3UHYLRXVVWXGLHVZKLFKKDYHPDGHXVHRILQVWDQFHVRIKLVDFWXDO
exegetical practice have used a broader base, although they also have been limited to the 
                                                        
22
 (Edinburgh/London: Oliver and Boyd, 1956). German original: Christus und Adam nach Röm 5: ein 
Beitrag zur Frage nach dem Menschen und der Menschheit, published in June 1952 by Evangelischer 
Verlag A.G. Zollikon-Zurich as No. 35 in the series Theologische Studien. The essay was later published 
by the same publisher in a second edition in 1964 together with another essay by Barth entitled Rudolf 
Bultmann: ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen. 
14 
 
PHUHVW IUDFWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHWLFDO PDWHULDO23 The reader may also observe that even 
within the scope of the small book Christ and Adam I have not made use of the full range 
of its contents, but have instead focused on what I believe to be the main thrust of the 
work - which of course limits the scope of my material even further. And so, in choosing 
such a narrow base, there is always the problem that my material may not be representative 
RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVJHQHUDOO\ 
 
On the other side, to state the obvious, the use of the case study is generally recognised to 
be an important aspect of research because it allows for a level of detailed enquiry which 
may be lost in a broader sweep of data. And also, with regard to my own line of enquiry, it 
LV P\ KRSH WKDW IRFXVLQJ RQ D SDUWLFXODU LQVWDQFH RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV ZLOO FKHFN DQ\
tendency to rest easy with a discovery of apparently fruitful general principles or general 
patterns of exegesis, and will lead us to consider the viability of BarWK¶VH[HJHVLVRI WKH
particular text under consideration (i.e. of Romans chapter 5). If we remain with a 
particular instance of exegesis, then we will have to be concerned with the seemingly 
intractable question of whether this exegesis is fruitful for an understanding of this text - 
and, if not, then why not? However, I would freely concede the limitations of my own 
approach, and would say that any results would need to be confirmed or modified through 
DEURDGHUVWXG\RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHWLFDOSUDFWLFH 
 
Another issue, more difficult to explain, is exactly how I relate this case study material to 
the theological question I have identified - that is, how do I relate the exegesis found in 
                                                        
23
 HJ )UHL .HOVH\ DQG )RUG KDYH FKLHIO\ PDGH XVH RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LQ &' ,9, DQG IROORZLQJ
0F*ODVVRQRIKLVH[HJHVLVLQ&',DQG,DQG&XQQLQJKDPVWXGLHG%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVRIWKHSURORJXHRI
John, and, in conneFWLRQ ZLWK WKLV RI (SKHVLDQV  $Q LPSRUWDQW H[FHSWLRQ KRZHYHU LV &%D[WHU¶V
statistical study which aims to cover the entire Dogmatics µ%DUWK - $ 7UXO\ %LEOLFDO 7KHRORJLDQ"¶
Tyndale Bulletin 38 (1987), pp 3-27; also µ7KH0RYHPHQWIURP([HJHVLVWR'ogmatics in the Theology of 
.DUO%DUWK¶3K'GLVVHUWDWLRQ8QLYHUVLW\RI'XUKDP$VDFRPPHQWRQ%D[WHU¶VVWXG\,ZRXOGVD\
WKDWKHUVWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VLVVHHPVWRKLJKOLJKWWKHSUREOHPRI%DUWK¶VXQQDWXUDOH[HJHVLVLQWKDWLWVKRZV
how his biblical interpretation is characterised by a dogmatically motivated selectivity. However, Baxter 
does not draw from this the natural conclusion that Barth did not base his theology on the Bible and hence 
was not a biblical theologian. Against the evident force oI KHU UHVXOWV VKH GUDZV DWWHQWLRQ WR %DUWK¶V
µLQWHQWLRQ¶WREHELEOLFDODQGDOVRKLVIDOOLELOLW\DVDKXPDQEHLQJ - which do not seem to me to be strong 
DUJXPHQWVµ%DUWK- $7UXO\%LEOLFDO7KHRORJLDQ"¶S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Christ and Adam WRWKHµVXEMHFWREMHFW¶SUREOHP",WPD\EHH[SHFWHGWKDW,would relate 
the question of the subject/object relation to the method RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV DQG \HW
readers will find that I relate it directly to the content (or conclusionsRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV
This requires further elaboration. 
 
7KHµPHWKRG¶RI%DUWK¶V exegesis denotes, of course, the means by which he comes to his 
H[HJHWLFDOFRQFOXVLRQVRUWRKLVYLHZRI3DXO¶VPHDQLQJWKHµFRQWHQW¶RQWKHRWKHUKDQG
GHQRWHVWKHFRQFOXVLRQVWKHPVHOYHVLH%DUWK¶VYLHZRUVWDWHPHQWRIZKDW3DXO¶VPHDQLQJ
actually waV 1RZ LW PD\ EH H[SHFWHG WKDW , PDNH D VWXG\ RI %DUWK¶V YLHZ RI WKH
VXEMHFWREMHFW UHODWLRQ LQ RUGHU WR DWWDLQ D GHHSHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHWLFDO
method, which method would then be exemplified in Christ and Adam. For is not the 
subject/object relation in essence the question of how we attain objectivity, which is surely 
D TXHVWLRQ RI PHWKRG" +RZHYHU LW ZLOO EH VHHQ WKDW , UHODWH %DUWK¶V YLHZ DERXW WKH
subject/object relation not to his method but directly to the content or conclusions of his 
exegesis - i.e. directly to his own statement of what Paul (supposedly) meant. This will 
PHDQWKDWWKHTXHVWLRQRI%DUWK¶VPHWKRG- the question of how he moves from the text to 
KLVYLHZRIWKHWH[W¶VPHDQLQJ- seems to be passed over. But does this not mean that we 
DUHSDVVLQJRYHUWKHZKROHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLVDYLDEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
of the text in front of us?  
 
There is, however, a specific reason for my approach, as I will now seek to explain. The 
IDFW LV D FRPSDULVRQ EHWZHHQ%DUWK¶V interpretation and the evident meaning of the text 
will disclose that he is indeed reading into the text a pre-formed theological content. The 
PDLQ FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LV QRW DQ\WKLQJ ZH ZRXOG UHFRJQLVHDV µPHWKRG¶
but rather is a determination to read the text in terms of a particular content; and so, it is 
this content rather than the method which is the proper focus of any study of his exegesis.  
 
I would actually agree with McCormack that when Barth reads Scripture in terms of this 
pre-given theological content, this is in response to the problem of the subjectivism 
concealed within historical criticism. But precisely this leads to my fundamental question   
- why does Barth think that he can counter a hidden subjectivism with what seems so  
much like a deliberate and conscious subjectivist assertion of Christian (or Barthian)   
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faith? The present thesis is based on the idea that if we examine this pre-given theological 
content within the framework of a more flexible and concrete account of the subject/object 
SUREOHPWKHQZHZLOOUHOHDVHVRPHRIWKHXQEHDUDEOHWHQVLRQWKDWH[LVWVEHWZHHQ%DUWK¶V
exegesis and contemporary critical exegesis - not to mention the tension with sheer 
common sense. And perhaps, instead of remaining with this rather modest and defensive 
DLP ZH ZLOO EH DEOH WR JOHDQ VRPH FRQVWUXFWLYH LQVLJKWV IURP %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV IRU
contemporary critical study of Scripture. But our starting point will have to be with the 
fact that Barth does read into individual scriptural texts prior dogmatic principles which, 
by means of any recognisable method, are not to be found in the texts themselves. It is only 
through a study of these prior dogmatic principles and their relation to the modern ideal of 
objectivity that we can ask serious questions about why Barth expects such a patently 
eisegetical procedure to be conducive to real objectivity, that is, to clearing away the 
QRUPDOVXEMHFWLYLVWEDUULHUVZKLFKEORFNWKHZD\WRWKHµUHDO¶PHDQLQJDQGPHVVDJHRIWKH
Scriptures.  
 
If this account of my approach appears too abstract, or, alternatively, if it seems to give a 
rather negative response to my enquiry before I have even begun, then I hope that the 
structure and aim of my argument will become clearer as it unfolds in subsequent chapters. 
 
In the meantime, I will turn to the other major methodological issue which I believe 
UHTXLUHVVRPHUHIOHFWLRQQDPHO\WKHGLIILFXOWVXEMHFWRIWKHXQLW\RI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ 
 
7KHDVVXPSWLRQRIWKHXQLW\RI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ 
 
If, as I have said, my startinJ SRLQW LV QRW ZLWK %DUWK¶V H[HJHWLFDO PHWKRG EXW ZLWK WKH
dogmatic or theological principles which he incorporates into his exegesis, then this   
PHDQV WKDW , ZLOO EH VHWWLQJ %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LQ WKH EURader context of his theology as  
such. Therefore, I will need to take up a position on what his theological approach  
DFWXDOO\ LV , DP PHQWLRQLQJ WKLV KHUH EHFDXVH P\ DSSURDFK WR %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ PD\ 
appear to be rather naïve, in that I seem to make the assumSWLRQWKDW%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\FDQ 
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be understood as the outworking or implementation of a single or basic principle. And 
precisely this seems to be contrary to current Barthian orthodoxy. 
 
)RU H[DPSOH %UXFH 0DUVKDOO ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR D FHUWDLQ µFDXVWLF¶ UHPDUN RI (EHUKDUG
Jüngel, comments as follows on Barth: 
 
Few theological writers of any period resist independent attempts critically and informatively to 
state the logic of their actual procedure quite as effectively as does Barth. This relative intractability 
to fruitful analysis makes an exceptionally daunting and perhaps misguided enterprise of the project 
of finding a Konstruktionsprinzip, a systematic or methodological principle or concept which 
governs the whole in all of its parts.24 
 
Marshall takes this as an occasion for a disclaimer - i.e. for a statement of the limitations 
of his own enquiry, in that his specific conclusion does not involve any claim to have found 
the Konstruktionsprinzip RI%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\DVVXFK/DWHURQ*+XQVLQJHUZRXOGWDNH
up the same question, but in a less defensive way. Hunsinger claims that studies previous 
to his can be divided into two types: those which attempt to find a single 
Konstruktionsprinzip IRU%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\DQG WKRVHZKLFKDGRSW WKH loci approach, i.e. 
which focus on a series of disparate themes without making any significant attempt to find 
an underlying unity. Hunsinger finds both approaches unsatisfactory, and advocates a 
PLGGOH ZD\ ZKHUHE\ KH RXWOLQHV D QXPEHU RI GLVWLQFWLYH µPRWLIV¶ ZKLFK DUH WR EH IRXQG
WKURXJKRXW %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ RU DW OHDVW Whroughout the Church Dogmatics) but which 
FDQQRW EH UHGXFHG WR D VLQJOH XQLWDU\ SULQFLSOH +XQVLQJHU¶V JHQHUDO DSSURDFK WRJHWKHU
with his individual insights about the nature of these motifs, generates an especially 
constructive and fruitful exposition oI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\25 
 
                                                        
24
 Bruce Marshall, Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour in Rahner and Barth (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1987), p 116 - referring to Jüngel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, p 14. (Jüngel writes: 
µ«%DUWK VFKRODUVKLS - and here I include everything that passes for Barth scholarship - is particularly 
concerned to reduce the extraordinary wealth of his theology to a few meager structural principles 
[=Konstruktionsprinzipien], so that his theology may be totally circumscribed and then commended or 
UHIXWHG¶ 
25
 G.Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, pp 3-4. 
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,QYLHZRIWKLVUHFHLYHGZLVGRPZLWKUHJDUGWR%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\LWQRGRXEWZLOODSSHDUDW
the very least retrogressive if I start talking about a single or basic insight which underlies 
it. I certainly have no wish to go against these more sophisticated readings of Barth which 
have sought to transcend simplistic readings and to do justice to the complexity and 
subtlety of his thought. Above all, I have no wish to disavow my own dependence on 
them. However, I am by no means convinced that it is so misguided to search for a basic, 
XQLI\LQJSULQFLSOHEHKLQG%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ - although it is certainly foolhardy to claim to 
have discovered such a principle once and for all. 
 
3HUKDSVWKHPRVWFRQFUHWHUHDVRQZK\%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\LVDOOHJHGOy not to be reduced to a 
single, overarching principle is that his theology represents an attempt to subordinate all 
general principles to the highly particular self-revelation of God in Christ. This also means 
that, according to Barth, theology must remain specifically theological, and that it must 
not be answerable to any general or (put another way) to any philosophical principles.  
 
,W LV RQ WKH ODVW SRLQW ZKHUH , EHOLHYH , PXVW GHPXU 0\ RZQ DUJXPHQW LV WKDW %DUWK¶V
theology can be understood as an outworking of a basic philosophical principle, and, 
FRQYHUVHO\ WKDW WKHSULQFLSOHXQGHUO\LQJ WKHHPHUJHQFHRI%DUWK¶VGLVWLQFWLYH WKHRORJ\ LV
not specifically theological. 
 
To speak in more general terms, my own understanding of the nature of theology is as 
follows: it is, at least in principle, the mediation between philosophy and religious belief. 
Christian theology is, accordingly, the mediation between philosophy and Christian faith. 
By philosophy I mean the investigation of the general epistemological principles which 
underlie the various branches and forms of human knowledge and activity. The task of the 
academic discipline of (Christian) theology is to subject Christian belief to the rigours of 
philosophical enquiry and philosophical criticism. And because philosophy mediates 
between the various forms of human knowledge, then theology brings Christian belief into 
connection with other branches of human knowledge, such as history, psychology, 
anthropology, ethics, etc. 
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It will quite naturally be objected that this definition of theology is diametrically opposed 
WR %DUWK¶V RZQ26 Barth argued, especially in his dispute with Bultmann, that theology 
must not have a fixed relation to any philosophical position.27 How can I possibly claim, 
WKHQWKDW%DUWK¶VWKHology represents the outworking of a specific philosophical principle 
or insight? 
 
I fully recognise that on a verbal or formal level such criticism is justified, and I do not 
wish to underestimate the significance of this. However, I am convinced that no author can 
be understood if we confine ourselves to a repetition or summary of the forms of his 
expressions. Precisely in order to understand an author, we must be prepared to take the 
risk of expressing ourselves differently from him, even to the point of appearing to 
contradict him. To achieve this, we must look behind the form of words to their function 
and scope. 
 
1RZ%DUWKFOHDUO\XQGHUVWRRGDµSRVLWLYH¶UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHRORJ\DQGSKLORVRSK\
to imply a systematic accommodation of the specifically Christian proclamation to the 
cultural climate of a given society. I believe this is because he understood philosophy as 
the expression of the culture in which it arises. In his mind, to insist on a positive 
relationship between theology and philosophy would mean that the corresponding 
Christian proclamation would be unable to stand over against the current cultural climate, 
but, on the contrary, would be condemned to reinforce the cultural situation to which it 
addressed itself.28 
                                                        
26
 e.g. CD I/1, p 6.  
27
 6HH HVSHFLDOO\ %DUWK¶V OHWWHU WR %XOWPDQQ GDWHG th December 1952 (Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann 
Letters 1922-1966 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), p 105.) 
28
 cf The parallel formulations in Barth, The Christian Life: Church Dogmatics  IV/4, Lecture Fragments 
(GLQEXUJK7	7&ODUNS µ7KHFKXUFK LQGHIHFW LV WKHFKXUFKZKLFK ORRNVDQ[LRXVO\ WRLWV
Lord but even more anxiously to everything else; which painfully compares itself to the world; which for 
this reason seeks possible points of contact from or to it, which is intent on bridges from the one place to 
WKHRWKHU7KH IDYRULWHZRUGRI WKLVFKXUFKLVWKHOLWWOHZRUG³DQG´«LQVXFKH[SUHVVLRQVDV³UHYHODWLRQ
DQGUHDVRQ´³FKXUFKDQGFXOWXUH´³JRVSHODQGVWDWH´³%LEOHDQGVFLHQFH´³WKHRORJ\DQGSKLORVRSK\´¶,Q
subsequent chapters I will seek to show how deep-URRWHG LQ%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LVKLVFRQFHUQ WKDWFKXUFK
proclamation should not accommodate itself to the prevailing culture. 
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But - the question is - what if the scope of philosophy were broadened to include as 
essential a principle or principles of counter-cultural criticism? Would this perhaps make a 
difference to the way we understand the relationship between theology and philosophy in 
Barth, even if - or precisely because - we remain materially faithful to his thought?  
 
These are only preliminary remarks, and are certainly not intended to lay the foundation for 
P\ SURSRVHG UHYLVLRQ RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKHRORJ\ DQG SKLORVRSK\ LQ %DUWK¶V
thought. What I mean and intend by this must be gathered not from my preliminary 
comments here, but from the more detailed arguments in the main body of my thesis. But 
KHUH , ZRXOG VD\ WKDW , ZLOO QRW EH XQGHUVWRRG DW DOO LI , DP WDNHQ WRPHDQ WKDW%DUWK¶V
concept of the relation between theology and philosophy was a mere function or 
epiphenomenon of his need to criticise certain elements of contemporary culture. That 
would be a reductionist and pragmatist account of his purposes, which I do not intend. 
%DUWK¶s criticism extends specifically to the underlying thought forms of cultural and 
theological discourse, and cannot be understood in terms of pragmatic, external counter-
cultural or political principles. But again, subsequent chapters must give a more concrete 
account of my meaning here. 
 
It may well be asked whether it is wise to raise such drastic and unorthodox questions 
DERXW WKHQDWXUHRI%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ZLWKLQ WKH VFRSHRID WKHVLVZKLFKLVDIWHUDOORQO\
DERXW %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV +RZHYHU , GR QRW WKLQN WKDW %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV VKRXOG EH
XQGHUVWRRG DV RQO\ RQH SDUW RU DVSHFW RI KLV WKHRORJ\ 7KH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW RI %DUWK¶V
distinctive theological approach was, in its own terms, intended to be a concerted and fresh 
turn to the Scriptures. Given that this is the case, then the fact that his theological positions 
do not seem to correspond to the meaning and content of the biblical texts to which they 
are related should surely be regarded as the most urgent question about his theology which 
we can ask. Put another way: if his theology was meant to be grounded in a turn to the 
Scriptures, then we are asking fundamental questions about the nature of his theology as 
such when we address ourselves to the question of what this turn to the Scriptures actually 
involved. 
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On the other hand, there may be those, coming as it were from the opposite direction, who 
ZRXOG DVN ZKHWKHU LW LV EHVLGH WKH SRLQW WR LQYHVWLJDWH WKH YLDELOLW\ RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV
7KDW LV IRU VRPH LW PD\ EH WKRXJKW LUUHOHYDQW ZKHWKHU %DUWK¶V WKHRORJLFal position 
represents a viable interpretation of Scripture, because this would leave unanswered the 
more fundamental question as to whether a renewed focus on Scripture is itself justified. 
The point is that even if %DUWK¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI 6FULSWXUH LV generally or even entirely 
correct, nevertheless this would not answer the more fundamental question of the truth 
and/or relevance of Scripture as such. Such criticisms assume (correctly in my view) that 
today we can no longer take for granted the traditional Protestant principles of the finality 
and sufficiency of Scripture. In response to this, I cannot emphasise too strongly that this 
thesis is meant to provide an enquiry into this kind of question also. The question of what 
LV LQYROYHG LQ %DUWK¶V WKHRORgy necessary includes - not incidentally, but fundamentally - 
the question of why Barth thought it necessary to turn to the Scripture in the historical and 
YRFDWLRQDOVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKKHIRXQGKLPVHOI0\IRFXVRQ%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVVKRXOGQRWLQ
the least EH WDNHQ WR PHDQ D µEUDFNHWLQJ RXW¶ RI TXHVWLRQV DERXW %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ DQG
thought as a whole.29 
 
A final comment I feel is required before I draw my introduction to a close. As may have 
in some part become apparent, the purpose of my research is not to question whether 
SUHYLRXV DXWKRUV KDYH SRUWUD\HG WKH FRQWHQW RI %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ DFFXUDWHO\ ,Q RWKHU
words, this is not primarily an exercise in historical theology, however much I will seek to 
SXW %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LQ LWV KLVWRULFDO FRQWH[W ,Q VR IDU DV , do make use of historical 
theology, I am happy to acknowledge my dependence on previous writers, especially 
McCormack and Burnett. My difficulty with previous writers (and the corresponding 
originality of my own approach) is not to be found in their portrD\DORI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\DV
such, but rather in their failure to ask the decisive critical questions about it, and their 
corresponding failure to test his theology and to seek to understand it in terms of those 
critical questions. On the other side, it will become apparent that my method does not 
entail taking up a critical position with regard to Barth himself, still less to suggest 
                                                        
29
 I think that the writers I have mentioned so far who criticise Barth for his unnatural exegesis themselves 
FRPHIURPWKLVµRSSRVLWHGLUHFWLRQ¶WKDWLVWKH\KROGWRWKHSRVLWLRQWKDWDQH[FOXVLYHIRFXVRQ6FULSWXUHLV
PLVJXLGHG DQG LQDGHTXDWH DQG VR PDNH XVH RI %DUWK¶V XQQDWXUDO H[HJHVLV Ds an additional argument 
against his turn to the Scripture. 
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improvements or emendations to his theology. I have consciously resisted the temptation 
to criticise Barth himself, and have made the assumption that his theology is adequate to 
answer the critical questions which I place to it - ZKLFK,EHOLHYHFRUUHVSRQGVWR%DUWK¶V
own approach to Paul (i.e. in his early Romans commentary).30 But also - as is the case 
ZLWK%DUWK¶VDSSURDFKWRPaul - my approach has the disadvantage that it may be difficult 
to see where Barth ends and my own position begins. 
 
But I still believe mine to be the most constructive approach in studying a theologian and 
thinker as nuanced and complex as Barth (as is also the case with other great thinkers). I 
believe that the best path towards a constructive understanding of him is found neither 
through a descriptive, historical approach, nor through an external, critical approach. To 
explain this further - a purely descriptive approach always leaves me asking certain critical 
questions about how Barth's theology can possibly be valid at such and such a point; and 
yet when any writer directly criticises Barth, I am always left wondering whether we could 
not explore further ways of defending his theology on the apparently vulnerable issue. This 
is why I have sought the middle path, of seeking to ask the decisive questions seemingly 
ignored or inadequately addressed by others, whilst at the same time exploring ways of 
defHQGLQJ %DUWK¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKHVH TXHVWLRQV ,W ZLOO EH VHHQ WKDW LQ WKHVH
H[SORUDWLRQV,ZLOOUHODWH%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\WRLGHDVQRWH[SOLFLWO\H[SUHVVHGLQKLVWKHRORJ\
as such, but I cling to the hope that this will deepen our understanding of his theology, in 
spite of the risk of confusing his theology with alien criteria. 
 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, I believe that what is called for in understanding the 
SUREOHPVRI%DUWK¶VXQQDWXUDOH[HJHVLV LVD UHQHZHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI WKHSUREOHP of the 
subject/object relation in his theology, and it is to this I now turn in my second chapter. 
                                                        
30
 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (London: Oxford University Press, 1933). The relevant details of 
%DUWK¶VDSSURDFKWR3DXOZLOOHPHUJHLQP\IRXUWKFKDSWHUEHORZ 
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Chapter Two  
+XPDQLW\DQGWKH6XEMHFW2EMHFW5HODWLRQLQ%DUWK¶V7KHRORJ\ 
 
Most studies of Barth will at some crucial point bring in the question of the subject-object 
relation in his theology. Instead of seeking to provide a detailed review of how others have 
approached this, it will be adequate to my purposes and quite possibly clearer if I simply 
state the basis and origin of my own concern. And my own coQFHUQ UHJDUGLQJ %DUWK¶V
general position on the subject/object relation is most clearly expressed by W. Pannenberg 
LQ KLV FULWLFLVP RI %DUWK DQG KLV µVFKRRO¶ +HQFH , ZLOO EHJLQ ZLWK D VXPPDU\ RI WKLV
FULWLFLVPDVODLGRXWLQ3DQQHQEHUJ¶VTheology and the Philosophy of Science. 
 
,Q HVVHQFH 3DQQHQEHUJ¶V FULWLFLVP LV VLPSOH %DUWK DVVXPHV ZLWKRXW DUJXPHQW WKH WUXWK
and validity of the Christian revelation, without allowing for any generally intelligible 
criteria for establishing this truth or for discussing it as a truth claim. Pannenberg notes 
that Barth understands his procedure to entail genuine objectivity, in that he (Barth) 
believes that he is conducting his enquiry in a way which is appropriate to the object 
concerned. For the object of theology is God¶VVHOI-revelation in Christ, which (according 
to Barth) must not be determined by the conditions laid down by the human subject, for 
this would cause the divine object to be compromised by the conditions laid down by the 
µQDWXUDOVLQIXOPDQ¶3DQQHQEHUJ QRWHV%DUWK¶VFRQFHUQEXWQHYHUWKHOHVVFODLPVWKDWWKLV
leaves Christian theology with nothing but a sheer, irrational assertion for its basis. In other 
ZRUGV%DUWK¶VDWWHPSWDWJHQXLQHREMHFWLYLW\HQGVXSLQVKHHUVXEMHFWLYLVP1 
                                                        
1
 µ:KHQWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKHROogy is left to a venture [of faith] in this way, not only is its scientific status 
endangered, but also the priority of God and his revelation over human beings, on which, for Barth, 
HYHU\WKLQJ UHVWV %DUWK¶V XQPHGLDWHG VWDUWLQJ SRLQW IURP*RGDQGKLV UHYHaling word turns out to be no 
more than an unfounded postulate of theological consciousness. Barth rightly rejects the reduction of the 
subject-PDWWHURIWKHRORJ\WRKXPDQUHOLJLRXVFRQVFLRXVQHVVEXW«%DUWK¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHREHGLHQFHRI
faith as a ventXUHVKRZV«WKDWDSRVLWLYHWKHRU\RIUHYHODWLRQQRWRQO\LVQRWDQDOWHUQDWLYHWRVXEMHFWLYLVP
LQ WKHRORJ\EXW LV LQ IDFW WKH IXUWKHVWH[WUHPHRIVXEMHFWLYLVPPDGHLQWRDWKHRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQ«%DUWK¶V
DSSDUHQWO\VRORIW\REMHFWLYLW\DERXW*RGDQG*RG¶VZRUG turns out to rest on no more than the irrational 
VXEMHFWLYLW\ RI D YHQWXUH RI IDLWK ZLWK QR MXVWLILFDWLRQ RXWVLGH LWVHOI¶ 3DQQHQEHUJ Theology and the 
Philosophy of Science, pp 272-3.) Earlier in the same book, Pannenberg discusses the views of H.Diem (a 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI%DUWK¶VµVFKRRO¶'LHP¶VYLHZLVWKDWWKHRORJ\VKRXOGQRWEHVXEMHFWWRJHQHUDOFULWHULDRI
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My own view is that there can be no question that Pannenberg has a legitimate concern 
here; however, I am not convinced that Barth thereby stands refuted, and - as suggested in 
my previous chapter - I would rather pursue means of exploring the question further in 
relation to BaUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LQSUHIHUHQFH WR VLPSO\GLVPLVVLQJKLPDQGFRQVWUXFWLQJP\
own alternative. Thus I will now attempt to provide a detailed but at the same time 
straightforward and basic account of the problem of subjectivity and objectivity. This will 
enable us to examine more precisely why %DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\RIUHYHODWLRQDSSHDUVDVVKHHU
subjectivism to modern thought (as represented here by Pannenberg). As stated in my first 
chapter, my aim in doing this is to analyse what is meant by objective exegesis, but I am 
adopting the method of looking at the broader question first, so that we may afterwards 
look at the specific question in the light of these more general reflections. 
 
The subject/object relation in modern thought as established by Descartes 
 
We may begin with the following observation. It would seem that in order to be truly 
objective, we must first attain an awareness of the limits of our own subjectivity, and must 
first establish our subjective capacities, before we can attain to true objectivity. How do I 
know I am not influenced by my own subjective prejudices when I believe I am being 
objective? I know that there are things which seem to me to be obviously true, but which 
to other people seem to be less obvious or simply false. Clearly, this affects us in the area 
of religion. My religious experiences, which seem to me to establish beyond doubt the 
reality of God, often do not seem to have much effect when I try to share them with other 
people. My arguments for the existence of God and the truth of the Christian revelation, 
which I find ever so convincing, do not seem so convincing to other people. In order to 
attain to certainty, I have to reflect on the possibility that I am prejudiced, that what seems 
to me to be a direct grasp of the object may be partly due to the specific conditions and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
VFLHQWLILF GLVFXVVLRQ µEHFDXVH WKH RWKHU VFLHQFHV DFFHSW WKH DVVXPSWLRQV RI ³QDWXUDO´ LH VLQIXO PDQ¶
Pannenberg questions Diem on the folloZLQJJURXQGVµ:KDWPHDQVKDVWKHRORJ\RIMXVWLI\LQJLWVFODLPWR
be automatically in a different and privileged position when the truth of its statements is challenged? Any 
such claim can be no more than an empty assertion. Even if claims of this sort are made on the theological 
side with disarming innocence, it is understandable, to say no more, if in other quarters they give the 
impression of immense arrogance on the part of a discipline which can ultimately, as a discipline, be no 
PRUHWKDQKXPDQ¶S9.) 
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context of my subjectivity - maybe I think in a certain way because of my background, my 
circumstances, my characteristic vices or weaknesses and so on. 
 
Of course this does not mean that I cannot attain certainty in my own beliefs, and must 
UHPDLQIRUHYHULQGRXEW,PD\FRQFOXGHDIWHUUHIOHFWLRQWKDWLWLVQRW,EXWµRWKHUSHRSOH¶
who are prejudiced; or, better, I may modify my own beliefs in the light of the experiences 
and opinions of other people. I may hope to return the favour and cause them to reflect on 
their prejudices and to modify their beliefs. In this way I can attain to a better 
understanding of my own limitations and prejudices as a thinking subject, through the help 
of other people, and thus learn to make a distinction between where I have really grasped 
the object in its own nature and where I have imposed my own subjective impressions or 
prejudices on the object. 
 
Now, I understand that this way of thinking has not been obvious to all people of all times, 
but - at least supposedly - has its historical roots in the thought and influence of René 
'HVFDUWHVLQVRIDUDVKHLVFUHGLWHGZLWKEHLQJWKHµIDWKHURIPRGHUQSKLORVRSK\¶RUHYHQ
WKH µIDWKHU RI PRGHUQ WKRXJKW¶ 2I FRXUVH LW LV KLVWRULFDOOy questionable whether one 
thinker should be credited with so much epochal influence. It is highly probable, in 
principle, that Descartes was at most one amongst other contributors to the emergence of 
modern thought (assuming, of course, that there is such D WKLQJ DV µPRGHUQ WKRXJKW¶
)XUWKHU 'HVFDUWHV KLPVHOI PD\ EH OHVV µPRGHUQ¶ WKDQ LV QRUPDOO\ VXSSRVHG DQG KLV
reputation of being the father of modern thought may rest on later developments being 
read back into his writings.2 More serious than this, however, is the possibility that 
'HVFDUWHV¶ UHSXWDWLRQ DV EHLQJ WKH IDWKHU RI PRGHUQ WKRXJKW LV LWVHOI FRQQHFWHG ZLWK D
misunderstanding of the nature of modern thought, and that there are other figures or 
movements which are different or even antithetical to Descartes but which are no less 
significant for understanding the nature of modern thought. However, in spite of these 
reservations, I will proceed by employing as at least a heuristic or provisional principle that 
                                                        
2
 cf S.Gaukroger, Descartes: an Intellectual Biography 2[IRUG&ODUHQGRQ3UHVVSµ$OWKRXJK
WKH LGHD RI 'HVFDUWHV DV WKH ³IDWKHU RI PRGHUQ SKLORVRSK\´ LV , VXVSHFW RQH WKDW KDV LWV RULJLQV LQ
nineteenth century historiography of philosophy, it is undeniable that he has had a pivotal role in 
philosophical thinking since the middle of the seventeenth century. This pivotal role arises, however, at 
least in part as a result of various kinds of philosophical or other investments that later thinkers and 
WHDFKHUVKDYHPDGHLQKLP¶ 
26 
 
Descartes can be understood as supremely representative of the main characteristics of 
ZKDWPD\IRUWKHVDNHRIDUJXPHQWEHWHUPHGµPRGHUQWKRXJKW¶3 
 
As I see it, Descartes promoted a concept of truth and rationality grounded in what is 
generally and universally accessible; his epistemology was based on that which is evident 
and clear to all people.4 He was strongly opposed to scholastic speculation, which was 
based on ideas which were interesting because of their complexity and subtlety, but which 
were unlikely to be true because they had lost touch with that which is known with 
                                                        
3
 7KH PRVW FRQILGHQW VWDWHPHQW RI 'HVFDUWHV¶ UHODWLRQ WR PRGHUQ WKRXJKW , KDYH IRXQG LV FRQWDLQHG LQ
$OEHUW %DO]¶ LQWURGXFWLRQ WR KLV ZRUN HQWLWOHG Descartes and the Modern Mind (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1952). µ7KH PLQG RI 'HVFDUWHV UHSUHVHQWV WKH PLQG RI DQ DJH ,I WKHQ 'HVFDUWHV EH
rightly described as the father of modern philosophy, he can be described with equal right as the father of 
PRGHUQLW\ +RZHYHU GHIHFWLYH KLV ³ILUVW´ SKLORVRSK\ KRZHYHU YDLQ KLV passion for certainty, however 
mistaken or inadequately formulated his scientific hypotheses, and, finally, however incomplete his 
concepts of method and of the metaphysical foundations of science, Descartes remains in spirit, in 
prophetic insight, and in generous ideality the father of the modern mind. It may be urged that there were 
many founding fathers. Let this be conceded. Nevertheless, in the perspective of three centuries, Descartes 
LVVHHQDVILUVWDPRQJHTXDOV¶SYLLL:KDWVWULNHVPHKHUHLVQot only the impression of historiographical 
naïveté about Descartes himself but also the implicitly laudatory view of the nature of modern (presumably 
Western European-Northern American) civilisation. My own use of Descartes, in which I provisionally 
accept the designation of him as the father of modern thought, is intended very differently. I intend to 
highlight a persistent question about the self-XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPRGHUQWKRXJKWYL]µREMHFWLYLW\¶DQGWKH
associated problems of this self-understanding. 
4
 -DPHV&/LYLQJVWRQLQKLVKLVWRU\RIPRGHUQ&KULVWLDQWKRXJKWGHILQHVWKHµ&DUWHVLDQ¶(QOLJKWHQPHQW
LQ VWDQGDUG WHUPV DV IROORZV µ0RUH WKDQ DQ\WKLQJ HOVH WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW PDUNV D UHYROW DJDLQVW
authoritarianism and the emergence of individual reason and conscience as the primary arbiter of truth 
DQG DFWLRQ¶ Modern Christian Thought Volume One: The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century 
8SSHU 6DGGOH 5LYHU 1HZ -HUVH\ 3UHQWLFH +DOO  S  /LYLQJVWRQ QRWHV WKDW µWKH >HLJKWHHQWK
century] philosophes « ORRNHG WR WKH UDWLRQDOLVW 'HVFDUWHV DV WKHRQHZKRKDG OLEHUDWHG WKHPLQG IURP
EOLQG DXWKRULW\¶ S  +RZHYHU ZKHQ , UHDG 'HVFDUWHV ZKDW VWULNHV PH LV QRW VR PXFK WKH LVVXH RI
µDXWRQRPRXVUHDVRQ¶EXWWKDWLQKLVYLHZDFDSDFLW\IRUWUXWKLVLQ the hands of each and every individual. 
'HVFDUWHV¶ IDPRXV µ'LVFRXUVH RQ WKH 0HWKRG¶ RSHQV ZLWK WKH IRXQGDWLRQDO SULQFLSOH WKDW µWKH SRZHU RI
judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false - ZKLFKLVZKDWZHSURSHUO\FDOO³JRRGVHQVH´RU
³UHDVRQ´ - LV QDWXUDOO\ HTXDO LQ DOO PHQ DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\«WKH GLYHUVLW\ RI RXURSLQLRQVGRHVQRWDULVH
because some of us are more reasonable than others but solely because we direct our thoughts along 
GLIIHUHQW SDWKV DQG GR QRW DWWHQG WR WKH VDPH WKLQJV¶ µ'LVFRXUVH RQ WKH 0HWKRG¶ 3DUW 2QH LQ The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume I  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p 111.) 
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certainty. To put it another way, something which is fascinating to a highly intelligent 
SHUVRQ LV QRW IRU WKDW UHDVRQ WR EH KHOG DV WUXH $QG \HW LQ 'HVFDUWHV¶ RZQ GD\ PDQ\
µOHDUQHG¶SHRSOHRI WKHWKHRORJLFDOIDFXOWies found doctrines very convincing for precisely 
that reason. In place of this, he proposed that we should restrict truth to that which is clear 
or practically demonstrable to all.5 
 
Of course, Descartes had to cope with the fact that all people did not agree on those basic 
SULQFLSOHV ZKLFK KH ZLVKHG WR FODLP DV µFOHDU DQG GLVWLQFW LGHDV¶ 7KLV KH DWWULEXWHG WR
prejudice - i.e. reason could be perverted by being obstinately attached to a given tradition 
of thought. Thus an essential part of his work was to seek to abolish prejudice in principle 
- to start from ideas which are clear and simple to each and every human mind, and to 
develop complex ideas only by clear lines of reasoning from such simple ideas.6 
 
At this point we can see how he related his contention to the subject/object relation at its 
most basic level - i.e. on the level of sense perception. According to traditional 
$ULVWRWHOLDQRQWRORJ\REMHFWVZKLFKDUHSHUFHLYHGWKURXJKWKHVHQVHVDUHSHUFHLYHGµDV
WKH\ UHDOO\ DUH¶ $ULVWRWOH KHOG WKDW Whe sensations or sense perceptions which we 
H[SHULHQFHDUHµFRSLHV¶RIWKHDFWXDOREMHFWVZHSHUFHLYHDQGKHQFHWKHUHLVDIXQGDPHQWDO
continuity between our subjective perceptions and the objects of our perception.7 
 
Descartes labelled this sense prejudice. He argued that our perceptions are not copies of 
the objects we perceive, but rather representations of what we perceive. Hence we do not 
perceive things as they really are. For although there is a genuine relation between our 
perceptions and the objects of our perception, it is a relation established by the reasoning 
mind rather than a relation directly imposed on the experiencing subject by the objects 
                                                        
5
 See H.Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity (New Haven/London: Yale University, 1973), pp 35f; Descartes, 
µ'LVFRXUVHRQWKH0HWKRG¶3DUW2QHSSI 
6
 Caton, The Origin of SubjectivityS'HVFDUWHVµ'LVFRXUVHRQWKH0HWKRG¶3DUW7ZRS 
7
 Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity, p 77. 
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themselves. This is the ontological gap between the subject and object in Cartesian 
thought.8 
 
How does this relate to the rather more complex issue of the object of religious worship 
and experience? 
 
Descartes himself understood God as the principle which guarantees the relation or 
continuity between the perceived object and the subjective impression of the object.9 
+RZHYHULWPXVWEHVDLGWKDWWKLVµSURRIRI*RG¶KDVQRWSRVVHVVHGWKHVDPHLQIOXHQFHDV
more general Cartesian ideas. Ultimately, we see his influence in the fact that a religion can 
now be studied as a human phenomenon of religion. A scientific study of any religion, 
including Christianity, is now held to involve a suspension of judgement regarding its truth 
claims. What we experience or believe about God is - like immediate sense impressions - 
merely a representation of God, and has not been directly imposed on our experience by 
God himself. If we assume that God is simply as we experience him, then this is the mark 
of prejudice. Indeed, the very reality or existence of God must from henceforth be held as 
only one among other possibilities as an explanation of our (apparent) experience of God. 
 
How, then, do we proceed to test or demonstrate the truth of our own religious experience 
or traditions, along Cartesian lines? As I have mentioned above, Descartes underlined the 
principle that we should only hold as true that which is clear and/or demonstrable to all. 
And so we come back to my earlier point, that today we tend to feel that we must seek to 
liberate ourselves from personal prejudice through an openness to other people, to people 
generaOO\RUWRµDOOSHRSOH¶%XWYHU\TXLFNO\ZHVHHDGLIIHUHQFHIURP'HVFDUWHV¶RULJLQDO
vision developing. Especially in questions of religious truth claims, it becomes apparent 
that the basic principle needs to be applied more flexibly, and we cannot make a simple 
appeal to that which is immediately clear or immediately demonstrable to all. We can retain 
the general principle that truth must be generally and universally accessible. But in  
                                                        
8
 Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity, pp 76, 81-2, 85; 'HVFDUWHVµ0HGLWDWLRQVRQ)LUVW3KLORVRSK\¶7KLUG
Meditation) in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), p 27. 
9
 Caton, The Origin of Subjectivity, S'HVFDUWHVµ'LVFRXUVHRQWKH0HWKRG¶3DUW)RXUSS-130. 
29 
 
practice this has to be a rather distant goal of our enquiries and proposals, for in practice 
we cannot gain universal agreement on even basic principles.10  
 
In some cases, logic would seem to be so compelling that any one person by himself could 
VHHWKHWUXWKEH\RQGGRXEW,IVRPHRQHFDQQRWVHHWKHWUXWKRI3\WKDJRUDV¶Wheorem, and 
even disputes it, then he simply needs educating and having the thing explained to him 
more clearly. Then he could see the inescapable truth of the theorem, with that clarity 
which would enable him to say that it does not matter if the majority of the human race 
GRHVQ¶WVHHLWRUGRHVQ¶WDJUHHZLWKLW+RZHYHUZLWKVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKHRQWRORJLFDOSURRI
of God it is a different matter. This proof is more likely to seem persuasive to someone 
who already believes in God and wants an additional reason for believing, than to someone 
ZKR GRHVQ¶W EHOLHYH LQ *RG DW DOO DQG HYHQ VLQFHUHO\ ZDQWV WR NQRZ ZKHWKHU WKHUH LV D
God. In the latter case, if I find this type of proof convincing, I cannot immediately leap to 
WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW VRPHRQH ZKR GRHVQ¶W Ls being unreasonable. So although I aim to 
PDNHSURSRVDOVDQGGHPRQVWUDWLRQVZKLFKZRXOGEHFRQYLQFLQJWRµDOOUHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶
I have to leave this principle as an ultimate aim. 
 
,XVHWKHWHUPµDOOUHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶UDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\µDOOSHRSOH¶WR reflect the fact that 
I cannot assume that each and every person will agree on basic principles - and already I 
have had to qualify even this by speaking of what all reasonable people might ultimately 
see or agree to. But there are further problems with tKLV LGHDRI µDOO UHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶
which I would like to go on to explore now. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10
 6HH&DWRQ¶VFRPPHQWRQ'HVFDUWHVµ«>,@WVKRXOGEHVDLGWKDWZKLOHWKHRSWLPLVWLFYLHZHQGXUHVDVD
conviction, it is complemented by an explanation of deviations from the standard: agreement would be 
IRUWKFRPLQJEXWIRUWKH³FRUUXSWLRQ´RIERQVHQVE\ prejudice. A perverted reason may refuse to assent to 
clear and distinct truths. This contingency raises difficulties about the adequacy of either certainty or 
XQDQLPLW\DVFULWHULDVLQFHSHUYHUWHGUHDVRQPD\HTXDOO\ZHOOFODLPFHUWDLQW\DQGXQDQLPLW\¶(Caton, The 
Origin of Subjectivity, p 36.) 
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7KHSUREOHPZLWKµDOOUHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶ 
 
$V VRRQ DV ZH XQGHUVWDQG UDWLRQDOLW\ LQ WHUPV RI WKDW ZKLFK DSSHDOV WR µDOO UHDVRQDEOH
SHRSOH¶ZHDUHWKURZQXSDJDLQVWWKHSURblem of what counts as a reasonable person. On 
WKHVLPSOHVWOHYHO,ZLOOFRXQWVRPHRQHDVDµUHDVRQDEOH¶SHUVRQLIKHVKDUHVP\RSLQLRQV
and if his experiences resonate closely with my own. And yet as a good Cartesian I am 
trying to get beyond my own opinions and experiences, in so far as my opinions may be 
distorted by local or personal prejudices. At the very least, then, I will be prepared to 
consider someone reasonable even if - indeed especially if - he seems to think and 
experience very differently from the way I do. For example, as a Christian, I have to 
UHFRJQLVH WKDW VRPHRQH PLJKW EH µUHDVRQDEOH¶ HYHQ LI KHVKH ZDV QRW EURXJKW XS DV D
Christian and if the appeal of the Christian gospel leaves him/her cold. I will not regard 
their lack of a ChristiaQXSEULQJLQJDVQHFHVVDULO\µXQIRUWXQDWH¶RUWKHLUODFNRIUHVSRQVHWR 
the gospel as necessarily due to spiritual blindness. Perhaps I am the one who is 
unfortunate or blind - my own background does not tell me what it is like to view the 
world through the eyes of a non-Christian.11 
 
$QG \HW LI , KDYH MRXUQH\HG VR IDU DV WR H[SDQG P\ FRQFHSW RI µDOO UHDVRQDEOH SHRSOH¶
beyond my own religious tradition - QHYHUWKHOHVVLWLVDOOWRROLNHO\WKDWP\FRQFHSWRIµDOO
UHDVRQDEOH SHRSOH¶ LV OLPLWHG E\ FRPSOH[ VRFLological factors, factors of which I am not 
LPPHGLDWHO\ DZDUH 0\ LGHD RI µDOO UHDVRQDEOH SHRSOH¶ PHDQV SHRSOH , KDYH WR GR ZLWK
every day, people from my own culture and time, of my own level of education and so on. 
I am blind to the fact that all these factors do not simply provide me with a certain level of 
rationality, but feed me with a particular understanding of the world which is not self-
HYLGHQWRUEDFNHGXSE\DFFHSWDEOHUHDVRQLQJ([SUHVVLRQVOLNHµREYLRXVO\¶RUµDVLVZHOO
                                                        
11
 Interestingly, Descartes is able to see that he cannot, by his own principles, assume that the Christian 
IDLWK KH ZDV EURXJKW XS LQ LV WUXH DV KH QRWHV µWKHUH PD\ EH PHQ DV VHQVLEOH DPRQJ WKH 3HUVLDQV RU
ChinesHDVDPRQJRXUVHOYHV¶- and yet he appears to regard it as a more practical and useful programme of 
DFWLRQWRSURFHHGE\µKROGLQJFRQVWDQWO\WRWKHUHOLJLRQLQZKLFKE\*RG¶VJUDFH,KDGEHHQLQVWUXFWHGIURP
P\ FKLOGKRRG¶ µ'LVFRXUVH RQ WKH 0HWKRG¶ 3DUW Three), p 122.) I mention this here to show that 
Descartes recognised that according to his own principles he should be open to the views of people of 
remote cultures and different religions, although for practical reasons (and perhaps for his own safety!) he 
decided to orient himself by the views of those around him. 
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NQRZQ¶ RU WKH PRUH DJJUHVVLYH µHYHU\RQH NQRZV WKDW«¶ - these expressions always 
conceal a reference to a particular social group (obvious to whom? Well known in whose 
opinion? etc.). This social group may be very large indeed but it does not literally represent 
all thinking people of any cultural or religious background whatever. 
 
And so - I suppose I must break the bounds of my socially-conditioned criteria of 
rationality by expanding my horizons. I must meet and talk openly with as many people 
from different cultural traditions as I can. I must read more widely - books from different 
traditions, from different times, reflecting different beliefs, and so on. Now - although this 
intention may well be commendable, I have first of all to ask with what attitude I am 
approaching the different cultures etc. It makes all the difference whether I approach 
SHRSOHZLWKDVHFUHWLQWHQWLRQWRFRQILUPP\RZQZD\RIWKLQNLQJRULI,DPµUHDOO\¶RSHQ
to a different way of thinking. And yet - the more subtle problem, I believe, is that even 
when I approach different cultures and religions with an intention to be truly open and 
self-critical, in reality I may be approaching them with a self-LQGXOJHQW µ3ROLWLFDO
&RUUHFWQHVV¶ZKLFKRQO\affects to take the truth-FODLPVRIWKHµRWKHUSHRSOH¶VHULRXVly. 
 
:KHQ , VSHDN RI WDNLQJ VHULRXVO\ WKH H[SHULHQFHV DQG RSLQLRQV RI µRWKHU SHRSOH¶ WKH
UHDVRQ,SXWWKLVH[SUHVVLRQµRWKHUSHRSOH¶LQLQYHUWHGFRPPDVLVEHFDXVH,DPDZDUHWKDW
LWLVWRDODUJHH[WHQWDFRQVWUXFWLQP\PLQG:KDW,DFWXDOO\PHDQE\µRWKHUSHRSOH¶LVD
rather generalised concept; it is not a set of actual people other than myself, recognised 
DQGH[SHULHQFHGLQWKHLUWUXHRWKHUQHVV1DWXUDOO\P\FRQFHSWRIZKDWµRWKHUSHRSOH¶WKLQN
is bound to be somewhat generalised at first, and needs to be filled out by my actual 
meeting with actual people. But - those occasions and experiences of meeting with other 
people will not give real content to my idea of what other people think, unless I am able in 
principle to embrace an authentic sense or ideDRI WKHRWKHUQHVVRIµRWKHUSHRSOH¶UDWKHU
than an inauthentic sense, socially conditioned and unreflectively received (such as the self-
LQGXOJHQWµ3ROLWLFDO&RUUHFWQHVV¶PHQWLRQHGDERYH7RSXWLWDQRWKHUZD\,DPLQGDQJHU
RI VLPSO\ LJQRULQJ DV WKH µGHDG ZRRG¶ RU FRQIXVLQJ DVSHFWV RI P\ HQFRXQWHUV SUHFLVHO\
those things which may be very important to the people I encounter; I will then go away 
DQGJLYHDQDFFRXQWRIWKHLUEHOLHIVRURSLQLRQVZKLFKVHHPVWRPHWREHµV\PSDWKHWLF¶EXW
which seems unbalanced, distorted or even unrecognisable to them. 
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6RZHFDQVHHKRZWKH&DUWHVLDQVXEMHFWKDVFRPHWREHLGHQWLILHGPRUHJHQHUDOO\ZLWKµDOO
UHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶ DQG WKHQKDV LWVHOIEHFRPHHQWDQJOHGZLWK WKHSUREOHPRIKRZ WREH
truly objective in its estimaWLRQ RI µDOO UHDVRQDEOH SHRSOH¶ )RU , ILQG WKDW µDOO UHDVRQDEOH
SHRSOH¶DUHERWKWKHsubject of knowledge, which I want to be identified with, but also the 
object of my knowledge, which I want to be objective about. But I am trapped in a circle - 
where arHWKHµDOOUHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶ZKRZLOOKHOSPHWRGHWHUPLQHZKDWLVPHDQWE\µDOO
UHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶"$QGDVORQJDV,GRQRWUHFRJQLVHWKLVFLUFOH,ZLOOUHPDLQDWERWWRP
trapped within it, allowing my principle of rationality to be determined by social factors 
beyond my control - LHP\FRQFHSWRI µDOO UHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶ LVGHWHUPLQHGQRWE\DQ\
actual people I encounter, but by an untested concept which has become unreflectively 
habitual in the social group to which I belong. I need somehow to step back. But how can 
I do this? 
 
With this problem or set of problems in mind, I would like to turn now to a further 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRI WKHIXQGDPHQWDOSUREOHPRUGLIILFXOW\ZLWK%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ WRVHHKRZ
we might locate his theology in relation to our considerations so far. 
 
The problem with Barth 
 
The problem with Barth is that he apparently refuses to give any generally accessible 
reasons for accepting Christian truth claims. In the present climate, Barth is not likely to 
get into trouble for refusing to search for proofs for the existence of God and the truth of 
Christianity - whether this means deducing these truths directly from universally valid or 
accessible principles (a priori) or drawing them from universally valid or accessible 
principles via universally recognised evidence (a posteriori). We no longer trust such 
µSURRIV¶ IRU ZH NQRZ QRZ WKDW ZKDW VHHPV WR EH XQLYHUVDOO\ DFFHVVLEOH RU UHFRJQLVHG
turns out not to be so universal when we actually get round to listening to what other 
people have to say about it. Our sense of logic cannot be the measure of HYHU\RQH¶V sense 
of logic, and hence cannot be the measure of logic itself. 
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But Barth is likely to get into trouble for refusing to recognise the more flexible version of 
WKH µXQLYHUVDOO\ DFFHVVLEOH¶ ZKich prevails today. We have abandoned proof, we have 
abandoned a transparent, naïve concept of universality, but we still hope to make a  
gradual progress towards truth by being in principle open to the views and experiences of 
all other people. We may be WURXEOHGE\WKHIDFW WKDWZHFDQ¶WSUDFWLFDOO\VSHDNLQJPHHW
with and listen to all other human beings alive today or that have ever lived; we may be 
troubled that even if we could there may be limiting prejudices which affect all human 
beings collectively, which would bar our way to ultimate truth. But at least we do not give   
up before we have begun by refusing to be open to others in discussion at all, as Barth   
does. 
 
I think I am right in saying that when Barth mentions Descartes, he is not narrowly 
concerned with Descartes himself, but with the more flexible application of Cartesianism 
which sees beyond the doubting individual or transparent universal subject, and attempts to 
take into account the diversity and ambiguity of human existence when it formulates its 
generally valid principles.12 But, even taking into account this greater flexibility and 
VRSKLVWLFDWLRQ %DUWK VWLOO RSSRVHV WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI D µSUROHJRPHQD WR GRJPDWLFV¶
outlining general principles which are accessible and acceptable to people whether they  
                                                        
12
 Barth does treat Descartes on an individual level in CD III/1, pp 350f, especially in relation to 
'HVFDUWHV¶ VXSSRVHGGHPRQVWUDWLRQRI WKHH[LVWHQFHRI*RG,WKLQNWKHFHQWUDOSRLQWRI%DUWK¶VFULWLFLVP
DSSHDUVRQSµ+RZFDQWKHREMHFWLYHH[LVWHQFHRI*RGEHGHPRQVWUDWHGVRORQJDVWKHVXSUHPHIRUFH
of the proof consists in the necessity under the pressure of which man cannot help attributing objective 
existence to the object of one of his ideas, so that its force is only that of the one who proves and not of the 
self-demonstration of the One whose existence is to be proved? Anything less than the latter cannot be 
UHTXLUHGLQDSURRIRI*RG¶VH[LVWHQFH)RUE\DQ\WKLQJOHVVWKHH[LVWHQFH of God, the existence of the One 
who exists originally, necessarily and essentially, beyond all human constructs and conceptions cannot be 
GHPRQVWUDWHG¶7KLVLVFHUWDLQO\UHOHYDQWWRWKHDUJXPHQW,DPSXWWLQJIRUZDUG\HW,DPPRUHLQWHUHVWHGLQ
%DUWK¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI'HVFDUWHV¶EURDGLQIOXHQFHWKDQLQKLVDVVHVVPHQWRI'HVFDUWHVDVDQLQGLYLGXDO- see 
HVSHFLDOO\ &' , SS I ZKHUH %DUWK WHOOV XV WKDW VLQFH 'HVFDUWHV D µFRPSUHKHQVLYHO\ H[SOLFDWHGVHOI-
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI KXPDQ H[LVWHQFH¶ KDV HIIHFWLYHO\ EHFRPH WKH µSUH-understanding and criterion of 
WKHRORJLFDONQRZOHGJH¶ 
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are Christian or not, which would then form the basis for demonstrating the viability of the 
specific content of the Christian faith.13 
 
Today many are most likely to squirm when they read Barth saying, in defence of his 
SRVLWLRQ WKDW µIDLWK¶PXVWQRW WDNHXQEHOLHIVHULRXVO\ - because if it did it would not take 
itself seriously. Faith which takes unbelief seriously would not be faith, he says.14 
&RQWHPSRUDU\UHDFWLRQPLJKWZHOOEHDVIROORZVZHPXVWVWRSWDONLQJDERXWµXQEHOLHI¶IRU
a start. We must talk about different EHOLHIV :H PXVW QRW WDON DERXW µXQEHOLHYHUV¶ EXW
DERXWµSHRSOHZKREHOLHYHGLIIHUHQWO\¶(YHQLIWKH\DUHQRWUHOLJLRXVEHOLHYHUVDWDOOWKH\
may still have faith in moral values and may believe in tolerance and openness towards 
other people. 
 
But - LVWKLVZKDW%DUWKLVWDONLQJDERXW":KHQKHWDONVDERXWµEHOLHI¶DQGµXQEHOLHI¶LVKH
thinking about the sum of Christians on the one hand and the sum of non-Christians on the 
other? Without going into detailed argument over it, I would say that I do not think that he 
is.15 Rather, he is opposing a general concept of humanity. Barth does not mean that we 
do not need to bother about the experiences or opinions of non-Christians, because as 
Christians we already know we are right - God has shown us what is true! Rather, he is 
opposing in principle the concept of a general, universal humanity into which both 
Christians and non-Christians can be placed.16 
                                                        
13
 6HH&',SSIµ'RJPDWLFSUROHJRPHQDRQWKHEDVLVRIWKLVFRQFHSWLRQ>ZKLFK%DUWKLVRSSRVLQJ@
obviously consist first in the demonstration that in a general ontology or anthropology there is actually a 
place for this ontic factor, for the being of Church and faith, and that human existence is practicable also 
DV EHOLHYLQJ H[LVWHQFH¶ &RPSDUH 'HVFDUWHV¶ µUHPDUNDEO\ FDQGLG«VWDWHPHQW¶ WKDW µVLQFH ZH ZHUH PHQ
before we became Christians, it is beyond belief that any man should seriously embrace opinions which he 
thinks contrary to that right reason which constitutes a man, in order that he may cling to the faith 
WKURXJKZKLFKKHLVD&KULVWLDQ¶FLWHGLQ&DWRQThe Origin of Subjectivity, p 126). 
14
 CD I/1, p 30. 
15
 2QWKLVSRLQWVHHHVSHFLDOO\%DUWK¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIµ7KH:RUGRI*RGDQG([SHULHQFH¶LQ&',, - note 
especially pp 212-3. 
16
 ,EHOLHYHWKLVLVWKHIRUFHRIWKHIROORZLQJH[FHUSWµ,VWKHUHDVSRVVLELOLW\VRPHWKLQJJHQHUDOO\human of 
ZKLFKWKLVVSHFLILFKXPDQSKHQRPHQRQ>LH&KULVWLDQH[LVWHQFH@PD\EHUHJDUGHGDVDQDFWXDOLVDWLRQ"«
[W]e cannot regard [such a view] as Christian to the extent that it interprets the possibility of this reality 
[Christian existence] as a human SRVVLELOLW\ WR WKHH[WHQW«WKDW LW VHHNV WR LQWHUSUHW LWVKLVWRU\QRW LQ
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Now, it is at this point that I would integrate my foregoing general discussion of the nature 
RIREMHFWLYLW\ZLWKRXUVSHFLILFGLVFXVVLRQRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\,QSDUWLFXODU,EHOLHYHZH
VKRXOGDVVRFLDWH%DUWK¶VµJHQHUDOKXPDQLW\¶ZLWKWKHXQUHIOHFWLYHFRQFHSWRIµDOOUHDVRQDEOH
SHRSOH¶ ZKLFK , FRQVLGHUHG DERYH )RU ZH FDQ VHH KRZ it is possible to make the same 
FODLP UHJDUGLQJ D JHQHUDO FRQFHSW RI KXPDQLW\ DV ZDV PDGH IRU WKH FRQFHSW RI µDOO
UHDVRQDEOHSHRSOH¶RQHFRXOGFODLPWKDWDgeneral concept of humanity is not a provisional 
anticipation of humanity as a whole, waiting to be made more particular and concrete by 
encounter with individual people; rather, one could say that in practice such a general 
conception of humanity serves as a rigid preconception about humanity, serving private 
interests, which precludes genuine encounter with others.  
 
7KDW LV , EHOLHYH LW LV SRVVLEOH WR XQGHUVWDQG %DUWK¶V SRVLWLRQ DV IROORZV ZH EXUGHQ
ourselves with a false general concept of humanity because we close our hearts to our 
fellow men - DQGZRPHQ:HXQGHUVWDQGµKXPDQLW\¶LQRXUWHUPVEHcause we attempt to 
FDQRQLVH RXU RZQ IRUP RI KXPDQLW\ DV WKDW ZKLFK LV XQLYHUVDOO\ YDOLG DQG µQDWXUDO¶
Concepts which seem to us to be self-HYLGHQWDQG µDFFRUGLQJ WRQDWXUH¶ UHDOO\ UHSUHVHQW
our own collective self-deception which is the result of sin and rebellion against our 
Creator.17 The path to a true understanding of humanity is barred by the distorting effect of 
sin. We can find our way back to a true knowledge of human nature not by our own 
efforts but only through the activity of God by which he redeems us from sin.  Two crucial 
TXRWDWLRQV IURP %DUWK¶V WKLUG YROXPH RI WKH Church Dogmatics will illustrate this basic 
aspect of his theology: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
WHUPVRILWVHOIEXWLQWHUPVRIDJHQHUDOFDSDFLW\RURIWKHJHQHUDOKLVWRULFLW\RIKXPDQH[LVWHQFH¶&',, 
pp 38-9.) To avoid misunderstanding, I should say here (as I will mention further on) that there are no 
proof-WH[WVIURP%DUWK¶VZULWLQJVZKLFKFDQGHPRQVWUDWHRQFHDQGIRUDOOWKHFRUUHFWQHVVRIP\DSSURDFK
UDWKHU WKLV LVDQH[SHULPHQW LQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ZKLFKFDQRQO\EHYDOLGDWHGE\KHXULVWLF
means and by attention to the broader structure of his theology and writings. 
17
 ,DPGUDZLQJRQ$&7KLVHOWRQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIFROOHFWLYHFRUSRUDWHVHOI-deception in Interpreting God 
and the Postmodern Self (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), pp 137-44, which in turn is drawing specifically 
on the ideas of Reinhold Niebuhr. The relation and tension between Niebuhr and Barth will receive more 
detailed attention later on. 
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If we were referred to a picture of human nature attained or attainable in any other way [than 
through Christ] we should always have to face the question whether what we think we see and know 
concerning it is not a delusion, because with our sinful eyes we cannot detect even the corruption of 
our nature, let alone its intrinsic character, and we are therefore condemned to an unceasing 
confusion of the natural with the unnatural, and vice versa.18 
 
The final thing [in theories about man] is always unrest, but not a genuine, pure or open unrest; but 
an unrest which is obscured by a forceful interpretation or dogmatic view of man, by an exculpation 
DQG MXVWLILFDWLRQRIKLVH[LVWHQFHRQWKHEDVLVRIWKLVGRJPD«>7@KHXOWLPDWHIDFWDERXWRXUKXPDQ
nature, as we shall constantly see in detail, is the self-contradiction of man and the conscious or 
unconscious self-deception in which he refuses to recognise this truth.19 
 
These passages will come under closer scrutiny as my thesis unfolds. More importantly, I 
will seek to show their structural significance in the broader context of his writings and 
development, for I do not actually suppose that these passages in themselves are sufficient 
WRVXSSRUWWKHYLHZRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ZKLFK,DPSUHVHQWLQJKHUH+RZHYHUP\FXUUHQW
SXUSRVH LV WR FODULI\ DQG H[SODLQ WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ ZKLFK LV EHLQJ
explored in this thesis, and so, instead of giving further evidence from his writings at this 
point, I will proceed to explain how I think his theology is related to Cartesian thought. 
 
I believe Barth views the self-understanding of humanity as fundamentally marred by sin; 
the vital difference from Cartesian thought is that in Barth self-understanding is regarded 
as a barrier to true understanding, rather than as an indispensable precondition. In this 
case, the object - God in Christ - must act to redeem the subject from its own self-
understanding which has fallen prey to sin. I hope I have said enough to indicate that we 
DUH DW OHDVW GHDOLQJ ZLWK D VHULRXV SUDFWLFDO SUREOHP WKDW ZKDW ZH PHDQ E\ µKXPDQ¶ RU
µQDWXUDO¶ RU WKH µWKLQNLQJ VXEMHFW¶ FDQ DFWXDOO\ EH HQWDQJOHG LQ FROlective self-deception; 
KHQFHLIZHDUHWRVSHDNPHDQLQJIXOO\RI*RG¶VVDYLQJDFWRIVDOYDWLRQIURPVLQWKHQZH
must take into account this specific form or manifestation of sin. That is, if we attempt to 
XVH RXU SULRU µJHQHUDO¶ LGHD RI QDWXUH RU KXPDQLW\ RU µWKH VXEMHFW¶ DV D QHFHVVDU\
precondition for understanding God, then our understanding of God will effectively be 
under the control of the self-deception concealed within our subjectivity. God (or God in 
                                                        
18
 CD III/2, p 43. 
19
 CD III/2; p 47. 
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Christ) will appear as the one who legitimates or reinforces the sin of self-deception - 
rather than as the one who redeems us from this sin. Implicitly or explicitly, God will 
appear as the advocate of our idea of humanity, which is projected as universally valid but 
in reality serves our own local interests. To sum up - the reason why Barth adheres to the 
theological principle of the priority of God in Christ is because of his awareness of the 
socio-political problem of corporate self-GHFHSWLRQLQKXPDQLW\¶VVHOI-understanding. 
 
This general thesis, expressed in my last sentence, will receive more detailed elaboration 
and defence as my thesis proceeds. But for now, I will seek to apply in general terms how 
P\ H[SORUDWLRQV VR IDU EHDU RQ %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV RI 5RPDQVDV UHSUHVHQWHG LQP\FDVH
study Christ and Adam. 
 
7KHVLJQLILFDQFHIRU%DUWK¶VChrist and Adam 
 
%DUWK¶V EDVLF SRVLWLRQ LV WKDW ZH FDQ RQO\ NQRZ ZKDW KXPDQLW\ LV LQ WKH OLJKW RI &KULVW
Even if humanity understands itself as sinful, it is not free from the circle of self-deception 
by which it closes itself off from God - for its own understanding of sin is itself marred by 
sin. It can only find its way back to a true self-XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKURXJK*RG¶VUHGHHPLQJDFW
not by any preparation on its own part. 
 
I have tried to show why I do not believe that this involves a perverse or naïve assumption 
that we can have a direct access to the oracles of God without bothering to find out or 
indeed caring whether other people hear God speaking when we do. Rather, in my reading, 
Barth is responsibly conceUQHGZLWKWKHUHDOSUREOHPWKDWRXUSHUFHSWLRQRIµRWKHUSHRSOH¶
is not as self-evident or innocent as it may seem.  
 
7KH ILUVW WKLQJ ZH QRWLFH DERXW %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LQ RXU FDVH VWXG\ WH[W LV WKDW KH
deliberately reverses the normal order of Adam and Christ, and gives his essay the title 
Christ and Adam. This will recall my words above that if we take our general idea of 
KXPDQLW\ DV D EDVLV IRU DSSURDFKLQJ *RG¶V UHYHODWLRQ LQ &KULVW WKHQ ZH ZLOO EH WDNLQJ
things in reverse order. We must first receive God¶V UHYHODWLRQ LQ &KULVW EHIRUH ZH
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understand what humanity truly is, for our understanding of man is marred by that sin from 
which we are redeemed in Christ. 
 
The second thing we notice is that Barth is concerned to show that the passage under 
consideration (Romans 5) urges not a general anthropology, based on human self-
understanding, but a special anthropology based on Christ.20 I find this relevant because, as 
I said above, general theories of man or approaches to anthropology have a tendency to 
canonise DQGPDNHXQLYHUVDOO\YDOLGµRXU¶IRUPRIKXPDQLW\&RQIRUPLQJWRWKHLPDJHRI
Christ means that we are able to surrender our self-interest and to attain a true self-
understanding of humanity which is not based on our own self-interest. In this sense, true 
anthropology is based on Christology, rather than vice versa. 
 
In view of this preoccupation with anthropology, I think it important to make an 
observation about the context of Christ and Adam. The fact is - even though Christ and 
Adam was written at the time of the part of the Dogmatics in which Barth deals with the 
doctrine of original sin in detail (i.e. IV/1), and even though an essay focusing on Romans 
5:12-2121 might be expected have original sin as its central concern - nevertheless Christ 
and Adam is not basically concerned with original sin, but rather with the doctrine of man 
and the issue of theological anthropology. Thus, Christ and Adam belongs to an earlier 
part of the Dogmatics, specifically to the second part of the third volume, which deals with 
the doctrine of man in considerable detail. As we shall see, it is clear from the substance of 
Christ and Adam that anthropology is its main concern; but also, Barth himself tells us that 
the essay was originally intended to be included in that part of Church Dogmatics which 
deals with the doctrine of man.22 
                                                        
20
 Christ and Adam, p 5. 
21
 As we will see, it is this second half of Romans 5 that Barth is mainly concerned with. 
22
 &',,,LQWURGXFWLRQS[UHDGVµ,QDILUVWGUDIW,KDGDVHFWLRQRQ³0DQDQG+XPDQLW\´LQZKLFK,
dealt with the individual, societies and society, but I later dropped this because I was not sure enough of 
WKH WKHRORJLFDO DSSURDFK WR WKLV SUREOHP¶ 7KLV LV FRPSOHPHQWHG E\ %DUWK¶V RZQ VWDWHPHQW LQ WKH
introduction to the second edition of Christus und Adam, where Barth tells us that Christus und Adam µZDU
die Überarbeitung eines Textes, der ursprünglich einen Bestandteil eines nachher aus verschiedenen 
*UQGHQLQ:HJIDOOJHNRPPHQHQ3DUDJUDSKHQ³'HU0HQFKXQGGLH0HQVFKKHLW´GHULQ%DQG,,,GHU
³.LUFKOLFKHQ 'RJPDWLN´ GDUJHVWHOOWHQ $QWKURSRORJLH ELOGHQ VROOWH¶ .DUO %DUWK Rudolf Bultmann: ein 
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$QG VR LQ WKLV FKDSWHU , KDYH DWWHPSWHG WR JLYH VRPH RXWOLQH RI KRZ %DUWK¶V SRVLWLRQ
expressed in Christ and Adam may be intelligible and constructive, but this does not in 
itself demonstrate that the exegesis of Romans 5 contained in this book is valid as exegesis. 
Taking into account my outline of the theological background, I will shortly take a closer 
look at the actual content of the exegesis itself. But before I do this, there is a certain 
matter which I need to deal with in some detail, because I sense that my reading of Barth 
may be open to certain objections, given the positions expressed in other contemporary 
readings of Barth. 
 
7KH3ODFHRI6LQLQ%DUWK¶V7KHRORJ\ 
 
The basic issue I need to consider arises from the fact that I have emphasised the social 
SUREOHPV RI NQRZOHGJH DV D EDVLV IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ VSHFLILFDOO\ ZLWK
regard to the effect of concealed cultural and social factors which may distort human self-
awareness and awareness of truth. And the question is whether this reading really accords 
ZLWKWKHWKHRFHQWULFDQGFKULVWRFHQWULFWKUXVWRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\'RHVQRW%DUWKGLVDYRZ
any VWDUWLQJ SRLQW RU FULWHULRQ IRU WKHRORJ\ ZKLFK LV QRW VWULFWO\ GUDZQ IURP *RG¶V VHOf-
revelation in Christ, including WKHµSUREOHPV¶RIWKHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOVSKHUH" 
 
This issue becomes more sharply defined when I acknowledge that I have drawn the 
FRQFHSWRIµFRUSRUDWHVHOI-GHFHSWLRQ¶QRWIURP%DUWKKLPVHOIEXWIURP%DUWK¶VWKHRORJLFDl 
opponent, Reinhold Niebuhr.23 And it was Niebuhr who accused Barth of being morally 
irrelevant in the political and social sphere - ZKLFK LQ 1LHEXKU¶V YLHZ DPRXQWHG WR DQ
almost total irrelevance.24 Corporate self-deception formed a central concept in NiHEXKU¶V
                                                                                                                                                                     
Versuch, ihn zu verstehen/Christus und Adam nach Röm 5: zwei theologische Studien (Zürich: EVZ-
Verlag, 1964), p 5). 
23
 R.Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society 1HZ<RUN&KDUOHV6FULEQHU¶V6RQV 21960 (1932)); The 
Nature and Destiny of Man, 2 vols. (London: Nisbet, 1941 and 1943). As previously noted, I am indebted 
to A.C.Thiselton for originally drawing my attention to this theologian and to his significance for 
contemporary theology (Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, pp 137-144). 
24
 6HH -%HWWLV µ3ROLWLFDO 7KHRORJ\ DQG 6RFLDO (WKLFV¶ LQ * +XQVLQJHU HG Karl Barth and Radical 
Politics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), p 172 (171-UHIHUULQJWR5HLQKROG1LHEXKUµ%DUWK¶V
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program of relating theology to political or social responsibility; specifically, the problem 
of corporate self-deception in society is equivalent to the Christian concept of sin.25 But in 
his theology at least Barth would refuse to engage at a primary level with the problems of 
the social and political sphere, and preferred to ground theology and Christian faith and 
ZLWQHVV LQ VRPHWKLQJ DERYH DQG EH\RQG VXFK SUREOHPV ZKLFK 1LHEXKU FDOOHG µ%DUWK¶V
DERYHWKHEDWWOH&KULVWLDQZLWQHVV¶26 
 
I will returQLQP\QH[WFKDSWHUWRWKHVSHFLILFLVVXHRI%DUWK¶VUHODWLRQWR1LHEXKU%XWIRU
WKHPRPHQW,ZLOOQRWHPRUHJHQHUDOO\WKDW1LHEXKU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI%DUWKEHORQJVWRD
fairly common tendency, by which Barth is seen as a theologian who is trying to secure a 
place for Christian faith above and beyond the sphere of secularity which characterises the 
modern world - but at the price of irrelevance to the real concerns of this world. Such an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LVH[HPSOLILHG LQ5REHUWV¶HVVD\ LWVHOIVKDUSO\FULWLcal of Barth along these 
lines.27 In an essay which was written at least partly in response to this, Ingolf Dalferth has 
given us a much richer and more credible account of Barth theology, under the title of 
µ.DUO %DUWK¶V (VFKDWRORJLFDO 5HDOLVP¶28 This essa\ DUJXHV WKDW %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LV QRW
intended to be a flight from the modern world or modern world-view, but is rather an 
attempt to re-interpret that modern world-view from within the special perspective of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(DVW*HUPDQ/HWWHU¶The Christian Century 76 (Feb 11, 1959), pp 167-DOVRµ7KH4XDOLW\RI2XU/LYHV¶
The Christian Century 77 (May 11, 1960), pp 568- µ7RZDUG1HZ,QWUD-&KULVWLDQ(QGHDYRXUV¶The 
Christian Century 86 (Dec 31, 1969), pp 1662-1667 (the latter containing a retraction on the part of 
Niebuhr); see also µ.DUO %DUWK¶V 2ZQ :RUGV H[FHUSWV IURP WKH 6ZLVV 7KHRORJLDQ¶V OHWWHU WR DQ (DVW
*HUPDQ3DVWRU¶The Christian Century 76 (March 25, 1959), pp 352-355. 
25
 Thiselton, Interpreting God, p 139. 
26
 1LHEXKU µ%DUWK¶V(DVW*HUPDQ/HWWHU¶S)RUDQDFFXUDWHVXPPDU\RI1LHEXKU¶VJHQHUDODWWLWXGH
towards Barth, see M.Lovatt, Confronting the Will-to-Power: a Reconsideration of the Theology of 
Reinhold Niebuhr (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001), pp 62-71. 
27
 55REHUWV µ%DUWK¶V 'RFWULQH RI 7LPH LWV 1DWXUH DQG ,PSOLFDWLRQV¶ LQ 6:6\NHV HG Karl Barth: 
Studies of his Theological Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp 88-HVSS µ7KURXJKD
profound ontological exclusiveness, Barth has attempted to preserve Christian theology from the 
indifference and hostility of a secular world. The triumphalist aggrandizement of his theology was made at 
WKHULVNRIDWRWDOGLVMXQFWLRQDQGDOLHQDWLRQRIKLVWKHRORJ\IURPQDWXUDOUHDOLW\¶ 
28
 This essay appears in S.W.Sykes (ed.), Karl Barth: Centenary Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp 14-45; note esp. p 30.  
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Christian faith. The contemporary world and its concerns are not bypassed but are taken 
up into this special perspective of the faith and proclamation of the Christian Church. 
 
+DQV )UHL WDNHV D YHU\ VLPLODU DSSURDFK WR WKDW RI 'DOIHUWK LQ KLV DQDO\VLV RI %DUWK¶V
theology,29 and George Hunsinger develops this approach further along the same lines.30 
+RZHYHU LQP\YLHZ+XQVLQJHUPRYHVFORVHU WR%DUWK¶V WKHRORJLFDO LQWHQWLRQ LQ WKDWKH
emphasises most of all the centrality of Christ rather than the faith and proclamation of the 
Christian Church. But, in spite of different emphases, these writers (Dalferth, Frei, 
+XQVLQJHUDUHVXFFHVVIXO LQVKRZLQJKRZ%DUWK¶VµFKULVWRFHQWULVP¶DQGXQFRPSURPLVLQJ
emphasis on the self-revelation of God in Christ does not in any way lead to an irrelevance 
to real world concerns. The uniqueness and centrality of Christ operates not restrictively 
but flexibly and creatively - so that whether we are concerned with existential fulfilment, 
social and political issues, interfaith dialogue, or whatever, Christian thought is open on 
the one hand to enrichment and, on the other, to relevant, constructive criticism, all by 
means of a focus on the uniqueness and finality of Christ as Barth conceived it. 
 
However, all this still leads to a collision with my way of reading Barth. These writers 
would, I suppose, argue that I have given a priority to the problem of the social structure 
of sin which was not really there in Barth. In my reading, a particular type of social 
problem (viz. corporate self-deception) virtually gives a prior grounG IRU %DUWK¶V
christological concentration. It acquires a constitutive and determinative position which in 
%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\EHORQJVWR&KULVWDORQH7REHVXUHWKHSUREOHPRIVLQ-as-collective-self-
GHFHSWLRQLVVRPHWKLQJZKLFKFDQEHWDNHQXSLQWR%DUWK¶V theological approach, provided 
that it receive critical re-definition through a specific focus on Christ. But in my reading it 
seems to acquire a fixed position which again raises the question as to whether I am 
reading Niebuhr into Barth. 
 
 
                                                        
29
 +)UHLµ)LYH7\SHVRI7KHRORJ\¶LQTypes of Christian Theology (New Haven/London: Yale University 
Press, 1992), pp 28-55 (see esp. p 43). 
30
 i.e. in How to Read Karl Barth. 
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I think I would best explain my stubbornness on this point by looking closely at the issue 
RI µGLDOHFWLF¶ ZKLFK KDV ORQJ EHHQ XVHG DV D ZD\ RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ %DUWK¶V HDUOLHU 
theology; but more recently it has been argued with considerable success that dialectic 
remainV D SHUPDQHQW IHDWXUH RI %DUWK¶V WKHRORJLFDO DSSURDFK WKURXJKRXW KLV WKHRORJLFDO
development.31 (VVHQWLDOO\ %DUWK¶V GLDOHFWLF LV D WKHRORJLFDO GLDOHFWLF RI UHYHODWLRQ LW
means that in his revelation God unveils himself only by simultaneously veiling himself.32 
This rather cryptic statement can, without too much difficulty, be understood in more 
concrete terms: the point is that God can only reveal himself through a worldly medium, 
i.e. through what is immediately accessible in the human sphere - WKH µKXPDQ VSKHUH¶
including religious experience, church institutions, or general rational and ethical  
FRQFHSWV $QG \HW *RG¶V UHYHODWLRQ PXVW QRW EH identified with these various things 
accessible within the human sphere, for that would eliminate the difference between   
divine and human. And so there emerges a dialectic of veiling and unveiling; God does 
reveal himself through the human, worldly medium but, at the same time, he maintains a 
critical distance from it. And so, if we apply this to the issues of the political and social 
                                                        
31
 That is, as an argument against the position initiated by H. von Balthasar (in The Theology of Karl 
Barth (New York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971)) that Barth turned from 
µGLDOHFWLFWRDQDORJ\¶DWVRPHSRLQWEHWZHHQWKHnd ed. of Romans and his Church Dogmatics. The more 
UHFHQWSRVLWLRQKDVEHHQWKDWGLDOHFWLFDQGDQDORJ\ZHUHSHUPDQHQWIHDWXUHVRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\IURPWKH
EHJLQQLQJDQG WKDW%DUWK¶VFRQFHSWRIDQDORJ\DV µDQDORJ\RI IDLWK¶ &',SS-4) is an inherently 
dialectical concept. This position was first set out most consistently by Ingrid Spieckermann 
(Gotteserkenntnis: ein Beitrag zur Grundfrage der neuen Theologie Karl Barths (Munich: Chr. Kaiser 
Verlag, 1985)), but was developed by B.McCormack in .DUO %DUWK¶V &ULWLFDOO\ 5HDOLVtic Dialectical 
Theology ZKR KDV VKDUSHQHG WKH JHQHUDO WKHVLV E\ UHFRQVLGHULQJ WKH U{OH SOD\HG E\ %DUWK¶V ERRN RQ
Anselm (Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum (London: SCM Press, 1960)), and has also done the service 
of bringing the new paradigm into Anglo-American scholarship. I think it appropriate to mention at this 
SRLQW WKH QHZ LQWURGXFWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V WKRXJKW SURYLGHG E\ -:HEVWHU Barth (London/New York: 
Continuum, 2000). Webster justifies the writing of a new introduction to Barth, amongst other reasons, on 
the grounds that questions have been raised in recent scholarship about the traditional distinction between 
DQHDUO\DQGODWH%DUWKSL[+RZHYHUZKHQZHWXUQWRWKHPDLQERG\RIWKHERRNZHILQGWKDW:HEVWHU¶V
own emphasis is on the fact that thH HDUO\ %DUWK KDG EHJXQ WR GHYHORS D µSRVLWLYH FRQWHQW¶ RI WKHRORJ\
ZKLFKTXDOLILHVWKHVHHPLQJO\µGLDOHFWLFDO¶WKUXVWRIKLVHDUO\WKHRORJ\SSI,PHQWLRQWKLVEHFDXVHP\
own understanding runs in the opposite direction: for me, the point is that the critical tension of dialectic 
IRXQGLQKLVHDUO\ZRUNLVVWLOOLIQRWDOOWKHPRUHSUHVHQWLQKLVODWHUZRUNDQGWKHVHHPLQJO\µSRVLWLYH
FRQWHQW¶RIKLVODWHUZRUNPXVWEHVHHQLQWKLVOLJKW 
32
 e.g. CD I/1, pp 165f; CD IV/2, pp 286-7. 
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sphere or problem of collective self-deception, then the problem with my approach can be 
formulated thus: God may reveal himself and his will to us through the problems of social 
and political self-deception; but as soon as this becomes a fixed means of grasping what is 
LQYROYHGLQ*RG¶VUHYHODWLRQWKHQWKDWVDPHUHYHODWLRQKDVWRPDLQWDLQFULWLFDOGLVWDQFHDQG
be critical RIP\WHQGHQF\WRDOORZVXFKµSUREOHPV¶WRVHWWKHWHUPVIRUZKDWLVPHDQWE\
UHYHODWLRQ RU *RG¶V ZLOO 7KLV LV , suppose, the point at which my reading would be 
vulnerable to criticism. 
 
+RZHYHUDWWKLVSRLQW,KDYHWRVD\WKDW,EHOLHYHWKDWWKHSODFHRIVLQLQ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\
has been misconceived. The self-deceptive element within sin, especially as it manifests 
itself in social and political terms, was not VXEMHFWWRWKLVµGLDOHFWLFDO¶UHVHUYDWLRQLQ%DUWK
It is not the case that this element could only be taken up in his theology in so far as it is 
also subject to basic criticism. Rather, this principle was the ground and basis for this type 
of dialectic. I will now explain why I think this and, indeed, more exactly what I mean, 
WKURXJKDKLVWRULFDOFRPPHQWRQWKHHPHUJHQFHRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ 
 
7KHTXHVWLRQRIVLQLQWKHHPHUJHQFHRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ 
 
It seems WREHJHQHUDOO\DJUHHGWKDWWKHVLJQLILFDQWHYHQWLQ%DUWK¶VOLIHZKLFKJDYHULVHWR
his distinctive theology was his inner disturbance over the fact that his former theological 
colleagues and mentors had given their explicit support to the German war effort.33 Barth 
himself strongly disagreed with this move, because he saw the German war involvement as 
utterly sinful; he believed that the war was due to the sinful self-interests of both or all 
sides involved in the war. Barth was especially disturbed by the fact that in this situation 
Christian theology functioned so effectively as legitimation for a sinful war policy. In 
particular, Barth was disturbed by how this tendency seemed integrally related to the 
theological approach of W.Herrmann, who had been BaUWK¶V PDLQ WKHRORJLFDO LQIOXHQFH  
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 This general pRLQW KDV EHHQ FKDOOHQJHG E\ :LOIULHG +lUOH LQ KLV DUWLFOH HQWLWOHG µ'HU $XIUXI GHU 
,QWHOOHNWXHOOHQXQG.DUO%DUWKV%UXFKPLWGHUOLEHUDOHQ7KHRORJLH¶Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
72 (1975), pp 207-224). I believe Härle is right to point out certain pre-ZDU DQWLFLSDWLRQV RI %DUWK¶V
distinctive theology and break with Liberal theology (as I will show in some detail, especially in my final 
chapter); however I am in agreement with McCormack that Härle has overstated his case (Dialectical 
Theology, p 79). 
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up to that time. The difficulty was - Herrmann sought to ground theology in the inner 
experience of the Christian. But then, what answer was there to the German Christians 
ZKRVDLGWKDWWKH\KDGDQµLQQHUH[SHULHQFH¶RIWhe war as a just or even a holy war? It is 
VXUHO\FOHDUWKDWKHUHZHKDYHWKHEXLOGLQJEORFNVRI%DUWK¶VODWHUWKHRORJLFDOGHYHORSPHQW
in which he sought to develop an antithesis between what is naturally accessible in human 
experience on the one hand and the true ground of theology on the other.34 
 
However, what is perhaps not so easy to understand is a further transitional step, which 
KDG WRRFFXUEHIRUHHYHQWKHHDUOLHVWIRUPRI%DUWK¶VGLVWLQFWLYHWKHRORJ\ZRXOGHPHUJH
The step was his refusal to identLI\*RG¶VDFWLRQLQWKHZRUOGnot only with activity which 
was obviously sinful and destructive, namely war, but also with activity which seemed to 
Barth to be constructive - that is, socialist activity. Barth had been closely involved with 
Christian socialism in Switzerland, but distanced himself from it when he saw that it had    
a tendency to identify strands of the socialist movement with the kingdom or action of 
God. But why refuse to identify the action of God with any human activity, even when it  
is JRRGDQGVDOXWDU\"7KHDQVZHU,ZRXOGVXJJHVWLVWKDW%DUWK¶VH[SHULHQFHVVKRZHGKLP
how human action can seem good when it is in fact evil. What must have overshadowed 
%DUWK¶V WKLQNLQJ DERXW WKH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ *RG DQG WKH ZRUOG IURP QRZ RQ ZDV KRZ
natural it seemed to the Christians in Germany to equate the human sinful actions of the 
German war effort with the will of God himself. The situation demonstrated in a very 
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 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, p 113; Karl Barth-Martin Rade: ein Briefwechsel (Gütersloh: 
Gütersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1981), p 115. In this connection, it is worth quoting at length the 
IROORZLQJ SDVVDJH IURP RQH RI %DUWK¶V VHUPRQV RI  µ%XW QRZ VRPHRQH ZLOO VD\ \HV WKH ZDU LV
horrible, but yet it is of God if it is a matter of a just cause. For God helps those who are in the right. Yes, 
LQ WKLV ZD\ SHRSOH VHHN WR H[FXVH WKHPVHOYHV«$V IDUEDFNDVRQHFDQ WKLQN VHOI-seeking and pride on 
ERWKVLGHVKDYHEHHQWKHFDXVHLQHYHU\ZDU«7KDWLVYHU\FOHDULQWKHSUHVHQWZDU«2QHZLOOILQDOO\RQO\
be able to say: among the peoples of Europe at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries there was an immense ambitionDMHDORXV\DQGDSULGHZLWKRXWHTXDO«DQGWKHUHIRUHWKH\DUPHG
themselves against one another to the point of insanity, and therefore this world war finally had to erupt. 
2IDMXVWFDXVHRQHLWKHUVLGHWKHUHFDQKRQHVWO\EHQRWDON«All of these things are completely alien to the 
innermost being of God. And if they nevertheless take place, then there is only one explanation for it: the 
innermost being of God is also completely alien to humankind.¶ &LWHG LQ 0F&RUPDFN Dialectical 
Theology, pp 114-5 - emphasis mine, referring to Barth, Predigten 1914 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 
1974), pp 463-5. 
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dramatic and sinister way how Christian theology and Christian belief can be caught up in 
the problem that people can deceive themselves into thinking that evil actions are good or 
at least necessary for the greater good. In response to this, Barth came to the view that no 
human activity should be considered in itself good and willed by God*RG¶VZLOOPXVWEH
FRQVLGHUHG DV D FULWLFDO SULQFLSOH RYHU DJDLQVW ZKDW VHHPV WR EH µJRRG¶ KXPDQ DFWLRQ
(religion, socialism, reform etc.); even the best human action must be open to being 
exposed as being (at least in part) evil masquerading as good.35 
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 There are two closely related passages in which Barth explains how the First World War demonstrated 
that what appears to be scholarly, cultured ethical reflection can actually be a mask for ethical self-
justification2QHRI WKHVHSDVVDJHVDSSHDUV LQ%DUWK¶V OHFWXUHVRIZKHUHKH LVFRPPHQWLQJRQWKH
JHQHUDOHWKLFDOTXHVWLRQIRUPXODWHGVLPSO\DVµ:KDWRXJKWZHWRGR"¶µWas sollen wir tun?¶µ(VSHFLDOO\
in times of a strong and definite cultural will, as in the period from the beginning of the century to the first 
world war and well into the war itself, ethical reflection can easily not be meant very seriously in the sense 
that in it - one has only to think of the products of war theologians of all countries - the content of the 
imperative that is apparently sought is fixed from the very outset in the form of specific practices whose 
goodness is no longer open to discussion, being known only too well, so that the factual result of ethical 
UHIOHFWLRQLVREYLRXVO\WKHHWKLFDOMXVWLI\LQJRIDPRUHRUOHVVFRPSDFW³This LVZKDWZHGR´>'DV wollen 
wir tun@¶%DUWKEthics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), p 68.) The other passage (or passages) is found in 
an address of µ7KH3UREOHPRI(WKLFV7RGD\¶LQThe Word of God and the Word of Man (Gloucester, 
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1978), pp 143-6 (136- µ7R FRPH GRZQ WR IDFWV WKH SHFXOLDULW\ RIRXU WLPH LV
that, in much greater measure than the time preceding, it presents the problem of ethics as a real concern, 
that is, as a true problem¶ S  µ>2@QH FDQQRW SRVVLEO\ DYRLG WKLQNLQJ WKDW ZH IDFH LW LQ D PRUH
SHUSOH[HGHPEDUUDVVHGDQGXQFHUWDLQZD\ WKDQ WKHJHQHUDWLRQRIGLG¶ S µ7KHUHZDVDWLPH
[i.e. beIRUH @ ZKHQ WKH HWKLFDO SUREOHP«ZDV WKH NLQG RUGLQDULO\ FDOOHG DFDGHPLF :KDWHYHU
pessimists, grumblers, literati DQG RWKHU H[FLWHG RQHV PLJKW ILQG REMHFWLRQDEOH«KHUH ZDV \HW D KXPDQ
culture building itself up in orderly fashion in politics, economics and science, theoretical and applied, 
progressing steadily along its whole front, interpreted and ennobled by art, and through its morality and 
UHOLJLRQUHDFKLQJZHOOEH\RQGLWVHOIWRZDUG\HWEHWWHUGD\V«)XQGDPHQWDOO\LWZDVDPDWWHUQRWRIDVNLQJ
what to GRDVLIWKDWZHUHQRWNQRZQ¶Sµ>,@QZKDW«UHFRJQLVHGHWKLFVRIWKRVHGD\VGRZHILQGWKH
question, What ought we to do? [Was sollen wir tun?] leading up to anything but an almost perfectly 
obvious answer, We ought to do this [Das wollen wir tun] - something which, in the state, in society, or in 
WKHFKXUFKZDVDOUHDG\EHLQJGRQH«"¶SS-6.) I believe these passages set the scene for how the First 
World War awakened Barth to the problem of corporate self-deception (viz. ethics as a form of 
corporate/cultural self-justification). When we bear in mind that these passages are commenting on the 
TXHVWLRQµWas sollen wir tun?¶WKHQLWFDQEHGHPRQVWUDWHGZLWKUHDVRQDEOHFHUWDLQW\WKDWWKHUHLVDFORVH
OLQNEHWZHHQ WKHVHSDVVDJHVDQG%DUWK¶VGHSDUWXUe from religious socialism. For, as McCormack relates, 
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I find that all of this leads me, at least provisionally, to the conclusion that we are unlikely 
WREHULJKWLIZHUHDG%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\DVLIKLVWKHRFHQWULFRUFKULVWRFHQWULFFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
gave a secondary and non-constitutive rôle to the social and political problems connected 
with human evil. To put it another way, I think it wrong to say that Barth in no way makes 
a theological criterion of what is generally accessible to human experience. It is a common 
feature of human experience, and something genuinely accessible to human knowledge as 
such, that human evil is self-deceptive; that is, human evil conceals and perpetuates itself 
through distorted representations of what is good and evil, of where the real dividing line 
between good and evil lies. Indeed, this is the most virulent form of evil, operating like a 
cancer, because it turns even the best of intentions into a force for evil. Thus, it can be 
counterproductive in the fight against evil to appeal to the common conscience and to 
SHRSOH¶VQDWXUDOVHQVHRIZURQJDQGULJKWWKLVLVWRGRWKHHQHP\¶VZRUN5DWKHURXUILUVW
line of attack must be against SHRSOH¶VQDWXUDOVHQVHRIZURQJDQGULJKW$QGVRDOWKRXJK
this responsibility is grounded in a generally accessible truth about the nature of evil (i.e. 
that it is self-deceptive), it comes to fight against what seem to be generally accessible 
truths about the nature of evil. 
 
7KHJURXQGRI%DUWK¶VGLDOHFWLFRIUHYHODWLRQ 
 
I have reiterated all this to show why I believe that the principle which underOLHV%DUWK¶V
dialectic of revelation is already present in a relative way in something which is generally 
accessible to human knowledge quite apart from God. The real and primary reason why 
*RG¶V UHYHODWLRQ KDV WR XQGHUJR D GLDOHFWLF RI YHLOLQJ DQG XQYHLOLng is not because of   
                                                                                                                                                                     
Barth departed from religious socialism on account of his disillusionment with a particular religious 
socialist, namely L.Ragaz, who also believed he had direct, straightforward answers to the question µWas 
sollen wir tun?¶- DQGWKHDERYHTXRWDWLRQVVKRZWKDWWKLVZDVSUHFLVHO\%DUWK¶VSUREOHPZLWKWKH*HUPDQ\
of the First World War. (See McCormack, Dialectical Theology, pp 122- FRPSDUH DOVR µ7KH
5LJKWHRXVQHVV RI *RG¶ LQ The Word of God and the Word of Man, p 16 (9- ,Q VXP %DUWK¶V
disillusionment with socialist ethics is almost certainly related to the impact of the First World War on his 
WKLQNLQJ :H VKRXOG DOVR QRWH WKDW 0F&RUPDFN GDWHV WKH HPHUJHQFH RI %DUWK¶V GLVWLQFWLYH WKHRFHQWULF
theology from this point (i.e. his disillusionment with religious socialism in the person of Ragaz). 
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some abstract distance between God and man (finite/infinite,36 time/eternity)37 but for the 
specific and concrete reason of human sin WR LGHQWLI\ *RG¶V UHYHODWLRQ ZLWK DQ\WKLQJ
familiar or accessible within human experience would mean WKDW *RG¶V UHYHODWLRQ LV
compromised with the very sin from which it is intended to save us. It is for this reason 
WKDW*RG¶VUHYHODWLRQPXVWPDLQWDLQDFULWLFDOGLVWDQFHIURPWKHYHU\IRUPVWKURXJKZKLFK
God chooses to reveal himself - because however fitting something might seem to us to be 
a vehicle of divine revelation, it might always in fact be evil masquerading as good. But, 
my main point is this: the principle which underlies this is accessible to human 
understanding quite apart from God i.e. the principle that evil engages in deliberate 
misrepresentations of its own nature. 
 
)RU PH %DUWK¶V SHFXOLDU VWDWXUH LV WKDW KH ZDV DEOH WR EULQJ D JHQHUDO DZDUHQHVV RI WKH
self-deceptive character of human evil into the particular context and sphere of Christian 
theology - that is, he addressed the problem that the self-deceptive character of sin infects 
the very categories and thought forms which the Christian must use to express his/her faith 
in a scientific or even intelligible manner. He addressed the problem that it infects those 
truths which are held to be self-evident by even or especially the most cultured and 
UHOLJLRXVPHPEHUVRIVRFLHW\7KHTXHVWLRQZKLFK%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\LVLQWHQGHGWRDQVZHULV
- given that sin is of such a nature and of such a power, what does it mean to say that God 
forgives us, heals us, guides and leads us from sin? What does it mean to say that he does 
this for us in Christ? But the fact that sin or human evil is of such a nature is knowable 
through generally valid arguments, and Barth does not try to see beyond this; this 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQLVHIIHFWLYHO\H[HPSWIURP%DUWK¶VSROHPLFDJDLQVWJHQHUDOO\YDOLGFDWHJRULHV
of thought and knowledge. 
                                                        
36
 cf CD I/1, p 407, where Barth prefers the expression homo peccator non capax verbi divini to the more 
abstract finitum non capax infiniti (also pp 220-1). 
37
 cf 0F&RUPDFN¶VVWDWHPHQWGUDZLQJRQ%HLQWNHUWKDWWKHµGLDOHFWLFRIWLPHDQGHWHUQLW\>LQRomans, 2nd 
HG@ LV HPSOR\HG DV D FRQFHSWXDO DSSDUDWXV IRU EHDULQJ ZLWQHVV WRZKDW LV LQ IDFWD VRWHULRORJLFDO WKHPH¶
(Dialectical Theology, p 12; M.Beintker, Die DialHNWLN LQ GHU µGLDOHNWLVFKHQ 7KHRORJLH¶ .DUO %DUWKV 
0QLFK&KU.DLVHU9HUODJ,QJHQHUDO,WKLQNLWDPLVWDNHWRUHDGWKHµWLPH-HWHUQLW\¶GLVWLQFWLRQ
DVWKHSULPDU\IHDWXUHRI%DUWK¶VRomans, DQGXQIRUWXQDWHO\WKLVPLVWDNHXQGHUOLHV-HQVRQ¶VUHDding (God 
after God: the God of the Past and the Future as Seen in the Work of Karl Barth (Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp 291-2 - cf Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, pp 17-8, 22, 291 n.5).  
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In so far as my proposal thus far depends on there being a close relationship between 
BartK¶VWKHRORJ\DQGSROLWLFDORUVRFLDOSUREOHPVZHFDQVD\WKDWWKHLVVXHKDVEHHQUDLVHG
before in 0DUTXDUGW¶V thesis and in the controversy he has provoked.38 Certainly, the 
JHQHUDO LGHDWKDW%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ZDVFORVHO\UHODWHGWRSUREOHPVDQGLVVXHVGUDZn from 
the social/political sphere, and, in a real sense, actually grounded in them - is obviously 
very congenial to my thesis. And yet - it seems to me that even though this general issue 
has been raised, yet no-one has yet been concerned specifically with the rôle of sin in 
%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\DVVRPHWKLQJZKLFKmanifests itself in the social/political sphere. At any 
rate, I do not think I have seen this approach in the main strands of scholarship on Barth. 
In fact, there is if anything a reverse emphasis: µVLQ¶DVVXFKHPSKDWLFDOO\GRHVQRWDSSHDU
WR SOD\ D FRQVWLWXWLYH U{OH LQSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LW DSSHDUVDVRQHDPRQJ
other theological concepts which are made relative and secondary in the light of Christ.39 
 
Of course, the writers concerned could point to explicit statements in the Dogmatics, 
where Barth states that sin can only be understood in the light of Christ.40 And so, it  
would seem, if Barth sometimes appears to rely on a generally intelligible aspect of sin  
(i.e. that it is self-deceptive), this should be understood in the context of these more central 
theological statements. And so, this is why I have made use of a conceptual    
clarification, to show that these (supposedly) more central statements need not be based 
on a prior conviction that all theology must be undertaken on the basis of Christ alone - 
rather, such statements can be based on a characteristic of sin itself. That is, the self-
                                                        
38
 See F.-W.Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Barths (Münich: Chr. Kaiser-
Verlag, 31985 (1972)); G.Hunsinger (ed.), Karl Barth and Radical Politics. For a recent detailed 
HODERUDWLRQ RI 0DUTXDUGW¶V DSSURDFK VHH 7*RUULQJH Karl Barth against Hegemony (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
39
 e.g. especially Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, pp 160-1, but also, even more notably, E.Jüngel, 
ZKRLQKLVV\VWHPDWLFZRUNXQGHUVWRRGDVDGHYHORSPHQWRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\VHHVVLQDVDGHULYDWLYHRI
WKHFRQFHSWRI µQRWKLQJQHVV¶DQG LQ WXUQ VHHV WKHFRQFHSWRIµQRWKLQJQHVV¶DVDGHULYDWLYHRIWKH7ULQLW\
(God as the Mystery of the World (GLQEXUJK7	7&ODUNSQ7KXVµVLQ¶DSSHDUVWREH
doubly derivative of a primary aspect of revelation (the Trinity). 
40
 Hunsinger makes reference to CD IV/1, pp 360-DOWKRXJK,EHOLHYHWKDWHYHQKHUH%DUWK¶VSRLQWLVWKDW
sin distorts the self-NQRZOHGJH RI KXPDQLW\ IRU KH ZULWHV µ$FFHVV WR WKH NQRZOHGJH WKDW KH >PDQ@ LVD
VLQQHULVODFNLQJWRPDQEHFDXVHKHLVDVLQQHU¶ 
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deceptive character of sin means that its true character can only be grasped where sin is 
dealt with; and, because it is dealt with in Christ according to the understanding of the 
Christian faith, there arises consequently the theological position that sin can only be 
grasped on the basis of Christ. Hence, although Barth does state that the truth about sin 
can only be known through Christ, I do not believe this undermines my thesis that it is his 
view of the self-GHFHSWLYHFKDUDFWHURIVLQZKLFKXQGHUOLHVKLVµGLDOHFWLF¶RIUHYHODWLRQ 
 
However, I would freely admit that my proposed way of understanding the Church 
Dogmatics RU %DUWK¶V GLVWLQFWLYH WKHRORJLFDO DSSURDFK LV LQ QR ZD\ VHOI-evident. I 
recognise how easy it is, with a writer as prolific and subtle as Barth, to label certain 
SDVVDJHV DV µSDUWLFXODUO\ LOOXPLQDWLQJ¶ DQG WKHQ WR SURFHHG WR LQWHUSUHW DOO RI %DUWK¶V
theology on the basis of a few, selected passages - all the while giving insufficient attention 
to other texts which seem to say different or even opposite things.41 In the present case, 
there are passages which seem to say that the problem of sin determines the development 
of his christocentric theology, but there are other passages which seem to say that sin can 
only be viewed retrospectively from the perspective of a fully developed chistocentric 
theology (that is, sin can only be understood in the light of Christ). More to the point for 
this thesis and for Christ and Adam, we can see that over against the passages where the 
SUREOHP RI VLQ VHHPV WR GHWHUPLQH %DUWK¶V FKULVWRORJ\ WKHUH DUH RWKHU SDVVDJHV ZKHUH
%DUWK¶V FKULVWRORJ\ VHHms to relate to the original created goodness of humanity, 
XQWRXFKHG E\ VLQ 7KHVH ODWWHU SDVVDJHV VXJJHVW WKDW %DUWK¶V FKULVWRORJ\ WUDQVFHQGV WKH
question of sin and the need for redemption from sin, and hence also seem contrary to 
those passages - on which I am relying - where the problem of sin appears determinative 
IRU%DUWK¶VFKULVWRORJ\ But in view of this variety, how does anyone ensure that they are 
not being selective in their reading of Barth, and that the appropriate balance between the 
different kinds of statements has been maintained?42 
                                                        
41
 µ$VZLWKIRUexample) Aquinas and Calvin, so with Barth: the interpretation of a corpus of such range 
DQG GHSWK LV SDUWLFXODUO\ H[SRVHG WR EHLQJ VNHZHG E\VHOHFWLRQDQGSDUWLDOLW\«DQGE\RYHU-eagerness to 
make constructive use of ill-digested accounts of some or other RIWKHLUSUHRFFXSDWLRQV¶:HEVWHUBarth, p 
168.) 
42
 , ILQG 36FKHPSS¶V FRPPHQWV UHOHYDQW WR WKLV SRLQW µ«>%@HFDXVH RI WKH ZLGH UDGLXV RI %DUWK¶V
theology, it would be a miracle if almost every theologian could not count off a few points at which he 
could WULXPSKDQWO\ VD\ ³7KDW LV ZKDW , KDYH DOUHDG\ µDGYRFDWHG¶ IRU D ORQJ WLPH´«,W ZRXOG DOVR EH D
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In view of this problem, I have made use of a comment on the life-VHWWLQJ RI %DUWK¶V
theology, to attempt to make concrete sense of his more abstract statements and, more 
importantly, to try to identify the concrete principles or struggles which underlie the 
VHHPLQJO\ GLVSDUDWH VWDWHPHQWV ,Q SDUWLFXODU WKH EDFNJURXQG RI %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LQ WKH
crisis of the social upheavals and mass destruction of the First World War gives plausibility 
to my program of giving emphasis to his statements on sin, and of relating these 
specifically to socio-political issues. However, in itself this only lends plausibility to my 
SURJUDPWKLVVWDUWLQJSRLQWPXVWEHJLYHQFRQILUPDWLRQLQ%DUWK¶VRZQZRUGVDQGOLQHVRI
argument. 
 
It is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an argument based on all of 
%DUWK¶VWKHRORJLFDORXWSXWRURQDOORIWKHDogmatics. Rather, my method will be to take 
examples of both kinds of seemingly disparate statements on the subject of sin and show 
how they are structurally related in specific instances. It will be seen as we proceed that 
both kinds of statements appear in Christ and Adam, and so part of my task will be to 
show how they are related in this essay. However, when I turn to the actual content of 
Christ and Adam in my next chapter, I will not initially make this question an explicit 
theme, but will return to this question once my analysis is basically complete, and will then 
seek to demonstrate that my presuppositions in reading Barth are justified in the course of 
my analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
PLUDFOH LI HDFK RQH FRXOG QRW DOVR WKLQN KH ILQGV LQ %DUWK KLV RZQ IRH«¶ µ0DUJLQDO *ORVVHV RQ
%DUWKLDQLVP¶LQ-05RELQVRQHGThe Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, p 193 (191-200)). 
 51 
 
Chapter Three - %DUWK¶V([HJHVLVRI5RPDQV 
 
Introduction 
 
%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVRI5RPDQVDVLWDSSHDUVLQKLVVPDOOERRNChrist and Adam: Man and 
Humanity in Romans 5, is introduced to us by British Barthians T.F.Torrance and 
-.65HLG DV D µVWULNLQJ SLHFH RI WKHRORJLFDO H[HJHVLV¶ DQG PRUH SRVLWLYHO\ DV D
µSHQHWUDWLQJDFFRXQWRIWKH%LEOLFDODQG&KULVWLDQGRFWULQHRIPDQ¶1 Yet this same exegesis 
.lVHPDQQFDOOVµJURWHVTXH¶2 %XOWPDQQFDOOVDµIRUFHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶3 and Jüngel refers to 
DV µeigenwillig¶4 It has also received detailed criticism from the conservative theologian 
-RKQ0XUUD\DORQJ WKHVDPH OLQHV MXGJLQJLWVPDLQSRLQWVWREHµH[WUDQHRXVDQGDOLHQWR
WKHHPSKDVLVRI WKHSDVVDJH¶5 More or less the same point is made by Brandenburger in 
his full length study on the passage.6 
 
No doubt each of these theologians approach the passage with their own theological 
perspective, perspectives which differ from that of Barth - and hence one might expect 
differences from Barth in their exegesis. However these are very similar testimonies 
coming from different theologians. Hence the difficulty does not seem to be one of 
theological perspective. And these very different theologians all seem to be accusing   
BDUWKRIµHLVHJHVLV¶RIUHDGLQJWKLQJVLQWRWKHSDVVDJHDOWRJHWKHUWKLVUDLVHVWKHVXVSLFLRQ
that Barth has violated the actual content of the text itself, and that in a particularly 
obvious way. And the fact that one of these theologians - Eberhard Jüngel - is known to  
be very close to Barth as a theologian, surely reinforces my point, for if a theologian who 
is close to Barth rejects his exegesis as forced and unreasonable, there is probably 
                                                        
1
 (GLWRUV¶)RUHZRUGRIChrist and Adam. 
2
 E. Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (London: SCM Press, 1980), p 143. 
3
 µ$GDP DQG &KULVW DFFRUGLQJ WR 5RPDQV ¶ LQ .ODVVHQ6Q\GHU (ed.), Current Issues in New Testament 
Interpretation (London: SCM Press, 1962), p 163 (143-165). 
4
 µ'DV *HVHW] ]ZLVFKHQ $GDP XQG &KULVWXV HLQH WKHRORJLVFKH 6WXGLH ]X 5|P  -¶ LQ (-QJHO
Unterwegs zur Sache (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972), p 147 (145-72). 
5
 The Epistle to the Romans (London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott; 1967), p 390 (Volume I). 
6
 Adam und Christus. Exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Röm 5,12-21 (1 Kor 15) 
(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1962), p 278. 
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something in the criticism. Notably, Jüngel even makes a sympathetic reference to the 
theology of Christ and Adam in his book entitled Karl Barth: a Theological Legacy, 
which makes it all the more striking that he nevertheless thinks very little of the exegesis 
which supposedly underlies this theology.7 
 
My point is DOVR UHLQIRUFHGDOEHLW LQGLUHFWO\E\&KDUOHV&UDQILHOG¶VXQFULWLFDO VXSSRUWRI
%DUWK¶VSRVLWLRQ8 7KLVLVEHFDXVH&UDQILHOG¶VVXSSRUWGRHVQRWVHHPWREHZHOOLQWHJUDWHG
into the main body of his exegesis; Cranfield does not appear to be either defending or 
expounding the actual details RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVDQGWKLVOHDYHVRQHZLWKWKHLPSUHVVLRQ
RI D JHQHUDO WKHRORJLFDO OR\DOW\ RQ &UDQILHOG¶V SDUW UDWKHU WKDQ ZLWK DQ LPSUHVVLRQ WKDW
%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVKDVDFWXDOO\PHDVXUHGXSWRVFKRODUO\FULWLFDOH[HJHVLs.9 
 
All in all, this brief review of responses to Christ and Adam bears witness to the general 
SUREOHPVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVZKLFK,ZURWHDERXWLQP\ILUVWFKDSWHUWKHSUREOHPLVWKDW
Barth seems to engage in unconvincing and unnatural exegesis, specifically by forcing his 
SULRUGRJPDWLFFRQFOXVLRQVRQWRWKHWH[W,WKLQNWKDWLWZLOOEHFRPHDSSDUHQWZK\%DUWK¶V
exegesis of our passage seems so unnatural to such differing theologians as we turn from 
this cloud of contrary witnesses to a summary of what his exegesis actually contains.  
 
%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVJHQHUDOIHDWXUHV 
 
In my thesis I am mainly concerned with the exegesis of the second part of Romans 5, 
verses 12-21. And indeed what Barth has to say seems to concern chiefly this second  
part. This is shown by the title itself, Christ and Adam; for plainly the Christ-Adam or 
Adam-Christ parallel appears explicitly only in this second part, vv 12-21. But also, it is 
                                                        
7
 Karl Barth: a Theological Legacy, p 50. 
8
 A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Volume I (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1975), pp 294-5; 269.  
9
 See J. Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, p 43, who identifies Cranfield and Barrett as exegetes 
who are influenced by loyalty to Barth, in connection with passages relating to natural theology. In the 
SUHVHQWSDVVDJH%DUUHWW¶VH[HJHVLVVHHPVWREHPRUHLQIOXHQFHGE\%DUWK¶VHDUOLHUH[HJHVLVLQThe Epistle 
to the Romans, 2nd ed., than by the exegesis under consideration here (C.K.Barrett, A Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans (London: A&C Black, 21991 (1957)), p 109). 
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shown by the relative amount of space and attention to textual detail which Barth expends 
on this second part.10  So I will begin with a brief outline of the content of these verses, 
Romans 5:12-21. 
 
As already indicated, this passage seems to concern a parallel between Adam and Christ. 
$GDP¶VRQHDFWRIGLVREHGLHQFHLQHDWLQJWKHIRUELGGHQIUXLWbrings sin and death to many; 
VLPLODUO\&KULVW¶VDFWRIREHGLHQFHLQWDNLQJXSWKHFURVVEULQJVULJKWHRXVQHVVDQGOLIHWR
many. It would seem that Paul wishes to bring out the parallel between these two states of 
affairs - that in both cases the situation, condition or fate of the many is determined by the 
action of the one. Barth notes that this parallel forms a crucial aspect of our passage. 
µ7KLVSDUDOOHOPXVWILUVWEHVHHQDVVXFK,QERWKFDVHVWKHUHLVWKHRQHDQGLQERWKWKH
many, all PHQ¶11 
 
And yet, before noting this surely very obvious point, it becomes clear that Barth wishes 
to argue that the real point of the passage is not the parallel between Adam and Christ, 
but rather the paradigmatic priority of Christ over Adam. If I understand the drift of 
%DUWK¶V DUJXPHQWV FRUUHFWO\ , WKLQN KH PHDQV WKDW ZKHQ SHRSOH UHDG -21, they 
assume that Adam is the head of humanity as a whole and Christ is the head only of 
Christians. Barth wishes to argue, on the contrary, that Christ rather than Adam is the 
KHDGRIWKHRULJLQDOKXPDQLW\7KLVLVH[SUHVVHGLQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPVµ0DQ¶VHVVHQWLDO
DQGRULJLQDOQDWXUHLVWREHIRXQG«QRWLQ$GDPEXWLQ&KULVW,Q$GDPZHFDQRQO\ILQG
it prefigured. Adam can therefore be interpreted only in the light of Christ and not the 
RWKHUZD\URXQG¶12 Here it can be seen very clearly that the order of the title, Christ and 
Adam, is plainly deliberate, and indeed, programmatic. 
                                                        
10
 )XUWKHULQ%DUWK¶VA Shorter Commentary on Romans (London: SCM Press, 1959), he refers the reader 
to Christ and Adam at the beginning of his exposition of 5:12-21, and not at the beginning of his 
exposition of chapter 5 as a whole (p 61). 
11
 Christ and AdamS,VKRXOGQRWHDWWKLVSRLQWWKDW6PDLO¶VWUDQVODWLRQZKLFK,KDYHXVHGLVFOHDUO\D
paraphrase of the original; however, I think his translation sufficiently representV%DUWK¶VPHDQLQJIRUP\
purposes - with one very important exception which I will mention below. The original from which page 
references are taken is Rudolf Bultmann: ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen/Christus und Adam nach Röm 5: 
zwei theologische Studien (i.e. the 1964 edition). 
12
 Christ and Adam, p 6. 
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$QGVRZHKDYHKHUH%DUWK¶VFHQWUDOFRQFOXVLRQWKDW&KULVWUDWKHUWKDQ$GDPUHSUHVHQWV
the RULJLQDOQDWXUHRIPDQDQGDVZHSURFHHGWRDQDO\VH%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLQPRUHGHWDLO
we will find the basic point expressed in different forms - e.g. that Christ is original and 
Adam derived or copy, that Christ and not Adam is the head of all of humanity, and that 
Christ is the primary anthropological ordering principle, and Adam the secondary, and so 
on. We will, of course, need to take a closer look at what exactly, in concrete terms, is 
meant by these statements. But first I would like to make a more detailed examination of 
how Barth believes he can derive them from the text itself. 
 
%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVVSHFLILFIHDWXUHV 
 
$UJXDEO\ WKHVWUDQJHVWDQGVHHPLQJO\PRVWLQGHIHQVLEOHDVSHFWRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLVKLV
sustained conclusion that it is not Adam, but Christ, who truly stands at the head of all of 
humanity. The relationship which all of humanity sustains to Adam is truly and rightly 
understood only in terms of their more original relation to Christ.13 
 
Barth does not seem to mean simply that it is Christ and not Adam to whom all men are 
related as their representative. Rather, he seems to be saying that Adam is the 
representative of all of humanity, but only by virtue of the fact that Christ is also the 
representative of humanity; the relation of all men to Adam is derived from and is 
dependent on their more original and primary relation to Christ. The relationship of the 
one to the many in Adam does exist, but only because the relation of the one to the many 
in Christ exists. 
 
Barth supports this thesis, which in any case does not appear to have very much meaning, 
by a number of exegetical points which seem in themselves to be very strained and 
artificial. 
 
 
 
                                                        
13
 Christ and Adam, pp 9-10. 
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The relationship of 5:12-21 to 5:1-11 
 
2QHRIWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWVRI%DUWK¶VVXSSRUWLQJDUguments is the way he relates 
the first and second halves of Romans 5 to each other. However, I have to confess here 
WKDW , ILQG %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV VR EL]DUUH DW WKLV SRLQW WKDW LW LV YHU\ GLIILFXOW DQG SHUKDSV
impossible, to give a clear and perspicuous summary of his arguments. I think, however, 
that it is possible to pick out the following point: it would appear to any casual reader of 
vv 12-21 that Paul has a basically antithetical parallel in mind, that in the Adam-sphere 
we have sin and the consequent death, but in the Christ-sphere we have righteousness 
and the consequent life etc. And yet, Barth challenges this natural assumption, and claims 
that the two spheres are not as antithetical as they seem. Specifically, although the Adam 
side seems to be simSO\ QHJDWLYH DQG FHQWUHG RQ µGDPQDWLRQ¶ QHYHUWKHOHVV &KULVW DV
Saviour is actually present even on the Adam side, albeit in a hidden way. Thus even in 
WKH VWDWH RI VLQ LH µ$GDP¶ KXPDQLW\ LV DOUHDG\ LQFOXGHG LQ WKH SRVLWLYH OLIH-centred) 
sphere of ChULVW¶VVDOYDWLRQ 
 
Now, Barth argues this by relating the two parts of Romans 5 in a particular way. That is, 
KH WDNHV 3DXO¶V VWDWHPHQW LQ Y  WKDW µ&KULVW GLHG IRU XV ZKLOH ZH ZHUH \HW VLQQHUV¶ WR
mean that even in the state of sin we are already included in the sphere of Christ; he then 
reads this into vv 12-21, and thus states that even when we were sinners in Adam we 
were already included in the sphere of salvation/Christ.14 
 
I do not think it necessary to argue in detail that the two parts of Romans 5 are not 
related in this way. But I think it is probably important to identify how this is related to 
%DUWK¶VFHQWUDOFRQFOXVLRQQDPHO\WKDW&KULVWLVWKHRULJLQDOKHDGRIKXPDQLW\DQG$GDP
is only copy or derivative. From what I can make out, the issue for Barth is as follows: he 
ZDQWV WR GHQ\ WR µ$GDP¶ DQ\ LQGHSHQGHQW UHDOLW\RYHUDJDLQVWRUSULRU WR&KULVW)RU LI
Adam has an independent sphere prior to Christ, then it might appear that Christ and his 
salvation would have to fit into the existing order already laid down by Adam; but if  
Barth can argue that Adam has no such independent reality over against Christ, and that 
&KULVW¶V VDYLQJDFWLYLW\ LVDOUHDG\SUHVHQW LQWKHVSKHUHRI$GDPWKHQLWFDQVRPHKRZ 
                                                        
14
 Christ and Adam, p 5; see also p 17. 
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be argued that Christ is the original to whicK$GDP¶VUHDOLW\KDVWRDGDSWLWVHOI,QWKHILUVW
case, Adam would be the head of the original humanity, and Christ the derivative; in the 
second case, which Barth endorses, Christ would be the original and Adam the derivative. 
Or so I understand the drifWRI%DUWK¶VDUJXPHQWV 
 
However, as a general comment, I would say that the exegetical basis is extremely weak 
at this point, for we surely cannot admit that Barth has given us any reason to conclude 
that Christ as Saviour is present in a hidden way on tKH µ$GDP VLGH¶ ,QGHHG %DUWK¶V
arguments at this point seem to me to be verging on the nonsensical. 
 
Adam as a type of Christ 
 
Barth takes note of an expression Paul uses in v 14, that Adam is a type (tÚpoj) of the 
one who is to come - XQGRXEWHGO\WKHµRQHWRFRPH¶EHLQJ&KULVW%DUWKUHDGVµW\SH¶DV
meaning something like copy, and hence understands our relationship to Adam as only a 
copy of our relationship to Christ. Again we have the conclusion, that our relationship to 
Adam is derivative of our relatiRQVKLSWR&KULVWµWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ$GDPDQGXV
reveals not the primary but only the secondary anthropological truth and ordering 
principle. The primary anthropological truth and ordering principle, which only mirrors 
itself in that relationship, is made clear only through the relationship between Christ and 
XV¶15 
 
%XWVXUHO\LWVHHPVSHUIHFWO\QDWXUDOLQGHHGPRUHQDWXUDOWRWDNHWKHH[SUHVVLRQµW\SH¶
in such a way as to see our respective relationships with Adam and with Christ as 
standing over against each other; they resemble each other and illuminate each other. 
7KHUHVHHPVWREHQRUHDVRQWRVHHWKLVZRUGµtÚpoj¶DVHVWDEOLVKLQJVRPHNLQGRISULRULW\
LQWKLVUHVHPEODQFHWKHXVHRIµtÚpoj¶LPSOLHVWKDW$GDPUHVHPEOHV&KULVWLQKLVUHODWLRQ
aVRQH WR WKHPDQ\EXWGRHVQRW LPSO\ WKDW$GDP LV µRQO\¶ UHVHPEODQFHDQG&KULVW WKH
original.16 
                                                        
15
 Christ and Adam, p 6.  
16
 6R 0XUUD\ µ3DXO¶V WHDFKLQJ LQ WKLV SDVVDJH GRHV QRW HVWDEOLVK WKH SULPDF\ RU SULRULW\ ZKLFK %DUWK
claims for the relationship to Christ. Adam could be the type of Christ, as Paul says, without drawing all 
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The dissimilarity between the trespass of Adam and the gift of salvation in Christ 
 
Barth also takes note of the fact that Paul wishes to qualify the parallel between Adam 
and Christ by saying that the salvation which comes through Christ is much greater than 
the condemnation which comes through Adam. It comes perhaps as no surprise that Barth 
interprets this as establishing the priority of the relationship of men to Christ over their 
relationship to Adam. Whether or not this is a correct interpretation is another matter. 
 
Barth is quite possibly correct in saying that Paul is arguing in v 15 that the gift of 
VDOYDWLRQLVJUHDWHUWKDQ$GDP¶VWUHVSDVVEHFDXVHRQWhe side of the gift God is involved; 
whereas on the side of the trespass it is only a man who is involved.17 Barth also seems to 
JHWLWULJKWZKHQKHVD\VRUVR,VXSSRVHKHLVVD\LQJWKDWWKHJUHDWQHVVRI*RG¶VJLIWLV
VHHQ LQ WKH IDFW WKDW LW GRHVQ¶W VLmply provide a neutral alternative to sin, but actually 
defeats sin or brings pardon for sin when sin has already arrived on the scene.18 But what 
LV VR YHU\ VWUDQJH LQ %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LV WKDW KH VHHPV WR WKLQN WKDW WKLV YHU\ UHDO
superiority and superior power of grace over sin somehow entails a kind of logical 
superiority, so that our relationship to Adam is logically dependent on our relationship to 
Christ.  
 
This non sequitur of reasoning is most plainly illustrated in two sentences found on page 
12 of Christ and AdamZLWKWKHZRUGVµ3DXOLVQRWGHQ\LQJWKDW$GDP¶VVLQVWLOOEULQJV
                                                                                                                                                                     
the inferences which Barth elicits from this relationship. All that could feasibly be derived from the 
typological datum mentioned in verse 14 and applied expressly in the succeeding verses is simply that 
there is an analogy between our relation to Adam in the realm of sin and death and our relation to Christ 
in the realm of righteousness and life. In the absence of additional data it is an importation, adopted on our  
RZQUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRLQIHUPRUH¶The Epistle to the Romans, p 388 (Volume I).) Bultmann even goes so 
IDUKRZHYHUDVWRLQIHUWKHRSSRVLWHWR%DUWKE\WUDQVODWLQJWKXVµWKHSURWRW\SHRIWKHFRPLQJ$GDP¶ - 
which gives the priority to the relationship of Adam WRDOOPHQRYHUWKDWRI&KULVWµ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶S
163.) Whether or not this is correct, it at least illustrates that the resemblance between the two relations is 
reversible. 
17
 Christ and Adam, p 10. 
18
 Christ and Adam, pp 12-3. 
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death to all men, but he is affirming that the grace of Christ has an incomparably greater 
SRZHUWRPDNHWKHVHGHDGPHQDOLYH¶- so much we can understand, so much we can even 
DFFHSW %XW WKH QH[W VHQWHQFH UHDGV µ+H >3DXO@ LV QRW VD\LQJ WKDW WKHUH LV QR WUXWK LQ
Adam, but he is saying that it is a subordinate truth that depends for its validity on its 
FRUUHVSRQGHQFH ZLWK WKH ILQDO WUXWK WKDW LV LQ &KULVW¶ 1RZ - we can say that we are 
dependent as human beings on our relation to Christ because of our relation to Adam - 
ZHQHHG&KULVW¶VVDOYDWLRQEHFDXVHZHDUHORVWLQ$GDP%XWGRHVWKDWPHDQWKDWWKHtruth 
that we have this relation to Adam depends for its validity on the truth that we also have a 
relation to Christ? There seems to be a particularly tortuous confusion between reality and 
logic at work here.19 
 
3DXO¶Va fortiori argument 
 
%DUWKJHWVLQWRHYHQGHHSHUZDWHULQKLVWUHDWPHQWRI3DXO¶Va fortiori argument of vv 15 
& +HVD\VULJKWO\WKDWZKHUHYHUWKHH[SUHVVLRQµKRZPXFKPRUH¶(pollù m©llon) is 
used, then we have a situation where the same principle is operative on both sides, but 
which is for some reason more strongly operative on the second side. An example of this 
ZRXOGEHµLI,FRXOGGULYHVDIHO\ZKHQ,¶GMXVWSDVVHGP\WHVW³KRZPXFKPRUH´ZLOO,EH
DEOH WR ZKHQ ,¶YH JRW WHQ \HDUV H[SHULHQFH EHKLQG PH¶ 7KH GLIIHUHQFH LV QRW EHWZHHQ
                                                        
19
 These two sentences which we have just considered are actually a single sentence in the original, which 
6PDLOKDVSDUDSKUDVHGDVWZR7KHRULJLQDOVHQWHQFHLVDVIROORZVµ'DGLH$GDPVZDKUKHLWYRP6WHUEHQ
aller Menschen in Adams Sünde ausgelöscht und nicht mehr in Betracht zu ziehen sei, wird hier nicht 
gesagt, wohl aber, daß sie mit der ihr gegenüberstehenden Christuswahrheit von der auf alle diese 
Gestorbenen überströmenden Gnade nicht zu vergleichen, daß sie unten und diese oben sei, daß sie nur 
noch überragt und EHOHXFKWHWYRQGLHVHU*HOWXQJKDEHQN|QQH¶Rudolf Bultmann/Christus und Adam, p 
82.) The German here is very difficult, and it is certainly impossible to provide an adequate translation 
without breaking it up into smaller sentences. However, I think the following would be closer to the 
RULJLQDOµ3DXOLVQRWVD\LQJWKDWWKHWUXWKRI$GDPZKLFKFRQFHUQVWKHGHDWKRIDOOPHQLQ$GDP¶VVLQLV
erased and does not need to be taken into consideration any longer. Rather, Paul is saying that the truth of 
Adam cannot be compared with the truth of Christ. This is because the truth of Christ which stands over 
against the truth of Adam concerns the grace which overflows onto all these dead men. Paul is saying that 
the truth of Adam is below, and the truth of Christ is above, and the truth of Adam can have validity only 
LQVRIDUDVLWLVH[FHHGHGDQGLOOXPLQDWHGE\WKHWUXWKRI&KULVW¶,WKLQNWKHFRQIXVLRQEHWZHHQUHDOLW\DQG
logic is still evident in this translation, in that from the superiority of Christ in actuality YL]WKHµJUDFH
ZKLFKRYHUIORZVRQWRDOOWKHVHGHDGPHQ¶%DUWKVHHPVWRLQIHUWKHVXSHULRULW\RIWKHµWUXWK¶ of Christ. 
 59 
 
inexperience and experience, but between some experience and more experience: as Barth 
VD\VµZHDUHGHDOLQJZLWKWZRWKLQJVWKDWIDOOXQGHUWKHVDPHRUGHULQJSULQFLSOHZKLFKLV
valid and recognisable in lesser degree on the one side and in greater degree on the other. 
Since it is already valid and recognisable even on the firsWVLGHLWPXVWEH³DOOWKHPRUH´
UHFRJQLVDEOHRQWKHRWKHUVLGHDVZHOO¶20 
 
%DUWKLQIHUVIURPWKLVSULQFLSOHWKDW&KULVW¶VVDYLQJUHODWLRQVKLSLVDOUHDG\SUHVHQWRQWKH
Adam side. The saving relation we sustain to Christ is already present, though in a hidden 
ZD\RQWKH$GDPVLGHµ,I WKHWUXWKLQ&KULVWKROGVJRRGLQWKHGDUNDQGDOLHQZRUOGRI
$GDP³KRZPXFKPRUH´GRHVLWKROGJRRGLQWKHZRUOGRI&KULVWZKHUHLWSURSHUO\DQG
RULJLQDOO\EHORQJV¶21 
 
Now, it is true that it is not clear what Paul means E\WKHµKRZPXFKPRUH¶H[SUHVVLRQ
which he makes use of in vv 15 & 17. How does it follow from the fact that death came 
WRWKHPDQ\IURPWKHRQHWKDWµDOOWKHPRUH¶PXVWOLIHFRPHWRWKHPDQ\IURPWKHRQH"6R
far as we can see, the same principle is operative on both sides, namely that the act of the 
one man pre-determines the fate of the many. So how does it follow that on one side, the 
side of life, this effect must be greater or more certain? 
 
As I noted above, I think that Barth has already stated the only reasons that are visible in 
the text: first of all that on the side of life God is involved (v 15), and second that the gift 
KDGWRVXUSDVVWKHHIIHFWRIWKHWUHVSDVVEHFDXVHWKHJLIWFDPHµDIWHUPDQ\WUHVSDVVHV¶DQG
hence it had to nullify the effects of past trespasses as well as bring into effect the future 
course of righteousness (v 16). Now - ZHPD\QRWWKLQN3DXO¶VUHDVRQLQJLVYHU\JRRGRQ
these points; we may not think Paul states it very clearly, but at least it seems to be 
present in the text, and gives us prima facie reason to suppose that it was what Paul had 
LQPLQG%XW%DUWK¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDW3DXOSUHVXSSRVHGDKLGGHQSUHVHQFHRI&KULVWRQWKH
side of Adam  - so that we could be all the more sure of his saving presence on the side  
                                                        
20
 Christ and Adam, p 19. 
21
 Christ and Adam, p 19. 
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of the gift, where he is not hidden - this seems to be without any support in the text; there 
seems to be no reason to think that Paul was thinking along these lines.22 
 
$W DQ\ UDWH %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV VHHPV WR EH JXLGHG KHUH E\ WKH SUHVXSSRVLWLRQ WKDW WKH
µUHODWLRQRIWKHRQHWRWKHPDQ\¶DVLWRFFXUVRQWKH$GDP-side, has its real and true origin 
only on the Christ-side, so that even on the Adam-VLGHZKHUHWKLVµRQH-PDQ\UHODWLRQ¶LV
mentioned it has christological and soteriological overtones. The fact that Christ and 
salvation are not mentioned at all on the Adam side does not mean for Barth that they are 
QRW WKHUH EXW PHUHO\ WKDW WKH\ DUH KLGGHQ :KDW %DUWK ZLOO QRW DGPLW LV WKDW WKH µRQH-
PDQ\¶UHODWLRQVKLS- this concept of the one man determining the fate of the many - might 
actually be a conceptual tool in its own right, with its own compelling clarity, which Paul 
applies with independently valid force to both the side of Adam and the side of Christ. 
 
6XPPDU\RIWKHSUREOHPVZLWK%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV 
 
To complete P\VXPPDU\RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV ,ZRXOGKDYH WRJRLQWRKLVDSSURDFKWR
3DXO¶VGLJUHVVLRQDERXWWKH0RVDLFODZLQYY-14 and v 20;23 and also his implicit use of 
WKH IDFW WKDW3DXOXVHV WKHH[SUHVVLRQ µDOO PHQ¶RQERWKVLGHVRI WKHSDUDOOHO LQYY-
19.24 Suffice to say that I do not find the same severity of exegetical difficulties in his 
treatment of these verses, although I think it does illustrate the tendency I have found in 
KLV H[HJHVLV VR IDU &HUWDLQO\ , GRQ¶W WKLQN ZH ZRXOG ILQG D FOXH WR HOLPLQating the 
problems I have highlighted up till now. 
 
 
                                                        
22
 0XUUD\ LV WKH RQO\ RQH , NQRZ RI ZKR DGGUHVVHV %DUWK¶V UHDVRQLQJ RQ WKLV SRLnt (The Epistle to the 
Romans, pp 389-90 (Volume I)), but unfortunately I think he misunderstands it; he seems to take Barth to 
PHDQ WKDW WKH VDYLQJ UHODWLRQ ZKLFK &KULVW EHDUV WR µDOO PHQ¶ IROORZV necessarily from the fact of their 
relation to Adam. But Barth seems to say almost the opposite, that the relation men bear to Adam follows 
from their relation to Christ; for example when he says that the truth in Adam is subordinate to and 
depends for its validity on the truth in Christ (Christ and Adam, p 12). 
23
 Christ and Adam, pp 24-41. 
24
 Christ and Adam, esp. p 42. 
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I think a fair summary of the problems we have encountered so far would be as follows: 
Barth persistently questions and interferes with the textual datum which seems to us to be 
so self-evident, namely that the concept of the relation of the one to the many has an 
independent validity which allows Paul to apply it with independent force to the cases of 
Adam and Christ. This is what lies behind the parallel between Adam and Christ; this and 
this alone makes the parallel intelligible. Yet Barth persistently says that the one-many 
relation belongs originally to Christ; and hence where it appears in Adam it is a derivative 
of where it occurs in Christ and hence it always points away from itself to Christ and to 
his saving truth. 
 
7KLV WRPHHQWDLOVD IDUPRUHVHULRXVSUREOHP WKDQ%DUWK¶VPRUHJHQHUDO VWDWHPHQW WKDW
the truth about humanity, about human nature, is to be found only in Christ and not in 
$GDPWKDWWRµILQGWKHWUXHDQGHVVHQWLDOQDWXUHRIPDQZHKave to look not to Adam the 
fallen man, but to Christ in whom what has fallen has been cancelled and what was 
RULJLQDOKDVEHHQUHVWRUHG¶25 For even if we disagree, it is at least intelligible to say that 
we can no longer find the true nature of man in Adam, because we know Adam only as 
fallen man in whom the original image of man has been perverted; we can only see this 
original image where it has been restored in Christ. Barth could find support for this view 
by a more or less traditional exegesis of Romans 5:12-21, showing how man as such is 
fallen by virtue of his relation to Adam, while perhaps laying more emphasis than is usual 
on the fact that Paul says nothing about an image of Adam or of created man remaining in 
spite of the fall. This would make sense; the problem only really arises where Barth starts 
interfering with the concept of the relationship of all men to Adam and reading into it the 
relationship of all men to Christ. 
 
7KXVIDU,KDYHEHHQSOD\LQJGHYLO¶VDGYRFDWHDQGVWDWLQJDVFOHDUO\DVpossible the sort of 
GLIILFXOWLHV , KDYH ZLWK %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV 7KHVH DUH VHYHUH GLIILFXOWLHV LQGHHG %DUWK¶V
exegesis seems so erratic that it is difficult even to summarise it and to say where the 
problem lies. But now I will try to examine the issue from another perspective, to see if 
there is any line of enquiry which might make this exegesis appear more intelligible, or 
even reasonable and constructive.  
                                                        
25
 Christ and Adam, p 24. 
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*HQHUDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJ%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVKLVFRQWUDVWZLWK%XOWPDQQ 
 
Rudolf Bultmann anG -RKQ 0XUUD\ HDFK SUHIDFH WKHLU FULWLFLVPV RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV RI
Romans 5 with the claim that they have every right to criticise Barth on the basis of 
exegesis alone, because this is how Barth himself claimed theological issues should be 
settled.26 From tKLVLWZRXOGVHHPWKDWWKHUHLVQRWKLQJWREHJDLQHGIURPVHWWLQJ%DUWK¶V
exegesis in its theological or dogmatic context - WKHRQO\WDVNLV WRVHHZKHWKHU%DUWK¶V
exegesis faithfully reflects the actual content of the text.  
 
A broader vision of the task RI H[HJHVLV DSSHDUV LQDTXLWHGLIIHUHQWDQDO\VLVRI%DUWK¶V
exegesis of Romans 5, specifically by the German Catholic scholar, E.H.Friedmann. He 
understands exegesis more as a dialogue or conversation of theology with the text, so that 
the results of theological exegesis are not read straight out of the text, but are 
SURJUHVVLYHO\VKDSHGE\WKHWH[W¶VRZQFRQWHQW27 This is at least closer to what Barth had 
in mind in his exegesis generally, even though Friedmann for his own (theological) 
reasons rejects BaUWK¶V FRQFOXVLRQ DERXW 5RPDQV 28 We may recall how in his earlier 
work Barth stated that in all exegesis something has to be read into the text as well as 
something being read out of the text. The true aim of exegesis is to avoid reading into the 
text more than one reads out.29 This approach seeks to balance the claims of the text itself 
with the theological presuppositions and concerns of the interpreter; it is a long way from 
supposing that the only aim of exegesis is to reproduce the objective content of the text 
pure and simple.30 
                                                        
26
 %XOWPDQQµ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶S0XUUD\Epistle to the Romans, p 384 (Volume I). 
27
 Christologie und Anthropologie: Methode und Bedeutung der Lehre vom Menschen in der  Theologie 
Karl Barths (Münsterschwarzach: Vier-Türme-Verlag, 1972), p 198. 
28
 Specifically Friedmann thinks that because Barth derives human nature in general from that of Christ in 
SDUWLFXODU KH LV LPSO\LQJ WKDW KXPDQLW\ DV VXFK LV DQ µHPDQDWLRQ¶ IURP *Rd (Christologie und 
Anthropologie, p 199). 
29
 The Epistle to the Romans, p ix (Preface to the English Edition). 
30
 FIDOVR&',Sµ1RUFDQLWHYHUEHWKHUHDOFRQFHUQRIGRJPDWLFVPHUHO\WRDVVHPEOHUHSHDWDQG
GHILQHWKHWHDFKLQJRIWKH%LEOH«>'@RJPDtics as such does not ask what the apostles and prophets said but 
ZKDWZHPXVWVD\RQWKHEDVLVRIWKHDSRVWOHVDQGSURSKHWV¶ 
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$VLWKDSSHQV,WKLQNLWOLNHO\WKDW%XOWPDQQ¶VVWDWHPHQWWRWKHHIIHFWWKDWµ%DUWKKLPVHOI
DVVHUWHGWKDWWKHRORJLFDOLVVXHVRXJKWWREHVHWWOHGRQWKHEDVLVRIH[HJHVLV¶LVDFWXDOO\DQ
allusion to a certain central aspect of %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ ,W LV LQ IDFW DQ DOOXVLRQ WR D
fundamental disagreement between Barth and Bultmann. The issue is not the normativity 
of Scripture and its exegesis for theology as such; on that they are agreed. But Bultmann 
grants a rôle to the prior understanding of the human subject in understanding and 
interpreting Scripture, where Barth believes that Scripture as the specific object of our 
understanding should always take priority over the general understanding which the 
human subject brings to it. Writing against Bultmann, Barth claimed that his original 
WKHRORJLFDODLPLQWKH¶VKDGEHHQ 
 
WR UHYHUVH WKH FXUUHQW XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH 1HZ DQG WKH 2OG 7HVWDPHQW« XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LQ
JHQHUDO PDQ¶V NQRZOHGJH DV ZH VDZ LW GHSHQGHG RQ KLV EHLQJ NQRZQ by the object of his 
NQRZOHGJH:HZHUHFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKH:RUG*RG¶VJLIWDQGPHVVDJHWRPDQ«$OWKRXJKZHGLG 
not know the Word, we were seeking to demythologise the belief that man was the measure of his 
own understanding and of all other understanding.31 
 
Barth is lamenting the fact that Bultmann once shared this theological vision, but has now 
forsaken it with his preoccupation with the prior self-understanding of man. 
 
However I think Bultmann has misunderstood Barth if he thinks that this means that we 
should seek to abandon all presuppositions when we approach Scripture. On the contrary, 
Barth is approaching the text with the specific theological presupposition that the Bible 
must speak against our human presuppositions, that is against our natural understanding, 
because it is presupposed that the Word of God which we meet in Scripture is intended to 
liberate us from our self-understanding which has fallen prey to sin.32 
 
In practice, this means that Barth will never appear at ease with any part of Scripture 
which seems to connect up smoothly with a general or prior human understanding; we 
would expect Barth to struggle especially with a text which seems to connect with human 
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 µ%XOWPDQQ - DQ DWWHPSW WR XQGHUVWDQG KLP¶ LQ+:%DUWVFK HG Kerygma and Myth: a Theological 
Debate (London: SPCK, 1972), p 127 (83-132 - Volume II). 
32
 µ%XOWPDQQ- DQDWWHPSWWRXQGHUVWDQGKLP¶S 
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self-XQGHUVWDQGLQJZLWKKXPDQLW\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI LWVHOI$QG WKLV LVH[DFWOy what we 
find happening in his exposition of Romans 5; for Romans 5 seems to be about the natural 
RUXQLYHUVDOFRQGLWLRQRIPDQLHDVµIDOOHQ¶DQGKHUHLIDQ\ZKHUHZHZRXOGH[SHFWWKH
text to be susceptible to illustrations from common human experience, that is from the 
normal everyday self-understanding of humanity. Hence, the last thing Barth would rest 
content with would be a merely formally correct exposition of the text, for that would 
simply allow human self-understanding to remain untouched or would even cause it to be 
reinforced; Barth must allow (or force!) the text to speak against this self-understanding. 
Of course, this does not excuse a formally incorrect or actually forced reading; a 
theological interpretation must not be based on thoughts which Paul never had. But we 
PXVWEHRQRXUJXDUGDJDLQVWMXGJLQJ%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVE\WKHFDQRQRIIRUPDOFRUUHFWQHVV
when the aim is not so much formal correctness as bringing out the material tensions 
between the text and the presuppositions of the modern world.33 
 
Another piece of the puzzle which goes some way to explaining why Barth interprets 
Romans 5 as he does, is that he does not think of Scripture itself and as such as the object 
which must stand as the basic critical corrective to the self-understanding of humanity. 
Properly speaking, it is Jesus Christ who is this object. We find that Barth summarises his 
doctrine of Scripture in the Church Dogmatics in terms which reinforce what I have said 
so far about his theology: 
 
Precisely in order that he may really appropriate what Scripture has to say, the reader and hearer 
must be willing to transpose the centre of attention from himself, from the system of his own 
concerns and questions (even if he thinks he can give them the character of concerns and 
questions typical of his whole epoch) to the scriptural word itself. He must allow himself to be 
lifted out of himself into this word and its concerns and questions.34 
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 FI-DPHV05RELQVRQ¶VFRPPHQWVRQ-OLFKHU¶VFULWLFLVPRI%DUWK¶V HDUOLHUFRQWURYHUVLDOUHDGLQJRI
Romans 9- DV UHIHUULQJ QRW WR ,VUDHO EXW WR WKH &KXUFK µ-OLFKHU LV « VXSHUILFLDO«ZKHQKHRSSRVHV
%DUWK¶V UHDGLQJ RI 3DXO¶V FRPPHQWV DERXW -XGDLVP WKH (VWDEOLVKPHQW RI KLV GD\ LQ WHUPV RI WKH
HVWDEOLVKHG&KULVWLDQFKXUFKWRGD\7KLVLVQRWDVOLSDQLQDFFXUDF\RQ%DUWK¶VSDUWEXWUDWKHUWKHUHVXOW
of the hermeneutical assumption that what was brought to expression in terms of a concrete specific 
situation by Paul has its equivalent in concrete specific situations today that are not necessarily the same as 
WKRVHWRZKLFK3DXOZDVUHIHUULQJ¶-05RELQVRQHGThe Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, pp 20-1. 
34
 CD I/2, p 739.  
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Barth then completes these reflections with the further, more essential reflection that our 
DFWRIIDLWKLQ6FULSWXUHWDNHVSODFHµQRWLQDQDEVWUDFWFRQILGHQFHLQLWVVDOXWDULQHVVDVRXU
act, but in a concrete confidence in its object - the object we encounter in the image 
UHIOHFWHGLQ6FULSWXUH«-HVXV&KULVWLVWKLVREMHFW¶35 
 
And so - Barth understood scriptural exegesis as a process by which Christ as the object 
corrects human self-understanding, indeed grounds true human self-understanding in the 
first place. On this basis we can understand why Barth would read the Adam-Christ 
parallel of 5:12-21 as meaning that Christ is the measure of Adam, that we can only 
understand our relation to Adam i.e. the universal condition of humanity, by first 
attending to our relation to Christ. 
 
This is merely a provisional comment, and in itself merely strengthens the suspicion that 
Barth is forcibly reading his dogmatic conclusions into the text itself. Still, I do hope to 
PDNHXVHRIZKDW,KDYHVKRZQVRIDUWRH[RQHUDWHRUDWOHDVWPLWLJDWH%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLV
but first I will have more to say about the context of his exegesis in his dogmatics. 
 
0RUHDERXW%DUWK¶VSURWHVWDJDLQVW&DUWHVLDQWKRXJKW 
 
,WZLOOEHSODLQE\QRZWKDW,KDYHFRPHURXQGDJDLQWRWDONLQJRI%DUWK¶VSURWHVWDJDLQVW
Cartesian thought: in effect, Barth believes the subject should not stand back and 
XQGHUVWDQG WKH REMHFW LQ LWV WKH VXEMHFW¶V RZQ WHUPV WKH VXEMHFW PXVW VHHN WR 
understand itself ever anew in terms of the object.36 In my second chapter I interpreted 
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 CD I/2, p 740. 
36
 For these ideas, I am specifically drawing on the work of my supervisor R.H.Bell, especially as 
UHSUHVHQWHG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ DUWLFOHV µ7KH 6XEMHFW-Object Relationship in Theology and Physics: A 
&RQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH GHEDWH DV WR ZKHWKHU 7KHRORJ\ LV D 6FLHQFH¶ XQSXEOLVKHG SDSHU  µ0\WKV
Metaphors and Models: An Inquiry into the Role of the Person as Subject in Natural Science and 
7KHRORJ\¶ LQ 1*UHJHUVHQ 8*RUPDQ DQG :'UHHV HG.), Studies in Science and Theology (Denmark: 
University of Aarhus, 2000), pp 115-µ7KH0\WKRI$GDPDQGWKH0\WKRI&KULVWLQ5RPDQV-¶
in A.Christophersen, C.Claussen, J.Frey and B.Longenecker (ed.), Paul, Luke and the Greco-Roman 
World: Essays in Honour of Alexander J.M. Wedderburn (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), pp 
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µWKHVXEMHFW¶DVWKHVHOI-understanding or self-representation of humanity which has fallen 
prey to sin; and I interpreted the act of God in Christ as the object which redeems this 
self-representation of humanity from the sin of its collective self-deception. 
 
I argued that because the self-understanding of humanity falls prey to severe sin in this 
particularly unobtrusive way, then it is very unwise to use this self-understanding of 
humanity as any kind of preparation for an understanding of redemption in Christ; for in 
that case the gospel will not be able to provide any liberation from this desperate situation 
of collective self-deception and may even find itself in the false and dreadful position of 
reinforcing it. Also, I argued that this is a particular problem in Cartesian thought, which 
sees what is accepted as self-evident by humanity in general as the only true basis for 
NQRZOHGJHDQG, LQWHUSUHWHG%DUWK¶VSURWHVWDJDLQVW WKH&DUWHVLDQVXEMHFWREMHFWVSOLWDV
an attempt to deal with this problem. 
 
)XUWKHU ,PDGHVRPHSURYLVLRQDOFRPPHQWVRQKRZ%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVRI5RPDns 5 may 
be related to this issue: specifically in the way he contends for a priority of Christ over 
Adam; and in the way he calls for a special anthropology based on Christ in place of a 
general anthropology, based on humanity in general. I now wish to show something of 
KRZ GHHSO\ URRWHG %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV RI 5RPDQV  LV LQ KLV GRJPDWLFV HVSHFLDOO\ ZLWK
regard to its anti-Cartesian basis. 
 
First of all, there can be no doubt that the comments on the opening pages of Christ and 
Adam, published in 1952, point back very clearly to the opening pages of the first volume 
RI%DUWK¶VChurch Dogmatics, published twenty years earlier in 1932. To show this, we 
will take the following passage from Christ and Adam: 
 
The meaning of the famous parallel (so called) between µ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶ZKLFKQRZIROORZVLV
not that the relationship between Adam and us is the expression of our true and original nature, so 
that we would have to recognise in Adam the fundamental truth of anthropology to which the 
subsequent relationship between Christ and us would have to fit and adapt itself. The relationship 
between Adam and us reveals not the primary but only the secondary anthropological truth and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
21-36. 6HH DOVR -)LVFKHU µhEHU GLH %H]LHKXQJ YRQ *ODXEH XQG 0\WKRV¶ Zeitschrift für Theologie und 
Kirche 85 (1988), pp 303-328.  
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ordering principle. The primary anthropological truth and ordering principle, which only mirrors 
itself in that relationship, is made clear only through the relationship between Christ and us.37 
 
This passage clearly states the fundamental contention - and, as I have said, the 
fundamental problem - RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV EXW P\ SRLQW KHUH LV QRW to consider the 
H[HJHWLFDOSUREOHPEXWWRVKRZKRZFOHDUO\LWLVHFKRHGRQWKHRSHQLQJSDJHVRI%DUWK¶V
Dogmatics. For there Barth opposes what he believes is the post-Enlightenment and 
Modernist approach, that Christian faith and existence should be interpreted in terms of a 
prior general anthropology. Barth is opposed to the idea that there is a general 
anthropology which could provide the criterion for the validity or relevance of theological 
statements.38 And, as I mentioned in my second chapter, he especially associates this idea 
with the thinking of Descartes, for it was he who stipulated that what was intelligible or 
demonstrable to humanity in general should be the prior criterion for all truth. 
 
7KH VDPH SRLQW HPHUJHV HYHQ PRUH IRUFHIXOO\ LQ %DUWK¶V dispute with his former 
theological ally, Friedrich Gogarten. I am thinking of where this dispute appears in the 
first volume of the Dogmatics, for there Barth makes it clear that it was his difficulties 
with Gogarten (and other related difficulties) which motivated him to revise the first 
volume of his Dogmatics fully.39 6SHFLILFDOO\%DUWKWDNHVLVVXHZLWK*RJDUWHQ¶VLGHDRID
µFLUFOH¶EHWZHHQWKHGRFWULQHRIPDQDQGWKHGRFWULQHRI*RG 
 
>4XRWLQJ*RJDUWHQ@³7KHUHLVQRXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPDQZLWKRXWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI*RGEXW«DJDLQ
,FDQQRWXQGHUVWDQGWKLV*RGZLWKRXWDOUHDG\XQGHUVWDQGLQJPDQ´«,ILQWKHODVWFODXVH*RJDUWHQ
KDG ZULWWHQ ³DOVR´ LQVWHDG RI ³DOUHDG\´ QR REMHFWLRQ FRXOG EH WDNHQ7KH WKRXJKWZRXOG WKHQEH
that understanding man presupposes understanding God and understanding God always includes 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJPDQDOVR%XWWKLVGRHVQRWVHHPWREH*RJDUWHQ¶VWKRXJKW>,ILWKDGEHHQ@LW>ZRXOG
EH@KDUGWRVHHKRZRQHFRXOGPRYHRQIURPWKLVWRWKHSULPDF\RIDQWKURSRORJ\«$QG*RJDUWHQ
does in faFWZULWH³DOUHDG\´7KLV³DOUHDG\´VHHPVWRJLYHWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPDQSULRULW\RYHU
                                                        
37
 Christ and Adam, p 6. 
38
 CD I/1, pp 36-7. 
39
 CD I/1, p 125. For the historical/biographical background to this, see Bruce L. McCormack, Dialectical 
Theology, pp 401-2; 407-11. 
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the understanding of God, a priority which for its part seems unthinkable unless one presupposes a 
³SUH-XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ZLWKUHJDUGWRPDQDV%XOWPDQQDFWXDOO\GRHV40  
 
A few pages later, Barth concludes his reflections on Gogarten with the striking words: 
 
8QGHUVWDQGLQJPDQLQWKHOLJKWRI*RG«LVDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJJURXQGHGLQ*RG¶V:RUGDQGQRWLQ
WKH SUHFHGLQJ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI PDQ µ)URP PDQ¶ FDQ RQO\ PHDQ IURP PDQ RI Whe lost status 
integritatis and hence from man of the present status corruptionis. Thus to understand God from 
man is an impossibility, or something one can do only in the form of Christology and not of 
anthropology (not even a Christology translated into anthropology). There is a way from 
Christology to anthropology; there is no way from anthropology to Christology.41 
 
Here we have the building blocks for what Barth would work out much later in more 
detail, i.e. the priority of Christology over anthropology; that a Christian doctrine of man 
may be possible, but only on the basis of the humanity of Christ. Also, we see here the 
FUXFLDOLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHGRFWULQHRIWKHIDOORIKXPDQLW\LQWRVLQIRU%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\ZH
can also see this in the way he opened the first chapter of his dogmatics with the problem 
RI µWDON DERXW *RG¶ ZKLFK LV WKDW µZH GR QRW NQRZ PDQ LH RXUVHOYHV DV PDQ LQ KLV
original estate and therefore as the man of the kingdom of glory. Of this man it might be 
said that all his talk is talk DERXW*RG%XW«ZHNQRZRXUVHOYHVRQO\DVWKHPDQWRZKRP
PHUF\LVVKRZQDVRQHZKRLVIDOOHQ ORVWRUFRQGHPQHG¶42 General anthropology, or an 
anthropology based on the self-understanding of man in general, cannot be the basis of a 
Christian theology, for this would make the distorted, perverted self-understanding of 
fallen PDQWKHFULWHULRQRIWKHH[SOLFDWLRQRIPDQ¶VUHGHPSWLRQPDQQHHGVWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ
of redemption first to redeem him from the self-understanding which has fallen prey to 
sin. 
 
 
JustifyLQJ%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVSURYLVLRQDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQV 
 
, KRSH , KDYH VKRZQ WKDW %DUWK¶V HPSKDVLV RQ WKH SULRULW\ RI &KULVWRORJ\ RYHU
anthropology, as it appears in Christ and Adam, LVGHHSO\URRWHGLQ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\DQG
                                                        
40
 CD I/1, p 129. 
41
 CD I/1, p 131. 
42
 CD I/1, p 47. 
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dogmatics, and this can be traced back to his concern with the influence of Descartes and 
WKHFRQVHTXHQWµWXUQWRDQWKURSRORJ\¶LQPRGHUQWKRXJKW1RZ,ZLOOWXUQWRORRNDWKRZ
WKLVPD\KHOSXVXQGHUVWDQGSURYLVLRQDOO\ZKDWLVKDSSHQLQJLQ%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLQChrist 
and Adam.  
 
I have mentioneGLQDSUHYLRXVIRRWQRWHKRZZHPLJKWXQGHUVWDQG%DUWK¶VXVHRIWKHLGHD
RI µ&KXUFK¶ WR LQWHUSUHW 3DXO¶V UHIHUHQFHV WR ,VUDHO LQ 5RPDQV -11.43 Although this is 
IRUPDOO\ LQFRUUHFWRQHFDQVD\ZLWK UHDVRQDEOHFRQILGHQFH WKDW WKHZRUGVµ&KXUFK¶DQG
µ,VUDHO¶would have had very different overtones to Paul to what they have for us today; in 
RXUGD\µ&KXUFK¶PHDQVWKHUHOLJLRXVHVWDEOLVKPHQWDQGWRUHDGµ&KXUFK¶DV3DXOXVHVLW
in the formally correct sense might lead to a reinforcement of the religious establishment, 
which would run contrary to the character of what Paul was saying. 
 
In the same way, when statements about man or humanity appear in the Bible, and we 
read them against the background of Cartesian thought, they might mean something very 
different to us to what they meant to Paul; they might have very different implications. 
They might come across very differently in an age when it is assumed that what is 
accepted and understood by humanity in general should be the criterion of all truth. They 
might well receive a priority of place in our thinking and in the development of our 
WKHRORJ\ ZKLFK 3DXO QHYHU LQWHQGHG WKHP WR KDYH 3DXO¶V WKRXJKW PD\ ZHOO KDYH EHHQ
moving in a very different direction. 
 
As a general point, I think it can be fairly proposed that Paul would have attributed to the 
state of being in Christ, or having faith in Christ, that clarity and certainty of knowledge 
which our contemporary thought would attribute to humanity in general, to humanity 
considered apart from specific religious or cultural traditions. The modern, post-
Enlightenment world assumes that certainty is only available through a detachment from 
external authority, including detachment from Christian faith or faith in Christ; the man 
who doubts everything, reflects on everything, tests everything (especially by the  
PHDVXUH RI µKXPDQLW\¶ LV WKH PDQ LV WUXO\ VSLULWXDO ZKR µMXGJHV DOO WKLQJV DQG LV  
himself judged by no-RQH¶&RU7KLVLVWKHQHUYHRIWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQPRGHUQ
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 i.e. in The Epistle to the Romans. 
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and Pauline thought, for where modeUQWKRXJKWZRXOGSODFHWKHµGRXEWLQJVXEMHFW¶3DXO
ZRXOGSODFHWKHµPLQGRI&KULVW¶&RU44 
 
Hence, I think it quite reasonable to say that in our modern reading of Paul we are all too 
likely to place greater emphasis on those aspects of his thought which appeal to common, 
universal human experience or intelligibility than Paul himself intended. We will have a 
tendency to give them a priority and essential function in our theological construction 
ZKLFKZRXOGEHDOLHQWR3DXO¶VRZQZD\RIWKLQNLQJ,n our minds, specifically Christian 
statements might seem to depend for their validity and correct interpretation on these 
PRUHJHQHUDOO\LQWHOOLJLEOHVWDWHPHQWVEXWLQ3DXO¶VPLQGWKHUHYHUVHZRXOGEHOLNHO\WREH
true - the statements of a more general VFRSHZRXOGKDYHDQLPSOLFLWµSURYLVR¶SODFHGRQ
them; they are only true to the extent that they conform to or do not limit and disturb the 
more specific Christian statements.45 $QG WKH DVVRFLDWHG µPRGHUQ¶ WHQGHQF\ WR
misunderstand Paul would still occur when a formally correct explication of Paul had  
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 A.C.Thiselton rightly notes WKDW YHUVHV VXFK DV WKHVH DUH IXQGDPHQWDO LQ %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ DQG
theological exegesis (The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description 
with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer and Wittgenstein (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 
1980), pp 88f) - cf CD I/1 pp 12-13, which makes specific reference to 1 Cor 2:15f (see also Barth, A 
Shorter Commentary on RomansS+RZHYHU,ZRXOGQRWDJUHHZLWK7KLVHOWRQ¶VJHQHUDOSRLQWWKDWIRU 
Barth theological understanding (sometimHV WDNHV SODFH µLQGHSHQGHQW RI DOO RUGLQDU\ SURFHVVHV RI
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ FI 0:DOODFH Barth, Ricoeur, and the New Yale TheologyS µ$QWKRQ\&7KLVHOWRQ
trades on the common misunderstanding of Barth as pneumatic exegete and argues that his emphasis on 
the Spirit in interpretation so separates human understanding from divine revelation that the task of 
KHUPHQHXWLFV LV VFXWWOHG DOWRJHWKHU¶ +RZHYHU , WKLQN ZH FDQ VHH D PRUH SRVLWLYH DSSURDFK WR %DUWK¶V
VFULSWXUDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQ7KLVHOWRQ¶VDUWLFOHµBarr on Barth and Natural Theology: A Plea for Hermeneutics 
LQ+LVWRULFDO7KHRORJ\¶Scottish Journal of Theology 47 (1994), pp 519-528. 
45
 There is a striking example of this issue in an open debate between Harnack and Barth, over the 
meaning of Phil 4:8 (µ:KDWHYHU LV WUXH ZKDWHYHU LV KRQRXUDEOH HWF¶ +DUQDFN HYLGHQWO\ WKLQNV RI WKLV
exhortation as having a general validity beyond what is specifically Christian, whereas Barth seems to see 
a Christ-oriented precondition on the exhortation, relating it to WKHSUHYLRXVYHUVHZKLFKUHDGVµWKHSHDFH
RI*RG«NHHS\RXUKHDUWVDQGPLQGV LQ&KULVW -HVXV¶ $+DUQDFN µ)LIWHHQ4XHVWLRQVWR7KRVH$PRQJ
WKH7KHRORJLDQVZKRDUH&RQWHPSWXRXVRIWKH6FLHQWLILF7KHRORJ\¶LQ-05RELQVRQHGThe Beginnings 
of Dialectic Theology, p 166 (165- .%DUWK µ)LIWHHQ $QVZHUV WR 3URIHVVRU YRQ +DUQDFN¶ LQ idem, p 
169 (167-170)). Whether the verses are related exactly as Barth implies I am not sure, but I cannot help 
thinking that Barth has nevertheless grasped something of PauO¶V WKRXJKWDQGSULRULWLHVZKLFK+DUQDFN
has missed. 
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been given; for its formal correctness would by no means guarantee that the relative 
importance he gave to different aspects of his thought would have been preserved.46 If 
%DUWK¶VDLP LQ WKHChurch Dogmatics wDV µWR OLVWHQ WRZKDW6FULSWXUHLVVD\LQJ¶47 then 
we must remember that careful listening necessarily goes beyond, and gets beneath, a 
formally correct exposition of the text. 
 
I will now give an account of how this applies to the specific exegesis found in Christ and 
Adam. 
 
Provisionally we can say this: when Barth says that the relationship between us and  
Adam depends for its validity on the relationship between us and Christ, he is saying that 
WKHVHDVSHFWVRI3DXO¶VWKRXJKWDUHUHODWHGWRHDFKRWKHULQ a way that they are not in our 
way of thinking. As I said before, it seems to us that the one-many relationship which 
exists on both sides of the parallel actually has independent validity for Paul. But it may 
not have been so for Paul himself; he may well have seen the truth of basic importance in 
our saving relationship with Christ, and may have made reference to the universal 
condition of man as fallen because it provides an effective illustration of the way  
salvation operates in Christ.48 But we, who come to the text with a different way of 
thinking, might place the opposite grid of interpretation on the text; we might suppose 
that Paul has placed Christ in the framework of universal humanity because of an interest 
in universal humanity as such: that Paul was a good Cartesian wishing to show the 
necessity of the salvation of Christ in the framework of what was universally knowable  
E\ µKXPDQLW\ LQ JHQHUDO¶ 6R DOWKRXJK ZH WKLQN RI WKH RQH-many relationship as having 
                                                        
46
 This general point was very clearly made (albeit in a different context) by John Henry Newman, in a 
OHWWHURIZLWK WKHZRUGVµ1HFHVVDU\DVLWLVWKDWZHVKRXOGDOOKROGWKHVDPHWUXWKVDVZHZd. be 
saved) still each of us holds them in his own way; and differs from his nearest and most loved friends 
either in the relative importance he gives to them, or in the connected view he takes of them as in his 
perception of the particular consequences aULVLQJIURPWKHP«¶FLWHGLQ'&DUVRQThe Gagging of God 
(Leicester: Apollos, 1996), p 69.) 
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 ,DPUHIHUULQJWRDYHUEDOFRPPHQWE\%DUWKFLWHGLQ5REHUW&-RKQVRQµ7KH/HJDF\RI.DUO%DUWK¶LQ
David L. Dickerman (ed.), Karl Barth and the Future of Theology: a Memorial Colloquium Held at the 
Yale Divinity School January 28, 1969 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Divinity School Association, 
1969), pp 3-4 (1-4).  
48
 cf Barth, A Shorter Commentary on Romans, p 61. 
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independent validity on both sides, we might unconsciously give an independent status to 
the Adam-side and a derivative status to the Christ-side; and although Paul seems to give 
independent validity to this relationship on both sides in the parallel, it could be that in his 
mind the relationship on the Christ-side was original and independent, and on the Adam-
side dependent and derivative. 
 
+RZHYHU WKHVH DUH YHU\ JHQHUDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DQG , KDYH WR FRQIHVV WKDW %DUWK¶V
exegesis still seems rather peculiar in its reasoning and rather abstract in its conclusions. 
$QG VR , ILQG , PXVW HQTXLUH IXUWKHU LQWR WKH GRJPDWLF FRQWH[W RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV
specifically with regard to the place in his Dogmatics where he undertakes to explicate the 
theological doctrine of man. 
 
Further issues in the dogmatLFFRQWH[WRI%DUWK¶VWKRXJKW 
 
In a sense, after all I have said, my problem remains where it was. I still cannot see why 
Barth does not simply give a more or less straight exegesis of 5:12-21; I cannot see why 
he does not leave well alone the relation between Adam and all men. This relation surely 
HVWDEOLVKHV ZKDW %DUWK¶V YHU\ WKHRORJ\ GHSHQGV RQ WKDW PDQ LV XQLYHUVDOO\ IDOOHQ DQG
hence a theology based on a general anthropology would be wrongheaded. Why does he 
interfere with this basic textual datum, apparently toning down the significance of the 
relation of Adam to all men, and even giving it salvific overtones so it looks almost as if 
people experience salvation through their relation to Adam rather than becoming truly 
fallen?49 Surely Barth is thereby undermining his own theology, and apparently taking 
leave of the natural sense of the text as well. So why bother? 
 
,QP\VHDUFKIRUDQDQVZHU,ZLOO WXUQDJDLQWR%DUWK¶VVSHFLILFGRFWULQHRIPDQ LQ&'
III/2. The significance of this part volume is that instead of the mostly negative  
statements about the rôle of humanity which we find in the earlier volumes (especially in 
I/1), and instead of the mere hints that if Barth were to work out an anthropology it 
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 %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV VHHPV WR XQGHUPLQH WKH YHU\ fallenness of humanity which, according to my view, 
JURXQGV KLV WKHRORJ\ µ>(@YHQ VLQIXO PDQ ZKRP DORQH ZH NQRZ UHIOHFWV EDFN«WKH KXPDQ QDWXUH RI
&KULVWDQGVRKDVQRWFHDVHGWREHWUXHPDQDQGKDVQRWFHDVHGWRVKRZPDQ¶VWUXHQDWXUHWRXV¶Christ 
and Adam, p 45.) I will return to the question of what Barth means by this later in the chapter. 
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would be based on Christology, here we find him actually going ahead and working it out 
in detail. And, as I argued in my second chapter, it is here where Barth gives us the 
primary background for his exegesis of Romans 5 in Christ and Adam, for it is here that 
he states that he intends to found anthropology on Christology; and it is also here that he 
gives his reason for seeking true human nature only in Christ, namely that as sinners our 
true human nature is concealed from us; hence we can only see it where it has been 
redeemed from sin in Christ.50 
 
But what I wish to draw attention to now is the first major clarification which Barth 
places on what he means. That is - although he talks of founding anthropology on 
&KULVWRORJ\QHYHUWKHOHVVKHVWDWHVKHKDVQRLQWHQWLRQRIPDNLQJDµVLPSOHGHGXFWLRQRI
aQWKURSRORJ\ IURP &KULVWRORJ\¶51 Rather, he understands that the issue is somewhat 
more complicated, that human nature as we know it exists in a number of contradictions 
which we cannot see beyond - in other words, it is dialectical. Any theory of man or 
anthropology consists in a forced reconciliation of these contradictions, and Barth 
specifically sees a process of self-deception occurring when one aspect of man is 
suppressed at the expense of another in this way. And Barth asserts that it is only in Christ 
that these contradictions are actually reconciled. He evidently does not mean that if we 
believe in Christ such contradictions will miraculously be reconciled within us; rather, he 
means that to believe in Christ as someone outside ourselves means that the 
contradictions will never be reconciled within ourselves; the circle of dialectic must not be 
closed but must be left open in hope.52 
 
If this all seems rather abstract, as it may well do, then I will give just one highly 
significant example: I mean, the contradiction between individual rights and the principle 
of solidarity. Without entering into any technical discussion, I would take it as broadly 
evident that there is a contradiction at the heart of the modern principle of freedom, 
namely that we believe that we have an individual right to live free from interference,   
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 CD III/2, pp 43-4. 
51
 CD III/2, p 47. 
52
 CD III/2, p 47. 
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and to enjoy or achieve certain things; but in order for that to be possible we have to 
maintain a certain level of responsibility towards each other. But either of these principles 
- rights and responsibilities - can only exist in tension with each other, and any modern 
theory or theory-praxis must search for a balance between the two; and, indeed, often one 
of the two (individualism or collectivism/solidarity) will win the day as the basic 
organising principle of the theory. This last will turn on the question of what is truly 
natural for humanity, what is the basic form of human nature - i.e. is it individual or 
collective? 
 
7KHVLJQLILFDQFHIRU%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVRI5RPDQV 
 
I have chosHQ WKLV H[DPSOH IRU WKH VLPSOH UHDVRQ WKDW LW RFFXUV H[SOLFLWO\ LQ %DUWK¶V
concluding statements of Christ and Adam, which hark back to the subtitle of the book 
itself - Man and Humanity - WKDW LVKH VHHPV WRXVH µPDQ¶ WRPHDQµLQGLYLGXDOKXPDQ¶
DQGµKXPDQLW\¶WRPHDQKXPDQLW\FRQVLGHUHGDVDVRFLDORUFROOHFWLYHHQWLW\+HUHLQWKHVH 
FRQFOXGLQJ VWDWHPHQWV %DUWK VWDWHV WKDW $GDP LV µDW RQFH DQ LQGLYLGXDO DQG RQO\ DQ
individual, and, at the same time, without in any way losing his individuality, he is also the 
UHVSRQVLEOH UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI DOO PHQ¶ DQG %DUWK WKHQ FRQQHFWV WKLV ZLWK D VXPPDU\ RI
two conflicting ways of understanding man: 
 
Might not humanity be a corporate personality of which individuals are only insignificant 
manifestations or fragmentary parts? Or might not the whole notion of humanity be a fiction, and 
the reality consist of only a collection of individuals each essentially unrelated to the others and 
each responsible only for himself? Romans 5:12-21 points in neither of these directions. If we base 
our thinking on this passage, we can have nothing to do with either collectivism on the one hand 
or individualism on the other. It understands the true man in neither of these ways.53 
 
Barth seems to assume that Paul has seen an implicit reconciliation of the conflict between 
individualism and collectivism, in that he assumes a unity of the human race in Adam. 
Barth then goes on to ask - how is Paul able to grasp this unity, when he is basing it on 
µQRWKLQJ EHWWHU WKDQ D NQRZOHGJH RI WKH FRUUXSW QDWXUH RI KXPDQLW\¶" $QG QRW
surprisingly, he says it is because when Paul looks at Adam, he does not see Adam alone, 
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 Christ and Adam, p 44. 
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but also the image of another, namely Christ. Thus, according to Barth, it is in Christ that 
the true unity of humanity becomes visible. 
 
Although this may seem strange, I would ask the reader to reflect on the conventional 
way this passage is interpreted. Conventionally, one of the main preoccupations is with 
the doctrine of original sin - that Adam predetermined the fate of many human beings etc. 
Now, setting aside the historical and scientific questions of a literal Adam, I think we can 
say that the normal issues which predominate in an exegesis of this passage is whether it 
coheres with the contemporary understanding of humanity. We know, or think we know, 
that the individual is responsible only for himself; hence we cannot rest easy with the 
doctrine of original sin - DQG VR ZH DUH GUDZQ WR HPSKDVLVH WKRVH DVSHFWV RI 3DXO¶V
writings which seem to allow for individual responsibility.54 Or we may draw on 
contemporary understanding of the need to balance individualism with solidarity or 
corporate responsibility, etc.55 Either way, we come to the text believing we have a prior 
grasp of the true unity of humanity which can disclose to us or illuminate the meaning of 
the text. 
 
Now, I feel sure I represent Barth accurately, when I say that in his view we have no 
natural awareness of the true and real unity of humanity; we have no natural awareness of 
the right balance between the individual and the collective, which would enable us to 
interpret the text without some kind of sinful bias. This problem, that our supposed 
awareness of this unity is obscured by sin, can be seen on a superficial or obvious level: 
there are many obnoxious people who will ORXGO\ DVVHUW WKHLU RZQ µULJKWV¶ DV DQ
LQGLYLGXDOZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHPDQLSXODWLQJRWKHUV¶VHQVHRIFRUSRUDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WR
serve them. But more subtle is the problem of collective self-deception, where a large 
social group will provide what seems to them to be a fair balance between the individual 
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 $V,EHOLHYH LV WUXHRI%XOWPDQQµ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶SLQFRQQHFWLRQZLth his demythologising 
SURJUDP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 LURQLFDOO\ LQ RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH WKHRU\ XQGHUO\LQJ %XOWPDQQ¶V
demythologising in this passage. 
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 e.g. C.H.Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), pp 79-83; 
see also A.C.Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), p 1225. 
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and the collective, while unconsciously or in practice giving a much greater proportion of 
rights to some individuals or groups over others. 
 
And so - if there is no natural awareness of the true unity of humanity which has not been 
perverted by sin, then in Christian terms we would say that the true unity is only seen 
where this sin has been dealt with, that is in Christ. 
 
To put this another way - it may be recalled that I said that the certainty and clarity of 
knowledge which the modern world would attribute to the detached, thinking subject, 
Paul would attribute only to the person re-created in Christ. We can now complement this 
with the likely suggestion that Paul would have attributed to the humanity re-created in 
Christ the kind and degree of unity the modern world would expect to be disclosed in a 
kind of natural self-awareness of humanity in general - WKDWLVLQKXPDQLW\¶VDZDUHQHVVRI
itself apart from any religious or cultural commitments. 
 
I would judge that Barth did believe that this unity of the human race exists, that there is a 
natural solidarity which binds people together whilst still preserving their individuality - 
LQGHHG ZKLFK JXDUDQWHHV DQG HQKDQFHV WKHLU LQGLYLGXDOLW\ µ3DXO « LV Qot deceiving 
KLPVHOI ZKHQ KH SUHVXSSRVHV WKLV XQLW\ DV VLPSO\ JLYHQ HYHQ LQ $GDP¶56 But our 
awareness of this true unity has been overlaid and obscured by sin, so that we can no 
longer distinguish between where we have really encountered this unity itself and where 
we have encountered a deliberate or unconscious manipulation of the mere idea of this 
unity. If we recognise that this unity can only be seen or revealed again in Christ, then this 
will tell us (a) that the unity is only revealed extra nos, i.e., in Christ, and (b) that we can 
only reach it through repentance and redemption from the sin which conceals it from us. 
 
It is surely all too likely that a false, deceptive idea of the real unity of humanity will be 
inherent in every form of modern culture, and that Christianity will seek to recommend 
itself by showing that it embodies or reinforces this unity in an especially pure or  
vigorous form - that we Christians are true democrats, true Westerners, true Americans 
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or true Germans etc. Thus we will eliminate before we have begun the chance of real 
criticism of or even effective detachment from these limited sinful ideals. 
 
,V%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVUHDOO\HLVHJHVLVDIWHUDOO" 
 
,KRSHWKLVJLYHVVRPHFOXHWRDVWRZKDWPD\EHEHKLQG%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVDQG,Kope it 
gives some meaning to the conclusions he draws. I hope it explains why he will not leave 
well alone the concept of the relation of all men to Adam, the idea of the unity of 
humanity in one head as a structural-corporate entity; why he will not allow this to remain 
a neutral concept which we can assimilate without distortion, but rather recognises it as a 
concept which is vulnerable to sin in the way it is interpreted, and hence in need of the 
redeeming grace of Christ. But, although this may give some meaning to his exegetical 
FRQFOXVLRQV DQG PD\ HYHQ HQJDJH RXU V\PSDWK\ IRU WKHP LW VXUHO\GRHVQ¶WFKDQJH WKH
fact that Barth seems to attribute to Paul thoughts he never had.  
 
6XUHO\ 3DXO GLG QRW DVN KLPVHOI µ2Q ZKDW JURXQGV FDQ , NQRZ DERXW WKH XQLW\ of the 
KXPDQUDFHLQ$GDP"¶DQGWKHQFRPHXSZLWKWKHDQVZHUµ*LYHQWKDWDOOKXPDQFRQFHSWV
of this unity are vulnerable to sin and deception, I realise I can only really know about it 
truly by looking at the place where this sin and deception is wiped oXWWKDWLVLQ&KULVW¶
Surely Paul never thought anything like that? 
 
Of course, put like that, we have to answer - no, Paul did not consciously or literally think 
that. Nevertheless, I think we can arrive at some understanding of why Barth might have 
porWUD\HG3DXO¶VOLQHRIWKRXJKWLQWKLVZD\ 
 
In his exegesis, Barth was first and foremost concerned with an overriding hermeneutical 
presupposition about the tension between Pauline thought and modern thought, between 
the way Paul understood discipleship to Christ and the way modern Christianity 
understands itself.57 I have already said something about this, but here I add the crucial 
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 ,QWKHKLVWRU\RI%DUWK¶VWKRXJKWWKLVJRHVEDFNHVSHFLDOO\WRWKHLQIOXHQFHRI)UDQ]2YHUEHFNRQ%DUWK¶V
approach to the New Testament, prior to the second edition of his Epistle to the Romans; see  McCormack, 
Dialectical Theology, pp 226-235. Of particular interest is p 231, where one of OYHUEHFN¶VNH\LQIOXHQFHV
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point that in the details of his exegesis, Barth was more engaged with applying this insight 
than with proving it. He is telling us how we should read Paul, in the light of this 
presupposition; he is not trying to prove the presupposition from a careful reading of 
Paul. 
 
)URP%DUWK¶VSRLQWRIYLHZZHFDQQRWOHDUQDERXWWKLVWHQVLRQE\VWUDLJKWFRPPRQVHQVH
exegesis, or by careful exegetical method, for that would simply cover up the tension or 
discrepancy. Our shared concepts, which we take for granted and which we would never 
think could twist or overlay the meaning of Scripture - these are precisely what conceal 
the difference between us and Scripture, between us and Paul. 
 
One may well ask - ZKDWWKHQFRXOGGLVSURYH%DUWK¶VJXLGLQJSUHVXSSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHUHLV
such a tension, if he is always ready to read it into Scripture, and is never willing to allow 
the details to contradict it? This is a very serious question, especially given the fact that 
WKHGHWDLOVRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVGRVHHPYHU\IRUFHGDVZHKDYHVHHQ,QHVVHQFH,EHOLHYH
WKLVLVWKHTXHVWLRQRI%DUWK¶VUHODWLRQWRKLVWRULFDO-critical interpretation of Scripture, and 
I will be addressing this question in some detail in my next two chapters. For the present, 
however, I will leave this question and instead will return to the issue which I left at the 
close of my last chapter, namely that of the place of sin in BartK¶VWKHRORJ\ 
 
,QWHULP&RQFOXVLRQ,WKH3ODFHRI6LQLQ%DUWK¶V7KHRORJ\ 
 
In my last chapter, I discussed this issue at some length. I noted how in contemporary 
readings of Barth, the place of Christ in his theology seems so central and all 
determinative as to relativise what is meant by sin. It often seems that, according to Barth, 
sin can only be understood in the light of Christ. It can hardly be denied that Barth does 
say this; but this must not obscure the fact that sin retains a distinctive place in his 
WKHRORJ\ ZKLFK LWVHOI GHWHUPLQHV WKH ZD\ WKDW ZH DUH WR XQGHUVWDQG &KULVW %DUWK¶V
                                                                                                                                                                     
RQ%DUWKLVVXPPDULVHGµ«>%@HFDXVHPRGHUQ&KULVWLDQLW\VHHNVDERYHDOOWKLQJVWRHVWDEOLVKLWVHOILQWKH
world, to make itself a force alongside and supportive of other movements in modern culture rather than 
fundamentally opposinJWKRVHPRYHPHQWVLWLVXQFKULVWLDQ>LHZKHQPHDVXUHGE\WKH1HZ7HVWDPHQW@¶ 
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understanding of sin and of its operation within humanity is precisely what shapes his 
Christology.58 
 
It has probably been clear that I have made use of this presupposition in the way I have 
read Christ and Adam,KDYHSODFHGDVWURQJHPSKDVLVRQ%DUWK¶VVWDWHPHQWWRWKHHIIHFW
WKDW ZH FDQQRW NQRZ WKH WUXH µXQLW\ RI KXPDQLW\¶ EHFDXVH KXPDQLW\ LV IDOOHQ LQWR VLQ -   
and I have cited statements from the Church Dogmatics which seem to be in line with  
this general principle (i.e. that human self-understanding cannot be a basis for theology 
EHFDXVH KXPDQLW\ LV IDOOHQ %XW ZKDW DERXW %DUWK¶V FORVLQJ VWDWHPHQWV LQ Christ and 
Adam, where he writes not about humanity redeemed from sin or the fall, but about a 
humanity which is untouched by the fall and which can be found by looking to Christ?   
Do not the statements at the close of Christ and Adam signify that, on the basis of Christ, 
we can know that humanity is not so radically fallen, and that there is a true unity of 
human nature which exists and persists in spite of the fall?59 Are there not statements in 
the Church Dogmatics which say the same type of thing repeatedly?60 Does this not  
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 For a definitive statement on this, see CD III/2, p 44, where Barth starts to develop the idea of founding 
DQWKURSRORJ\RQ&KULVWRORJ\+HFRPPHQWVµ,QVRGRLQJZHOHDYHWhe traditional way, which was to try 
first to establish generally what human nature is, and on this basis to interpret the human nature of Jesus 
Christ in particular. Our whole approach to the relation between human sin and human nature has led us 
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a new disclosure through the perception of divine grace addressed to man and revealing and affirming true 
KXPDQLW\LQWKHPLGVWRIKXPDQVLQ¶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 µ«>,@I$GDPLVVXERUGLQDWHWR&KULVWWKHQ$GDPUHSUHVHQWVWUXHDQGJHQXLQHKXPDQQDWXUHLQVRIDUDV
he shows us the man in humanity and humanity in the man. Whatever else in his representation of human 
nature may have to be accounted for by its later corruption and ruin, this ordering principle at least 
EHORQJVWRLWVFRQGLWLRQDQGFKDUDFWHUDVFUHDWHGDQGXQWRXFKHGE\VLQ¶SS-µ>7@KLVXQLW\DVVXFK
EHORQJV QRW WR WKH SHUYHUVLRQ RI >$GDP¶V@QDWXUHEXW WR LWVRULJLQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ$QGVR3DXO makes no 
arbitrary assertion, and he is not deceiving himself when he presupposes this unity as simply given in 
$GDP+HGRHVVREHFDXVHKHKDVIRXQGLWJLYHQILUVWDQGSULPDULO\LQ&KULVW¶S 
60
 HJµ:KDWLVWKHFUHDWXUHO\QDWXUHRIPDQWRWKHH[WHnt that, looking to the revealed grace of God and 
concretely to the man Jesus, we can see in it a continuum unbroken by sin, an essence which even sin does 
QRW DQG FDQQRW FKDQJH"¶ &' ,,, S  µ7KH IDFW WKDW QDWXUDO KXPDQLW\ DV *RG FUHDWHG LW ZDV
subsequently concealed by our sinful corruption is a lesser mystery than the fact that humanity is originally 
KLGGHQ LQ -HVXV VR WKDW SULPDULO\ LW LV +LV DQG QRW RXUV¶ &' ,,, S  µ,I WKHUH LV D EDVLF IRUP RI
humanity in which it corresponds and is similar to the divine determination of man, in this 
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mean that sin is relative to Christ and sXERUGLQDWHWR&KULVW LQ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\"+HUH,
am returning to the question I raised at the close of my last chapter, as to what method (if 
any) I am using to make sure I do justice to the different kinds of statements which appear 
LQ%DUWK¶VZULWLQJV 
 
On the one hand Barth seems to say that the problem of sin is so radical that it makes any 
direct relationship between God and humanity impossible, and this seems to be the ground 
RIKLVWKHRORJLFDOµGLDOHFWLF¶%XWDWRWKHUWLPHVKHVHHPVWRZULWHDVLIWhe problem of sin 
is not so radical, because God sustains humanity from falling completely away from him; 
further, he emphasises that this fact can only be known through Christ. The last point 
FDXVHV GLIILFXOWLHV IRU P\ WKHVLV WKDW LW LV %DUWK¶V YLHZ RI WKe problem of sin which 
fundamentally shapes his Christology - for his focus on Christ seems to cover not only the 
question of redemption from sin, but also the question of the original goodness of 
humanity from creation - where there would appear to be no need for redemption. This 
ZRXOG VHHP WR PHDQ WKDW %DUWK¶V FKULVWRFHQWULVP WUDQVFHQGV WKH VSKHUH RI VLQ DQG LWV
redemption.  
 
Provisionally I could say that it is precisely because human nature is so completely fallen 
that we can only see the original unfallen nature by looking to Christ, where it is 
redeemed and restored. Initially this would seem to reconcile the two types of statement 
quite satisfactorily. But this does not explain the statements where Barth seems to say that 
humanity is not completely fallen and that vital characteristics persist in spite of the fall. 
 
I believe that the most crucial thing to grasp here is the hermeneutical character of 
%DUWK¶V VWDWHPHQWV+H LVSURWHVWLQJDJDLQVW WKHLOOXVLRQRIDQLQQRFHQWVHOI-awareness in 
humanity. HuPDQLW\¶V immediate self-understanding is the understanding of fallen man, 
and therefore is entangled in self-GHFHSWLRQ KXPDQLW\¶V mediate self-understanding 
WKURXJK &KULVW LV KXPDQLW\¶V JHQXLQH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI LWVHOI WKURXJK &KULVW KXPDQLW\  
                                                                                                                                                                     
correspondence and similarity we have something constant and persistent, an inviolable particularity of his 
creaturely form which cannot be effaced or lost or changed or made unrecognisable even in sinful man. 
And the task of theological anthropology is rightly to point to this inviolable and constant factor, so that it 
LVVHHQDVVXFK¶&',,,, p 206.) 
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can become aware of its real needs and even of its innate goodness. Now, this is in line 
with what I have said so far about how the subject (=human self-understanding) must 
understand its own nature on the basis of the object (=Christ). But here I add the crucial 
faFW WKDW LQ%DUWK¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJKXPDQLW\FDQEHFRPHDZDUHRI LWV innate goodness as 
created by God, when its self-awareness is mediated through Christ.61 
 
I think that Barth did WDNHWKHYLHZWKDWPDQ¶VIDOO LQWRVLQZDVPRUHSURIRXQGWKDQKDV
been recognised in previous theology (whether orthodox or modern), and I think that this 
was WKH VKDSLQJSULQFLSOHRI%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ IURPEHJLQQLQJ WRHQG%XW%DUWKGLGQRW
take the line that man is as bad as he could possibly be. Man is not completely and utterly 
evil; there is real goodness in humanity. But the new point is that human sin affects man 
even at the point of what seems to be his self-evident self-awareness. It affects him 
especially at this point. In and of himself man cannot be aware where the dividing line 
between good and evil lies. So, although man is rightly aware that there is sin in himself 
and others, he is mistaken and culpably mistaken in his understanding of where this sin 
really is; and, although he is rightly aware that there is true goodness in himself and 
others, he is equally mistaken in his understanding of where this goodness truly lies. 
 
6R , ZRXOG VWLOO PDLQWDLQ WKDW %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LV EDVHG RQ D SDUWLFXODUO\ LQWHQVH
DZDUHQHVV RI WKH QDWXUH DQG GHSWK RI VLQ LH WKH µUDGLFDO¶ QDWXUe of sin. But sin is not 
µUDGLFDO¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWWHQGVWREHWRWDOO\DQGDEVROXWHO\SHUYDVLYHLQKXPDQLW\LWLV
radical in the sense that as well as anything else it also pervades the self-awareness of 
humanity. This is what I call the hermeneutical dimension of sin, in that sin afflicts the 
µVWDQGSRLQWRIWKHREVHUYHU¶ZLWKVLQIXOVHOI-deception. Barth certainly regarded this as the 
                                                        
61
 ,W VHHPV WRPH WKDW%DUWKPD\ZHOOKDYHREMHFWHGWRWKHH[SUHVVLRQµLQQDWHJRRGQHVV¶RQWKHJURXQGV
that we have no goodness except for that sustained by God. Yet Barth clearly believed in a goodness which 
was granted to us with creation and which can never be effaced by sin; on the grounds of this I think that 
WKH WHUP µLQQDWH JRRGQHVV¶ LV DSSURSULDWH Dnd in practice less subject to misunderstanding than the 
converse statement that man has no innate goodness. 
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most serious aspect of sin and he regarded it as his urgent responsibility to proclaim and 
apply the gospel in view of this aspect of sin.62 
 
This is how I would understand the relation between the two types of statements in 
%DUWK¶VZRUNUDGLFDOVLQand ineffaceable goodness). The most striking thing is that these 
two types of statements, which seem to be inconsistent with each other, actually seem to 
IRUPDFRQWLQXRXVDUJXPHQWLQ%DUWK¶VUHDVRQLQJZLWKRXWDQ\HYLGHQWVHQVHRIWKHWHQVLRQ
between them. This is evident in the relevant parts of the Dogmatics, but for our purposes 
is sufficiently evident in Christ and Adam. Here, Barth writes that Paul cannot base 
conclusions about the nature of man on the basis of Adam alone, because that would be 
to base his conclusions on nothing sounder than the knowledge of corrupt and fallen man; 
then Barth seems to conclude from this that Paul can, by looking to Christ, see that the 
essentially good nature of humanity has not been erased by the fall.63 It might seem that 
Barth has taken away with one hand what he has given with the other; or, more to the 
point, that he has cut the ground from under his own feet. But when we recognise that the 
statements about the fall apply specifically to the issue of human self-knowledge, then 
%DUWK¶V OLQH RI UHDVRQLQJ EHFRPHV TXLWH FRPSUHKHQVLEOH \HV RXU LQQDWH FUHDWHG
goodness still exists, but our sin has covered up our knowledge of it; hence the 
precondition for a right understanding of our created goodness depends on being 
UHGHHPHG IURP VLQ $V %DUWK VXFFLQFWO\ SXWV LW µEven in this matter we are concealed 
from ourselves, and need the Word of God to know ourselves. But in this respect too, in 
our humanity as such, there is something in ourselves to know.¶64 
 
I would like now to consider more of the practical and concrete issues which are at stake 
in what I have said so far. I have been writing aboXW µVLQ¶ DQG µFUHDWHG JRRGQHVV¶ LQ D
                                                        
62
 To put it another way - there have been and indeed are strands of Calvinist thought which maintain that 
humanity outside the church is as bad as it could possibly be; any appearance of goodness would be 
explained as one lust overcoming another etc. But even here the question of sin has not really been applied 
on the hermeneutical level - i.e. it has not been applied to the question of spontaneous human self-
awareness; even in such a rigid hyper-Calvinism, a sense of what is right and wrong would still be 
culturally determined at the deepest level. 
63
 Christ and Adam, pp 44-5. 
64
 CD III/2, p 207 (emphasis mine). 
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rather abstract way; but, as I hope has been apparent, I am not emphasising the rôle of sin 
LQ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\LQRUGHUWRVROYHDWKHRORJLFDOSX]]OH,DPHPSKDVLVLQJLWLQRUGHUWR
UHODWH%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ WRFRQFUHWH issues of history, especially to outbreaks of violence 
and war. 
 
There is a striking passage in CD IV/1, pp 434ff, in which Barth states that the deepest 
evil in humanity is precisely where humanity claims to know the difference between good 
and evil for itself. This is entirely consistent with what I have said about the hermeneutical 
FKDUDFWHURI%DUWK¶VGRFWULQHRIVLQDQGKRZKHUHJDUGHGWKLVDVWKHPRVWXUJHQWSUREOHP
RI VLQ µ7KH DUPRXU EHKLQG ZKLFK WKH UHDO HYLO RI WKH SULGH RI PDQ FRQFHDOV LWVHOI Ls 
REYLRXVO\ WKLFNHU DQG PRUH LPSHQHWUDEOH DW WKLV SRLQW WKDQ DW DQ\ RWKHU¶65 But here I 
would add that Barth relates this problem explicitly to the outbreak of war:  
 
the war which is always holy and righteous and necessary, war under the sign of the promising 
crescent or the natural sickle or the useful hammer or the sacred cross, the war of blood or the (in 
*RG¶V VLJKW SUREDEO\ QR OHVV LQIDPRXV DQG WHUULEOH FROGZDU:KHQPDQ WKLQNV WKDWKLVH\HVDUH
opened, and therefore that he knows what is good and evil, when man sets himself on the seat of 
judgement, or even imagines that he can do so, war cannot be prevented but comes irresistibly.66 
                                                        
65
 CD IV/1, p 449; cf also CD IV/1, p 220µ$OOVLQKDVLWVEHLQJDQGRULJLQLQWKHIDFWWKDWPDQZDQWVWR
EHKLVRZQMXGJH¶ 
66
 &' ,9 S  HPSKDVLV PLQH ,W LV ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW %DUWK LV UHIOHFWLQJ KHUH RQ WKH VHUSHQW¶V
WHPSWDWLRQ RI *HQHVLV  µ<RX VKDOO EH DV *RG¶ DQG WKDW WKHUH DUH VWULNLQJ SDUDOOHOV WR WKLV LQ%DUWK¶V
HDUO\ZRUN)URPµ,WLVRXUDFTXDLQWDQFHQRWZLWKVDYDJHDQGXQPRUDOPDQVRPXFKDVZLWKPRUDO
man that makes us none too proud of his achievements. We are reminded by the third chapter of Genesis 
WKDW PDQ¶V DELOLW\ to distinguish between good and evil and his consequent greatness and dignity may 
LQGLFDWHKLVIDOOIURP*RGDVZHOODVKLVDVFHQGDQF\RYHUQDWXUH¶µ7KH3UREOHPRI(WKLFV7RGD\¶S
$QGIURPZHILQGWKHIROORZLQJµ:HDUURJDWHWRRXUVHOYHVXnquestioningly, the right to take up the 
tumultuous question, What shall we do? [Was sollen wir tun?] as if that were in any case the first and most 
pressing problem. Only let us be quick to put our hand to reform, sanitation, methods, cultural and 
religioXV HQGHDYRXUV RI DOO VRUWV 2QO\ WR GR ³UHDO ZRUN´ $QG EHIRUH ZH NQRZ LW WKH WUXPSHW EODVW RI
FRQVFLHQFHKDVORVWLWVGLVWXUELQJWRQH«7KHULJKWHRXVQHVVRI*RGLWVHOIKDVVORZO\FKDQJHGIURPEHLQJWKH
surest of facts into being the highest among various high ideals, and is now at all events are very own 
DIIDLU«Eritis sicut Deus! You may act as if you were God, you may with ease take his righteousness under 
\RXRZQPDQDJHPHQW7KDW LVFHUWDLQO\SULGH¶µ7KH5LJKWHRXVQHVVRI*RG¶S,WLVDOVRLQWHUHVWing 
that both the 1922 and the 1915 passages also contain a reflection on the ethical question formulated as 
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I believe this reference to war is no mere add-RQ WR %DUWK¶V DXWRQRPRXV WKHRORJLFDO
reflections, in which he naïvely thinks that if only everyone followed his dogmatics, 
everyone would be peaceful and happy; rather, there is a very natural, clear and close 
connection between the question of war and his distinctive theology, for his distinctive 
theology was born from a reaction against war (i.e. the First World War) and it never lost 
that connection. In the light of this, I will turn to consider the historical context of Christ 
and Adam, and examine the relation between Christ and Adam and the live issues of the 
time. 
 
Interim Conclusion II: the historical context of Christ and Adam; %DUWK¶V UHODWLRQ WR
Reinhold Niebuhr 
 
1RZ RI DOO WKH WKLQJV ZKLFK ZHUH JRLQJ RQ LQ %DUWK¶V OLIH DW WKH WLPH RI Christ and  
Adam, it would seem most natural to give emphasis to the question of %DUWK¶V
controversy with Bultmann.67 7KLVZRXOGEHLQOLQHZLWK%DUWK¶VODWHUVWDWHPHQWVRQWKH
matter, and with the fact that Christ and Adam immediately followed his critique of 
Bultmann in the same series; it would also fit in with the fact that Christ and Adam was 
ODWHUSXEOLVKHGLQWKHVDPHYROXPHDV%DUWK¶VFULWLTXHRI%XOWPDQQ68 And indeed, I have 
WDNHQ UHFRXUVH WR TXRWDWLRQV IURP WKLV FULWLTXH µ%XOWPDQQ - an attempt to understand 
KLP¶LQRUGHUWRFODULI\DFUXFLDODVSHFWRI%DUWK¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDODpproach. Specifically,  
I had in mind the point that Barth wished to allow the content of Scripture to speak 
against natural human understanding; he wished to question the modern assumption that 
man is the measure of all things. As I believe I have shown, this was the fundamental  
issue in Christ and AdamDQGLWZDVFOHDUO\WKHIXQGDPHQWDOLVVXHLQ%DUWK¶VFRQWURYHUV\
with Bultmann. For me, this is sufficient to explain why Barth published this essay when 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Was sollen wir tun? (see note 35 of my second chapter). In all these reflections, Barth is opposing the view 
that humanity has an immediate and spontaneous knowledge of ethical truth. 
67
 This appears to be the line taken by E.Busch, who places Christ and Adam LQ WKHFRQWH[WRI%DUWK¶V
debate with Bultmann, and includes his brief mention of the book under the heading of 
µ'HP\WKRORJL]LQJ"¶ (Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts (London: SCM Press, 
1976), p 389). 
68
 6HH %DUWK¶V OHWWHU WR %XOWPDQQ RI th December 1959 (Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters, pp 109-
110), and the introduction to the 1964 edition of Rudolf Bultmann/Christus und Adam  (pp 5f). 
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he did (i.e. in 1952), and to explain his later statements that there was a close connection 
between the essay and his hermeneutical controversy with Bultmann. 
 
However, I do not believe that this is where the main emphasis should lie when we come 
to a more detailed analysis of Christ and Adam. As noted previously, Barth himself tells 
us that Christ and Adam was originally intended to form a part of the doctrine of man in 
Church Dogmatics; specifically, it was meant to form a part of an ultimately omitted 
subsection of this part of the Dogmatics, in which Barth would consider the relation 
between the individual and society. A close analysis of Christ and Adam has shown that it 
was ultimately concerned with the question of individualism and collectivism as 
alternative interpretations of the being of man -  which, I presume, were meant to be the 
basic alternatives in considering how individual and society are related. Now - the 
question of individualism and collectivism did not, to the best of my knowledge, form a 
point of controversy between Barth and Bultmann. Certainly, it did not form the central 
nerve of their difference. That central nerve was the question of demythologising and of 
existentialist interpretation of the New Testament. And these matters are absent from the 
discussion in Christ and Adam. 
 
Now, we can see that it was the same underlying issue which was at stake in Christ and 
Adam as in the controversy with Bultmann. The underlying issue was the rôle of the 
human subject in its relation to divine revelation. In his program of existentialist 
interpretation of Scripture, Bultmann was making a criterion of the modern self-
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKXPDQLW\RUVR%DUWKWKRXJKW$JDLQVWWKLV%DUWKFRQWHQGHGWKDW*RG¶V
revelation in Christ should take precedence over human self-understanding. It is more 
than clear that Barth was stating the very same general principle in Christ and Adam. But 
the specific sphere of application is different in both cases. In Christ and Adam, the 
specific sphere is the self-awareness of humanity as to whether it is individual or collective 
in its basic structure. 
 
If we take the question of the alternative between individualism and collectivism as the 
basic issue of Christ and Adam, then can we find anything in the historical context which 
will make this question something more than a merely theoretical reflection about the 
µQDWXUHRIPDQ¶"7KHPRVWREYLRXVDQVZHULQWKHFRQWH[WRISRVW-war Europe, would be 
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WKHLVVXHRI WKHVSUHDGRIFRPPXQLVPDQGWKHµ&ROG:DU¶- which, we have seen, Barth 
WHOOVXVLVµLQ*RG¶VVLJKWSUREDEO\QROHVVLQIDPRXVDQGWHUULEOH¶WKDQWKHµZDURIEORRG¶,
EHOLHYH WKDW WKHµ&ROG:DU¶LV WKHPRVW LPSRUWDQWKLVWRULFDOIDFWRUIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKH
inner content of Christ and Adam, if not for understanding why it was published when it 
was. As might be expected, individualism UHIHUVHVSHFLDOO\WRWKHSROLWLFVRIµWKH:HVW¶
i.e. to capitalism, and collectivism UHIHUV HVSHFLDOO\ WR WKH SROLWLFV RI µWKH (DVW¶ LH WR
communism. This is reflected in a certain political allusiveness in the original German of 
Christ and Adam,69 DQGLQ%DUWK¶VSROLWLFDOZULWLQJVDGGUHVVHVRIWKHWLPH70  
 
As made clear above, Barth recognised both individualism and collectivism as two 
alternatives in the self-interpretation of man; accordingly, he believed that as a Christian 
he must refuse to let either principle become a determining factor, for that would be to 
understand humanity on the basis of its (local) self-knowledge rather than on the basis of 
Christ. And since he understood these principles as broadly representing Western and 
EDVWHUQSROLWLFVWKLVPHDQWWKDWKHFRXOGQRWVD\DQDEVROXWHµ<HV¶RUµ1R¶WRHLWKHUVLGH
%XW KLV FRQVHTXHQW UHIXVDO WR VD\ D FOHDU µ1R¶ WR FRPPXQLVP HDUQHG KLP YHU\ VHYHUH
criticism. The atrocities connected with communism were sufficiently known at that time 
to make a total denunciation of it seem morally obligatory in the absolute sense. 
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 6PDLO WUDQVODWHV µ,I ZH EDVH RXU WKLQNLQJ RQ WKLV SDVVDJH ZH FDQ KDYH QRWKLQJ WR GR ZLWK HLWKHU
FROOHFWLYLVPRQWKHRQHKDQGRULQGLYLGXDOLVPRQWKHRWKHU¶Christ and Adam, p 44); but Hunsinger gives 
XV D PRUH OLWHUDO UHQGHULQJ µIf we base our thinking on this text, then we must depart from every 
FROOHFWLYLVPRQWKHOHIWDQGHYHU\LQGLYLGXDOLVPRQWKHULJKW¶*+XQVLQJHUHGKarl Barth and Radical 
Politics S  7KH RULJLQDO *HUPDQ LV µ'HQNHQ ZLU YRQ GLHVHP 7H[W KHU GDQQ Zerden wir jeden 
.ROOHNWLYLVPXVOLQNVXQGMHGHQ,QGLYLGXDOLVPXVUHFKWVOLHJHQODVVHQPVVHQ¶Rudolf Bultmann/Christus 
und Adam, p 120.) 
70
 µ« >7@KH &KULVWLDQ DSSURDFK VXUSDVVHV ERWK LQGLYLGXDOLVP DQG FROOHFWLYLVP 7KH &KXUFK NQRZV DQG
UHFRJQLVHVWKH³LQWHUHVW´RIWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGRIWKH³ZKROH´EXWLWUHVLVWVWKHPERWKZKHQWKH\ZDQWWR
KDYHWKHODVWZRUG¶µ7KH&KULVWLDQ&RPPXQLW\DQGWKH&LYLO&RPPXQLW\¶LQ%DUWKAgainst the Stream: 
Shorter Post-War Writings, 1946-52 (London/Southampton: Camelot Press, 1954), p 37 (15-50).) This 
comes from an address given in 1946, and here Barth only notes this principle in criticism of Western 
SROLWLFVEXW ODWHULQKHZLOODSSO\LWWRERWK:HVWHUQDQG(DVWHUQSROLWLFVµ>WKH&KULVWLDQPHVVDJH@
does not exclude LQGLYLGXDOLVP RU FROOHFWLYLVP«>,@W GHIHQGV VRFLDO IUHHGRP DJDLQVW WKH DWWDFNV RI WKH
:HVW DQG SHUVRQDO IUHHGRP DJDLQVW WKH DWWDFNV RI WKH (DVW¶ µ7KH &KULVWLDQ 0HVVDJH DQG WKH 1HZ
+XPDQLVP¶LQAgainst the Stream, p 188 (183-191).) 
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In my previous chapter, I have noted how my interpretation of Barth by means of the 
FRQFHSWRIµFROOHFWLYHVHOI-GHFHSWLRQ¶KDVFORVHDIILQLWLHVZLWKWKHWKRXJKWRI1Lebuhr; and 
yet this very fact makes my interpretation of Barth rather suspect as Niebuhr and Barth 
were known theological opponents. As it turns out, my conclusions about Christ and 
Adam are particularly relevant to this opposition between Niebuhr and Barth, for it was 
%DUWK¶V UHIXVDO WRFRQGHPQFRPPXQLVPRXWULJKWZKLFKEURXJKW WKHRSSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQ
1LHEXKUDQG%DUWKWRDKHDG,WZDVLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKDW1LHEXKU¶VDFFXVDWLRQRIFRPSOHWH
moral irrelevance was made against Barth.71 
 
:KHQZHORRNDW%DUWK¶VUesponse to communism, I think it important to begin by noting 
the hermeneutical intent EHKLQG KLV SRVLWLRQ µ*HRJUDSKLFDO DQG QDWXUDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV
inevitably lead us to take sides with America and the Western hemisphere. And therefore 
we are influenced in our judgment of the issue«>,@WKDVSOHDVHG*RGWREULQJXVLQWRWKH
world as men of the West. But it does not follow by any means that we should simply 
give way to Western prejudices and especially to the pressure of our Western 
environment. It follows that we must be all the more on our guard against regarding our 
:HVWHUQ MXGJPHQWDV WKH ULJKWDQG&KULVWLDQ MXGJPHQW¶72 Thus Barth is clearly drawing 
DWWHQWLRQWRWKHKHUPHQHXWLFDOSULQFLSOHWKDWWKHµKXPDQVXEMHFW¶LVQRWLQQRFHQWLQLWVVHOI-
awareness. But this forces the question - surely on the issue of the known communist 
practice of denying basic human rights, to the point of torture and death, there can be no 
doubt that the West is right - at least on this issue? If our hermeneutical reflections on the 
UDGLFDOOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHµVXEMHFW¶OHDGXVWRWKHSRLQWRIFRQGRQLQJDWURFLWLHV- surely this 
means there is something wrong with our hermeneutical reflections?  
 
This is, of course, precisely the type of accusation which Niebuhr brought against Barth. 
$QG KHUH WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKHP FDQ EH VWDWHG WKXV 1LHEXKU EHOLHYHG %DUWK¶V
approach represented a passive withdrawal from the political question posed by the East; 
whereas Barth believed his own approach represented an active protest against the 
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 5HLQKROG1LHEXKUµ%DUWK¶V(DVW*HUPDQ/HWWHU¶S 
72
 µ7KH&KXUFKEHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW¶LQAgainst the Stream, p 135 (127-146) (emphasis mine). 
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political presumption of the West. To put the question another way - did Barth represent 
a hermeneutic of isolation or a hermeneutic of protest? 
 
Now, to put his position in perspective we must note that Barth could see, as much as 
anyone else, that there were very great historical evils associated with communism. As he 
ZURWH WR%UXQQHU µ$Q\RQHZKRZRXOG OLNH IURPPHDSROLWLFDOGLVFODLPHURI LWVV\VWHP
DQG LWV PHWKRGV PD\ KDYH LW DW RQFH¶73 But he believed that behind something so self-
evident there lurked not merely a remnant of corporate self-deception but a powerful and 
dangerous element: the denunciation was an all too convenient legitimation of the politics 
of the West.74 This had a tendency to make people blind to problems from the political 
right;75 and also threatened a useless war on the basis of the political division of East and 
West.76 This was entirely consistent with his position that human perspective is blind to its 
hidden evils, and also that the self-confidence of the human subject in judging good and 
evil leads inevitably to useless war. 
 
%DUWK¶VPDLQZULWLQJRQWKLVVXEMHFWZDVSURYRNHGE\%UXQQHU¶VFULWLFLVP+LVSRVLWLRQLV
VHW RXW LQ KLV UHSO\ WR %UXQQHU¶V RSHQ OHWWHUDQG LQD ORQJHUSLHFHHQWLWOHG µ7KH&KXUFK
EHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW¶IURPZKLFK,KDYHDOUHDG\TXRWHG%DUWKDQG%UXQQHU¶VSHUKDSV
PRUH IDPRXV GHEDWH RQ WKH LVVXH RI µQDWXUH DQG JUDFH¶77 is not mentioned in these 
writings, but I think there is good reason for thinking it was in the background 
somewhere. Brunner defined the problem of communism as the problem of the 
µWRWDOLWDULDQ6WDWH¶ZKLFKLQKLVYLHZGHQLHGWKRVHEDVLFRULJLQDOKXPDQULJKWVµFRQIHUUHG
RQ >WKH LQGLYLGXDO@ DV D FUHDWXUH RI *RG¶78 7KLV LV FOHDUO\ FRQQHFWHG ZLWK %UXQQHU¶V
position on nature and grace, that alongside revealed theology based on grace there is 
also a natural theology which is able to formulate general principles of human relations 
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 µ$&RUUHVSRQGHQFH.DUO%DUWK¶V5HSO\¶LQAgainst the Stream, p 116 (113-8). 
74
 µ7KH&KXUFKEHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW¶SS-5. 
75
 µ7KH&KXUFKEHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW¶S 
76
 µ7KH&KXUFKEHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW¶S 
77
 Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the reply "No!" by Dr. 
Karl Barth (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946). 
78
 µ$&RUUHVSRQGHQFH $Q2SHQ/HWWHUIURP(PLO%UXQQHUWR.DUO%DUWK¶LQ Against the Stream, p 110 
(106-113). 
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DQGEHKDYLRXU%UXQQHU¶VDSSURDFKKHUH LVEDVHGH[SOLFLWO\RQWKHLGHDRIQDWXUDORUGHUV
which were ordained by God with the creation of the world.79 
 
Barth himself does not bring in the question of nature and grace, or his view of the 
SULRULW\RIJUDFHRYHUQDWXUHZKHQKHUHSOLHVWR%UXQQHU¶VRSHQOHWWHU:KDWKHDFWXDOO\
VD\VLVWKDWWKH&KULVWLDQFKXUFKLVQRWERXQGWRµHWHUQDOWUXWKV¶RUWRµDEVWUDFWSULQFLSOHV¶
EXW µWR LWV OLYLQJ/RUG¶80 But this is clearly in line with his position that the specifically 
Christian - i.e. grace - should take precedence over the general principles derived from 
natural theology and from the corresponding doctrine of creation. But, precisely here, the 
hermeneutical FKDUDFWHURI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJLFDODSSURDFKEHFRPHVFOHDU%DUWKZLVKHVWR
resist the formulation and application of general principles because he recognises that they 
can conceal self-interest, in this case the glorification of the perhaps equally questionable 
principles of Western politics. So he wishes to apply the specifically Christian 
understanding of repentance also here; the heart is desperately wicked, and even where it 
seems to have very obvious reason to be sure of itself, it must still be open to questioning 
itself. 
 
It is very interesting to note how the themes of the priority of grace over nature and the 
priority of Christ over Adam each operate at an implicit level in the context of the urgent 
practical question of the response to communism. In each case, I think it essential to take 
LQWRDFFRXQWWKHKHUPHQHXWLFDOLQWHQWEHKLQG%DUWK¶VUHYHUVDORIWKHWUDGLWLRQDORUGHUWKH
SRLQW LV QRW WKDW µ&KULVWLDQV¶ KDYH VSHFLDO LQVLJKW over against the general mass of 
humanity; rather, the Christian faith has the special responsibility of convicting people of 
the sinful self-interest which is hidden in all seemingly self-evident principles - whether of 
µJHQHUDO DQWKURSRORJ\¶ µ$GDP¶ RU of principles supposedly universally valid from 
FUHDWLRQ µQDWXUH¶7KHVDPHDSSURDFKFRXOGDOVREHDSSOLHG WRWKHTXHVWLRQRI%DUWK¶V
UHYHUVDO RI WKH WUDGLWLRQDO /XWKHUDQ RUGHU RI µODZ DQG JRVSHO¶ DQG LW ZRXOG EH YHU\
interesting to compare and contrasW %DUWK DQG 1LHEXKU¶V WUHDWPHQW RI WKLV WUDGLWLRQDO
                                                        
79
 See Brunner, The Divine Imperative 3KLODGHOSKLD :HVWPLQVWHU  )RU %DUWK¶V UHVSRQVH WR
%UXQQHU¶VZRUNVHH&',,,SSII 
80
 µ$&RUUHVSRQGHQFH.DUO%DUWK¶V5HSO\¶ p 114. 
 90 
 
theological problem.81 But I will not say more about this in the present thesis, and instead 
will make some concluding comments about the historical context of Christ and Adam. 
 
Now - of course, the fact tKDW%DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\KDGSUDFWLFDOFRQVHTXHQFHVGRHVQRW LQ
itself mean that it was truly relevant. If it led him to politically intolerable positions, then 
this itself would demonstrate that his theology was dangerously irrelevant to political and 
practical issues - which is exactly the view advocated by Niebuhr. Indeed, especially with 
KLQGVLJKW LW LV LPSRVVLEOHQRW WREHWURXEOHGE\%DUWK¶VUHIXVDO WRFRQGHPQFRPPXQLVP
outright when we consider in particular the outworking of Stalinism. Barth wrote that µLW
ZRXOG EH TXLWH DEVXUG WR PHQWLRQ«D PDQ RI WKH VWDWXUH RI -RVHSK 6WDOLQ LQ WKH VDPH
EUHDWK DV VXFK FKDUODWDQV DV +LWOHU¶82 But in this respect history has surely justified 
%UXQQHU¶V FRQWUDU\ FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW WKH PDLQ GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ +LWOHU DQG 6WDOLn was  
that Stalin was ultimately far more successful in applying the principle of totalitarianism  
to destructive effect.83 In the face of such evil, it hardly seems sufficient for Barth to  
                                                        
81
 6HH&',,SIRU%DUWK¶VEDVLFVWDWHPHQWVRQWKHODZJRVSHOUHODWLRQDQGThe Nature and Destiny 
of Man, YROSSI IRU1LHEXKU¶VFRPPHQWVRQ/XWKHU¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQODZDQGJRVSHO,QRQH
sense Niebuhr and BaUWK DUH DJUHHG LQ REMHFWLQJ WR /XWKHU¶V ODZJRVSHO GLVWLQFWLRQ DQG DUH DJUHHG WKDW
gospel should also be applied in the sphere of law (contra Thiselton, Interpreting God, p 139, where 
7KLVHOWRQZURQJO\VD\VWKDW1LHEXKUHQGRUVHV/XWKHU¶VGLVWLQFWLRQ%XW I would argue that Niebuhr does 
not really deal with the hermeneutical dimension of the problem.  
82
 µ7KH&KXUFKEHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW¶S 
83
 µ$ &RUUHVSRQGHQFH $Q 2SHQ /HWWHU WR .DUO %DUWK¶ S  FI 1RUPDQ 'DYLHV Europe: A History 
(London: Pimlico, Sµ$VDPDQLSXODWRURISROLWLFDOSRZHU6WDOLQKDVHYHU\FODLPWREHMXGJHG
WKHJUHDWHVWPDQRI WKH WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\«7KHRQO\SHUVRQZKRVHHYLOFDQEHFRPSDUHGWRKLVRZQZDV
another small man with a different moustache, whom he never met, anG ZKR ZDV QRW VR VXFFHVVIXO¶
However, it is interesting that the more recent Pimlico history, penned by Clive Ponting, suggests the 
FRQWUDU\ MXGJHPHQW µ7KH GHOLEHUDWH GHVWUXFWLRQ RI  PLOOLRQ -HZV PRUH WKDQ KDOI RI WKHP LQ VSHFLDOO\
constructed death camps which had no other purpose than mass slaughter, was an even greater crime than 
WKH *XODJ VODYH FDPSV RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ¶  &3RQWLQJ World History: a New Perspective (London: 
Pimlico, 2001), p 776.) I would also draw attention to the more specialist studies collected and edited by 
Sheila Fitzpatrick (Stalinism: New Directions (London/New York: Routledge, 2000)). These studies 
FROOHFWLYHO\TXHVWLRQWKHVFLHQWLILFDQGKLVWRULRJUDSKLFDOYDOLGLW\RIWKHµWRWDOLWDULDQ¶PRGHODVDPHDQVIRU
understanding Stalinism and Nazism under a single, generalised category. Fitzpatrick (introduction, p 2) 
notes the huge influence of this model in the post-war West, and this gives us the historical and cultural 
EDFNJURXQGWR%UXQQHU¶VSRVLWLRQDQGPRGHRIH[SUHVVLRQ 
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make a restrained admission that, if asked, he would be prepared WR JLYH D µSROLWLFDO
GLVFODLPHURI>WKHFRPPXQLVW@V\VWHP¶ 
 
Without wishing to say that Barth was simply correct, something must be noted on the 
other side, of no small significance. It seems clear that one of the worst strings of 
atrocities which weighs heavily on the conscience of the West, and on America in 
particular, is the Vietnam War. And it could be argued that the main driving force behind 
WKLVZDVWKDWLWZDVµDQWL-FRPPXQLVWRQSULQFLSOH¶LWWUHDWHGFRPPXQLVPDVLILWZHUHWKH
worst threat imaginable. This anti-communist principle, when applied to the extreme and 
without differentiation, made the American government disastrously blind to other 
GDQJHUV7KLVLQLWVHOIZRXOGVHHPWREHDSUDFWLFDOYLQGLFDWLRQRI%DUWK¶VFRQFHUQV$QG,
cannot help but find it highly significant that, in response to the Vietnam War and other 
political developments, Niebuhr himself published a retraction of his criticism of Barth, 
saying that he had failed to see problems which Barth had seen earlier. This was in 1969, 
about a year after Barth died.84 
 
This is not to say that Barth was unquestionably right in his judgement or handling of the 
question of communism. But I think it very important to reflect on practical  
consequences when we are assessing where the point of difference between Barth and 
Niebuhr really lies. Both Barth and Niebuhr were moved deeply by the problem of 
corporate self-deception in humanity; but Niebuhr thought that Barth and his followers 
were pressing this point too far - if sin has such a completely radical effect on human 
understanding, then this throws away what remaining chance we have of finding  
principles which might make at least some moral progress possible.85 But for Barth this 
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 1LHEXKU µ7RZDUG1HZ,QWUD-&KULVWLDQ(QGHDYRXUV¶SS--%HWWLVZULWHV µ,W LVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRI
1LHEXKU¶VJUHDWQHVVWKDWKLVUHYHUVDOLVFOHDUDQGXQDPELJXRXV¶µ3ROLWLFDO7KHRORJ\DQG6RFLDO(WKLFV¶S
1LHEXKU¶VDFWXDOZRUGVDUHDVIROORZV µ,PXVWQRZUXHIXOO\FKDQJHWKDWGHFDGH-ago opinion of mine 
LQUHJDUGWR%DUWK¶VQHXWUDOLVP:KLOH,GRQRWVKDUHKLVVQHHUDWWKH³IOHVKSRWVRI*HUPDQ\DQG$PHULFD´  
I must admit that our wealth makes our religious anticommunism particularly odious. Perhaps there is not 
so much to choose between communist and anticommunist fanaticism, particularly when the latter, 
combined with our wealth, has caused us to stumble into the most pointless, costly and bloody war in our 
KLVWRU\¶SS-3.) 
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 See Moral Man and Immoral Society, p 68; cf also The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, p 39 n.1, and 
p 66 n.2 (in the latter Niebuhr explicitly sides with Brunner on the question of nature and grace).  
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approach which tries to build on the remnants of human moral capacity is not radical 
enough; as Christians we must always use general principles of moral capacity with a 
fundamental reservation and suspect that however carefully we have constructed these 
principles there may lurk deep structures of collective self-deception within them.86 It is 
FHUWDLQO\ WUXH WKDW %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK PD\ VHHP RYHUO\ F\QLFDO DQG PD\ VHHP WR VWXOWLI\
ZKDWFKDQFHRIPRUDOSURJUHVVZHKDYHOHIW:KHWKHU%DUWK¶VKHUPHQHXWLFDODSSURDFKLVD
viable one in practice can only be tested by looking at specific practical issues, and my 
glance at the question of communism has been an attempt to make a start on doing 
precisely this. 
 
)RU ZH FDQ VHH KRZ %DUWK¶V UHVSRQVH WR FRPPXQLVP PDNHV UDWKHU PRUH FRQFUHWH WKH
SUREOHPVDQGEHQHILWVRI%DUWK¶VJHQHUDO dogmatic position. The general question stated 
in the last paragraph has now become the more specific, sharper question - has Barth 
really made an effective protest against the political presumptions of the West, or has he 
just thrown away the chance of building on where the West is clearly right (i.e. in the 
ULJKWV RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO RU µKXPDQ ULJKWV¶" 5HODWHG WR WKLV LV %UXQQHU¶V FRPPHQW WKDW
there is no reason why we cannot condemn communism whilst also fighting against the 
injustices of Western politics, of capitalism.87 Clearly Brunner believes that he can 
formulate general principles of human rights which would show up the evils of both 
communism and capitalism, drawing on insights of both the right and the left (rights of 
individual humans and social MXVWLFH UHVSHFWLYHO\ %XW %DUWK¶V UHIXVDO WR FRQGHPQ
communism seems to mean a relaxation of what Brunner holds to be inviolable, that is the 
principle of human rights. And yet - something like the Vietnam conflict can show how 
the problem of perspective and collective self-interest affects even such inviolable 
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 I note that T.F.Torrance comments that the difference between BaUWKDQG1LHEXKU¶VDQWKURSRORJ\LVWKDW
Barth is able to make a positive affirmation of humanity on the basis of Christ, whereas Niebuhr tends to 
HQG LQ FULWLFDO GHVSDLU µ.DUO %DUWK $SSUHFLDWLRQ DQG 7ULEXWH LQ +RQRXU RI KLV 6HYHQWLHWK %LUWKGD\¶
Expository Times 67 (1955-6), p 262 (261-3)). Like so many things that can be said about Barth this is not 
wrong but is one-sided, and I think it more pertinent to say that the difference between Barth and Niebuhr 
ZDVQRW%DUWK¶VPRUHSRVLWLYHDIILUPDWLRQRIKXPDQLty but rather his recognition that human sin was more 
UDGLFDO7RUUDQFH¶VFRPPHQWLVFOHDUO\UHODWHGWRWKH%ULWLVKSXEOLFDWLRQRIChrist and Adam; which was 
DOVR SXEOLVKHG LQ KRQRXU RI %DUWK¶V VHYHQWLHWK ELUWKGD\ VHH (GLWRUV¶ )RUZDUG RQH HGLWRU ZDV
T.F7RUUDQFHDQGFI7RUUDQFHµ.DUO%DUWK¶Expository Times 66 (1954-5), p 209 (pp 205-9).) 
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SULQFLSOHV LW FRXOG EH DUJXHG WKDW WKH 9LHWQDP FRQIOLFW VKRZHG KRZ WKH µLQYLRODEOH¶
Western principle of human rights all too easily degenerates into a principle of the 
inviolable rights of Western humans. It need hardly be said that this is an urgent problem 
today, after the general break-up of communism. 
 
+RZHYHU ZKDWHYHU PD\ EH VDLG IRU %DUWK¶V LQVLJKWV DERXW FRQWHPSRUDU\ KLVWRU\ WKLV
does not absolve us from a detailed consideration of the proEOHPRI%DUWK¶VVHHPLQJODFN
of insight regarding past history, specifically the history contained in or witnessed to by 
WKHELEOLFDOWH[WV7KLVLVRIFRXUVHWKHSUREOHPRI%DUWK¶VUHODWLRQWRKLVWRULFDOFULWLFLVP
and historical understanding, and it will be the concern of my next chapter to address this 
issue.  
94 
Chapter Four 
 %DUWK¶V([HJHVLVLQ5HODWLRQWR+LVWRULFDO&ULWLFLVP 
 
3DUW$%XOWPDQQ¶VFULWLTXHRIChrist and Adam 
 
,QWURGXFWLRQ%DUWK¶VLVRODWLRQ 
 
I have noted in previous chapters that the substance of Christ and Adam belongs originally 
WRWKHSDUWYROXPHRI%DUWK¶VDogmatics which deals specifically with the doctrine of man. 
And it is striking that in the introduction to this part volume, we find that Barth makes a 
statement of his alienation or isolation from the contemporary world of scholarly exegesis. 
Barth expresses himself in terms which may recall issues alluded to in my first chapter - 
namely that exegetes always work with dogmatic (i.e. theological) presuppositions which 
they tend to keep hidden but which ought to be made explicit. But what is more noticeable 
LV%DUWK¶VFRQVHTXHQWVWDWHPHQWRIKLVRZQVHOI-enforced isolation from scholarly exegesis; 
he states that because of this problem he must work out his own proofs from Scripture 
without reference to the work of standard exegesis.1 This self-enforced isolation is 
reflected in the pages of Christ and Adam, which contain no explicit reference to any 
contemporary writer or work of any kind. 
 
Although it may fairly be said that this expOLFLWLVRODWLRQRFFXUVILUVWDWWKLVSRLQWLQ%DUWK¶V
theological writings, it cannot be denied that this tendency has its roots in his earliest 
RXWSXWVSHFLILFDOO\LQKLVIDPRXVFRPPHQWDU\RQ3DXO¶V(SLVWOHWRWKH5RPDQV6RLQWKLV
chapter I will be taking a glance back at this earliest stage, with a view to examining where 
Barth stands in relation to what would be called more scholarly or critical exegesis. 
 
Where does Barth stand? 
 
The method used here for assessing where Barth stands in relation to standard exegesis 
will be that suggested by W.G.Jeanrond, at least in terms of the selection of primary 
                                                        
1
 CD III/2, p ix. 
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material. Jeanrond makes use of material from the first volume of the Church Dogmatics, 
WKH µYDULRXVSUHIDFHV¶RI WKHEpistle to the Romans DQG WKH µGLDORJXHZLWKKLV>%DUWK¶V@
life-long friend Rudolf Bultmann which gave rise to many discussions of hermeneutical 
SUREOHPV¶2 There is a difference in scope between my analysis and that of Jeanrond, in that 
he was concerned with biblical hermeneutics, whereas ,DPORRNLQJPRUHFORVHO\DW%DUWK¶V
relation to historical-critical exegesis; however the material selected is equally suited to the 
slightly different question with which I am concerned. The dialogue with Bultmann seems 
particularly appropriate for two reasons: first of all, because it is Bultmann rather than 
Barth who was accessible to even the most critical of twentieth century exegetes; 
accordingly the dialogue between the two seems an appropriate place to start for assessing 
%DUWK¶VUHODWLRQWRVWDQGDrd exegesis; secondly, Bultmann provided a particularly important 
critique of Christ and Adam LWVHOI DQG D UHYLHZRI%XOWPDQQ¶VRYHUDOO DWWLWXGH WR%DUWK
will give us an opportunity to look at this critique in context. 
 
It is clear that Bultmann, like so PDQ\ RWKHUV ZDV YHU\ PXFK LPSUHVVHG ZLWK %DUWK¶V
Epistle to the Romans in its second edition, and that in some part he wished to base his 
DWWHPSWVWRXQGHUVWDQGDQGLQWHUSUHWWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQWRQ%DUWK¶VZRUN7KXVWKHUHLVD
clear and close connection beWZHHQ %DUWK¶V PRVW GHILQLWLYH DQG VXVWDLQHG ZRUN RI
VFULSWXUDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG %XOWPDQQ¶V VXEVHTXHQW GHYHORSPHQW +RZHYHU HYHQ DW WKLV
HDUOLHVWVWDJH%XOWPDQQKDGFHUWDLQUHVHUYDWLRQVDERXW%DUWK¶VDSSURDFKDQGLWLVSUHFLVHO\
these reservations which marked Bultmann off from Barth and made him accessible to 
even the most critical of twentieth century New Testament scholars. So it will be important 
that we look at what those reservations were and how Bultmann saw himself as set apart 
from Barth. 
 
 
 
                                                        
2
 W.G.Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance (Basingstoke/London: 
Macmillan, 1991), p 128. Note: with regard to the prefaces of the Epistle to the Romans, I have mostly 
SUHIHUUHG.&ULP¶VWUDQVODWLRQRIWKHVHSUHIDFHVRUµIRUHZRUGV¶SXEOLVKHGLQThe Beginnings of Dialectic 
TheologyDVRSSRVHGWR(+RVN\QV¶WUDQVlations, which appear in the English edition of The Epistle to the 
Romans. 
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The position of Bultmann; his critique of Christ and Adam 
 
,I ZH ORRN EDFN DW WKH HDUOLHVW VWDJH RI %XOWPDQQ¶V GHYHORSPHQW DURXQG WKH WLPH RI
%DUWK¶VRomans, we can see that one of his defining theological achievements was that he 
saw a specific theological significance in the discovery of the distance between the New 
Testament in its final form on the one hand and the historical person and teaching of Jesus 
on the other. A principal aspect of this was the theory that in primitive Christianity there 
was a development of the Hellenistic congregation separate from the Palestinian 
congregation, and that the Hellenistic congregation was the main presupposition of 
significant aspects of the New Testament - HVSHFLDOO\ WKH ZULWLQJV RI 3DXO DQG µ-RKQ¶
However, according to Bultmann, this Hellenistic congregation (in contrast to the 
Palestinian congregation) had no direct, historical contact with Jesus and re-interpreted 
him according to the understanding of the Hellenistic (Oriental) mystery cult.3 Traditional 
Liberal theology could make little of the consequent alienation of much of the New 
Testament from the Palestinian congregation, simply because this involved a greater 
alienation from the historical Jesus, and it was ostensibly the historically reconstructed 
ethical teaching of Jesus which was the ground and source of Liberal theology. The 
influence of the Hellenistic mystery cult meant, by contrast, that the continual presence of 
WKHµ&KULVW¶ZDVGHWHUPLQDWLYHIRUWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQWUDWKHUWKDQWKHUHFROOHFWLRQRI -HVXV¶
ethical teaching. However, this did not mean that the New Testament had become simply 
and purely determined by these Hellenistic mystery cults; it was crucial to note that to a 
significant extent there remained a link with the Palestinian and hence Jewish/Jewish-
Christian origins.  
 
+HUH 3DXO HVSHFLDOO\ SOD\HG DQ LPSRUWDQW U{OH LQ %XOWPDQQ¶V UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ 3DXO 
belonged to the Hellenistic community from the outset. He was a Hellenistic Jew who 
WKURXJKKLVFRQYHUVLRQµFDPHXQGHUWKHVZD\RIWKH+HOOHQLVWLFFRQJUHJDWLRQ¶4 However, 
3DXO¶VGLVWLQFWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQZDVWKDWKHSURYLGHGWKHWKHRORJLFDOEDVLVIRUDFRQWLQXLQJ
relation between the Hellenistic congregations and the Palestinian congregation at 
                                                        
3
 µ(WKLFDO DQG 0\VWLFDO 5HOLJLRQ LQ 3ULPLWLYH &KULVWLDQLW\¶ LQ -05RELQVRQ HG The Beginnings of 
Dialectic Theology, pp 222-3 (221-235). 
4
 µ(WKLFDODQG0\VWLFDO5HOLJLRQ¶SS4-5. 
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Jerusalem; accordingly both Hellenistic and authentically Jewish (Palestinian) elements are 
visible in his presentation of the gospel. 
 
If I understand Bultmann correctly, in his earlier writings he seemed to see a kind of 
creative tension between the Palestinian and Hellenistic forms of primitive Christianity, 
ZKLFKKHFKDUDFWHULVHGDVµHWKLFDO¶DQGµP\VWLFDO¶UHVSHFWLYHO\7KH3DOHVWLQLDQIRUPZDV
FDOOHGµHWKLFDO¶EHFDXVHRILWVGLUHFWOLQNZLWKWKHHWKLFDOWHDFKLQJRI-HVXV(DFKRIWKHVH
two forms in its own way brought the divine claim upon human life, but each did so in a 
one-sided way which resulted in the divine claim being reduced to the purely human, as a 
predicate of human thought or experience. Specifically, ethical religion brings the divine 
moral claim to human life, but this becomes merely a matter of human moral reasoning 
XQOHVVLWLVUHPLQGHGE\WKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIP\VWLFDOUHOLJLRQWKDW*RGLVWKHµ:KROO\2WKHU¶
of religious experience and cannot thus be reduced to immanent moral reasoning. 
However, in and of itself the religious experience of mystical religion cannot be 
distinguished from intense emotional experience, and thus in turn needs the critical 
corrective of ethical religion to prevent it from being dissolved in feeling. 
 
This of course is a very simple sketch, but I think it is possible to see from this much why 
%XOWPDQQ WRRN D YHU\ VWURQJ LQWHUHVW LQ %DUWK¶V Epistle to the Romans, especially in its 
second edition.5 :HKDYHDOUHDG\FRQVLGHUHGLQVRPHGHWDLOKRZ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\IURPLWV
earliest stage was grounded in an antithesis between what was naturally accessible in 
human experience and the true voice of God. According to Barth, the Word of God cannot 
EH PHGLDWHG GLUHFWO\ HLWKHU WKURXJK PDQ¶V QDWXUDO PRUDO VHQVH RU WKURXJK KLV UHOLJLRXV
experience or feeling, and we can see from what has been said so far that this was 
HVSHFLDOO\FRQJHQLDOWR%XOWPDQQ¶VUHIOHFWLRQV+RZHYHU%DUWKGLGQRWXQGHUWDNHKLVRZQ
reflections in connection with the problems or tensions visible within the New Testament 
text or within the thought of Paul himself, and this obviously caused problems for 
Bultmann. It was essential to Bultmann that he expound the workings of the creative 
                                                        
5
 Bultmann contended that the first edition of the Epistle to the Romans constituted a repristination of the 
Christ myth/cult of Hellenistic Christianity, evidently because this first edition, while making nothing of 
the historical Jesus, seemed to assert a more or less direct presence of Christ in history through the growth 
RIWKH&KXUFKµ(WKLFDODQG0\VWLFDO5HOLJLRQ¶S 
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tension between the different forms of primitive Christianity within the text; and this  
meant that there were places where the tension was not operative because one or the other 
form was simply present, and hence the material was not suitable for appropriation 
because (e.g.) Paul was merely reiterating inherited traditions. Or, more to the point, there 
might be discrepancies and contradictions visible within the conceptuality of the text which 
bear witness to the working out of this creative tension. Barth clearly had no interest in 
this; indeed he showed no interest in a direct conceptual analysis of the text as such, but 
rather relied on loose analogies between concepts in the text and the problems of the 
current situation, as a platform from which to expound his basic theological insight. 
 
:KHQ ZH UHDG %XOWPDQQ¶V FULWLTXH RI %DUWK¶V Christ and Adam, more than thirty years 
later, we can see that the basic pattern of his early ideas is still present. We can still see   
the idea that Jewish (=Palestinian) and Hellenistic thought appear as mutually critical 
FRUUHFWLYHVLQ3DXO¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHJRVSHO+RZHYHUZHZRXOGDOso have to take into 
DFFRXQW FHUWDLQ RI %XOWPDQQ¶V later developments, especially the ideas associated with 
µGHP\WKRORJLVLQJ¶ 6SHFLILFDOO\ GHP\WKRORJLVLQJ ZKLFK %XOWPDQQ EHOLHYHG KH FRXOG VHH
taking place in the New Testament itself) was directed against two forms of mythical 
thought, one of which pertained to Jewish thought, and the other to Hellenistic thought. In 
Jewish thought, the relevant mythical thought form was apocalyptic; in Hellenistic  
thought, the relevant mythical thought form was Gnostic redemption myths.6 The essence 
of the Jewish kind of mythology was an expectation of a future intervention by God; the 
essence of the Hellenistic kind was an immediate determination of the present life of the 
EHOLHYHU E\ DQWHFHGHQW µFRVPLF¶ HYHQWV $JDLQ Dt the risk of oversimplification, I would  
say that for Bultmann the problem with the Jewish myth was that it related only to the 
future, whereas the problem with the Hellenistic myth was that it related only to the 
present. What Bultmann was after was a revelation which had not lost contact with the 
present, but which also showed a radical tension with the present. The Jewish concept of 
the future intervention of God creates a tension with the present, because it does not look 
IRU*RG¶VDFWLRQLQWKHSUHVHnt but only in the future by hope; however, because it looks 
                                                        
6
 µ1HZ7HVWDPHQWDQG0\WKRORJ\¶LQ%DUWVFKHGKerygma and Myth, p 15 (1-44). (From an early stage, 
Bultmann had drawn attention to the apocalyptic or eschatological element of Jewish Christianity as well 
as to the ethical.) 
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principally to the future, it lacks the immediacy of the Gnostic myth for the present. 
However the two mythical thought forms together (somehow) generate the right balance 
of relevance to and tension with the present moment of existence. 
 
%HFDXVHRI WKLV%XOWPDQQILQGVVSHFLDOVLJQLILFDQFHLQ3DXO¶VµSDUDGR[LFDO-HVFKDWRORJLFDO¶
statements, that is, the statements of living in commitment to the present situation but with 
the eschatological reservaWLRQRIµDVLIQRW¶DVVWDWHGLQWH[WVVXFKDV&RULQWKLDQV-
31.7 :LWK WKLV EDFNJURXQG LW FRPHV DV QR VXUSULVH WKDW ZKHQ ZH WXUQ WR %XOWPDQQ¶V
exposition of Romans 5, we find he sees the high point of the chapter in verses 2 
following, which say thaWµZHERDVWLQWKHKRSHRIWKHJORU\RI*RG- but not only that, we 
JORU\ LQSUHVHQW WULEXODWLRQVNQRZLQJ WKDW WULEXODWLRQEULQJVDERXWSDWLHQFHHWF¶8 Is this 
not the combination of radical commitment to the present moment together with radical 
detachment from the present moment? But Bultmann is still concerned that the mere 
µKRSH¶ RI 5RPDQV -11 is oriented mainly to the future, and hence is not sufficiently 
closely tied to the present. Hence he portrays Paul as making use of the Gnostic myth in 
Romans 5:12-21, which is able more vividly to portray the presence of salvation and life 
because it entails immediate determination of the present life of the believer by antecedent 
cosmic events.9 
 
7KH µ*QRVWLF¶ P\WK ZKLFK %XOWPDQQ DWWULEXWHV WR 3DXO LQ 5RPDQV 5:12-21 is that of an 
LPPHGLDWH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI KXPDQ EHLQJV¶ SUHVHQW H[LVWHQFH WKURXJK WKHLU LQFOXVLRQ LQ  
RQHRI WZRSULPDOPHQ LQ3DXO¶V WHUPLQRORJ\ LQ$GDPRU&KULVW ,W LV WKLVP\WKZKLFK
forms a critical corrective to the all-too-future orientation of 5:1-11, because, as indicated, 
it posits an immediate determination of the present lives of believers (by antecedent  
FRVPLF HYHQWVUHDOLWLHV HWF +RZHYHU %XOWPDQQ¶V PDVWHUVWURNH FRPHV ZKHQ KH GUDZV 
attention to the apparent discrepancies between this basic Gnostic idea and the way Paul 
                                                        
7
 µ1HZ7HVWDPHQWDQG0\WKRORJ\¶S 
8
 µ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶SSI 
9
 µ7KH SDUDGR[LFDO HVFKDWRORJLFDO FKDUDFWHU RI WKH SUHVHQW IRU WKH EHOLHYHU LV PDGH clear in 5:1-11, and 
thereby the question about the presence of life has been answered for the time being. But is the presence of 
life not merely a relative one, i.e., only anticipated in hope? Obviously Paul felt the need to express the 
presence of life more clearly and he so expresses it in 5:12-¶%XOWPDQQµ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶SFI
further Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume One (London: SCM Press, 1952), pp 177-8.) 
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actually works it out. The point is, Paul does not seem to be happy with the thought that 
DOOPHQ¶VIDWHLVSUHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHSULPDOPDQ$GDPEXWUDWKHUZDQWVWRUHODWHKXPDQ
EHLQJV¶ IDWH WR WKHLU RZQ historical existence; specifically, in 5:12d Paul attributes the 
FDXVHRIGHDWKWRWKHVLQVRIDOOLQGLYLGXDOVµEHFDXVHDOOVLQQHG¶UDWKHUWKDQWRWKHDFWRI
the primal man; in addition to this, Paul says that sin is only really sin when it is against a 
(historically) given law (5:13-14).10 Although Bultmann does not say it at this point, this 
critical corrective towards a more historical mode of thought relates to what he would 
FODVVLI\DVµ-HZLVK¶EDVHG- not, to be sure, that of a future intervention of God, but more 
JHQHUDOO\LQWHUPVRIDKLVWRULFDOUHODWLRQWR*RGWKURXJKDIRFXVRQ*RG¶VDFWVLQKLVWRU\
7KDW WKLV ODVW GRHV FRQVWLWXWH D WXUQ WR WKH µ-HZLVK¶ PRGH RI WKRXJKW LQ %XOWPDQQ¶V
scheme) can, I believe, be demonstrated by parallel statements in the Theology of the New 
Testament, in which it is said that the a-historical tendencies of Gnostic thought are 
corrected by the fact that the primitive Hellenistic church retained the Old Testament.11 
 
Thus, to summarise, Bultmann claims that Paul has countered the Jewish future  
orientation of Romans 5:1- E\ µUHDFKLQJ IRU¶ WKH *QRVWLF P\WK LQ 5RPDQV -21 
(which, supposedly, speaks more clearly of the presence of life); however, Paul needs also 
to correct the Gnostic idea he has adopted in order to bring it home to the historical 
existence of the individual believer or sinner - which, although Bultmann does not say so 
                                                        
10
 µ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶S 
11
 µ8QGRXEWHGO\ WKH *QRVWLF P\WK DQG LWV Werminology offered the possibility of elucidating the 
eschatological occurrence as one inaugurated by the history of Jesus Christ and now at work in the present 
LQSURFHVVRIFRQVXPPDWLRQ«%XWWKHTXHVWLRQQRZLVZKHWKHUWKLVFRVPLFRFFXUUHQFHLVWREHXQGHrstood 
only as a sublime process of nature which takes place by-passing, so to say, my conduct, my responsibility, 
P\GHFLVLRQV«Will human history be conceived as natural process, or as genuine historical happening? ¶
(Theology of the New Testament Volume One, pp 181-2 - emphasis his), and further p 117, where it is said 
WKDW *HQWLOH +HOOHQLVWLF &KULVWLDQLW\ ZDV LQ GDQJHU µRI FRQFHLYLQJ LWVHOI VLPSO\ DV D ³QHZ UHOLJLRQ´ LQ
contradistinction to the heathen and the Jews, a new religion resting upon progress in knowledge of God. 
This danger can be avoided by the continuing possession of the Old Testament, since it teaches an 
understanding of God according to which God deals with men in history and man becomes aware of God 
and of his own nature not by free-soaring thought but by historical encounter. For to the Old Testament 
God is not cosmic law, available to thought and investigation, but the God who reveals himself in the 
course of history¶ )LQDOO\ FRPSDUH WKH HDUOLHU HVVD\ µ(WKLFDO DQG 0\VWLFDO 5HOLJLRQ¶ where Bultmann 
ZULWHVµ)RU3DXO*RGLVQRWWKHSHDFHDQGTXLHWRIWKHP\VWLFDO*RGEXWWKH2OG7HVWDPHQW*RGRIZLOO
who rules the history and destiny RIPDQLQWKHZRUOG¶S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explicitly, shows the same pattern of allowing the Gnostic mythology to be in turn 
corrected by the Jewish perspective.12 Thus, in these different ways, we can see that the 
IXQGDPHQWDO WKUXVW RI %XOWPDQQ¶V H[HJHVLV UHPDLQV DQ H[SRVLWLRQ RI FUHDWLYH WHQVLRQV
between different traditions within the text - i.e. between Jewish thought on the one hand 
and Gnostic thought on the other. 
 
Unfortunately it seems likely that the Gnostic myth of Romans 5:12-21 is more a 
SURMHFWLRQ IURP %XOWPDQQ¶V RZQ VFKHPD UDWKHU WKDQ VRPHWKLQJ KH DFWXDOO\ ILQGV LQ WKH
text. Certainly, there is no critical testing at this crucial point as to whether the Gnostic 
myth is actually present, and more recent study of the text has shown that it is quite 
possible to account for the conceptual discrepancies of Romans 5:12-21 by considering its 
Jewish background, rather than by postulating a discrepancy between a Gnostic myth and a 
µValvation-KLVWRULFDO¶ SHUVSHFWLYH13 More serious is the fact that it is not only here but 
HYHU\ZKHUHLQWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQWWKDW%XOWPDQQ¶VWKHRU\RIWKHLQIOXHQFHRI*QRVWLFP\WK
has come under suspicion; it is now more widely believed that the tensions visible within 
the New Testament have more to do with intra-Jewish questions, that is, between 
Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism; and where there is extra-Jewish influence, it is 
generally attributed to the Hellenistic Enlightenment (e.g. Stoicism) rather than to 
Hellenistic Gnostic mystery cults. We will need to bear this in mind as we turn to 
%XOWPDQQ¶VVSHFLILFFULWLFLVPRI%DUWK¶VRZQH[HJHVLVRI5RPDQV 
 
                                                        
12
 µ7KH VLWXDWLRQ LV FOHDU 3DXO FDQQRW EH VDWLVILHG ZLWK KDYLQJ GHVFULbed life in 5.1-11 as already 
anticipated in hope, but he intends to depict it as something now already procured by Christ; it is already 
present with Christ in a hidden way even though for the individual it will only be actualized in the future 
(vss. 17 and 19). He reaches for the gnostic myth of the original man, so that he can affirm the presence of 
OLIH +H FRUUHFWV LW  WKURXJK WKH SKUDVH ³EHFDXVH DOO VLQQHG´ YV  DQG  LQ FRPSOHWLQJ WKH
cosmological consideration with the consideration of salvation history by a reflection upon the meaning of 
WKHODZLQ$GDPLFPDQNLQG¶µ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶S 
13
 6HHHVSHFLDOO\:HGGHUEXUQµ7KH7KHRORJLFDO6WUXFWXUHRI5RPDQV9¶%XOWPDQQEHOLHYHVKHFDQVHH
the Gnostic primal man in the Adam/Christ parallel because he thinks Paul has adopted the terminology of 
the Corinthian Gnostics in the parallel passage 1 Corinthians 15 (Theology of the New Testament Volume 
One, pp 177-8). For a critique of this, see J.Dunn, Word Biblical Commentary Volume 38A Romans 1-8 
(Dallas: Word Books, 1988), pp 277-279. 
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%XOWPDQQ¶VFULWLFLVPRI%DUWKZDVDVIROORZV%DUWKIDLOVWRQRWLFHWKHP\WKRORJLFDOEDVLV
of Romans 5:12-21, and, because of this, he is unable to see that Paul has critically re-
interpreted the Gnostic myth; and hence Barth takes on this myth without the necessary 
FULWLFDODPHQGPHQWV7KLV LVKRZ%XOWPDQQDFFRXQWV IRU%DUWK¶VQRWLRQ WKDW all men are 
included in Christ, which Bultmann thinks is contained in the Gnostic myth, which, as we 
noted, entails an inclusion of humans in (the being of) a primal man.14 What I find worth 
noting here is that Bultmann is repeating the type of criticisms he uttered many years 
before, namely that the failure to read the New Testament in its historical context leads to 
one aspect of the New Testament being adopted without necessary criticism: that is, he 
had originally criticised Liberal theology for merely adopting the perspective of the 
Palestinian congregation, and contemporary pietism for merely renewing the Christ-cult of 
Hellenistic Christianity. In the same way, he is claiming here that Barth has taken over a 
limited aspect of the text, pertaining to the Hellenistic congregation (i.e. the Gnostic 
myth), because he has failed to read the text in its historical context.15 
 
+RZHYHU ZKDWHYHU ZH PD\ EH DEOH WR VD\ DERXW WKH FRQVLVWHQF\ RI %XOWPDQQ¶V
development, still his criticism of Barth in this case has been somewhat weakened by the 
passing of his influence on the historical reconstruction of the origin of the New 
Testament. Nevertheless, it still remains the case that Bultmann seems to have the edge 
over Barth because at least in principle he searches for ways to relate the historical study 
of the Bible to theological interpretation. James Smart, for example, has argued that it is 
SDUWLFXODUO\KHUHLQ%DUWK¶VUHIXVDOWRPDNHXVHRIWKHKLVWRULFDOVWXG\RI6FULSWXUHZKHUH
KH KDV FRQWULEXWHG WR WKH µGLYLGHG PLQG RI PRGHUQ WKHRORJ\¶ LH WKH GLVXQLW\ LQ WKH
theological scene occasioned by the division between Barth and Bultmann).16 
                                                        
14
 µ$GDPDQG&KULVW¶SS-&XULRXVO\'XQQVD\VWKDW%XOWPDQQLVFRUUHFWLQVD\LQJWKDW%DUWK¶V
position is dependent on a Gnostic Christology (Romans 1-8, p 277). How can Dunn maintain this if he 
denies %XOWPDQQ¶VWKHVLVWKDWD*QRVWLF&KULVWRORJ\LVDFWXDOO\SUHVHQW"6HHSUHYLRXVQRWH 
15
 It is also interesting that in his criticism of Christ and Adam, Bultmann is returning to his criticism of 
Barth vis-à-vis the first edition of Romans (see earlier footnote). 
16
 J.Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology: Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann: 1908-33 
3KLODGHOSKLD:HVWPLQVWHU3UHVVµ«>,@QVHSDUDWLQJWKHKLVWRULFDOIURPWKHWKHRORJLFDOKH>%DUWK@
has contributed, perhaps unintentionally, to the divided mind of modern theology. The theological and the 
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Hence, we must take a step back from the specific historical theses of Bultmann - which 
Barth normally did not dispute directly in any case17 - DQGWDNHDORRNDW%DUWK¶VUHVSRQVH
to Bultmann on the general issue of the relation between historical study and theological 
interpretation. When we have done this, we will hopefully be able to see more clearly the 
VLJQLILFDQFH RI %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK IRU the particular historical theses of Bultmann which I 
have sketched above. 
 
Part B: Barth and the General Question of Historical Criticism 
 
Barth on the relation between historical criticism and theological interpretation 
 
What, then, was the general question on which Barth and Bultmann were divided in their 
UHODWLRQ WR KLVWRULFDO VWXG\ RI WKH %LEOH" %XOWPDQQ¶V PDLQ SRLQW LQ KLV FULWLFLVP RI The 
Epistle to the Romans turned on the fact that the thought and teaching of Paul must 
necessarily have been historically relative, and that it is therefore necessary to approach 
him as historically limited and hence as subject to error in order to understand him 
properly.18 %DUWK¶V UHVSRQVH WR WKLV ZDV - of course what Paul says was historically 
conditioned and therefore fallible; every sensible person knows that!19 And yet, if we are 
serious about providing a real commentary on Paul and his epistle to the Romans, then, it 
                                                                                                                                                                     
historical elements are so intertwined in the text of the Scriptures that in their interpretation the historical 
DQGWKHRORJLFDOTXHVWLRQVPXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGFRQVWDQWO\LQWKHFORVHVWLQWHUUHODWLRQ¶S 226.) 
17
 e.g. Barth agrees that there may be genuine parallels between the use of the term Kyrios for Christ and 
its use for Hellenistic ruler cults, although, characteristically, he immediately moves on to emphasis the 
intra-biblical significance of Kyrios as the Septuagint translation of Yahweh-Adonai, so that the extra-
biblical parallels are granted virtually no theological significance. (CD I/1, p 400; also CD III/2, p 450) - 
cf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume One, p 124. 
18
 %XOWPDQQ µ.DUO%DUWK¶VEpistle to the Romans LQ LWV6HFRQG(GLWLRQ¶ LQThe Beginnings of Dialectic 
Theology, p 120 (100-120). 
19
 %DUWKµEpistle to the Romans)RUHZRUGWRWKH7KLUG(GLWLRQ¶LQThe Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, 
p 129 (126- µ,EHOLHYH ,KDYH WKH same opinion as Bultmann and all reasonable persons concerning 
WKHUHODWLYLW\RIDOOKXPDQZRUGVHYHQWKRVHRI3DXO¶ 
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seems, we must accept the principle of unconditional loyalty to the author.20 Now, the 
most obvious thLQJWRDVNDERXW%DUWK¶VUHVSRQVHLV- how could it possibly be wise to give 
unconditional loyalty to a writer whom one acknowledges to be subject to limitations and 
error in some respects? In order to form an idea of what Barth was aiming at here, I will 
give something like a commentary on his response to Bultmann and on his other related 
comments. It is here that I will be making detailed use of the primary material suggested by 
Jeanrond which I mentioned above, i.e. the material from the prefaces to the Epistle to the 
Romans and the first volume of the Church Dogmatics. 
 
I will begin with the general point: historical criticism involves identifying parallels 
between the biblical text and extra-biblical materials, and, by means of this, identifying 
historical influences on the texts and on the thought of the biblical authors themselves. 
Although this is always subject to the relativity of historical judgements, much success can 
be gained in this direction. However, whatever success there is to be gained in the 
historical sphere, we need to think carefully about the hermeneutical significance of such 
µSDUDOOHOV¶ DQG RI WKH WKHRULHV RI KLVWRULFDO LQIOXHQFHV ZKLFK DUH GHULYHG IURP WKHLU
discovery. For when it is said that an author is subject to a historical influence, often the 
LQWHQGHG LPSOLFDWLRQ LV WKDW VRPH DVSHFW RI WKH DXWKRU¶V WKRXJKW LV ZLWKRXW SUHVHQW
significance and is not suitable for contemporary application; hence the question has to be 
UDLVHGZKHWKHUDµKLVWRULFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶RIWKHDXWKRURIthe text and of the situation of 
WKHWH[WOHDGVWRDVXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHWH[W¶VFRQWHQW21 
                                                        
20
 %DUWKµEpistle to the Romans: )RUHZRUGWRWKH7KLUG(GLWLRQ¶SS-%DUWK¶VZRUGIRUWKLVOR\DOW\
is Treueverhältnis, which E.+RVN\QV WUDQVODWHV DV µXWWHU OR\DOW\¶ The Epistle to the Romans, p 17) and 
.&ULPWUDQVODWHVDVµUHODWLRQVKLSRIIDLWKIXOQHVV¶µEpistle to the Romans)RUHZRUGWRWKH7KLUG(GLWLRQ¶
S  7KH UHOHYDQW SDUDJUDSK UHDGV LQ &ULP¶V WUDQVODWLRQ µ7KH H[HJete stands before the either-or, 
whether or not he, knowing what is at stake, and entering into a relationship of faithfulness to the author, 
intends to read him with the hypothesis that the author also knew more or less clearly down to the last 
ZRUG«ZKDWLVDWVWDNH¶S 
21
 On this, see especially the foreword to the second edition of Romans, where Barth is discussing Wernle's 
FULWLFLVPVµ:LWKDFHUWDLQELWWHUQHVV:HUQOHZULWHV³7KHUHLVDEVROXWHO\QRSRLQWLQWKHWKRXJKWRI3DXO
that he [Barth] fiQGVGLVDJUHHDEOH«QRUHPQDQWFRQGLWLRQHGE\WKHKLVWRU\RIWKHWLPHVKRZHYHUPRGHVWLV
OHIW RYHU´ DQG WKHQ KH >:HUQOH@ OLVWV ZKDW VKRXOG KDYH EHHQ ³OHIW RYHU´ DV ³GLVDJUHHDEOH SRLQWV´ DQG
³UHPQDQWVFRQGLWLRQHGE\WKHKLVWRU\RIWKHWLPHV´QDPHO\WKH3DXOLQH³EHOLWWOLQJ´RIWKHHDUWKO\OLIHZRUN
of Jesus, Christ as the Son of God, reconciliation through the blood of Christ, Christ and Adam, Pauline 
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Barth would agree that it is the biblical content as such rather than extra-biblical  
influences which should be normative for Christian theology; however, he believed that   
no clear line could be drawn between what was an extra-biblical influence and what was 
WKHµUHDO¶VXEMHFWPDWWHURIWKHELEOLFDODXWKRU$QGEHFDXVHQRFOHDUOLQHFRXOGEHGUDZQ 
it became too much a matter for the judgement and perspective of the interpreter as to 
ZKDW VKRXOG EH UHOHJDWHG WR EHLQJ D PHUH µKLVWRULFDO LQIOXHQFH¶ DQG ZKDW VKRXOG EH
regarded as having permanent significance.22 Put simply, if an interpreter finds something 
illuminating, then he is likely to receive it as the veritable Word of God; if an interpreter 
finds something difficult, then this is attributed to the merely historical or historically 
                                                                                                                                                                     
scriptural proofs, the so-FDOOHG³EDSWLVPVDFUDPHQWDOLVP´GRXEOHSUHGHVWLQDWLRQDQG3DXO¶VUHODWLRQWRWKH 
magistrate. Let us imagine a commentary on Romans in which these eight little points remain 
XQH[SODLQHG WKDWLVDUHGHFODUHGWREH³GLVDJUHHDEOHSRLQWV´ZKLFKDUH³OHIWRYHU´XQGHUDVFUROOZRUNRI
FRQWHPSRUDU\ SDUDOOHOV +RZ FRXOG WKDW EH FDOOHG D ³FRPPHQWDU\´"¶ µThe Epistle to the Romans: 
)RUHZRUG WR WKH 6HFRQG (GLWLRQ¶ LQ The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, pp 95-6 (88-99).) See also 
%DUWK¶VFULWLFLVPRI-OLFKHULQWKHVDPHIRUHZRUGZKHUHKHFRPSODLQVWKDWZKHQ-OLFKHUFDQQRWH[SODLQ
Paul easily WKURXJKWKHFDWHJRULHVRIPRGHUQ3URWHVWDQWLVPKHZLOOµDVFULEHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHPHDQLQJ
RIWKHWH[WWRWKH³SHUVRQDOLW\´RI3DXOWRWKH³'DPDVFXVH[SHULHQFH´«WR/DWH-XGDLVPWR+HOOHQLVPWR
the ancient world in general, and to some other demigodV¶ S  - and finally, in the foreword to the 
WKLUGHGLWLRQLQFULWLFLVPRI%XOWPDQQµ:KDW,FDQQRWXQGHUVWDQGLVWKHLQYLWDWLRQ«WRWKLQNDQGWRZULWH
with Paul, that is, first of all in the entirely foreign language of his Jewish-popular-Christian-Hellenistic 
thought world, and then suddenly, when this may get to be too much for me - as if something struck me as 
especially strange when everything is strange! - WR VSHDN ³FULWLFDOO\´ DERXW DQG DJDLQVW 3DXO 'RHV
Bultmann not perceive that, even considered only from the point of view of purity of style, this will not do; 
WKDW DV , VHH LW WKLV ZRXOG EH D PDWWHU RI EDG WDVWH RI IDOOLQJ EDFN LQWR WKH PHWKRG RI ³WHPSRUDOO\
FRQGLWLRQHG UHPQDQWV´ DQG ³GLVDJUHHDEOH SRLQWV´"¶ µThe Epistle to the Romans: Foreword to the Third 
(GLWLRQ¶, p 128.) 
22
 7KLV LV KRZ , XQGHUVWDQG %DUWK¶V UHSO\ WR %XOWPDQQ ZKHQ %XOWPDQQ FODLPHG WKDW WKHUH ZHUH RWKHU
VSLULWV SUHVHQW WKDQ WKH 6SLULWRI&KULVW LQ3DXO¶V OHWWHUV%DUWK UHSOLHG WKDWQRWRQO\ LQVRPHSODFHVEXW
everywhere one hears the voices of other spirits, and that one should not think of them as existing 
alongside of or competing with the Spirit of Christ; strikingly Barth goes on to insist on the hypothesis 
that the author knew his own subject matter with clarity down to the last word - µfor where should the limit 
be set - VXUHO\QRWWKURXJKWKHGLVFRYHU\RIUHODWLRQVKLSVRIKLVWRULFDOGHSHQGHQFH"¶ %DUWKµThe Epistle 
to the Romans )RUHZRUG WR WKH 7KLUG (GLWLRQ¶ S  HPSKDVLV PLQH VHH %XOWPDQQ µ.DUO %DUWK¶V
Epistle to the Romans LQ LWV 6HFRQG (GLWLRQ¶ S  6HH DOVR &' , S  ZKHUH %DUWK LV FOHDUO\
GHYHORSLQJWKHVDPHOLQHRIWKRXJKWPDQ\\HDUVODWHUµ1RWRQO\part but all that they [the biblical authors] 
VD\LVKLVWRULFDOO\UHODWHGDQGFRQGLWLRQHG¶HPSKDsis mine). 
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conditioned Paul.23 But this means that the prior understanding and priorities of the 
interpreter become the criteria by which the present significance of the text is evaluated. 
However, a real understanding of the text would mean that the priorities of the author 
rather than those of the interpreter would need to be respected.  
 
However, it is in practice extraordinarily difficult to do this; or, put another way, many 
ZRXOGVD\WKDWLWLVRQO\SRVVLEOHWRUHVSHFWWKHDXWKRU¶VRZQSULRULWLHVZKHQZHDGPLWWKDW
we cannot give the same relative importance to everything in the text as the author himself 
did. There may be aspects of his belief which seemed to him to be essential but which for 
us are merely transient, merely an aspect of his historical conditioning which we have 
transcended. Indeed, we can only really understand a biblical author and give a genuine 
exposition of what he says when we stop pretending we can make every judgement or 
aspect of his teaching our own, because it is only then that we will stop stretching the text 
to fit what we are able to believe or apply today. 
 
Why is it so difficult to accept what a biblical author teaches or implies, not only in their 
occasional judgements but in persistent aspects of his thought and beliefs? This has been 
expressed, specifically by Bultmann, as a difference in world view 7KHUH LV D µPRGHUQ¶
ZRUOG YLHZ DQG WKHUH LV D µELEOLFDO¶ ZRUld view (or rather, an ancient world view 
presupposed in the Bible), and on many points these world views are simply not 
compatible. In our modern world there have been advances in scientific method, in 
historical method and hermeneutical method which in various ways give rise to tensions 
between the content of many biblical texts and what is credible today.24 
 
                                                        
23
 µThe Epistle to the Romans )RUHZRUG WR WKH 7KLUG (GLWLRQ¶ SS -8. Further, my previous notes 
VKRXOG VKRZ WKDW LQ %DUWK¶V PLQG WKHUH LV D YHU\ WKLQ OLQH LQGHHG EHWZHHQ ILQGLQJ VRPHWKLQJ
µGLVDJUHHDEOH¶IRUPRGHUQWKRXJKWDQGDWWULEXWLQJLW WRWKHµKLVWRULFDOFRQGLWLRQLQJ¶RI3DXO 
24
 7KHUH LV D QRWRULRXVO\ EOXQW VWDWHPHQW RI WKLV LQ %XOWPDQQ¶V IDPRXV HVVD\ µ1HZ 7HVWDPHQW DQG
0\WKRORJ\¶ HJ S  ZKHUH %XOWPDQQ WHOOVXV WKDW WR UHTXLUHRIRXUVHOYHV WKHDFFHSWDQFHRI WKHDQFLHQW
world view (KHUHODEHOOHGDVµP\WKLFDO¶µZRXOGLQYROYHDVDFULILFHRIWKHLQWHOOHFWZKLFKFRXOGKDYHRQO\
one result - a curious form of schizophrenia and insincerity. It would mean accepting a view of the world 
in our faith and religion which we should deny in our everyday life. Modern thought as we have inherited 
it brings with it criticism of the New Testament view of the world¶HPSKDVLVKLV 
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Yet I would say that the modern world view includes not only genuine advances in 
knowledge and real intellectual progress, but also a vast network of cultural and 
historically developed assumptions which are not self-evident but only seem so. In the 
terms I have laid down so far in my thesis, I would say that alongside genuine progress in 
the modern world view, there is also the subtle process of collective self-deception which 
makes certain things appear self-evident and progressive but which are really the collective 
self-assertion of the interests of our own culture and time. 
 
I believe that Barth fully recognised that there was a tension between the contemporary 
world view and that of the Bible, and he believed that it was wrong to try to avoid or 
explain away the tensions which arise as a consequence when we attempt to interpret the 
biblical text.25 However, there is a crucial respect in which he responds to this problem in 
the reverse way to that which is standard; he regards the tensions between the modern 
world view and that of the biblical text as the primary material for interpretation. The 
standard way of dealing with the problem is as follows: where there is a tension between 
our world view and that of the biblical texts, then it is assumed that it is the biblical world 
view which is at fault, which is primitive and so on, and that anything asserted under the 
presuppositions of the biblical world view needs re-interpretation in modern terms. I 
believe that Barth was trying to find a method which would give first place to the reverse 
procedure: where there is a tension between the modern world view and that of the text, 
we must assume that it is the modern world view which is at fault and needs re-
interpretation. Thus, wherever possible, the modern world view and our own way of 
thinking should receive critical re-interpretation through the biblical perspective.26 This is 
                                                        
25
 6HHPRVWQRWDEO\&',Sµ,QWKHELEOLFDOYLHZRIWKHZRUOGDQGPDQZHDUHFRQVWDQWO\FRPLQJ
up against presuppositions which are not ours, and statements and judgements which we cannot accept. 
7KHUHIRUH DW ERWWRP ZH FDQQRW DYRLG WKH WHQVLRQV ZKLFK DULVH DW WKLV SRLQW¶ FI DOVR &' , S 
referred to in the following note.) 
26
 This principle is enunciated at a nXPEHURISRLQWVVHHILUVWRIDOO%DUWK¶VUHVSRQVHWR:HUQOHµ,FRXOG
go even further and admit to Wernle that my calculation does not come out as exact in any single verse, 
WKDW,«VHQVHPRUHRUOHVVFOHDUO\LQWKHEDFNJURXQGD³UHPQDQW´WKDWLVQRWXQGHUstood and not explained 
and which awaits working out. But it awaits working out - not being left over. The view that unexplained 
KLVWRULFDO FUXPEV VKRXOG LQ WKHPVHOYHV EH WKH VHDO RI WUXH VFKRODUVKLS LV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW ,«FDQQRW JHW
WKURXJKP\KHDG«7DNHQH[DFWO\DOOWKH³%LEOLFLVP´ZKLFK,FDQEHVKRZQWRKDYHFRQVLVWVLQP\KDYLQJ
the prejudice that the Bible is a good book, and that it is worthwhile to take its thoughts at least as 
seriously as one takes his own¶µEpistle to the Romans: Foreword to the SHFRQG(GLWLRQ¶SHPSKDVLV
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precisely what we should expect from a theologian whose theology began with an attempt 
to disengage from the most fundamental and widespread assumptions of modern thought. 
  
We can now return to the question with which I started this section - how can Barth admit 
the relativity of the Biblical authors, and at the same time XUJHDVQHFHVVDU\WKHµFRQGLWLRQ
RIDEVROXWHOR\DOW\¶"7KHDQVZHUPXVWEHWKDW LQ%DUWK¶VYLHZLWLVDOOWRRHDV\WRVHHWKH
µUHODWLYLW\¶ RI WKH %LEOLFDO WH[W WKH GLIILFXOW WKLQJ LV WR VHH WKH UHODWLYLW\ RI RQH¶V Rwn 
thought world. Because of this, methodological priority must be given to criticising the 
contemporary world view in the light of the text, as opposed to the more normal 
procedure of criticising the text in the light of the contemporary world view. Barth¶V
procedure is not at all inconsistent with conceding the historical relativity of the biblical 
                                                                                                                                                                     
PLQH 6HH DOVR LQ %DUWK¶V UHVSRQVH WR %XOWPDQQ µ+H >WKH UHVSRQVLEOH H[SRVLWRU@ QHYHU OHWV KLPVHOI EH
HQWLUHO\ EOXIIHG E\ WKH YRLFH RI WKH ³RWKHU VSLULWV´ ZKR RIWHQ PDNH WKH GRPLQDQW QRWHV RI WKH ³6SLULW RI
&KULVW´DOPRVWLQaudible. He always looks first for the lack of understanding in himself and not in Paul¶
µThe Epistle to the Romans )RUHZRUG WR WKH 7KLUG (GLWLRQ¶ S  HPSKDVLV PLQH %DUWKJRHVRQ WR
admit that there might be some authors where such a procedure is impossible, where their thought can 
only be regarded as of past-KLVWRULFDOLQWHUHVWEXWHYHQKHUHµWKHUHLVDOZD\VWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUZKDWLV
HQLJPDWLF RU SX]]OLQJ LV WR EH VRXJKW PRUH RQ WKHLU VLGH RU PRUH RQ WKHVLGHRIXVZKRREVHUYH WKHP¶
µThe Epistle to the Romans)RUHZRUGWRWKH7KLUG(GLWLRQ¶S- cf also Barth, The Theology of John 
Calvin *UDQG5DSLGV(HUGPDQVSSI6HHDOVR%DUWK¶VODWHUUHVSRQVHWR%XOWPDQQ¶VFODLPDERXW 
WKH µJLYHQQHVV¶ RI WKH µPRGHUQ ZRUOG YLHZ¶ µ2I FRXUVH everyone approaches the New Testament with 
some kind of preconceptions, as he does any other document. We all have our prior notions of possibility, 
WUXWKDQGLPSRUWDQFH«$QGRIFRXUVHDVZHVHHNWRXQGHUVWDQGWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQWRXUILUVWUHDFWLRQLV
bound to be one of self-GHIHQFH DJDLQVW LWV VWUDQJHQHVV«>:@H VKDOO DOZD\V EH WU\LQJ WR FRQILQH WKLV
strangeness within the strait jacket of our prior understandings and preconceptions. But have we any right 
to elevate all this into a methodological principle? 7R GHI\ WKDW VWUDQJHQHVV ZLWK D ³WKXV IDU DQG QR
IXUWKHU´":KDWEXVLQHVVKDVWKHPRGHUQZRUOGYLHZKHUHKRZHYHUWHQDFLRXVO\ZHFOLQJWRLWDQGLPDJLQH
ZHDUHPRUDOO\REOLJHG WRXSKROG LW"¶ µ%XOWPDQQ - DQDWWHPSW WRXQGHUVWDQGKLP¶S - see also CD 
III/2, p 447.) It is worth comparing the parallel passage in CD I/2 in this light (pp 508-510), and see also 
&',Sµ«>,@IWKH:RUGRI*RGKDVDFWXDOO\FRPHLQWRLWVRZQDQGLILWLVWREHFOHDUO\VHHQWKH
only thing which can happen to [our own] ZRUOGRIWKRXJKW«LVWKDWLWVKRXOGDWOHDVWJLYHJURXQGIRUZH
cannot simply free ourselves from it, nor ought we to try to do so, since emancipation from it is identical 
with the resurrection of the flesh), that it should become fluid, losing its absoluteness, subordinating itself 
DQGIROORZLQJWKH:RUG«7RWU\WRKROGWRJHWKHU«WKHWHVWLPRQ\RIWKH%LEOH«DQGWKHDXWRQRP\RIRXU
RZQZRUOGRIWKRXJKWLVDQLPSRVVLEOHKHUPHQHXWLFSURJUDP¶ 
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WH[WSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHKLVµK\SRWKHVLV¶RIXQFRQGLWLRQDOOR\DOW\VWHPVnot from an exalted 
view of the biblical text RULJLQDOO\KHFODLPVRQO\WKHµSUHMXGLFH¶WKDWWKH%LEOHLVDµJRRG
ERRN¶ UDWKHU LW VWHPV IURP radical suspicion towards the contemporary world view. It 
QHHGKDUGO\EHVDLG WKDW WKLV LVGLUHFWO\ UHODWHG WRKLVFROODSVHRIFRQILGHQFHLQµPRGHUQ¶
µHQOLJKWHQHG¶RUµOLEHUDO¶FXOWXUHIROORZLQJWKe outbreak of the First World War.27 
 
Although I have said that Barth was seeking to find a method which would allow him to 
give priority to the scriptural perspective over that of the modern world, we have to 
recognise that we will be disappointed if we expect an explicit comparison between the 
scriptural perspective and that of the modern world. In fact, what is characteristically 
PLVVLQJ IURP PXFK RI %DUWK¶V H[SRVLWLRQ RI 6FULSWXUH DQG FHUWDLQO\ IURP Christ and 
Adam, is any general statement or analysis RI WKH µZRUOG YLHZ¶ RU µWKRXJKW ZRUOG¶ RU
µSHUVSHFWLYH¶RIWKHWH[WLWVHOILQLWVKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W2QHPD\WKHQZHOODVNWKHTXHVWLRQ- 
how could Barth hope to give a methodological priority to the world view etc. of the text 
if he formed no particular idea of what it was? The answer must be the hermeneutical 
contention that the actual perspective of the past becomes visible only for those who are 
willing and able to disengage from the perspective of the present; those who attempt to 
provide an independent description of the past apart from this effort of disengagement will 
see the past through the eyes of the present - DQGZLOO WHQGWRUHJDUGLWHLWKHUDVDµPHUH
SDVW¶ EH\RQG ZKLFK ZH KDYH GHYHORSHG RU DV D SDUW RI D GHYHORSPHQW ZKLFK KDV - 
fortunately - led up to the present. Thus, apart from the attempt at disengagement, the past 
is either opaque or - a mere mirror of the present.28 
                                                        
27
 FI7KXUQH\VHQ¶VFRPPHQWLQKLVLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKHHDUO\%DUWK-ThurQH\VHQFRUUHVSRQGHQFHµ1HYHUKDV
Barth denied the validity of the established results of historical-critical research. He was glad to be 
OLEHUDWHGE\ LW IURP WKHGRJPDRID IDOVH³UHYHODWLRQ-SRVLWLYLVP´%XWKHGLGQRW OHWKLPVHOIEH OLEHUDWHG
from this only to surrender at once to a new liberal dogma of the validity of the present-day world view in 
DQWLWKHVLV WRELEOLFDO WUXWK¶ Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence, 
1914-1925 (London: Epworth Press, 1964), p 21.) 
28
 There is a highly instructive passage in the Epistle to the Romans, pp 145-148, where Barth argues that 
WKH PHDQLQJ RI SDVW KLVWRU\ RQO\ EHFRPHV YLVLEOH IRU WKRVHZKRH[SHULHQFH WKH µ.5,6,6¶ LQ WKHSUHVHQW
)XUWKHURQWKLVFI*RJDUWHQ¶VUHVSRQVHWR-OLFKHULQGHIHQFHRI%DUWKµ,WFRXOGHYHQEHWKDWP\LQWHQWLRQ
>LQWKLVUHSO\@ZDVWRIUHHZKDWLV³JUHDWLQWKHSDVW´IURPWKHKXPDQL]LQJDQGEHOLWWOLQJWKDWLVLPSOLHGE\
that panhistoric inclusion in general development and the pervasive dependence on developmenW¶µ7KH
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To put it another way - Barth was above all wary of the thought that encounter with the 
µRWKHUQHVV¶RI WKHSDVW LV LQDQG of itself an enriching exercise or that it naturally leads to 
self-criticism on the part of the present. In so far as the encounter with the past is not also 
the occasion of deliberate and explicit self-criticism, then it is not really an encounter with 
the past at all, but merely an unconscious domestication of the past from within the 
perspective of the present - however rich and diverse or inspiring and challenging the past 
may seem in the process. It is easy to see how this fits in with the overall patWHUQRI%DUWK¶V
anti-Cartesian thought; the past of the biblical text cannot be regarded as an object which 
is accessible to a detached subject or observer. It is possible to see that this was a concern 
LQ%DUWK¶VH[HJHWLFDOPHWKRGIURPWKHYHU\EHJLQQLQJof his development: in the preface to 
the first edition of Romans KHZURWHWKHIROORZLQJµ,W LVFHUWDLQWKDW LWZDVPRUHQDWXUDO
for all ages which hungered and thirsted for righteousness to take a positive, active 
position alongside Paul instead of one oI WKH SDVVLYH GHWDFKPHQW RIDQREVHUYHU¶29 This 
µSRVLWLYHDFWLYHSRVLWLRQDORQJVLGH3DXO¶,EHOLHYHGRHVQRWLQYROYHDFUHDWLRQRIPHDQLQJV
which we then impose on Paul, but rather means regarding our world as just as 
problematic as Paul regarded the world he belonged to. This is as opposed to the 
procedure of regarding the world we live in as fairly well established and as something 
Paul can be invited to support, or (to the extent that he will not support it) as a vantage 
point from which he may be safel\ GLVPLVVHGE\PHDQVRI µKLVWRULFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶7R
my mind, this sums up how Barth viewed the standard procedure of historical criticism and 
its alliance with theological interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
+RO\ (JRLVP RI WKH &KULVWLDQ $Q $QVZHU WR -OLFKHU¶V (VVD\ ³$ 0RGHUQ ,QWHUSUHWHU RI 3DXO´¶ LQ The 
Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, p 85 (pp 82-87).) 
29
 µThe Epistle to the Romans)RUHZRUGWRWKH)LUVW(GLWLRQ¶LQThe Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, p 
61 (61-626HHDOVRKLVUHVSRQVHWR%XOWPDQQµ7KH6SLULWRI&KULVWLVQRWDYDQWDJH-point from which a 
ceaseless correction of Paul - or of anyone else - may be exercised schoolmaster-ZLVH¶The Epistle to the 
Romans, p 19.) See also CD I/2, pp 509-µ$JDLQZHPXVWEHFDUHIXOQRWWREHEHWUD\HGLQWRWDNLQJVLGHV
into playing off the one biblical man against the other, into pronouncing that this one or that one has 
³HUUHG´ )URP ZKDW VWDQGSRLQW FDQ ZH PDNH DQ\ VXFK SURQRXQFHPHQW"¶ ,Q WKHVH Tuotations Barth is 
clearly not concerned with the possibility or actuality that biblical authors are in error on specific points; 
rather, he is concerned with the hermeneutical problem of what a pronouncement of error actually involves 
- QDPHO\WKDWWKHµPRGHUQZRUOG¶LVVXIILFLHQWO\VHFXUHWRUHJDUGLWVHOIDVDGHWDFKHGREVHUYHURIWKHSDVW 
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The fundamental point is that we cannot rely on a critical, objective description of the 
world view of the Bible, because the perspective of our own world already intrudes on the 
description itself. I believe that this is what Barth means when he writes: 
 
«>,@I ZH FDQQRW GHFLGH IRU LW >WKH 6FULSWXUH¶V PHVVDJH@30, then from the standpoint of our own 
unshaken intellectual world we can perceive the outlines of the apparently equally unshaken world 
of the Bible; and there may then arise the relative understanding which is possible between 
representatives of different worlds. This may lead on to the corresponding interpretation of the 
%LEOH ,W FDQQRW LQ WKLV FDVH EH H[SODLQHG DV D ZLWQHVV WR UHYHODWLRQ«,W FDQ EH H[SODLQHG DV D
witness to revelation only to a human intellectual world the inner security of which has been 
shaken, and which has become yielding and responsive to the biblical world; and then it will be 
manifest at once that the biblical world is not an unshaken quantity, but a moving, living organ, 
functioning in a very definite service.31 
 
This is, I believe, a very important passage, although perhaps rather obscure when taken 
by itself. So I would like to try to make its concerns more concrete by considering it in 
connection with what I believe to be the main issue in Christ and Adam. I will begin with a 
book entitled The Christian Doctrine of Man, by H.W.Robinson, which was first published 
in 1911 and which clearly enjoyed a significant amount of influence in how scholars 
understood Romans 5:12-LQ%DUWK¶VRZQGD\32 
 
5RELQVRQDQGWKHFRQFHSWRIµ&RUSRUDWH3HUVRQDOLW\¶ 
 
7KHILUVWWKLQJWRQRWLFHDERXW5RELQVRQ¶VERRNDVRQHORRNVDWLWVHDUOLHVWSDJHVLVWKDWLW
represents a very confident statement about the high development of Western thought and 
of how Western thought can be further enriched by the recollection of the Christian 
GRJPDVZKLFKFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIRXUµKLJKHVWFRQFHSWLRQV¶2QHFHUWDLQO\
gets the sense that the biblical authors are invited to give their approval to modern (i.e. 
modern Western) thought, and that, where they fail to do so directly, they can be corrected 
                                                        
30
 6WULFWO\ %DUWK KDV LQ PLQG µVWRRSLQJ WR ORRN LQWR WKH 6FULSWXUDO PHVVDJH¶ DV D OLWHUDO UHQGHULQJ RI
parakÚptein in James 1:25) i.e. in order to look into the Scriptural message we must stoop or step down 
from our higher vantage-point to understand Scripture in its own terms. 
31
 CD I/2, p 719. 
32
 H.W.Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 41958 (1911)). 
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by means of a modern re-LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKRVH µSULPLWLYH¶ FRQFHSWLRQV ZKLFK ZH KDYH
transcended.33 
 
7KH µSULPLWLYH FRQFHSWLRQ¶ DGYDQFHG E\5RELQVRQZKLFKKDVDFORVHEHDULQJRQ5RPDQV
5:12-21 is that of corporate personality 7KH SULPLWLYH KXPDQ EHLQJ KDG LQ 5RELQVRQ¶V
view, a defective sense of his own individuality and of the individuality of others. This 
primitive conception was (supposedly) present in ancient Hebrew thought; accordingly it 
provides the background to PDXO¶V WKRXJKW DQG LQ WXUQ DFFRXQWV IRU WKH FRQFHSWXDO
framework of Romans 5:12- 5RELQVRQ ZULWHV µ,Q WKH IRUHJURXQG ZH KDYH KHUH WKH
RWKHUDQGGLVWLQFWWKRXJKWRI$GDPDVWKH³FRUSRUDWHSHUVRQDOLW\´RIWKHUDFHRYHUDJDLQVW
Christ as the corporate personality of His body, the Church. God dealt with the race in 
$GDP EHFDXVH LQD UHDO VHQVH IRUDQFLHQW WKRXJKWKHZDV WKH UDFHEHFDXVHRI$GDP¶V
VLQ*RGSDVVHVVHQWHQFHRIGHDWKRQWKHUDFH¶34 
 
                                                        
33
 6HHHVSHFLDOO\Sµ>7KH&KULVWLDQGRFWrine of man] has so passed into the common stock of our higher 
:HVWHUQWKRXJKWDVWREHWKHFKLHIIRUPDWLYHLQIOXHQFHLQRXUFRQFHSWLRQRISHUVRQDOLW\«0HQXQIDPLOLDU
ZLWKWKHKLVWRU\RIPRGHUQWKRXJKWDUHRIWHQDSWWRGHVSLVHWKH³GRJPDV´ZKLFKKDYHPHGLDWed to us some 
of our highest conceptions. On the other hand, in the natural eagerness of the Christian to defend those 
dogmas from such injustice, he must not forget that every generation has its part to play in the unceasing 
evolution of Christian doctrine, and that our part to-day is a somewhat stirring one. The primitive 
conceptions of Hebrew cosmology are replaced in the modern mind by the evolutionary view of man; the 
ZLGHU KRUL]RQ RI QDWXUH DQG KLVWRU\ LQYROYHV PDQ\ FKDQJHV LQ HDUOLHU  FRQFOXVLRQV«7KH Christian 
doctrine of man is not to be secluded from the thought of the age in timorous unbelief; it is to be employed 
amid the common wealth of the world so that it may be worthily developed by us, as it was by those who 
ZHQW EHIRUH XV¶ 5RELQVRQFRPHVclosest to criticising this developmentalist view only in his admission 
that humanity does not develop as naturally and as self-evidently as a simple biological organism - pp 263-
4.) 
34
 Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p 121. In this context, it is striking that the very expression 
µFRUSRUDWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶ DSSHDUV LQ 6PDLO¶V WUDQVODWLRQ RI Christus und Adam (Christ and Adam, p 44, 
quoted in my previous chapter). However we should note that the original German does not contain a 
direct equivalent of thH H[SUHVVLRQ µFRUSRUDWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶ LQVWHDG ZH ILQG WKH ZRUGV µHLQH LGHDOH RGHU
DXFK SK\VLVFKH (LQKHLW GHV 0HQVFKHQJHVFKOHFKWV«¶ Rudolf Bultmann/Christus und Adam, p 120). 
$OWKRXJK 6PDLO¶V WUDQVODWLRQ LV UDWKHU IUHH WKHUH GRHV VHHP WR EH D FHUWDLQ FRQFHptual accuracy in the 
WUDQVODWLRQ µFRUSRUDWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶ , WKLQN WKDW µDQ LGHDO RU HYHQ SK\VLFDO XQLW\ RI WKH KXPDQ UDFH¶
FRQVWLWXWHVDILQHO\QXDQFHGVXPPDU\RI5RELQVRQ¶VFRQFHSW 
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Here I believe we have a prime example of what Barth meant by the modern intellectual 
world confronting the thought world of the Bible, as I will now explain. For our purposes 
the most important thing to note is that the picture of ancient thought emerges by a 
comparison with modern WKRXJKW7KHFRQFHSWRIµFRUSRUDWHSHUVRQDOLW\¶LVFRQVWUXFWHGE\
means of a critical comparison with the sense of individuality and individual responsibility 
which (allegedly) characterises modern thought - thus, as Barth put it, the outlines of a 
VSHFLILFDQGGHILQDEOHµXQVKDNHQ¶world view in the Bible emerges from the standpoint of 
a specific self-XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPRGHUQZRUOG)XUWKHULQ5RELQVRQ¶VERRNZHFDQVHH
what Barth meant by the relative understanding which can occur between two worlds of 
thought: firstly, there is a relative understanding between the biblical world of thought and 
our own because in the prophetic tradition there is a criticism of the primitive, defective 
FRQFHSWRIµFRUSRUDWHSHUVRQDOLW\¶35 secondly, a relative understanding can occur through 
a modern re-interpretation of the ancient concept of corporate personality itself - 
VSHFLILFDOO\ DV WKH µQHZYLHZRI VRFLDO VROLGDULW\DQGRI LQGLYLGXDODQGVRFLDOKHUHGLW\¶36 
:HFDQVXUHO\VHHIURPWKLVH[DFWO\ZKDW%DUWKPHDQVE\WKHµXQVKDNHQLQWHOOHFWXDOZRUOG¶
RIPRGHUQLW\DQGRIKRZWKLVµUHODWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶EHWZHHQPRGHUQLW\DQGWKHDQFLHQW
world view does not disturb the inner security of the modern world view - for nowhere is 
there any basic criticism or questioning of the modern world view. The only question is to 
what extent and in what way the ancient, biblical world view can be critically adapted to 
what is assuredly known in modern thought.  
 
2QH RI WKHPRVW LQIOXHQWLDOFULWLFLVPVRI5RELQVRQ¶VEDVLF LGHDRI µFRUSRUDWHSHUVRQDOLW\¶
comes from the pen of the Old Testament scholar Rogerson, in an article published after 
%DUWK¶VRZQWLPHLQ5RJHUVRQDUJXHVSULPDULO\WKDW5RELQVRQZDVGHSHQGHQWRQD
concept of primitive mentality (that of Levy-Bruhl) which has now been largely  
                                                        
35
 µ,WLVFOHDUWKDWSULPLWLYHPRUDOLW\DQGUHOLJLRXVFRQFHSWLRQVEDVHG on the idea of corporate personality, 
were seriously limited by the absence of a fuller recognition of individual rights and needs. The 
GHYHORSPHQW RI ,VUDHO¶V PRUDOLW\ DQG UHOLJLRQ LQYROYHG DV RQH RI LWV DVSHFWV D QHZ HPSKDVLV RQ WKH
individual person; consequently, a full account of the rise of individualism would be the history of the 
SURSKHWLFUHIRUPDWLRQ¶5RELQVRQThe Christian Doctrine of Man, p 30.) 
36
 Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p 244. 
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superseded in anthropological theory and research.37 Rogerson notes the strange situation 
WKDW DGYRFDWHV RI µFRUSRUDWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶ ZLOO FODLP WKDW WKLV SULPLWLYH WKRXJKW-form is 
incomprehensible to us moderns, but at the same time will illustrate it using examples from 
modern thinking. He then sums up: 
 
What is the reason for these odd arguments? It is clearly lack of attention to the importance of social 
context in trying to establish the nature of both Hebrew and Western thought. The Hebrew thought 
which is allegedly so different from our own is not just based on the application to Israel of alleged 
mental processes of primitives; it is also an abstraction from those Israelite institutions which 
corporate responsibility sought to explain, formed into an entity labelled µ+HEUHZWKRXJKW¶DQGWKHQ
imposed on the rest of the Old Testament regardless of social context. At the same time, it is 
assumed without discussion, and again without reference to social context, that modern Western 
thought is individualistic.38 
 
What claims my attention in this passage is that Rogerson recognises a connection between 
the self-perception of modern Western thought and the portrayal of ancient thought by 
comparison with (and in contrast to) this self-perception. Lying behind this contrast 
between modern and ancient thought there is a sense of cultural and political superiority of 
the modern West i.e. that we represent a higher development in that we recognise the 
reality, significance and rights of the individual. However, when it becomes questionable 
that modern thought is primarily individualistic, then this casts doubt on the construct of 
WKH µSULPLWLYH FRQFHSWLRQ RI FRUSRUDWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶ EHFDXVH WKH DFWXDO PL[ RI LQGLYLGXDO
DQG FRUSRUDWH HOHPHQWV ZLWKLQ PRGHUQ WKRXJKW VXJJHVWV WKDW µSULPLWLYH¶ WKRXJKW ZDV
probably rather like our own in this respect, albeit with a different spread of concrete 
HPSKDVHV 7KH µFRQFHSWLRQ RI FRUSRUDWH SHUVRQDOLW\¶ LV HIIHFWLYHO\ D VKDGRZFDVWE\RXU
own self-understanding rather than something we have actually discovered in ancient 
thought itself, and will only seem solid so long as our self-understanding remains solid and 
XQTXHVWLRQHG WR UHSHDW %DUWK¶V RZQ ZRUGV µIURP WKH VWDQGSRLQW RI RXU RZQ XQVKDNHQ
intellectual world we can perceive the outlines of the apparently equally unshaken world of 
WKH%LEOH¶ 
                                                        
37
 -:5RJHUVRQ µ7KH +HEUHZ &RQFHSWLRQ RI &RUSorate Personality: A Re-H[DPLQDWLRQ¶ Journal of 
Theological Studies 21 (1970), pp 1-16. 
38
 5RJHUVRQµ7KH+HEUHZ&RQFHSWLRQRI&RUSRUDWH3HUVRQDOLW\¶SHPSKDVLVPLQH 
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+RZHYHU ZH FDQQRW JR DQ\ IXUWKHU ZLWKRXW UHFRJQLVLQJ D GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ %DUWK¶V
concern and that of Rogerson. Rogerson is concerned to advocate a genuinely scientific 
approach to the question; he wants to prevent the genuine diversity of scientific data from 
being suppressed by being compartmentalised into prior generalisations - such as 
µFRUSRUDWHSHUVRQDOLW\¶RUµ:HVWHUQLQGLYLGXDOLVP¶,EHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHLVDJHQXLQHSDUDOOHO
between Barth and Rogerson on this point, but I think that Barth goes beyond the 
scientific concern to a concern with the moral dimension of generalisations:39 as I have 
argued in my previous chapters, the most serious problem with generalisations is their 
strong tendency to conceal collective self-interest, and in particular in my third chapter I 
UHODWHGWKLVWRWKHµ:HVWHUQ¶SULQFLSOHRILQGLYLGXDOKXPDQULJKWV7KHTXHVWLRQZKLFKIDFHV
us here, which Rogerson does not address at this point, is - KRZGLG µ:HVWHUQ¶ WKRXJKW
come to UHJDUGLWVHOIDVLQGLYLGXDOLVWLFLILWZDVQRWVRLQIDFW",Q%DUWK¶VYLHZVXFKDVHOI-
misunderstanding is not incidental but belongs to the moralistic rhetoric and propaganda of 
the Western bid for world power and domination. If this is so, it puts a far more sinister 
perspective on the sense of cultural superiority and self-confidence which breathed through 
the writings of Robinson and others. 
 
$QG VR ZKHQ %DUWK VSHDNV RI WKH µKXPDQ LQWHOOHFWXDO ZRUOG WKH LQQHU VHFXULW\RIZKLFK 
KDVEHHQVKDNHQ¶ WKHQZe are dealing not only with a recognition that modern thought is 
more diverse than is apparent in its general self-FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQVUDWKHULQ%DUWK¶VZRUGV
here we catch the echo of a radical collapse in confidence in modern thought and its 
implicit claiPV WR EH µRQ VRPH SHDNV DQG KHLJKWV RI GHYHORSPHQW¶40 Barth came to see 
modern culture - indeed all human culture - as subject to sin in the way it understands its 
own development and achievements. Specifically, he wished to relate the innate problem  
of this cultural narcissism to the Biblical concept of sin.41 It is a very human tendency, 
                                                        
39
 ,UHFRJQLVHWKDW%DUWKZRXOGQRWXVHWKHZRUGµPRUDO¶sittlich/moralisch); however, this is because he 
DVVRFLDWHVWKHZRUGµPRUDO¶ZLWKWKHµUHOLJLRXV-PRUDO¶GHFHSWLYHVHOI-awareness of cultured Protestantism, 
of which I will say much more in my subsequent chapters.  
40
 %DUWKµ$Q$QVZHUWR3URIHVVRUYRQ+DUQDFN¶V2SHQ/HWWHU¶LQThe Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, p 
182 (175-185). 
41
 2Q µFXOWXUDO QDUFLVVLVP¶ FI 1RUPDQ 'DYLHV Europe: a History µ8QIRUWXQDWHO\ (XURSHDQ KLVWRULDQV
have frequently approached their subject as Narcissus approached the pool, looking only for a reflection of 
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which often takes subtle and unconscious forms, to regard our own culture as the 
framework or basic criterion for evaluating past history, including the past history enclosed 
DQGGLVFORVHGLQWKHFRQWHQWRIWKH%LEOH%DUWK¶VIXQGDPHQWDOKHUPHQHXWLFDOGHFLVLRQLVWR
UHODWH WKLV WHQGHQF\ WR ZKDW WKH %LEOH PHDQV E\ VLQ DFFRUGLQJO\ KH ZULWHV µ)URP WKH
standpoint of what the biblical witness says, the fog and darkness of the human world of 
thought consists in the fact that, while it arises and subsists as our world, it constantly 
exposes our nature, the nature of sinful man, without the name of Jesus Christ, and 
therefore without the God who deals graciously with us. The nature of this man is a 
striving to justify himself from his own resources in face of a God whose image he has 
IDVKLRQHGLQKLVRZQKHDUW«¶42 
 
,W LV XQGRXEWHGO\ KHUH WKDW ZH ILQG WKH OLQFKSLQ RI %DUWK¶V KHUPHQHXWLFDO FRQFHUQ +LV
general concern was with the problem that human culture is constantly building a thought-
world oriented to its self-justification and self-approval. His special concern was with the 
way that the Bible, which supposedly brings us the gospel, which supposedly discloses the 
divine judgement on human attempts at self-justification - this Bible becomes   
LQFRUSRUDWHG WKURXJK µH[HJHVLV¶ DQG µLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ LQWR WKH WKRXJKW-world which is 
prevalent in the culture at any one time. Yet because this construction of a thought-world 
conceals a process of self-justification, then the incorporation of the Bible into this 
thought-world means that the claims of the gospel can never be brought to bear on the 
element of self-justification which is concealed within it. This is the real consequence of 
reqXLULQJWKDWELEOLFDOVWXG\EHµVFLHQWLILFDOO\¶DFFRXQWDEOHDQGRIUHTXLULQJWKDWLWIRUPDQ
                                                                                                                                                                     
KLVRZQEHDXW\¶S'DYLHVWKHQJLYHVH[DPSOHVRIWKLVWHQGHQF\IURPZULWLQJVRIWKHODWHQLQHWHHQWK
and early twentieth century i.e. what would have represented the attitude prevalent at the point of the 
HPHUJHQFHRI%DUWK¶VGLVWLQFWLYHWKHRORJ\7his becomes specifically relevant to our theme because Davies 
LGHQWLILHVEHOLHILQWKHKLJKGHYHORSPHQWRIµ:HVWHUQFLYLOLVDWLRQ¶DVDFORVHFRUROODU\RIWKLVµ(XURFHQWULF¶
tendency, where the virtues of (e.g.) individual rights are assumed to be an inherent tendency of European 
FLYLOLVDWLRQµ$VIRUWKHSURGXFWVRI(XURSHDQKLVWRU\ZKLFKWKHSURSDJDQGLVWVRI:HVWHUQFLYLOLVDWLRQDUH
PRVW HDJHU WR HPSKDVL]H HYHU\RQH¶V OLVW ZRXOG YDU\ ,Q WKH ODWH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ PDQ\ ZRXOG OLNH WR
point to religious toOHUDWLRQ KXPDQ ULJKWV GHPRFUDWLF JRYHUQPHQW«DQG WKH VXSUHPH &KULVWLDQ YLUWXHV
such as compassion, charity and respect for the individual. How far such things are truly representative of 
(XURSH¶VSDVWLVDPDWWHUIRUGHEDWH,WZRXOGQRWEHGLIILFXOWWRGraw up a matching list which starts with 
UHOLJLRXVSHUVHFXWLRQDQGHQGVZLWKWRWDOLWDULDQFRQWHPSWIRUKXPDQOLIH¶- p 26.) 
42
 CD I/2, 721. 
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integral part of the edifice of human understanding and knowledge which is generally 
accepted at the current stage of cultural and intellectual development.43 
 
Robinson and Bultmann: a comparison 
 
%HIRUHGHYHORSLQJIXUWKHUP\DQDO\VLVRI%DUWK¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHDSSURDFK,WKLQNLWZRXOG
be helpful to pause and reflect on the similarity and differences between Robinson and 
Bultmann in their approach to Romans 5:12-21. As we have noted, both of them believed 
that there was a significant mythical element in the passage, although for Robinson it had a 
SULPLWLYH+HEUHZRULJLQZKHUHDVIRU%XOWPDQQLWKDGDµ*QRVWLF-+HOOHQLVWLF¶RULJLQ%RWK
effectively wished to develop the passage critically in the direction of individual 
responsibility - although Bultmann understood this in the more specific sense of existential 
analysis. As well as showing this greater sophistication on the anthropological side, 
Bultmann shows a correspondingly greater sophistication on the historical side also - in 
that he does not simply relate Paul directly to Old Testament thought but to the more 
complex sociological situation of the primitive Church as involving a mix of Jewish and 
Hellenistic elements. However, for our purposes, Robinson and Bultmann had this much in 
common: from out of the varied historical elements available to them, they constructed an 
essentially fictitious ancient thought form which they could then portray as having become 
obsolete in the modern world - and accordingly, to the extent that it appears in the text, 
they could claim that it requires critical re-interpretation. In both cases, the existence of the 
postulated ancient thought form has proved to be lacking in evidence when subjected to a 
more searching historical enquiry.  
 
I think that the significance of this is that it shows how what appears to be critical honesty 
about the text and a willingness to distance oneself from the text, can in reality lead to a 
                                                        
43
 Although I will not go into detail on this, I believe it well worth comparing the relevant section in the 
Church DogmaticsRQZKLFKPXFKRIP\DQDO\VLVLVEDVHGZLWK%DUWK¶VGHEDWHZLWK+DUQDFNWRZKLFK,
believe it has a genetic relationship (the relevant section of the Church Dogmatics LVHQWLWOHG µ)UHHGRP
XQGHUWKH:RUG¶DQGLVIRXQGLQ&',SS-740, esp. pp 716f; the debate between Barth and Harnack 
is published in English translation in The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, pp 165-187 - opening with 
+DUQDFN¶V µ)LIWHHQ 4XHVWLRQV WR 7KRVH $PRQJ WKH 7KHRORJLDQV ZKRDUH&RQWHPSWXRXVRI WKH6FLHQWLILF
Theology¶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false systematisation of the elements of the text which do not suit modern thought, which 
then can be labelled a persistent characteristic of ancient thought which modern thought 
has a right to dispense with. 
 
I mentioned above that I believe that a comparison between BaUWKDQG%XOWPDQQ¶VJHQHUDO
DSSURDFK WR VFULSWXUDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ PD\ HQDEOH XV WR VKRZ KRZ %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK ZDV
UHOHYDQW WR %XOWPDQQ¶V SDUWLFXODU KLVWRULFDO WKHVHV DQG , KRSH WKDWP\SUHVHQWDUJXPHQW
about Bultmann and Robinson shows that we are in part in a position to do this. For me, 
the fact that Bultmann and Robinson have become questionable in the manner I have 
VNHWFKHG MXVWLILHV LQ DW OHDVW D UHODWLYH ZD\ WKH FRQFHUQV RI %DUWK¶V µKHUPHQHXWLF RI
VXVSLFLRQ¶ LH WKDW DSSDUHQWO\ QHXWUDO RU JHQHUDO GHVcriptions of the past can conceal 
within them the limitations of the perspective and self-understanding of contemporary 
thought. A passage like Romans 5:12-21 is bound to raise the issue of individual rights or 
personal responsibility, and hence its exegesis and interpretation will inevitably become 
incorporated into the self-justifying discourse of our contemporary culture; accordingly the 
exaggerations or false generalisations (exemplified by Robinson and Bultmann) are likely 
to appear as a symptom of this discourse. 
 
I would like now to turn to a consideration of the most recent thorough work on the 
TXHVWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV QDPHO\ .DUO %DUWK¶V 7KHRORJLFDO ([HJHVLV by Richard 
%XUQHWW $V ZLOO EH VHHQ , EHOLHYH WKDW %XUQHWW¶V DQDO\VLV IXUWKHU VXEVWDQWiates my own 
YLHZ RI WKH VLJQLILFDQFH DQG DLP RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV KRZHYHU LW ZLOO DOVR HQDEOH XV WR
UHODWH%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVPRUHFORVHO\ WRJHQHUDORUPDLQVWUHDPKHUPHQHXWLFVDQGWKLV ODVW
point will be developed more fully in my next chapter, which will explore possible parallels 
between Barth and the work of H.-G.Gadamer. 
 
Part C: Barth and the Empathetic Tradition 
 
%DUWK¶VUHODWLRQWRWKHHPSDWKHWLFWUDGLWLRQDFFRUGLQJWR%XUQHWW 
 
%XUQHWW DUJXHV WKDW %DUWK¶V KHUPHQHXWLFV ZHUH D GHOLEHUDWH DWWHPSW WR Ereak with the 
empathetic tradition in hermeneutical thought which had been current especially in  
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*HUPDQ WKRXJKW XS WR %DUWK¶V WLPH7KH µHPSDWKHWLF¶KHUPHQHXWLFDO WUDGLWLRQEHJLQQLQJ
with Herder and refined by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, stated that the task of historical 
interpretation was to enter into the mind of the author, to identify with him as closely as 
possible, and hence to understand him from within.44 
 
Now - %XUQHWW KDV SUHVHQWHG %DUWK¶V KHUPHQHXWLFDO SULQFLSOHV DV D UHDFWLRQ against this 
empathetic tradition. But, in that case, the question arises as to how Barth can make 
statements suggesting an immediate identification with the author, such as the following 
(from the preface to the second edition of Romans µ, PXVW SUHVV IRUZDUG WR WKH SRLQt 
ZKHUH«,FDQDOPRVWIRUJHWWKDW,DPQRWWKHDXWKRUZKHUH,KDYHDOPRVWXQGHUVWRRGKLP
VR ZHOO WKDW , OHW KLP VSHDN LQ P\ QDPHDQGFDQP\VHOI VSHDN LQKLVQDPH¶45 Does not 
Barth here echo the empathetic tradition very closely, in that he also claims to be seeking 
to identify himself immediately with the author? Accordingly, given Burnett's central 
                                                        
44
 %XUQHWWH[SRXQGVWKHGHWDLOVRIWKHµHPSDWKHWLFWUDGLWLRQ¶IURPSS-166 and following, and I do not 
intend to cover the same ground here. However, it needs to be mentioned that when Burnett places 
Schleiermacher within the empathetic tradition, he makes himself vulnerable to the criticism of Kimmerle, 
QDPHO\WKDWLQWHUSUHWHUVRI6FKOHLHUPDFKHUKDYHRYHUHPSKDVLVHGWKHµSV\FKRORJLFDO¶SROHRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
(entering into and grasping the inner life processes of the author) at the expense of the equally important 
µJUDPPDWLFDO¶ SROH RI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ NQRZOHGJH RI JUDPPDWLFDOOLQJXLVWLF UXOHV HWF 6HH .LPPHUOH¶V
introduction to Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts (Missoula: Scholars Press, 
1977), pp 19-40 esp. pp 27-28.) This criticism was directed particularly against Dilthey and Gadamer. 
'LOWKH\ RI FRXUVH FRXOG QRW UHVSRQG WR WKLV EXW *DGDPHU FRPPHQWV µ3HUKDSV , RYHUHPSKDVL]HG
6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶V WHQGHQF\ WRZDUG SV\FKRORJLFDO WHFKQLFDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ 1HYHUWKHOHVV WKDW LV KLs 
SHFXOLDUFRQWULEXWLRQDQGVRKLV VFKRRO >HJ'LOWKH\@ZDVEDVHGRQSV\FKRORJLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶Truth 
and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, 21989 (1975)), p 565.) This comment is very significant for my 
thesis, as I am more interested in those elementV RI 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶V WKRXJKW ZKLFK ZHUH LQIOXHQWLDO
around the time of Barth and Bultmann, rather than in his thought as an individual. For example, we will 
see later on that Bultmann took it for granted that Schleiermacher and Dilthey could be taken together as 
advocates of a unified empathetic tradition. It may be that Schleiermacher as an individual represents a 
more balanced view of the hermeneutical task than comparable figures who came before and after him; 
nevertheless, it is at least beyond dispute WKDW µHPSDWK\¶RUSV\FKRORJLFDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQSOD\HGDFUXFLDO
role in his thinking, and that it was the most decisive element for his influence on subsequent 
developments. Hence, I think Burnett is at least provisionally justified in portraying Schleiermacher as a 
part of the empathetic tradition, and so have developed my thesis on this basis. 
45
 µThe Epistle to the Romans)RUHZRUGWR6HFRQG(GLWLRQ¶S 
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argument that Barth is opposing the main lines of that tradition, he finds it necessary to 
give a close analysis of such statements which seem to suggest continuity with it. 
 
As I understand it, when Barth made such statements in which he seemed to imply an 
identification with the author, his intention was to draw attention to the historicity of the 
interpreter. The present, and not only the past, must be grasped in its historicity. It will be 
UHFDOOHG WKDW LQ P\ DQDO\VLV DERYH ZLWK UHJDUG WR ZKDW %DUWK PHDQW E\ µXQFRQGLWLRQDO
OR\DOW\WRWKHDXWKRU¶,VXJJHVWHGWKDWKLVLQWHQWZDVWRGHQ\WKDWWKHSUHVHQWKDVH[FOXVLYH
rights to determine the meaning of the past; the present must recognise that it has no 
detached or a-historical vantage point from which it may do this. I believe that Barth was 
driving at the same point when he made statements implying identification with the author; 
he meant a surrender of the detached attitude towards the biblical text which is implied in 
the normal procedure of historical criticism. 
 
$Q H[FHUSW IURP %XUQHWW¶V RZQ VWXG\ ZLOO LOOXVWUDWH ZK\ , WKLQN KH %XUQHWW FRPHV WR
similar conclusions to myself in this regard. At this point in his study Burnett is reflecting 
on one of the expressions Barth used to convey the concept of identification with the 
author, namely that of sharing a living context with the author:  
 
%DUWKGLGQRWXVHWKHSKUDVH³OLYLQJFRQWH[W´LQKLVILQDOSUHIDFHs to [the first and second editions of 
Romans] but it is clear that the reason he emphasised it so strongly in his preface drafts to [the first 
edition]46 was because he saw it as a necessary condition for the possibility of historical interpretation. 
³:LWKout this living context of the past and the present which is given within the subject matter, the 
ZRUGV µKLVWRU\¶ DQG µXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶KDYHQRPHDQLQJDWDOO´%\ UDLVLQJ LW >WKH LVVXHRI WKH µOLYLQJ
FRQWH[W¶@%DUWKZDVVHHNLQJWRUHPLQGKLVFRQWHPSRUDULHV that historical interpretation did not take 
place in a vacuum, in abstracto, or from some divine vantage point. Many historians and biblical 
scholars he recognised operated as if the only real, relevant, or living context was their own or as if 
they did have their own divine vantage point. Many had wittingly or unwittingly adopted a belief in 
the autonomy of the present which subordinated the past to the present, as if it were primarily we in 
the present who confer meaning upon the past, as if we were the primary arbiters of whether 
VRPHWKLQJIURPWKHSDVWLVWREHUHJDUGHGDVD³GHDGUHOLF´RUD³OLYLQJOLQN´7KHUHVXOWRIWKLVZDV
that historians and biblical scholars tended not only to forget their own historicity, e.g., the relativity 
                                                        
46
 Burnett has provided the first English translation of the draft prefaces to the first edition of Romans in 
the appendix to Theological Exegesis, and the page references to these draft prefaces will refer to 
%XUQHWW¶VDSSHQGL[ 
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of their own standpoints, perspectives, prejudices, values, etc., but tended also to develop a rather 
FRQGHVFHQGLQJDWWLWXGH WR WKHSDVWZKLFK LVZK\%DUWKVDLG WKDWWRGD\¶VWKHRORJ\³GRHVQRWWDNHWKH
prophets and apostles in earnest, instead, while it stands smiling sympathetically beside them or 
DERYHWKHPLWWDNHVDFRRORULQGLIIHUHQWGLVWDQFHIURPWKHP´47 
 
, KRSH WKDW IURP WKLV H[FHUSW LW LV FOHDU WKDW P\ RZQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V DWWLWXGH
towards historical criticism is strikingly similar to that of Burnett.48 However, we still need 
to examine why Burnett sees Barth as set apart from the empathetic tradition, for it has not 
\HWEHFRPHFOHDUKRZ%DUWK¶VDSSURDFKGLIIHUVIXQGDPHQWDOO\IURPLW)RULWLVFOHDUO\not 
WKHLQWHQWLRQRIWKHµHPSDWKHWLF¶ZULWHUVWRµVXERUGLQDWHWKHSDVWWRWKHSUHVHQW¶DV%XUQHWW
SXWV LW DQ\PRUH WKDQ LW ZDV %DUWK¶V LQWHQWLRQ UDWKHU E\ HQWHULQJ LPPHGLDWHO\ LQWR WKH
world of the author or text, their intention was to give a high value to the past in its own 
terms, and precisely not to understand the past merely in terms of the present. If Burnett is 
right, that Barth was reacting against the empathetic tradition of interpretation, then it is 
hard to see how Barth could accuse this tradition of not taking the prophets and apostles in 
earneVWDQGWDNLQJµDFRRORULQGLIIHUHQWGLVWDQFHIURPWKHP¶49 
 
In order to explain what I believe is at stake here, I will make use of an analogy of my 
own, drawn from everyday life and experience. Although the analogy is my own, I hope 
my point is in line wiWK%XUQHWW¶VPRUHGHWDLOHGDUJXPHQWV 
 
I have in mind the straightforward, everyday situation in which we believe that someone 
has done (or said/thought) something which is questionable or even entirely wrong, but we 
nevertheless feel able to say to them: µ,XQGHUVWDQGZK\\RXGLGLWRUVDLGWKRXJKWLW¶,Q
such a situation, we have suspended the question of whether the person concerned has 
done, said or thought the right thing as such. Often we mean that, all things considered, 
they have not done the right thing, or not exactly the right thing; but that given the 
                                                        
47
 Theological Exegesis, p 109. 
48
 7KLV LV FRQILUPHG LQ %XUQHWW¶V ODWHU VXPPDU\ RI %DUWK¶V DWWLWXGH WR KLVWRULFDO FULWLFLVP µ>H]istorical 
criticism as generally practiced was not critical enough of its own presuppositions. It did not recognize the 
relativity of its judgments or of historical understanding in general. In the name of scientific objectivity it 
presumed to take up a position of unprejudiced, non-participatory observation outside or above history 
HYHQWKRXJKLWVMXGJPHQWVZHUHRIWHQKLJKO\SUHMXGLFHGDQGVSHFXODWLYH¶Theological Exegesis, p 230.) 
49
 Theological Exegesis, p 109. 
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µH[WHUQDO¶FLUFXPVWDQFHVVXFKDVWKHSUHVVXUHVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQRUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDYDLODEOH
- DQGJLYHQWKHµLQWHUQDO¶FLUFXPVWDQFHVVXFKDVWKHFKDUDFWHURUZHDNQHVVHVRIWKHSHUVRQ
(in their peculiarities or current stage of development) - then we can understand why they 
did it. This is, I believe, analogous to the concept of empathy or the German Einfühlung 
from which our word empathy is derived - for in this example we would have put 
ourselYHVLQWKHSODFHRIWKHRWKHUSHUVRQDQGHQWHUHGWKHLUµZRUOG¶LQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQG
them and their situation from within.50 
 
If we transfer this to the field of biblical study, then we can see how it is analogous to the 
modern approach to the Bible. We now approach the Bible not by trying to show that it is 
simply correct, nor by showing that it is wrong, but by seeking to understand it in terms of 
the circumstances within which it was written. We cannot help but think that the biblical 
authors said or did things questionable or even at times entirely wrong from our point of 
view, but we can understand them if we suspend our point of view and empathise with 
them internally. Also, if we consider what I have named as the external and internal 
circumstances, then we find that we have equivalents in historical methodology, that is in 
historicism and psychologism respectively. Historicism is the principle of explaining the 
historical event  - or text - from its historical antecedents, that is from the externally 
ascertainable circumstances which led up to it; psychologism means understanding the text 
in terms of the personal or psychological state or condition of the author which gave rise 
to the text - i.e. the internal circumstances.51 
                                                        
50
 I should say at this point that my arguments here do not depend on the German authors consistently 
using a single word for the concept of empathy. Dilthey uses the term Hineinversetzen rather than 
Einfühlung WRGHQRWHZKDWZHDUHFRQVLGHULQJKHUHDQG5LFNPDQWUDQVODWHVWKLVZRUGDVµHPSDWK\¶  See 
W.Dilthey, Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp 226-7; Dilthey, 
Gesammelte Schriften VII: Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften (Stuttgart: 
B.G.Teubner/Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), pp 213-5). Hineinversetzen signifies the 
activity of transposing or imagining oneself into the position of someone else, and therefore corresponds to 
the concept under discussion in this thesis.   
51
 %XUQHWWGHILQHVKLVWRULFLVPDVµWKHFODLPWKDWHYHU\HYHnt in the past can be sufficiently explained solely 
RQWKHEDVLVRILWVDQWHFHGHQWV¶Theological ExegesisSDQGDOVRJLYHVWKHTXRWHGGHILQLWLRQµWKH
belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of anything and an adequate assessment of its value are 
to be gained by considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the role it played within a process of 
GHYHORSPHQW¶ S  Q  3V\FKRORJLVP RU SV\FKRORJLFDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DSSHDUV PRVW FOHDUO\ LQ
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We can see generally how tKLVµHPSDWKHWLF¶DSSURDFKZLWKLWVDVVRFLDWHGPHWKRGVVHHPVWR
give us the best of both worlds; we do not need to give up the perspective of the present 
by pretending we can accept the truth of what the biblical text says, but nor do we need to 
leap to the RWKHU H[WUHPH E\ PDNLQJ H[WUDYDJDQW FODLPV DERXW WKH %LEOH¶V IXQGDPHQWDO
falsehood or deceptive character. By seeking to understand the biblical text from within - 
E\HQWHULQJLQWRWKHµZRUOG¶RIWKHDXWKRUDQGVXVSHQGLQJRXUMXGJHPHQWVDERXWULJKWDQG
wrong - we are able to give an account of the biblical text which steers a path between 
these two extremes.52 
 
However, if we look again at my example from everyday life, then we can see that there is 
another side to the issue of empathetic understanding. It is quite evident that when we say 
µ, FDQ XQGHUVWDQG ZK\ \RX GLG WKDW¶ WKHQ ZH DUH DVVXPLQJ D IXOOHU NQRZOHGJH RI WKH
situation and its implications than the other person had at the time - perhaps more than 
they have now. In effect, we are assuming a superior standpoint or vantage point to them. 
2IWHQ ZH PD\ EH ULJKW WR GR VR DQG RIWHQ ZH DUH JLYLQJ XS D µMXGJPHQWDO¶ DWWLWXGH
towards the other person when we cease to judge them in the light of later (or superior) 
knowledge, and begin to judge the act etc. in the light of the special circumstances (both 
internal and external) of the time. 
 
However, it is all too often the case that the person who is the object of our empathetic 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJZLOOIHHOµSDWURQLVHG¶E\RXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ- i.e. will feel that we have been 
condescending towards them. They may feel that we have closed the question of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
%XUQHWW¶V DQDO\VLV RI 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU Ln his consideration of what Schleiermacher meant by 
µXQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH DXWKRU EHWWHU WKDQ KH XQGHUVWRRG KLPVHOI¶ - µ>,@QWHUSUHWDWLRQ KDV WR GR ZLWK UHDGHUV
reproducing in their own minds the original experience and thought processes which gave rise to the 
DXWKRU¶VZRUG«8QGHUVWDQGLQJDQDXWKRUEHWWHUWKDQKHXQGHUVWRRGKLPVHOIWKHUHIRUHIRU6FKOHLHUPDFKHU
means becoming more conscious of the various factors and circumstances of which the author was 
unconscious or perhaps only partially conscious in the prRFHVV RI SURGXFWLRQ¶ Theological Exegesis, p 
151).  
52
 ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW%XUQHWWGUDZVRQ.6WHQGDKO¶VREVHUYDWLRQ WKDW WKHKLVWRULFDODSSURDFKWRWKH%LEOHDW
the beginning of the twentieth century had moved beyond sympathy and antipathy i.e. beyond agreement 
DQGGLVDJUHHPHQWDQGKDGDGRSWHGDQµHPSDWKHWLF¶DSSURDFKTheological Exegesis, p 261; referring to 
.6WHQGDKO µ%LEOLFDO 7KHRORJ\ &RQWHPSRUDU\¶ LQ ,QWHUSUHWHU¶V 'LFWLRQDU\ RI WKH %LEOH I (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1962), p 418 (418-432).) 
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LQWULQVLFREMHFWLYHULJKWQHVVRIWKHLUDFWLRQWRRVRRQ7KH\GRQ¶WZDQWXVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKH
DFWLRQ IURP WKH VXSHULRU VWDQGSRLQW RI RXU µHPSDWK\¶ VD\LQJ WKDW Wheir action was 
comprehensible in the light of the internal and external circumstances of the time; rather, 
they want us to understand the rightness of their action in terms of its objective rightness; 
they want us to question our judgement that it was wholly or partly wrong. The difficulty, 
from their point of view, is that we have closed or ignored the question of its objective 
rightness at the point when we begin to understand it empathetically i.e. when we 
understand it only relative to its internal and external circumstances. To them it is so 
IUXVWUDWLQJWKDWZHFODLPWRµXQGHUVWDQG¶WKHPZKHQUHDOO\ZHPDNHQRDWWHPSWWRTXHVWLRQ
our own judgement and perspective on the issue. We need to open up afresh the question 
of objective rightness, even or especially at the risk of our own perspective or vantage 
point. 
 
Now, I think that this provides us with an effective analogy for how Barth understood the 
state of historical criticism based on the general idea of empathy.53 :KHQZHµXQGHUVWDQG¶
the biblical text in an empathetic sense, then we mean that we are striving to understand 
the text relative to its internal and external circumstances (psychologically and  
historically); and this means, implicitly, that we are assuming a superior vantage point to 
the biblical writers; when we enter empathetically into the world of the author to 
understand him from within, we are actually making a prior assumption that we are  
correct in our point of view and in the perspective from which we have judged the text as 
being iQ QHHG RI DQ µHPSDWKHWLF¶ DSSURDFK LQ WKH ILUVW SODFH54 In contrast to this, Barth 
                                                        
53
 See HJ3UHIDFH'UDIW$µ>7@RGD\¶VWKHRORJ\GRHVQRWVWDQGE\WKHSURSKHWVDQGWKHDSRVWOHVGRHVQRW
participate in the same subject matter with them, but rather stands with the modern reader and his 
prejudices; it does not take the prophets and apostles in earnest, but while it stands smiling 
sympathetically albeit condescendingly beside them, it conceitedly distances itself from them and 
RXWZDUGO\ H[DPLQHV WKHP KLVWRULFDOO\ DQG SV\FKRORJLFDOO\¶ µ7KH 3UHIDFH 'UDIWV WR WKH )LUVW (GLWLRQ RI
%DUWK¶VRömerbrief¶LQ5%XUQHWW Theological Exegesis, p 281 (277-292).) 
54
 %XUQHWWQRWHVWKDW+HUGHUWKHHDUOLHVWPDLQH[SRQHQWRIWKHµHPSDWKHWLF¶DSSURDFKDVNVKRZWKHµGHDG
SURIHVVLRQ RI IDLWK GHDG FXVWRPV¶ PD\ EH PDGH µDOLYH LQ PHQ¶ WRGD\ DQG UHFRPPHQGV WKH SURcess of 
µHPSDWK\¶ WR PDNH WKLV SRVVLEOH %XW %XUQHWW REMHFWV WR WKLV FRPPHQWLQJ µ2Q ZKDW JURXQGV PD\ WKH
professions of faith, customs and language of the Bible be pronounced dead? From what vantage point may 
we who are alive in the present pronounce theP GHDG"¶ Theological Exegesis, p 147.) Burnett then 
REVHUYHV WKDW WKH HPSDWKHWLF DSSURDFK LPSOLHV µWKH SURIRXQGO\ VSLULWXDO SUHVXSSRVLWLRQ RI D IUHH
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believed that we should strive to question our own perspective and the criteria by which 
we suppose we can judge the biblical text; our value judgements must come into question 
LQ WKH OLJKW RI WKH WH[W¶V REMHFWLYH FODLP - which is what I believe Barth meant by 
participation in the subject matter (die Sache µ3DUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ HVVHQWLDOO\ PHDQV WKH
opposite of detachment - that we strive to abandon the presumption of occupying a 
detached position from which we may survey the past;55 DQGWKHHPSKDVLVRQWKHµVXEMHFW
PDWWHU¶die Sache) corresponds, or so it seems to me, to what I have called the question 
of the objective rightness of the text itself. This is analogous to the situation I outlined in 
ZKLFK WKH SHUVRQ ZKR IHHOV SDWURQLVHG E\ DQ µHPSDWKHWLF¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ PD\ ZLVK WKH
other to open up afresh the issue of the objective rightness of his act and may wish the 
other to learn to question their perspective in the light of this issue. 
 
However, it is vital that we also recognise the limits of this analogy; by this I mean that 
%DUWKZDVQRWEDVLFDOO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHµREMHFWLYHULJKWQHVV¶RIWKHWH[W
itself, but rather with the question of its enduring significance. The main question for him 
was not whether the biblical text was generally or wholly right, but whether it has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
autonomous, self-positioning subject, an interpreter who knows himself to be partaking of a specific 
histRULFDO ORFDWLRQ WKDW RI WKH SUHVHQW LQVWHDG RI WKH GHDG DOEHLW HPSDWKHWLFDOO\ UHWULHYDEOH SDVW¶
(Theological Exegesis, p 147); Burnett is here explicitly drawing on the work of Hans Frei (see The 
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, pp 183-201). 
55
 I believe WKDW%DUWKXQGHUVWRRG µSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶DVWKHFULWLFDODOWHUQDWLYHWRµGHWDFKPHQW¶WKLVEHFRPHV
especially plain in the draft prefaces to the first edition of Romans. Especially I have in mind the following 
SDVVDJHV)URP3UHIDFH'UDIW,,µ7RXQGHUVWDQGDn author means for me mainly to stand with him, to take 
each of his words in earnest, so long as it is not proven that he does not deserve this trust, to participate 
ZLWKKLPLQWKLVVXEMHFWPDWWHULQRUGHUWRLQWHUSUHWKLPIURPWKHLQVLGHRXW%XWWRGD\¶s theology does not 
stand with the prophets and the apostles; it does not stand with them but rather with the modern reader 
and his prejudices; it does not take the prophets and apostles in earnest, instead, while it stands smiling 
sympathetically beside or above them, it takes up a cool and indifferent distance from them; it critically or 
merrily examines the historical-SV\FKRORJLFDO VXUIDFHDQGPLVVHVLWVPHDQLQJ¶µ3UHIDFH'UDIWV¶, p 284), 
DQG IURP 3UHIDFH 'UDIW ,,, µ$Q DXWKRU FDQ QHYHU EH LQWHUSUHWHG through the historical-psychological 
surface, but only by joining with him in the subject matter, by working with him, by taking each word of 
his in earnest, so long as it is not proven that he does not deserve such trust. The Bible has been 
approached much too carelessly with the application of this emergency clause. The mistrust one has, the 
Unwillingness-To-Understand, the non-participatory, distancing of oneself, has simply been made into a 
VFLHQWLILFSULQFLSOH¶µ3UHIDFH'UDIWV¶, p 288.) 
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continuing significance for us, and the problem with the contemporary state of biblical 
exegesis was that it assumed - unintentionally, to be sure - that the biblical text no longer 
KDGFRQWLQXLQJVLJQLILFDQFH IRUXV WKDW VFKRODUVYLHZHG WKHELEOLFDO WH[WDVD µGHDG UHOLF¶
UDWKHUWKDQDµOLYLQJOLQN¶56 The aim of the analogy I have been using is to demonstrate the 
inner connection between the HPSDWKHWLF SULQFLSOHRI µHQWHULQJ WKHZRUOG¶RI WKH WH[WRQ
the one hand and adopting a superior standpoint on the other. It shows why Barth could 
think that in spite of its claim to identify with the author, the empathetic tradition 
represents a prior failure to identify with the author at a deeper level. However we now 
KDYH WR PRYH RQ IURP WKLV DQDORJ\ DV %DUWK¶V FRQFHUQ ZDV PRUH SURIRXQG WKDQ WKH
question of the simple correctness or otherwise of the biblical texts. 
 
Dead Relics and Living Links 
 
As we KDYH QRWHG ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR %XUQHWW¶V SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V SRVLWLRQ WKH
empathetic tradition of thought aimed to revitalise for the present the historically remote or 
µGHDG¶IDLWKDQGFXVWRPVRIWKHSDVW%XWLQ%DUWK¶VYLHZZKHQZHH[SHULHQFHWKHpast as 
µGHDG¶ WKLV LV QRW DQ LQQRFHQW H[SHULHQFH LW LV QRW VLPSO\ D VLWXDWLRQ ZKLFK ZH ILQG
ourselves in with regard to the past, which simply has to be reckoned with and taken into 
account in any historical method. Rather, it is a particular attitude towards the past by 
ZKLFK ZH VHFXUH WKH µDXWRQRP\ RI WKH SUHVHQW¶ RYHU DJDLQVW WKH SDVW %DUWK ZLVKHG WR
adopt a critical attitude towards the normal approach of assuming such a gap between the 
past and the present, and hence towards the normal procedure of making a distinction 
between what the text meant in its own time and what the text can mean for today.57 
                                                        
56
 cf Preface 'UDIW ,,, ZKHUH %DUWK GHIHQGV WKH WUDGLWLRQDO GRFWULQH RI LQVSLUDWLRQ EHFDXVH µLW DW OHDVW
contains the wise challenge of stubbornly occupying readers with a biblical text until it is brought forth to 
significant speech, until it stands before us not as a dead relic of Jewish or near-eastern nonsense, but as a 
OLYLQJOLQNLQDPRYHPHQWZKLFKVKRXOGPRYHXVDVZHOO¶µ3UHIDFH'UDIWV¶S 
57
 cf Burnett, Theological ExegesisSµ>:@KDWZDVVRGLVWXUELQJWRKLVFULWLFVZDVKLVUHIXVDOWRGUDZ
a fundamental distinction between what it [the text] meant and what it means at any particular point. As 
%DUWKSXWLWIURPZKDWVWDQGSRLQWFRXOGRQHSRVVLEO\GRVR"*LYHQ³WKHOLYLQJFRQWH[W´IRXQGZLWKLQWKH
subject matter of the Bible, there was no place he feOWKHFRXOGSRLQWWRDQGVD\ZLWKDQ\FHUWDLQW\³+HUH
this LV D µGHDG UHOLF¶ZKHUHDV there LVD µOLYLQJ OLQN¶´0RUHRYHUH[HJHVLVZKLFKZDV WUXO\VFLHQWLILFKH
LQVLVWHGGHPDQGHGDSHUSHWXDORSHQQHVVWRWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWZKDWZDVRQFHWKRXJKWD³GHDG UHOLF´RIWKH
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, WKLQNWKDWZHFDQFRUUHFWO\UHSUHVHQW%DUWK¶VYLHZDVIROORZVZKHQZHYLHZWKHWH[WLQ
terms of its past-historical context, then we are viewing the past in a specific way, namely 
in such a way as to bracket out the relation between the past and the present. If we 
understand the past (for example) in terms of ancient Judaism or first century Gnosticism, 
then we are not viewing the past as it really was, in its naked objectivity; we are viewing it 
under the specific presupposition of its unrelatedness to the present; or at least its relation 
to the present is deliberately being bracketed out in this procedure. The fundamental 
difference between the pasW DQG WKHSUHVHQW LVLQ%DUWK¶VYLHZQRWDEDUHREMHFWLYHIDFW
but is simply one way of looking at past history, and if we wish to make - or allow - the 
past to speak to the present, then we must follow the opposite procedure and bracket out 
the differences between the past and the present.58 For me this goes some way towards 
accounting for the mixture of indifference and hostility Barth consistently showed towards 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH ELEOLFDO WH[W LQ LWV µRULJLQDO¶ KLVWRULFDO FRQWH[W WKLV ZDV EHFDXVH KH
viHZHGWKLVµKLVWRULFDO¶DSSURDFKQRWDVDQHFHVVDU\VDIHJXDUGDJDLQVWPLVUHDGLQJWKHWH[W
in a modern way, but rather as a particular way of looking at the past i.e. under the 
narrowing presupposition of its unrelatedness to the present. 
 
However, I am convinced that when Barth prefers a hermeneutic of relatedness, when he 
VSHDNVRIUHJDUGLQJWKHWH[WDVDµOLYLQJOLQN¶UDWKHUWKDQDµGHDGUHOLF¶KHGRHVQRWKDYHLQ
PLQGDGLUHFWRUQDWXUDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ WKHSDVWDQGWKHSUHVHQWµ5HODWHGQHVV¶KHUH
doeVQRWPHDQµIDPLOLDULW\¶2QWKHFRQWUDU\ LWPHDQVDW\SHRIUHOHYDQFHZKLFKdisturbs 
and unsettles WKHSUHVHQW7KHELEOLFDOWH[WLVWREHDµOLYLQJOLQN¶LQWKDWLWLVWREHUHDGLQ
connection with fundamental questions about the self-understanding of the modern world. 
This leads me to the more general point: even though Barth seemed to be talking about a 
natural congeniality between the present and the past, I do not think this really represents 
                                                                                                                                                                     
SDVWFRXOGEHFRPHDWDQ\PRPHQWD³OLYLQJOLQN´1RUZDVKHZLOOLQJWRVHSDUDWHWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKDWLW
means from what is meant in any safe, two-stage, bifurcated process which might hermetically seal the 
IRUPHURIIIURPWKHODWWHU¶ 
58
 PrefDFH ,$ µ7KH DUW RI KLVWRULFDO GHVFULSWLRQ PXVW WKHQ FRQVLVW SUHFLVHO\ LQ VXVSHQGLQJ IURP WKLV
dialogue [between past and present] unimportant differences of former and present ways of thought and 
sensibilities, instead of continually emphasizing them as tKHGHFLVLYHPDWWHU¶µ3UHIDFH'UDIWV¶S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what he meant and in some sense is the opposite of what he meant.59 It is more true to 
Barth to say that we have no natural, direct relation to the past. Our grasp of the past is 
always and only relative; it is always related to and coloured by the concerns and interests 
of the present. It is the illusion of an objective, immediate and direct grasp of the past 
which causes exegetes to become blind to the fact that their grasp of the past is not a 
passive observation but is intimately related to the only too active interest of the present.  
 
The problem of cultural self-awareness 
 
2QHPD\ZHOOTXHVWLRQKRZ%DUWK¶VVWDWHPHQWVUHJDUGLQJKLVVXSSRVHGLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWK
the biblical author and his statements regarding the unity of past and present can really be 
consistent with such conclusions as these. How can it be riJKW LQ YLHZ RI %DUWK¶V
comments on the matter, to argue that he believed that we have no direct relation to the 
past at all? However, I think that it is DFRQVLVWHQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI%DUWK¶VVWDWHPHQWVWR
understand him in this way. His statements to the effect that we have a living or 
participatory relation to the past is meant to draw attention to the fact that we have the 
past only in the form of the active construction of our cultural and social existence. If we 
think that we have the past in a pure form, detached from the concerns of the present, this 
means that we are suppressing the fact that our reading of the past supports and endorses 
the culture in which we live. If, however, we make use of our reading of the past to 
criticise the present culture, then this liberates us from the self-imposed tyranny of 
unconsciously using the past merely to endorse the present. If Barth is criticised for 
reading his own problems into the text, and for exaggerating the anti-cultural potential of 
                                                        
59
 ,WKLQNWKLVLVZRUWKHPSKDVLVLQJEHFDXVHEHOLHILQDµQDWXUDOFRQJHQLDOLW\¶EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWKLVWRULFDO
HUDV LV LQIDFWDIHDWXUHRIWKHµHPSDWKHWLF¶WUDGLWLRQZKLFKDFFRUGLQJWR%XUQHWW%DUWKZDVPHDQ t to be 
opposing. The empathetic tradition presupposed a natural congeniality between the present and the past to 
account for the possibility of a direct empathy between the interpreter and the author (or other historical 
figure). In view of the intensity with which Barth claims identification with the author on the basis of 
some kind of common ground, Burnett considers the possibility that there may be a certain amount of 
continuity between Barth and the empathetic tradition (Theological Exegesis, pp 192-3; see also 
*(LFKKRO] µ'HU $QVDW] .DUO %DUWKV LQ GHU +HUPHQHXWLN¶ S  56PHQG µ1DFKNULWLVFKH
6FKULIWDXVOHJXQJ¶SSI+RZHYHU,DPIXUWKHULQJ%XUQHWW¶Vmain line of argument, which is that any 
similarity between Barth and the empathetic tradition was purely formal and that he was opposed to the 
notion of a natural link between the present and the past. 
 129 
 
the text, then he could reply (and, as I will show, I think he did reply) that the real danger 
is in thinking that one can read the text in any meaningful sense without reading in. Those 
who think they can read the text without being concerned with their own culture are those 
who uncritically endorse their own culture without knowing it. Thus Barth was concerned 
to combat an illusory objectivity in our attitude to the past. It is not possible to be 
FXOWXUDOO\QHXWUDOLQRQH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSDVWVWLOOOHVVLQRQH¶VLnterpretation of the 
Bible. If we do not make a reading of the text an occasion for actively criticising our 
culture, then we are not being neutral or passive; we have not really suspended the 
question of our culture to get at what the text itself is; rather, we are endorsing the 
standpoint and perspective of our culture uncritically - and unconsciously. 
 
,EHOLHYHWKDWWKHVDPHWKLQJDSSOLHVWR%DUWK¶VDSSDUHQWSUHWHQVLRQVRIGLUHFWLGHQWLILFDWLRQ
with the author. It certainly appears that here we have a claim to a direct relation to the 
past based on the common ground between the past and the present, and of course the 
TXHVWLRQPXVWDULVHKRZWKLVILWVLQZLWKP\FODLPWKDW%DUWK¶VPDLQSRLQWZDVWRGHQ\DQ\
such direct access to the past. Yet I would undeUVWDQG%DUWK¶VFODLPWRLGHQWLI\ZLWKWKH
author as a challenge to reflect on what is involved in making a distinction between what 
3DXO PHDQW DQG ZKDW ZH PHDQ , EHOLHYH WKDW %DUWK¶V REMHFWLRQ WR PDNLQJ VXFK D
distinction was that it involves an illusory objectivity in our understanding of Paul; the 
illusion would be to think that we can understand Paul while suspending questions about 
RXURZQZRUOGRXURZQFXOWXUH7RXQGHUVWDQG3DXOµLQKLPVHOI¶DSDUWIURPWKHSUDFWLFDO
questions of our own culture is precisely what we cannot do - and the danger is in thinking 
that we can do it.60 
 
:H FDQ SXW WKLV DQRWKHU ZD\ %DUWK NQHZ YHU\ ZHOO WKDW KH ZDV LQWHUSUHWLQJ 3DXO µIRU
WRGD\¶+HZDVLQWHUSUHWLQJ3DXO LQYLHZRIWKHFULVLVRIFXOWXUHZKLFKKHSHUFHLYHGWREH
taking place in the events of the history of his own time. Thus Barth was not giving us 
3DXO¶V PHDQLQJ RQO\ +H ZDV TXLWH VHOI-consciously giving us an interpretation of Paul   
                                                        
60
 Although this is not based on specific statements in the prefaces, I believe that it stands up as a coherent 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI%DUWK¶VLQWHQWLQWhe Römerbrief period. However I think the point becomes clearer in the 
relevant section of the Dogmatics µ)UHHGRP XQGHU WKH :RUG¶ DQG VR LW LV WKURXJK DQ DQDO\VLV RI WKLV
section that I will attempt to substantiate my point (see below). 
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WKDW ZDV PRUH WKDQ 3DXO¶V RZQ PHDQLQJ61 The real question, I believe, is why Barth 
refuses to give any account or justification for the specific way in which he expands on 
3DXO¶VRULJLQDOPHDQLQJ*LYHQWKDWKHKDVJRQHEH\RQG3DXO¶VPHDQLQJ - as he evidently 
believes is necessary in any interpretation - the question is why he does not back up his 
own specific way of saying something different from what Paul originally intended. He 
does not give a critical account of how our situation differs from that of Paul, and of why 
we need to say something different from Paul if we are to interpret him meaningfully for 
our time. 
 
I believe that Barth restrains himself from giving a systematic account of the specific  
issues and problems of our own time because he is sensitive to the problem of cultural 
self-consciousness. The problem is that we tend to assume that our own culture or time 
has genuine awareness of its own needs, its own problems, and so on. But this leaves out 
of account the persistently self-deceptive aspect which is an integral element in the 
formation of culture. Cultural self-awareness is far from transparent; our seeming 
awareness of our problems is always at least partly a suppression of an awareness of our 
real problems; our cultural self-awareness effectively functions to maintain an oppressive 
                                                        
61
 In writing this I am thinking, of course, mainly of his Epistle to the Romans, although I believe that this 
also applies to his later exegesis. There are, I think, pivotal points in the Epistle to the Romans where 
%DUWKVKRZVDFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIJRLQJEH\RQG3DXO¶VPHDQLQJDQGFRQWH[WRQ5RPKHZULWHVµ7KH
Jewish sacrament of circumcision - and this is true of every other sacrament - is no longer fellowship with 
*RG¶ Epistle to the Romans, p 74 - P\HPSKDVLVDQGRQ5RPEµ7KHUHLVQRGLVWLQFWLRQ¶µ7KH
reality of the righteousness of God is attested by its universality. It is not irrelevant that it is precisely Paul, 
who, daring, in Jesus, to put his trust boldly in grace alone, is able, in Jesus, also to perceive the divine 
breaking down of all human disWLQFWLRQV«%HFDXVHKHLVWKH$SRVWOHRIWKH*HQWLOHVKHLVWKH3URSKHWRI
the Kingdom of God. Once this interdependence was obscured, there came into being what was afterwards 
NQRZQDV³PLVVLRQDU\ZRUN´%XWWKLVLVVRPHWKLQJTXLWHGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHPLVVLon of Paul. His mission 
GLG QRW HUHFW EDUULHUV LW WRUH WKHP GRZQ¶ Epistle to the Romans, pp 99-100.) Especially in this last 
reference we have something approaching hermeneutical reflection, something very rare in Barth. My 
interest in these passages is WKDWWKH\VKRZDFRQVFLRXVLQWHUHVWLQJRLQJEH\RQG3DXO¶VIRUPDOPHDQLQJDW
points where Barth is laying the foundation for patterns of interpretation which will dominate much of the 
ODWHU H[SRVLWLRQ H[WHQGLQJ FLUFXPFLVLRQ WR µHYHU\ RWKHU VDFUDPHQW¶ - including Christian sacraments - 
IRUPV WKHEDVLVRI LGHQWLI\LQJ ,VUDHOZLWK WKH&KXUFK3DXO¶VXQLYHUVDOLVWLF LQWHQW LVXVHG WRLQWHUSUHWWKH
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social structure which has becRPHKDELWXDODQGWKHUHIRUHVHHPVWREHµQDWXUDO¶,QGHHG,
ZRXOGJRVRIDUDVWRVD\WKDW%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\SURFHHGVIURPWKHFRQYLFWLRQWKDWFXOWXUDO
self-awareness is principally deceptive and oppressive in its outworking; that our true 
awareness of our SUREOHPVLVZHDNDQGOLPLWHGLQH[WHQWDQGWKDWWKHµGHFHSWLYHHOHPHQW¶
in our apparent awareness is powerful and deep-rooted. 
  
Thus when we attempt to provide an account of the specific problems of our own age in 
distinction from those of the biblical age, it is then that we fall prey to this deceptive 
element hidden within our cultural self-awareness. It is normally assumed that we provide 
a more effective and meaningful interpretation of the Bible when we adapt it to the special 
concerns of our age. In %DUWK¶V YLHZ WKLV SURFHVV RI DGDSWDWLRQ PHDQV WKDW WKH UHDO
meaning of the Bible is sifted through the deceptive element hidden in our awareness of 
ZKDWRXUµVSHFLDOFRQFHUQV¶DUH 
 
I believe that my point is substantiated by what I take to be the most relevant section of the 
Dogmatics, where Barth repeats his claim that the interpreter must aim to identify with the 
biblical author: 
 
Because the Word of God meets us in the form of the scriptural word, assimilation [Aneignung] 
means the contemporaneity, homogeneity and indirect identification of the reader and hearer of 
Scripture with the witness of the revelation. Assimilation means assuming this witness into our own 
responsibility. How can we have heard it, and how can we be its hearers if and so long as we still 
distinguish our own concern from its concern? How can we have heard its Word if we do not feel 
compelled to speak it as our own word to ourselves and pass it on to others?62 
 
Clearly, we have here a further reflection on the necessity of identification with the author, 
but in a more systematic context than in the Romans prefaces, given that it appears in the 
Dogmatics ,W LV KHUH WKHQ WKDW ZH PLJKWH[SHFW WR ILQG%DUWK¶VFOHDUHVWH[SODQDWLRQRI
what he means by identification with the author, and so I will proceed by reflecting on 
%DUWK¶VOLQHRIDUJXPHQWLQWKLVVHFWLRQ 
                                                                                                                                                                     
doctrine of election etc.). However, the most important point for what I am saying now is that Barth makes 
no attempt to justify WKHVSHFLILFZD\LQZKLFKKHH[WHQGV3DXO¶VPHDQLQJEH\RQGLWVRULJLQDOFRQWH[W 
62
 CD I/2, p 736. 
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I think the essential point in the above quoted passage is that we should not make a 
distinction between our FRQFHUQVDQGWKHFRQFHUQVRIµ6FULSWXUH¶7KLVXOWLPDWHO\LVZK\
our exposition must take the form of speaking the word of the biblical author as our own 
word. At this point in the Dogmatics, Barth is reflecting on the relation between the 
practical application of Scripture and the theoretical understanding of Scripture (the 
WKHRUHWLFDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ EHLQJ GLYLGHG XS LQWR WKH WZR µVWDJHV¶ RI µREVHUYDWLRQ¶ DQG
µUHIOHFWLRQ¶ +LV DUJXPHQW LV WKDW ZH VKRXOG QRW PDNH D UHDO GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
application of Scripture and a theoretical understanding of it; on the contrary, we should 
understand application as an integral part of the theoretical aspect. This is because if we 
ZHUHWRJUDQWDXWRQRP\WRWKHµDSSOLFDWLRQ¶VWDJHWKHQZHZRXOGEHDV,VDLGUHO\LQJRQ
our self-understanding of what the special problems and needs of our own age really are: 
 
Therefore, it is not the case that in this third and last stage of exposition, the Word is to be conveyed 
to man (actual, contemporary man) according to the statement of his special claims and hopes, so 
that applicatio means the adaptation of the Word of God to the service of this man. It is not the case 
that the exposition of Holy Scripture must finally issue in the answering of the so-called burning 
questions of the present day, that if possible it will acquire meaning and force as it is able to give an 
LOOXPLQDWLQJ DQVZHU WR WKHTXHVWLRQVRI WKHSUHVHQWJHQHUDWLRQ«:HFDQQRWERDVWDERXWDSUHVHQW-
day point of view which it must under all circumstances take into account or to which it must 
FRUUHVSRQG«,IZHGRLWFDQPHDQRQO\WKDW although we may appear to be eagerly laying ourselves 
RSHQ WR LW LQ IDFW ZH DUH VKXWWLQJ RXUVHOYHV RII IURP LW >LH IURP 6FULSWXUH@«,Q IDFH RI LW >WKH
freedom of the Word of God?], we cannot know beforehand what the real present is, what are its 
burniQJTXHVWLRQVZKRDQGZKDWZHDUH³RXUJHQHUDWLRQ´³WKHPRGHUQPDQ´HWF In a very real 
sense this will not appear until the Bible opens up before us, to give us correct and infallible 
information concerning ourselves and our real questions, concerns and needs.63 
 
+HUH ,EHOLHYHZH ILQG WKH UHDOPHDQLQJEHKLQG%DUWK¶VDVVHUWLRQ WKDWZHPXVW VWULYH WR
identify ourselves (indirectly) with the biblical author. When we make the critical 
distinction between the biblical author and our interpretation of him, this means that we 
are also making a critical distinction between the concerns of the author and our own 
concerns, which in turn means we suppose we have a prior awareness of what our own 
special concerns and needs really are. The point is that our awareness of our special 
concerns should not remain a closed circle as we approach the Bible, but must be open to 
                                                        
63
 CD I/2, pp 738-9 (emphasis mine). 
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question; indeed the real task of biblical interpretation is to allow the Bible to speak a 
word from outside the framework of this cultural self-consciousness. The final reason 
why we cannot make a critical distinction and comparison between what Paul meant in his 
own time and what he means for today is because to do this we would need to have an 
awareness of the needs of our own time in order to demarcaWH WKHVSKHUHRIµZKDW3DXO
PHDQVIRUWRGD\¶- and we have no neutral awareness of the needs of our own time which 
has not been compromised. 
 
This leads me to the general point: the problem with which Barth is wrestling does not 
derive from an independent concern with the content of the Bible; rather, for Barth the 
locus of the problem is how human culture tends to assimilate anything external to itself 
to its own interests and prior understanding.  According to my view, Barth did not start 
with a discovery RIµZKDWLVWKHUH¶LQWKH%LEOH+HGLGQRWEHFRPHDZDUHRIWKHREMHFWLYH
content of the Bible, and then make a critical comparison with the way people in his 
culture interpreted it, and then find out by means of this comparison that people were 
overlaying the Bible with their own distorting interpretations. His starting point was 
rather an awareness of the self-deceptive element within his own culture, and an 
awareness of how standard biblical interpretation - especially when it appears to be 
µVFLHQWLILF¶ - ZDVERXQGXSZLWKWKLVGHFHSWLYHHOHPHQW%DUWK¶VTXHVWLRQZDV- how do we 
allow the Bible to speak something beyond and outside this framework of cultural self-
GHFHSWLRQ" 7KLV ZDV WKH µFDUGLQDO TXHVWLRQ¶ WKLV LV ZKDW , EHOLHYH KH PHDQW E\ KLV
comment WKDW WKHUHDUHWH[WVµHJWKRVHRIWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQWZKLFKWRPDNHLWVSHDN
FRVWZKDWLWPD\PD\EHWHUPHGDQXOWLPDWHDQGSURIRXQGFRQFHUQRIFXOWXUH¶64 %DUWK¶V
principal concern is with how the Bible may speak a word to us which does not simply 
become assimilated to the framework of our prior assumptions. But he knew only too 
well that this does not happen automatically or naturally; what happens automatically and 
naturally, under the veil of objectivity or presuppositionless reading, is that Scripture 
becomes assimilated to our deepest, most powerful, most hidden presuppositions.65 
                                                        
64
 µThe Epistle to the Romans)RUHZRUGWRWKH6HFRQG(GLWLRQ¶S 
65
 FI µ:KDW PDNH WKH :RUG RI *RG LQ WKe form in which we encounter it, obscure and in need of 
interpretation are the ideas, thoughts and convictions which man always and everywhere brings to this 
Word from his own resources. When the Word of God meets us, we are laden with the images, ideas and 
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I believe that my general position will be further substantiated if we give a more detailed 
analysis of the relevant section of the Dogmatics we have been considering (i.e. the 
VHFWLRQHQWLWOHGµ)UHHGRPXQGHUWKH:RUG¶ 
 
The three stages of biblical interpretation according to Barth 
 
As indicated above in passing, Barth divides up the interpretation of Scripture into three 
stages, namely observation (explicatio), reflection (meditatio) and application 
(applicatio+RZHYHU,EHOLHYHLW LVPLVOHDGLQJWRJLYHDVXPPDU\RI%DUWK¶VWKHRU\RI
interpretation by simply listing and/or briefly summarising these three stages.66 This is 
partly because it is vital to draw attention to the common thread UXQQLQJWKURXJK%DUWK¶V
treatment of these three stages, but also because it is of crucial importance to show how 
these three stages are fundamentally interdependent. 
 
:HZLOOEHJLQ WKHQZLWKWKHFRPPRQWKUHDGUXQQLQJWKURXJK%DUWK¶VWUHatment of each 
RIWKHWKUHHVWDJHV7KLVFRPPRQWKUHDGLV%DUWK¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWwe necessarily bring 
to the text our prior assumptions and presuppositions, which obscure what the text needs 
to say to us. Because of this, there are two essential aspects to the process of 
interpretation: first that we recognise that we cannot escape or avoid bringing these 
presuppositions to the text, and second that we must not allow these presuppositions to 
become fixed, or think of them as in and of themselves productive for illuminating the 
PHDQLQJ RI WKH WH[W H[FHSW LQ WKH PRVW SURYLVLRQDO ZD\ 7KHVH WZR DVSHFWV RI %DUWK¶V
attitude towards presuppositions are clearly visible in each of the three stages of biblical 
interpretation which Barth delineates, as I will now explain. 
 
The first stage of biblical interpretation, observation RU µexplicatio¶ LQYROYHV WKH
apprehension of the text in its original historical context - something which is surprising in 
YLHZ RI %DUWK¶V DSSDUHQW ODFN RI LQWHUHVW LQ KLVWRULFDO TXHVWLRQV. However, the most 
                                                                                                                                                                     
FHUWDLQWLHVZKLFKZHRXUVHOYHVKDYH IRUPHGDERXW*RG WKHZRUOGDQGRXUVHOYHV¶&',SFI&'
I/2, p 470.)  
66
 e.g. Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, pp 132-3; G.Bromiley, An Introduction to the Theology of 
Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1979), p 43. 
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characteristic thing Barth has to say on the matter is that our apprehension of the 
historical content is only our own image or picture, and that although we may have to 
begin with our own images, it is essential that we allow the text to extend or even shatter 
our initial images and expectations of what the historical content is.67 This general pattern 
DSSHDUVDJDLQLQ%DUWK¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI WKHsecond stage LHµUHIOHFWLRQ¶RUmeditatio; 
here the point is that we necessarily bring a prior scheme of thought or philosophy to the 
text, but we must not allow these conceptual presuppositions to become absolute and 
must always allow them to be open to critical modification in the course of exposition.68 
Finally, the same pattern appears in his exposition of the third stage, applicatio: here, 
Barth tells us that man inevitably comes to the scriptural text with his own practical 
expectations of what he needs from the text; and, as expected, Barth emphasises that the 
word of Scripture can only be heard when the reader is prepared to allow the Scripture to 
speak against these prior expectations.69 
 
,QDOOWKUHHFDVHVWKHQZHILQGWKDW%DUWK¶VYLHZLVboth that we do not have the text or 
its meaning in a pure, presuppositionless form, and that in RUGHU WR µKHDU¶ WKH WH[W ZH
have to allow it to speak against the presuppositions which we inevitably bring to it. And 
                                                        
67
 µ,QP\DWWHPSW WRSLFWXUH WRP\VHOI WKH LPDJHRIZKDWLVVDLGWRPH,PD\DFWXDOO\EHJLQZLWKZKDW,
could imagine already. But I must not refuse to widen my circle of conceptions, perhaps even to allow it to 
be widened in a very unexpected fasKLRQ¶&',S 
68
 µ7KHUHIRUHZHPXVWQRW WKLQNDQ\RIRXURZQVFKHPHVRI WKRXJKW LVRI LWVHOIILWWHGRUHYHQSHFXOLDUO\
fitted, to apprehend and explain the word of Scripture. On the contrary, we should assume from the outset 
that it is not in itself fitted for this purpose, that at best it can only acquire this fitness through its 
HQFRXQWHUZLWKDQGSXUVXLWRIWKHVFULSWXUDOZRUG¶&',S 
69
 µ,WZLOOFHUWDLQO\EH WKHFDVH WKDWZHRQRXUVLGHHQFRXQWHUWKH:RUGRI*RGZLWKDOONLQGVRIVSHcific 
wishes and needs, hopes and fears. Not man alone in respect of his thinking, but each of us in virtue of our 
whole fate and character, is a specific system of presuppositions, expectations and restraints. When we 
assimilate something, this implies thDWZHPDNHLWDSDUWRIWKLVV\VWHP«:HXWLOLVHLWLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK
what we are and what we are not, with what we like and what we do not like. The Word of God, however, 
FDQQRWEHXVHGDORQJ WKHVH OLQHV¶ &',Sµ0DQLVFHUWDLQO\ULJKWWRH[SHFW something from the 
:RUG RI *RG«%XW KH LV IDU IURP ULJKW LI KH VWXEERUQO\ LQVLVWV RQ WU\LQJ WR NQRZ IRU KLPVHOI LQ ZKDW
everything will consist if it is imparted to him. He is far from right if he wants to insist on the feelings and 
ideas with which he views it. On the contrary, he will have to be prepared for the fact that it may be 
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yet, illuminating as it is to highlight the common thread which runs through his exposition 
of the three stages, still I think that BartK¶VGHHSHVWLQVLJKWRQWKHPDWWHULVHYLGHQWLQWKH
way he understands the interrelation between them (which I referred to above as their 
fundamental interdependence). Specifically, he emphasises that in the deepest sense they 
are not distinguishable. When %DUWKPRYHVRQIURPµREVHUYDWLRQ¶WRFRQVLGHUµUHIOHFWLRQ¶ 
KH LPPHGLDWHO\ DVVHUWV WKDW WKH WZR DUH QRW JHQXLQHO\ GLVWLQFW IRU µ>H@YHQ LQ WKH DFW RI
observing and representing, no interpreter is merely an observer and exponent. No one is 
in a position, objectively and abstractly, merely to observe and present what is there. For 
how can he do so, without at the same time reflecting upon and interpreting what is 
WKHUH"¶70 Barth shows here a sensitive awareness to the fact that no observation is mere 
observatLRQ REVHUYDWLRQ DOZD\V WDNHV SODFH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH LQWHUSUHWHU¶V SULRU
conceptual framework: 
 
Even in what he says as an observer and exponent, he [the interpreter] will everywhere betray the 
fact that, consciously or unconsciously, in cultured or primitive fashion, consistently or 
inconsistently, he has approached the text from the standpoint of a particular epistemology, logic 
RUHWKLFV«(YHU\RQHKDVVRPHVRUWRISKLORVRSK\LHDSHUVRQDOYLHZRIWKHIXQGDPHQWDOQDWXUH
and relationship of things - however popular, aphoristic, irregular and eclectically vacillating. This 
is true even of the simplest Bible reader (and of him perhaps with particular force and tenacity). 
%XWLWLVGHILQLWHO\WUXHRIWKHHGXFDWHG%LEOHVWXGHQW«71 
 
7KXVWKHVWDJHRIµUHIOHFWLRQ¶LVQRWDGGHGRQWRDQDFWRUSURFHVVRIREVHUYDWLRQZKLFKLV
in principle complete in itself, because the act of observation is always also reflection; it 
always takes place in the framework of a particular scheme of thought, and if the observer 
e[SHULHQFHV KLPVHOI DV µPHUHO\¶ REVHUYLQJ WKLV RQO\ PHDQV WKDW KH LV XQDZDUH RI WKH
underlying scheme of thought which is influencing and even determining his observation. I 
WKLQN,XQGHUVWDQG%DUWKDULJKWZKHQ,DGGWKDW LQVXFKDFDVHWKHµREVHUYHU¶LVvictim to 
his own scheme of thought, because he does not know it is there and thinks that he is 
observing the object as it is in itself.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
imparted to him, but in a very different way, one which is perhaps quite contrary to his feelings and 
LGHDV«¶&',S 
70
 CD I/2, p 727. 
71
 CD I/2, p 728.  
 137 
 
 
The same thing applies - as we have already seen in part - to the third stage of biblical 
interpretation, namely appliFDWLRQ :H ILQG WKDW DFFRUGLQJ WR %DUWK¶V DQDO\VLV WKLV WKLUG
stage must also never be understood in abstraction from the first two stages. Just as 
observation must always also be reflection, so observation and reflection must always also 
be application. Just as our act of observation is never mere observation, but always 
presupposes a given scheme of thought, so in turn the pre-given scheme of thought is 
never mere thought, but always presupposes a practical orientation or life-relation. 
Without appropriDWLRQ RQ WKH SUDFWLFDO OHYHO µREVHUYDWLRQ FDQ RQO\ EH D KLVWRULFDOO\
aesthetic survey, and reflection only idle speculation, in spite of all the supposed openness 
WRWKHREMHFWLQERWKFDVHV¶72 What Barth means here, I think, is that if we do not take into 
account the issue of practical application, then this falsifies or distorts the stages of 
observation and reflection; just as we become victim to our scheme of thought if we 
suppose we merely observe, so we become victim to our prior practical, life-orientation if 
we suppose that we merely observe and reflect. It should be emphasised that in the passage 
under consideration Barth was not simply making a common sense assertion that biblical 
study is pointless if we do not apply what we learn; rather he is expressing the 
hermeneutical insight that every act of interpretation or exegesis presupposes an implicit 
praxis - that is, a context or situation of social and cultural responsibility. 
 
,EHOLHYHWKDW%DUWK¶VPDLQFRQFHUQLQKLVELEOLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZDV to address the question 
- how can we truly hear the Word of God, given the hermeneutical complexity of hearing 
anything which does not correspond to what we already know? When we think that we are 
merely observing the Word of God, when we suppose we are being merely passive or 
receptive, then we are unconsciously assimilating the Word of God to a pre-given scheme 
of thought; when we suppose we are merely reflecting and are suspending the question of 
our practical life-orientation and cultural situatedness, it is then that we are unconsciously 
assimilating the Word of God to the prior framework of the expectations of our own 
culture.  
 
7KLV EHFRPHV VLJQLILFDQW ZKHQ ZH FRQVLGHU %DUWK¶V RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH µHPSDWKHWLF¶
tradition of interpretation, for one of the major characteristics of this tradition was that it 
                                                        
72
 CD I/2, p 736. 
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recognised that all understanding of the past actually involves assimilation to the 
IUDPHZRUN RI RXU RZQ µLQQHU OLIH¶ :H FDQ RQO\ XQGHUVWDQG WKDWZKLFKZHFDQ UHODWH WR 
our own sense of life or interests.73 This would seem to imply that we cannot really 
understand the past, as we can only ever see it under the limiting conditions of the 
presuppositions of our own lives; however, the empathetic tradition solves this problem  
by positing a universal, general human nature which is always and everywhere the same   
on a fundamental level.74 According to this way of thinking, the fact that we always 
assimilate the past to our own presuppositions is not a problem, or at least not an 
intractable one, for our deepest presuppositions possess a natural congeniality to those of 
the past which we are trying to understand. I think that Barth simply did not believe in this 
µJHQHUDO KXPDQ QDWXUH¶ DQG KHQFH WKH FRPSOH[ ZD\V LQ ZKLFK ZH XQFRQVFLRXVO\ 
assimilate the other in the past to the presuppositions of the present is, in his view, a 
                                                        
73
 $VVXPPDULVHGE\'LOWKH\µ>7@KHH[LVWHQFHRIRWKHUSHRSOHLVJLYHQXVRQO\IURPWKHRXWVLGHLQVHQVRU\
events, gestures, words and actions. Only through a process of reconstruction [Nachbildung] do we 
FRPSOHWH WKLV VHQVH SHUFHSWLRQ«We are thus obliged to translate everything - the raw material, the 
structure, the most individual traits of such a completion - out of our own sense of life [aus der eignen 
Lebendigkeit].¶ :'LOWKH\ µ7KH 5LVH RI +HUPHQHXWLFV¶ LQ New Literary History 3 (1972), p 231 (229-
244) - HPSKDVLVPLQH$OVRKHQRWHVµ>7KHGHJUHHRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJLV@GHWHUPLQed above all by interest. 
If our interest is limited, so also is our understanding. How impatiently do we listen to many arguments; 
merely extracting the point that happens to be important to us practically, without any interest in the inner 
OLIHRIWKHVSHDNHU«¶µ7KH5LVHRI+HUPHQHXWLFV¶S 
74
 )RUDVXPPDU\RIWKHU{OHRIµFRPPRQKXPDQLW\¶RUµJHQHUDOKXPDQQDWXUH¶LQWKHHPSDWKHWLFWUDGLWLRQ
see Burnett, Theological Exegesis, pp 155, 163-%XUQHWWGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWR6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶VVWDWHPHQW
that receptivity to other individuals is made possible by the fact that every individual contains within them 
a minimum of every other individual (Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p %XUQHWWFRPPHQWV µ+HUH
we are obviously standing on the same ground as Herder, the ground of a common, universally intuitable 
FRUH RI KXPDQLW\«¶ Theological Exegesis, p 155). Burnett also shows how Dilthey draws on 
Schleiermacher on this very poiQW'LOWKH\ZULWHVµ,Q8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDOLW\RIWKHH[HJHWHDQG
that of the author are not opposed to each other like two incomparable facts. Rather, both have been 
formed on the substratum of a general human nature, and it is this which makes possible the communion 
RI SHRSOH ZLWK HDFK RWKHU LQ VSHHFK«,QGLYLGXDO GLIIHUHQFHV DUH QRW LQ WKH ODVW DQDO\VLV GHWHUPLQHG E\
qualitative differences between people, but rather through a difference in degree of development of their 
spiritual processes. Now, inasmuch as the exegete tentatively projects his own sense of life [seine eigne 
Lebendigkeit] into another historical milieu, he is able within that perspective, to strengthen and 
emphasize certain spiritual processes in himself and to minimize others, thus making possible within 
himself a re-experiencing [Nachbildung@RIDQDOLHQIRUPRIOLIH¶:'LOWKH\µ7KH5LVHRI+HUPHQHXWLFV¶
pp 252-3.) 
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problem and not a resource; however much we think we are recognising ourselves in the 
other, what we are really doing is shutting out the otherness of the other and assimilating it 
to an image of ourselves. 
 
I think my argument in this chapter would be best summed up through a further reflection 
RQ RQH RI %DUWK¶V IDPRXV YHUEDOO\ UHSRUWHG VD\LQJV - namely that in the Dogmatics his 
intention was simply to listen to what Scripture has to say and to tell people what he 
heard.75 It seems very likely - as I briefly indicated in my last chapter - that what Barth said 
on that occasion was heavily nuanced. It was not a statement of a merely passive 
acquiescence in the content of Scripture - on the contrary, it is those who seem passive or 
who experience themselves as passive who are ignorant of the influence of active 
presuppositions, who are most active in assimilating Scripture to their own ends - or, 
rather, to the ends of the culture which they repUHVHQW %DUWK¶V VWDWHPHQW DOOXGHV WR WKH
entire morass of hermeneutical problems which threaten to turn any true hearing of 
Scripture into a mixture of hearing and speaking, in which the speaking ultimately comes 
to dominate.76 
 
In the latter part of this chapter, I turned to the work of Burnett to support my own view 
WKDW %DUWK¶V FRQFHUQ ZLWK WKH PHDQLQJ RI 6FULSWXUH LWVHOI VKRXOG EH XQGHUVWRRG
(paradoxically) as a critical concern with contemporary culture. However, drawing on 
Burnett has also had the consLGHUDEOHDGYDQWDJHRIHQDEOLQJXVWRUHODWH%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\
and exegesis to issues of mainstream hermeneutics through our attention to the 
µHPSDWKHWLF¶ WUDGLWLRQ RI 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU DQG 'LOWKH\ $V ZHOO DV ILQGLQJ LQ %DUWK DQ
implicit critique of this empathetic tradition, Burnett also suggests in the same connection 
a possible parallel between Barth and the more recent philosopher H.-G.Gadamer - who 
also makes substantial criticisms of the empathetic tradition. If there is such a parallel,   
this would enable us to relate Barth positively to contemporary discussions of 
hermeneutics, given that Gadamer is amongst the most highly regarded scholars in the  
area of hermeneutics today. I will therefore devote my next chapter to following up 
                                                        
75
 µ,I , XQGHUVWDQG ZKDW , DP WU\LQJ WR GR LQ WKH &KXUFK 'RJPDWLFV LW LV WR OLVWHQ WR ZKDW 6FULSWXUH LV
saying aQGWHOO\RXZKDW,KHDU¶&LWHGLQ5REHUW&-RKQVRQµ7KH/HJDF\RI.DUO%DUWK¶SS-4. 
76
 &',S µ2XUVXSSRVHG OLVWHQLQJ LV LQ IDFWDVWUDQJHPL[WXUHRIKHDULQJDQGRXURZQVSHDNLQJ
and, in accordance with the usual rule, it is most likely that our own speaking will be the really decisive 
HYHQW¶ 
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%XUQHWW¶V VXJJHVWLRQRf a comparison between Barth and Gadamer. This will also enable 
me to attain a clarification of the relation between Barth and Bultmann; in particular I will 
be following up another suggestion from Burnett, namely that on a fundamental level 
Bultmann represents a continuation of the empathetic tradition in hermeneutics, whereas 
Barth represents a fundamental criticism of this tradition. 
141 
Chapter Five 
A Comparison Between Barth and Gadamer 
 
The question of parallels between Barth and Gadamer 
 
R.Burnett, whose work on Barth we considered in the last chapter, raised the question of a 
certain parallel or parallels between Gadamer, the philosopher of the human sciences and 
KHUPHQHXWLFV DQG %DUWK +H REVHUYHG WKDW *DGDPHU FDOOHG WKH ILUVW HGLWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V
Romans D µKHUPHQHXWLFDO PDQLIHVWR¶1 EXW JRHV RQ WR VD\ WKDW µ>X@QIRUWXQDWHO\ *DGDPHU
never elaborated on this claim nor has anyone else provided a substantive explanation of 
LW¶2 Burnett then gives his own explanation, which he goes on to elaborate throughout his 
VWXG\ WKDW %DUWK¶V Romans µFKDOOHQJHG WKH KHJHPRQ\ RI D UHLJQLQJ KHUPHQHXWLFDO
WUDGLWLRQ WKH KHUPHQHXWLFDO WUDGLWLRQ RI )ULHGULFK 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶3 We have already 
ORRNHGDW%XUQHWW¶VDQDO\VLVRI%DUWK¶VUHODWLRQWRWKHWUDGLWLRQRI6FKOHLHUPDFKHUor rather 
to that hermeneutical tradition which found concretion in Schleiermacher and which 
%XUQHWWUHIHUVWRDVWKHµHPSDWKHWLF¶WUDGLWLRQ,QWKLVFKDSWHU,ZRXOGOLNHWRFRQWLQXHWKLV
line of enquiry indicated by Burnett, by examining the similarities and parallels between 
Gadamer and Barth.4 
                                                        
1
 H.-G.Gadamer, Truth and Method, p 509; Burnett, Theological Exegesis, pp 3-4. 
2
 Theological Exegesis, p 4. 
3
 Theological Exegesis, p 4. 
4
 Two previous writers who have made comparisons between Barth and Gadamer should be mentioned 
here. Firstly, M.Trowitzsch has provided a comparison between Gadamer and Barth which I think is 
comparable to my general position, although perhaps not so much to the more detailed analysis I will 
provide below. (M.TrowitzscK µ³1DFKNULWLVFKH 6FKULIWDXVOHJXQJ´ :LHGHUDXIQDKPH XQG )RUWIKUXQJ
HLQHU )UDJHVWHOOXQJ¶ LQ 07URZLW]VFK HG Karl Barths Schriftauslegung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1996), pp 73-109.) Trowitzsch compares Barth to Gadamer on the question of the subject/object relation, 
WKH FUXFLDO SRLQW EHLQJ WKDW WKH FULWLFDO µVXEMHFW¶ RI WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW LV QRW QHXWUDO RU IUHH IURP
presuppositions but is in fact implicated in the responsibility for the barbarisms of modern civilisation - 
especially the First World War (p 87). Trowitzsch concludes that the reason for the unnatural character 
(Befremdlichkeit RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV LV WKDW KH UHMHFWV FRQWHPSRUDU\ FULWLFDO PHWKRG EHOLHYLQJ WKDW LW
legitimates the self-deception of the modern critical subject etc. (p 99). I hope it is evident how this 
FRKHUHVZLWKP\YLHZRIWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVRUKHUPHQHXWLFVEXW,KRSHLWLVDOVRHYLGHQW
that my analysis provides more detail regarding the relation between Barth and Gadamer in connection 
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In this comparison, there are two broad questions I will be concerned with. Firstly, I have 
SUHVHQWHG%DUWK¶VVFULSWXUDOKHUPHQHXWLFVDVH[LVWLQJLQDFHUWDLQWHQVLRQ2QWKHRQHKDQG
LWZDV%DUWK¶VYLHZDV,XQderstand it) that we do not have a direct grasp of the content of 
Scripture, that our grasp of this content is always and only relative. On the other hand, 
Barth seemed to speak in terms of a very immediate and direct grasp of the meaning of the 
biblical authors, to the point even of speaking of an identity between himself and the 
authors. I have given some explanation of this, but it is my hope that bringing out the 
similarities between Barth and Gadamer on this point will shed further light on the issue. 
 
The second question I want to consider is - if there is any continuity between Barth and 
*DGDPHU ZKDW GRHV WKLV PHDQ IRU %DUWK¶V HVVHQWLDO FKULVWRFHQWULVP" ,V DQ\ PDWHULDO
continuity possible between Barth and a philosopher who does not share his assumption of 
faith in Christ? If there are parallels between Barth and Gadamer, could this only be 
DSSURSULDWHGIRU%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\E\PHDQVRIDFKULVWRFHQWULFUHRUJDQLVDWLRQE\PHDQVRI
a transformation through what is more specifically Christian? Or might the insights of 
*DGDPHUKDYHPRUHIXQGDPHQWDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\",
would cautiously suggest the latter, and I will explain my reasons for this at the 
appropriate place. But first, it will be necessary for me to consider the evidence of parallels 
between Barth and Gadamer, before proceeding to consider their significance. 
 
The primacy of die Sache 
 
$VDVWDUWLQJSRLQW,ZLOO WDNH%XUQHWW¶VRZQSULPDU\IRFXVLQEULQJLQJRXW WKHVLPLODULW\
between Barth and Gadamer. Burnett focuses on a passage in the second section of 
*DGDPHU¶V PDLQ V\VWHPDWLF ZRUN Truth and Method.5 (This is the section in which 
                                                                                                                                                                     
with biblical exegesis. The second author I will mention is Tiffany Conlin, who has provided a more 
GHWDLOHG FRPSDULVRQ EHWZHHQ WKH KHUPHQHXWLFV RI %DUWK DQG *DGDPHU LQ KHU 3K' GLVVHUWDWLRQ µ$
Hermeneutical Triangle: The Positive Relationship between General and Special Hermeneutics in the 
7KRXJKW RI 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU %DUWK DQG *DGDPHU¶ .LQJ¶V &ROOHJH /RQGRQ  VHH SS -215). 
Conlin covers some of the same material as myself, and I will refer to her work further below.  
5
 Theological Exegesis, p 201. 
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Gadamer considers specifically the hermeneutical issues of the human sciences or 
Geisteswissenschaften.) In the passage to which Burnett draws attention, Gadamer makes 
WKHSURJUDPPDWLFSURSRVLWLRQWKDWµWRXQGHUVWDQGPHDQVWRFRPHWRDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJZLWK
HDFKRWKHUVLFKPLWHLQDQGHUYHUVWHKHQ¶*DGDPHUFRQWLQXHV 
 
Understanding is, primarily, agreement (Verständnis ist zunächst Einverständnis). Thus people 
usually understand (verstehen) each other immediately, or they make themselves understood 
YHUVWlQGLJHQVLFKZLWKDYLHZWRZDUGUHDFKLQJDJUHHPHQW(LQYHUVWlQGQLV«8QGHUVWDQGLQJHDFK
other (sich verstehen) is always understanding each other with respect to something. From language 
we learn that the subject matter (Sache) is not merely an arbitrary object of discussion, independent 
of the process of mutual understanding (Sichverstehen), but rather is the path and goal of mutual 
uQGHUVWDQGLQJ LWVHOI«8QGHUVWDQGLQJ EHFRPHV D VSHFLDO WDVN RQO\ ZKHQ QDWXUDO OLIH WKLV MRLQW
meaning of the meant [sic] where both intend a common subject matter, is disturbed. Where 
misunderstandings have arisen or where an expression of opinion alienates us because it is 
unintelligible, there natural life in the subject matter intended is impeded in such a way that the 
meaning is given as the opinion of another, the opinion of the Thou or of the text, or in general as a 
fixed datum.6 
 
Gadamer presents this as the decisive insight which has become obscured through the 
LQIOXHQFHRI6FKOHLHUPDFKHUDQGODWHURI'LOWKH\:KHQZHFRQVLGHU*DGDPHU¶VSRVLWLRQ
here, we can see certain points of convergence between him and Barth: first of all, there is 
the concern with the subject matter or die Sache, and more specifically the continuity of 
life which is given in and with this subject matter. This is clearly a fundamental issue in 
the prefaces and draft prefaces of Romans.7 Secondly, there is the more general point that 
true understanding of what another person has to say is an understanding of the content 
or reference of what he/she actually says rather than an understanding of the person 
himself/herself. In the second part of the first volume of the Dogmatics, Barth tells us: 
 
                                                        
6
 Truth and Method, p 180. 
7
 6HHHVSHFLDOO\µ7KHZRUGV³KLVWRU\´DQG³XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´PDNHQRVHQVHIRUPHDWDOOZLWKRXWWKLVOLYLQJ
context between the past and the present which cannot be achieved through some empathetic art 
[Einfühlungskunst], but is given in the subject matter and in which one must be.¶ µ3UHIDFH 'UDIWV¶ pp 
281-%DUWK¶VH[SOLFLWGLVWDQFLQJRIKLPVHOIIURPWKHHPSDWKHWLFWUDGLWLRQZKLFK%XUQHWWHPSKDVLVHVLV
particularly striking here. 
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We can speak meaningfully of hearing a human utterance only when it is clear to us in its function 
of indicating something that is described or intended by the word, and also when this function has 
become an event confronting us, when therefore by means of the human word we ourselves in some 
degree perceive the thing described or intended. It is only then that anyone has told me anything and 
I have heard it from him. We may call other things speaking and hearing, but in the strict sense they 
are only unsuccessful attempts at speaking and hearing.8 
 
The convergence between Barth and Gadamer at this point, to which I wish to draw 
attention, is in the apparently conservative objectivism which is implied in these statements. 
Both thinkers are seeking to escape from the concept of understanding which had been 
taken for granted in modern hermeneutical theory, namely that the aim of understanding is 
to understand the speaker himself, rather than the content or reference of his utterance (i.e. 
the subject matter). True understanding, or at least its aim, is agreement in the subject 
matter; where the aim becomes an understanding of the person himself, this constitutes a 
failure of understanding (unsuccessful attempts at speaking and hearing).9 Both Barth and 
Gadamer would say that where the person himself has become the focus of understanding, 
this is at best a secondary and derivative situation, and is not the supreme achievement of 
understanding. 
 
What is going on here? On the one hand, Gadamer and Barth represent an apparently 
common sense view: the primary task of understanding is to understand what is said,  
rather than to understand the speaker (or author) himself. However, common sense might 
also suggest that understanding what is said is only the bare minimum of what is required 
for understanding, adequate for the normal course of things. But when we understand not 
only what is said (or written) but proceed also to understand the speaker (or author) 
himself, then we have achieved understanding on a more profound level. If I read a past 
text I may understand its content and find it makes sense to me, but if I find out about the 
DXWKRU¶V ELRJUDSK\ DQG DFFRXQW IRU ZKDW KH ZURWH LQ WHUPV RI KLV SV\FKRORJLFDO
development, or in terms of the time in which he lived, then I have surely arrived at a more 
                                                        
8
 CD I/2, pp 464-5. 
9
 µ7KH UHVXOW RI P\ LQTXLU\ LQ WKLV IRUP ZLOl be my interpretation of this human word. My exposition 
cannot possibly consist in an interpretation of the speaker. Did he say something to me only to display 
KLPVHOI"¶&',S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profound understanding of the content of the text than if I simply remained with the text in 
isolation from these background factors. 
 
It is this latter common sense assumption which Barth and Gadamer set out to question. In 
WKHLUYLHZWKHWDVNRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHDXWKRUKLPVHOILVDQµHPHUJHQF\PHDVXUH¶ZKLFKLV
undertaken when the primary task of understanding the subject matter has failed, and is 
only undertaken for the sake of getting back to the primary task. When interpretation 
regards its ultimate aim as understanding the author himself, it has gone badly wrong.10 
 
Now - I do not think for one moment that either Barth or Gadamer thought that a broader 
NQRZOHGJHRI WKHFRQWH[WRI WKH WH[W VXFKDV WKHDXWKRU¶s biography or historical context 
would in itself distort understanding, nor that they thought we should remain with isolated 
texts. The question rather turns on what is the ultimate aim or focus of understanding. As  
is especially clear in Gadamer, the point is that specifically in the tradition of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey the actual aim of understanding had become understanding the 
                                                        
10
 I note that Conlin has also observed the parallel between Gadamer and Barth on the theme of 
µDJUHHPHQWLQWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHU¶µ$+HUPHQHXWLFDO7ULDQJOH¶SS-5). Her analysis differs from mine 
on the following points: 1) She states that Gadamer and Barth have to be distinguished in that Barth states 
that only the subject matter of the Bible LV GLUHFWO\ FRPSUHKHQVLEOH ZKHUHDV *DGDPHU¶V DUJXPHQW LV
universal in scope (p 174). Conlin makes this type of distinction between Barth and Gadamer throughout 
her analysis, whereas I will argue that their concerns should not be distinguished in this way. Conlin can, 
RI FRXUVH SRLQW WR %DUWK¶V H[SUHVV VWDWHPHQWV DERXW WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH %LEOH DQG RWKHU KXPDQ
words (CD I/2, pp 471-2), where it is stated that the special hermeneutics of scriptural exegesis should not 
be subordinated to the claims of general hermeneutics. However, I would argue that the background to this 
LV %DUWK¶V UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH VHOI-GHFHSWLYH RU KLVWRULFDOO\ FRQGLWLRQHG FKDUDFWHU RI µJHQHUDOO\ DFFHVVLEOH
WUXWKV¶KHQFH,ZRXOGFODLPWKDWKHUH%DUWKLVanalogous to Gadamer in that, like Gadamer, his thinking 
has an anti-Cartesian basis (see my final chapter on the issue of anti-Cartesianism). 2) Conlin states that 
Barth is in agreement with W.Dilthey on the need for the interpreter to identify with the author, whereas 
*DGDPHUGLVDJUHHGZLWK'LOWKH\RQ WKLVSRLQW µ$+HUPHQHXWLFDO7ULDQJOH¶S$JDLQVWWKLV,KDYH
argued that Barth should not be understood in terms of continuity with Dilthey, and I will be arguing that 
Barth is comparable to Gadamer on precisely this point. Overall, my conclusion is that Barth is more 
closely comparable to Gadamer than is recognised by Conlin. 
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µDXWKRUKLPVHOI¶ LHKLVSV\FKRORJLFDODQGKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W - and this is where things had 
gone astray.11 
 
The problem of Romantic hermeneutics 
 
Gadamer seeks to show that it is the intention of Romantic hermeneutics to take into 
account the historical being of the historian - that is, that the historian does not simply 
survey history as a spectator but is himself a participant in history. In Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, whom Gadamer regards as principal exponents of the Romantic tradition, we see 
an attempt to overcome the abstraction of a detached, reflecting subject, for the latter 
concept does not correspond to the real conditions of historical life. However, as we shall 
now show, Gadamer believed that the Romantic conception of real, historical life was itself 
an abstraction. 
 
In the course of his analysis, Gadamer argues that Scheiermacher is a highly significant 
figure in the development of hermeneutics, because he succeeds in establishing the 
universal scope RI KHUPHQHXWLFV ,Q µSUH-6FKOHLHUPDFKULDQ¶KHUPHQHXWLFV LWZDVDVVXPHG
that understanding occurred naturally, as a matter of course, and that misunderstanding  
was the exception. However, Schleiermacher established the principle that 
misunderstanding is a universal possibility, and that understanding has to be sought and 
won at every point. Hence there is a great reversal; misunderstanding becomes the norm 
and understanding becomes, as it were, the exception. This establishes a universal need for 
interpretation, given that interpretation is required to avoid misunderstanding. That is, 
interpretation is called for when the meaning which seems obvious to the reader is the 
                                                        
11
 , VKRXOG SHUKDSV SRLQW RXW WKDW , DP TXLWH GHOLEHUDWHO\ IROORZLQJ *DGDPHU¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
Schleiermacher, and hence am not raising critical questions about whether Gadamer has overemphasised 
WKHU{OHRIµSV\FKRORJLFDO¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ7KLVLVSDUWO\EHFDXVHLWLVP\PDLQLQWHQWLRQLQWKLVFKDSWHUWR
FRPSDUH %DUWK ZLWK *DGDPHU DQG VR WKH DFFXUDF\ RI *DGDPHU¶V SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI Schleiermacher is a 
VHFRQGDU\LVVXH7KHSULPDU\LVVXHIRUP\SXUSRVHVZRXOGEHWKHVLPLODULW\EHWZHHQ*DGDPHUDQG%DUWK¶V
perception of Schleiermacher. However, I also suggested in my last chapter that Gadamer was at least 
relatively justified in emphasiVLQJ WKH µSV\FKRORJLFDO¶ SROH LQ 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶V WKRXJKW EHFDXVH - as 
Gadamer indicated - WKLV UHSUHVHQWV 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶V KLVWRULFDO VLJQLILFDQFH LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI
hermeneutical theory. 
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wrong one, and hence a direct, non-interpretative reading of the text would give rise to a 
misunderstanding of the text. Accordingly, if misunderstanding is a universal problem, then 
hermeneutics becomes universal in scope.12 
 
Gadamer goes on to show how LW IROORZV IURP WKLV WKDW 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶V XQLYHUVDO
hermeneutics gives rise to his programme of giving primacy to an understanding of the 
author - WKDW LV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH DXWKRU KLPVHOI DV RSSRVHG WR µPHUHO\¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
what is said. We noted above that according to common sense, understanding the content 
of what is said is considered sufficient in the normal course of things, but understanding the 
author himself constitutes a special effort of understanding which goes beyond this. But this 
also indLFDWHV WKDW WKLV VSHFLDO HIIRUW RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LV UHTXLUHG RQO\ ZKHQ WKH µQRUPDO
FRXUVHRI WKLQJV¶KDVEHHQGLVWXUEHG WKDWLVZKHQIRUVRPHUHDVRQWKHFRQWHQWRIZKDWLV
said seems unintelligible or alien to us, and we have to understand the factors (i.e. 
biographical and/or historical) which led up to the utterance. However, because for 
6FKOHLHUPDFKHU WKHUH LV QR µQRUPDO FRXUVH RI WKLQJV¶ LQ ZKLFK XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RFFXUV
naturally, then the task of understanding the author as such becomes the universal and 
necessary principle of true understanding rather than a technique called upon in special 
circumstances.13 
 
The obvious question, then, arises as to how it is possible to avoid the problem of 
PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ RQ WKH OHYHO RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH µDXWKRU KLPVHOI¶ ,I ZH DVVXPH WKH
universal possibility of misunderstanding the content and objective claim of what is said, 
then surely we are just as likely to fall into error concerning the biographical or historical 
conditions which gave rise to the utterance? According to Gadamer, Schleiermacher deals 
ZLWKWKHSUREOHPE\DGKHULQJWRDQµDHVWKHWLFPHWDSK\VLFVRILQGLYLGXDOLW\¶14 in which it is 
asserted that there is a pre-H[LVWLQJXQLYHUVDOERQGEHWZHHQDOO LQGLYLGXDOV DQGKHQFH µDOO
individuality is a manifestatioQ RI XQLYHUVDO OLIH¶15 This means that an understanding of    
                                                        
12
 Truth and Method, pp 184-5. 
13
 µ:KDW LV WR EH XQGHUVWRRG LV QRw not only the exact words and their objective meaning, but also the 
individuality of the speaker or author. Schleiermacher holds that the author can really be understood only 
E\JRLQJEDFNWRWKHRULJLQRIWKHWKRXJKW¶Truth and Method, p 186.) 
14
 Truth and Method, p 190. 
15
 Truth and Method, p 189. 
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WKH µDXWKRU KLPVHOI¶ is possible, because the unique individuality of a past author is 
DFFHVVLEOHE\PHDQVRIDFRPSDULVRQZLWKRQH¶Vown uniquely individual self, given that to 
some degree the same life is manifest in both.  
 
7KLVLVFOHDUO\WKHµHPSDWKHWLF¶DSSURDFKWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJSDVWKLVWRU\ZKLFKZHKDYHEHHQ
FRQVLGHULQJDVLWLQYROYHVDµIHHOLQJ-ZLWK¶WKHSDVWDXWKRUDQGWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHXQLYHUVDO
bond between individuals is posited aV WKH FRQGLWLRQ ZKLFK PDNHV SRVVLEOH WKLV µIHHOLQJ-
ZLWK¶ RU HPSDWK\ ,W LV FOHDU WKDW *DGDPHU¶V SUREOHP ZLWK WKLV µHPSDWKHWLF¶ DSSURDFK LV
that, in the deepest sense, it eliminates or ignores the historicity of the interpreter (and, 
indeed, of the past author) at a decisive point. In the final analysis it does not take into 
account the fact that the interpreter in the present is bounded by a limited horizon and is 
constituted by historical finitude. Instead, it posits a universal and timeless human nature 
which is present in all humans of all times, which forms a bond between interpreter and 
author, and hence transcends the difference between past and present. According to this 
scheme, humanity is not historical at its most fundamental level. 
 
In his analysis of Dilthey, Gadamer concludes that in his philosophy based around lived 
experience and in his theory that the past can be understood by re-living it, he also was 
caught up in the problems of Romantic hermeneutics. Re-OLYLQJWKHSDVWLQ'LOWKH\¶VVHQVH
depends on a concept of a universal life which is to some degree present in all people, and 
which thus makes possible re-living the past experience of another. Thus Dilthey follows 
the Romantic tradition of hermeneutics at this crucial point, and also falls prey to the same 
SUREOHP LQ WKDW KLV FRQFHSW RI µOLIH¶ LV QRW HVVHQWLDOO\ KLVWRULFDO16 ,Q *DGDPHU¶V YLHZ LW
was only with Heidegger that there appeared a philosophy with a fundamental 
understanding of the historicity of human experience.17 
                                                        
16
 µ5RPDQWLF KHUPHQHXWLFV KHUH FDPH WR KLV >'LOWKH\¶V@ DVVLVWDQFH VLQFHDVZHVDZ LW WRRNQRDFFRXQW
ZKDWVRHYHURI WKHKLVWRULFDOQDWXUHRIH[SHULHQFH«>)@RU5RPDQWLFKHUPHQHXWLFVHYHU\HQFRXQWHUZLWKD
text is an encounter of the spirit with itself. Every text is strange enough to present a problem, and yet 
familiar enough to be fundamentally intelligible even when we know nothing about it except that it is text, 
ZULWLQJDQH[SUHVVLRQRIPLQG¶Truth and Method, p 240.) 
17
 I would add the qualification that both Heidegger and Gadamer acknowledge that Count Yorck von 
Wartenburg had anticipated in an unsystematic form the sense in which philosophy should take into 
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*DGDPHU¶VXVHof Heidegger: the historicity of human existence 
 
As I understand it,18 *DGDPHU LV LQWHUHVWHG LQ DSSURSULDWLQJ +HLGHJJHU¶V WKRXJKW IRU WKH
human sciences because Heidegger affirmed the fundamental temporality - and hence, 
historicity - of the process of understanding. Above all, according to Heidegger, the 
specific situation or situatedness of the interpreter is a fundamental factor in the process of 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ7KLVLVNQRZQDVWKHµIRUH-VWUXFWXUHRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶LQWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJ 
is never simply DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI µZKDW LV WKHUH¶ EXW DOZD\V LQYROYHV VSHFLILF µIRUH-
FRQFHSWLRQV¶ GHULYHG IURP WKH FRQFUHWH OLIH-context or horizon of the interpreter. This is 
different from Romantic hermeneutics or the empathetic tradition (the latter two I take to 
be equivalent for our purposes), because we are no longer seeking to draw on the resources 
of an a-historical or trans-historical universal human nature. Gadamer explains that, in 
+HLGHJJHU¶V YLHZ LW LV RQO\ LQ WKH VSHFLILF OLYLQJ FRQWH[W DQG KRUL]RQ RI KLs own 
involvements and concerns that the interpreter can understand at all. 
 
This is what I mean by saying that Gadamer appears to advocate the relativity of all 
understanding. In his appropriation of Heidegger at this point, he argues that all 
understandiQJRIWKHRWKHURIWKHSDVWWDNHVSODFHZLWKLQWKHVSHFLILFIUDPHZRUNRIRQH¶V
own particular concerns; the framework of the present situation provides the interpreter 
with specific fore-meanings and fore-conceptions, which are of necessity an integral part of 
all understanding. Because of this, a true understanding of the past will always be different 
for each concrete situation or horizon within which or from which the understanding takes 
place, given that all understanding of the past is co-determined by the present situation or 
context. Accordingly, there is no one valid understanding of a text for all time, and the 
understanding of the text which was valid for the original readers is not valid for those who 
EHORQJWRDVXEVHTXHQWVLWXDWLRQµ1RWMXVWoccasionally but always, the meaning of a text 
JRHVEH\RQGLWVDXWKRU¶19 
                                                                                                                                                                     
account the fundamental historicity of existence (M. Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1962), pp 449f; Truth and Method, p 262). 
18
 The following is intended as a summary of Truth and Method, pp 265-271 and following. 
19
 Truth and Method, p 296. 
 150 
 
 
7KHTXHVWLRQPXVWEHWKHQKRZWKLVDSSDUHQWµUHODWLYLVP¶RIXQGHUVWDQGLQJZKLFKWDNHVDOO 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWREHUHODWLYHWRWKHSUHVHQWFRQWH[WFDQEHVTXDUHGZLWK*DGDPHU¶VVWDWHG 
concern with the objective content or Sache (=subject-matter) of the text. To be sure, 
*DGDPHUGRHVQRWVSHDNRIµUHODWLYLVP¶RQWKHRQHKDQGDQGµREMHFWLYLVP¶RQWKHRWKHUEXW
when he says that there is no one valid understanding and that true understanding of the 
same text etc. is different for each situation, then this does appear to be a species of 
relativism; and when he urges a concern with the content or reference of the text, then this 
does appear to be a species of objectivism. 
 
It could also be objected that different word-groups are involved i.e. when Gadamer claims 
that all readings must be related to the present context, he says that we cannot have 
objective knowledge of the past, but the word for objective here is objektiv (or 
gegenständlich); and when Gadamer talks about the objective content (=subject-matter) of 
the text, he uses the term Sache (also Sachlichkeit).20 The difference in words is indeed 
LPSRUWDQWEXW LWGRHVQRW WRP\PLQGUHOLHYHWKHDSSDUHQWWHQVLRQLQ*DGDPHU¶VWKRXJKW
For ZKHQ KH WDONV DERXW D FRQFHUQ ZLWK RU DJUHHPHQW ZLWK µdie Sache¶ RI WKH WH[W WKLV
VXUHO\ DSSHDUV WR FRQIOLFW ZLWK D UHODWLYLVW YLHZ ZKLFK VD\V WKHUH LV QR µREMHFWLYH¶
understanding of the text but only a plurality of interpretations related to the particular, 
local interests of the interpreters. This blend of conservative and radical elements of 
*DGDPHU¶V WKRXJKWREYLRXVO\UHTXLUHVH[SODQDWLRQ3XWDQRWKHUZD\ WKHTXHVWLRQLVKRZ
Gadamer can understand the words objektiv and sachlich in an antithetical sense in spite of 
the obvious overlap of meaning which is reflected in the fact that they can both be 
WUDQVODWHGLQWR(QJOLVKDVµREMHFWLYH¶ 
 
 
 
                                                        
20
 2QµREMHFWLYHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSDVW¶VHHTruth and MethodSZKHUHµJHJHQVWlQGOLFKHV:LVVHQ¶
LV WUDQVODWHG DV µREMHFWLYH NQRZOHGJH¶ DQG SS  DQG  ZKHUH µREMHNWLYHU (UNHQQWQLV¶ LV DOVR
WUDQVODWHG DV µREMHFWLYH NQRZOHGJH¶ 6HH Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), pp 307, 309 and 314 respectively.) In the context I think 
the German expressions are identical in meaning and hence the translators were right to use the same 
English expression. 
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Overcoming the subject-object distinction according to Gadamer 
 
Thus far, we have focused on the fact that in the tradition of romantic hermeneutics, there 
is a universal human nature which is in principle the same for both past and present. And 
yet, in apparent contradiction to this, the romantic tradition is known for its emphasis on 
the mystery of individuality, which involves an emphasis on the difference and 
GLVWLQFWLYHQHVVRISHRSOHLQWKHSDVW7KHSDVWDXWKRULVUHJDUGHGDVDQµLQGLYLGXDO¶WKDWLV
as unique and to that extent opaque to understanding for other individuals. However, as we 
have seen, according to romantic hermeneutics, the individual of the past can be 
understood by the individual in the present, or, put more generally, one individual can 
XQGHUVWDQG DQRWKHU LQGLYLGXDO EHFDXVH DOO LQGLYLGXDOLW\ DULVHV IURP D XQLYHUVDO µOLIH¶ RU
human nature which is everywhere the same. And so the presuppositions of otherness and 
sameness exist in tension with each other in romantic hermeneutics. 
 
But how is it possible for such presuppositions to co-exist without an intolerable tension? 
How is it possible for individuals to be absolutely other and yet to be in the most 
fundamental sense absolutely the same? In response, I would propose that they are not 
µDEVROXWHO\ WKH VDPH¶ DQG µDEVROXWHO\ GLIIHUHQW¶ LQ WKH VDPH VHQVH 7KH\ DUH WKH same on  
the level of subjectivity or aesthetics; they are different RU µRWKHU¶ RQ WKH OHYHO RI
objectivity or on the level of cognitive, objective beliefs or commitments. Hence I can 
understand the past - whether a past author or past event - E\HQWHULQJLQWRWKHµVSLULW¶RI
the paVWLHE\HPSDWK\7KLVFRQVWLWXWHVDQµDHVWKHWLF¶DSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHSDVWEHFDXVH,
no longer ask what is true or false in past texts, or in past expressions or actions. We may 
FDOO WKLV D µVXEMHFWLYH¶ DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI WKH SDVW SURYLGHG WKDW µVXEMHFWLYH¶ LV QRW KHUH
XQGHUVWRRG LQ WKH XVXDO VHQVH RI µGLVWRUWHG E\ SHUVRQDO SUHMXGLFHV¶ EXW LQ WKH PRUH 
technical sense that the objective truth claim of the past has been suspended, and in the 
sense that we empathise with the point of view of the other (i.e. share in his subjectivity). 
:HPD\HYHQWDONRIµDJUHHLQJ¶ZLWKWKHSDVWDXWKRUHWFLQWKLVµVXEMHFWLYH¶RUµDHVWKHWLF¶
sense, because we suspend our own point of view and see things from their point of view 
and understand why they spoke or acted as they GLG%XWZHGRQRWµDJUHH¶ZLWKWKHPLQ
the normal sense of the word by receiving their claim as objectively valid, not so much 
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because we disagree with them, but because neither agreement nor disagreement are any 
ORQJHUDQLVVXHRQWKHµREMHFWLYH¶RUFRJnitive) level. 
 
$QGVRWKLVVKRZVXVKRZWKHµDJUHHPHQW¶LQWKLVTXDOLILHGDQGDQDORJLFDOVHQVH- i.e. in the 
µDHVWKHWLF¶RU µVXEMHFWLYH¶ VHQVH - actually precludes agreement in the normal sense of the 
word. The viewpoint of the past author, although (or precisely because) it is so close to us 
LQ WKH µVXEMHFWLYH¶ VHQVH LV DFWXDOO\ FRPSOHWHO\ DOLHQ WR XV LQ WKH µREMHFWLYH¶ VHQVH :H
DGRSW WKH RWKHU¶V YLHZSRLQW DEVROXWHO\ DV RXU RZQ - on the basis of a universally shared 
subjectivity, which we share with the author and everyone else who has ever lived; yet on 
the objective level we never even consider the viewpoint of the other; it is methodologically 
excluded. 
 
5(3DOPHU REVHUYHV WKDW *DGDPHU¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO DSSURDFK RULJLQDWHV IURP KLV
dissatisfaction witKFRQWHPSRUDU\DHVWKHWLFWKHRU\*DGDPHU¶VSULPDU\WKHVLVRQWKLVVFRUH
is that we should not make an ultimate separation between aesthetic experience of a work 
of art and the truth claim which the work of art makes on us. Palmer gives a vivid example 
of tKLV 0LOWRQ¶V ZRUN Paradise Lost, presupposes many theological beliefs which 
(supposedly) we cannot today accept. However, we can still read it as great work of art - 
µIRU WKH JUHDWQHVV RI LWV VW\OH WKH JUDQGHXU RI LWV FRQFHSWLRQ LWV LPDJLQDWLYH YLJRU - not 
because it is true. Such an argument separates beauty from truth, and ultimately we see the 
HSLFDVD³QREOHPRQXPHQWWRGHDGLGHDV´¶21 This demonstrates quite vividly the close link 
between aesthetic appreciation and dismissal of any objective claim. Palmer goes on to 
comment: 
 
Ironically this false view of a literary text masquerades as the ultimate in open-mindedness, in spite 
of the fact that the present is presupposed as correct, as not to be put to the test, i.e. as absolute. Yet 
the present is to be suspended because the past cannot compete with it. Behind this open-minded 
suspension of prejudice is the unwillingness to risk our prejudgments; the past stands opposed to us 
DVVRPHWKLQJDOPRVWLUUHOHYDQW«22  
 
                                                        
21
 R.E.Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p 181. 
22
 Palmer, Hermeneutics, p 181. 
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This adverse comment on the ideal of aesWKHWLF DSSUHFLDWLRQ FRUUHVSRQGV WR *DGDPHU¶V
own position, and it is all the more pertinent when we consider that in romantic 
hermeneutics the aesthetic approach becomes a universal method for understanding not 
only past literary works but also for understanding all aspects of the past. The point is that 
because we fence off the subjective/aesthetic appreciation of an author from a consideration 
of his objective truth claim, then we regard our own objective beliefs, opinions, 
commitments etc. as being beyond criticism. This is the true nature and consequence of the 
division between subject and object, which needs to be overcome. 
 
:HFDQVHHIURPWKLVPXFKWKHGULIWRI*DGDPHU¶VWKRXJKWZKHQKHFDOOVIRUDUHFHSWLYLW\WR
the subject-matter or objective content (die Sache). We have seen that in the hermeneutical 
tradition immediately prior to Gadamer, there was a radical separation between subjective 
and objective modes of understanding, in that there was a search for agreement (or rather, 
unity) on the subjective level, but at the same time a surrender of any search for agreement 
on the objective level. But this has the effect of making our own beliefs unassailable. 
Gadamer calls for a renewed consideration of the objective claim which comes to us from 
the past, that is, he calls for an attempt to find understanding in terms of agreement in the 
subject-matter, because he wishes to overcome this dichotomy; he wishes to overcome the 
absolutising of the standpoint of the present. 
 
Gadamer argues that when someone sHHNVWRXQGHUVWDQGDQRWKHUSHUVRQIURPWKDWSHUVRQ¶V
own point of view - that is, when someone seeks to understand by transposing themselves 
LQWRWKHRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VKRUL]RQ- WKHQWKHRQHZKRLVVHHNLQJWRXQGHUVWDQGµKDVDVLWZHUH
stopped trying to reach an agreement. He himself cannot be reached. By factoring the other 
SHUVRQ¶V VWDQGSRLQW LQWR ZKDW KH LV FODLPLQJ WR VD\ ZH DUH PDNLQJ RXU RZQ VWDQGSRLQW
VDIHO\ XQDWWDLQDEOH¶23 8QGRXEWHGO\ µIDFWRULQJ WKHRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V VWDQGSRLQW LQWRZKDWKH
[the authoU@LVFODLPLQJWRVD\¶PHDQVWKDWZHUHJDUGWKHWUXWKFODLPRIWKHDXWKRUDVUHODWHG
specifically to their point of view, which we enter into empathetically, but do not consider 
objectively - and so leave our own point of view untouched and unquestioned. 
 
 
                                                        
23
 Truth and Method, p 303. 
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The question of horizons 
 
3RVVLEO\ WKH PRVW IDPRXV DVSHFW RI *DGDPHU¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO WKHRU\ LV WKH LGHD RI WKH
µIXVLRQRIKRUL]RQV¶LHWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJWDNHVSODFHDVDIXVLRQEHWZHHQWKHKRUL]RQRI
the reader and the horizon of the author. However, it must be remembered that for 
Gadamer, there are ultimately not two horizons but only one. Or, more accurately put, the 
WZR KRUL]RQV DUH QRW WR EH XQGHUVWRRG DV µFORVHG¶ KRUL]RQV DQG LW LV D FRPPRQ
fundamental methodological error to regard them so. This is the error of regarding the past 
author as coming from a specific point of view which we ourselves do not share, or share 
RQO\ LQ WKH UHGXFHG µHPSDWKHWLF¶ VHQVH ,Q WKH ODWWHU FDVH ZH UHJDUG WKH WZR KRUL]RQV DV
ultimately separate from and closed to eacK RWKHU 7KLV LV ZK\ LQ *DGDPHU¶V YLHZ ZH
should not UHJDUGWKHµWZRKRUL]RQV¶DVXOWLPDWHO\VHSDUDWH7KLVLVZK\ZHPXVWUHJDUGWKH
past as having something true and relevant to say to the present. The methodological 
assumption of mutual irrelevance or of two separate horizons is precisely what places the 
present horizon beyond criticism.24 
 
+RZHYHU LW LV DW WKLV SRLQW WKDW ZH FDQ VHH WKH VXEWOHW\ DQG FRPSOH[LW\ RI *DGDPHU¶V
SKLORVRSK\ *DGDPHU LQVLVWV WKDW LQ WDONLQJ DERXW µRQH KRUL]RQ¶ KH LV QRW WKLQNing of an 
unbroken continuity between the past horizon and that of the present, but rather wishes to 
bring out the tensions between the two as sharply as possible.25 But how then does this fit 
in with his statement that there is really only one horizon, enclosing both past and present? 
I think it should be explained thus: it is precisely when we think in terms of two closed 
horizons that we bring to an end the tension that exists between them. Thinking of the two 
horizons as being enclosed within a wider, single horizon (as Gadamer does) means that 
this path of peaceful co-existence of two closed horizons is no longer an option. Similarly, 
seeking to understand the past as having something true and relevant to say to the present 
should not be understood as implying an unbroken continuity between the past and the 
present, but rather should be understood as a refusal to immunise the present from the past 
E\ UHGXFLQJ µDJUHHPHQW¶ WR D PDWWHU RI HPSDWK\ RU DHVWKHWLF DSSUHFLDWLRQ 7U\LQJ WR
                                                        
24
 Truth and Method, pp 303-4. 
25
 Truth and Method, p 306 (cf p 295). 
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understand the past as true and relevant to the present brings out the real tension between 
the two. 
 
The similarity between Barth and Gadamer 
 
I began this chapter with two questions which I wished to address in connection with the 
similarities between Gadamer and Barth. The first of these was that of the apparent tension 
EHWZHHQ %DUWK¶V UHODWLYLVP DQG KLV REMHFWLYLVP ,I DV ,KDYHFODLPHG%DUWKEHOLHYHG WKDW
our grasp of the past is always and only relative, then how is it that he could call for a 
return to a concern with the objective content (Sache) of the text? I noted that there 
seemed to be a similar tension in the thought of both Gadamer and Barth, but now I wish to 
draw out more specifically where the similarity lies. 
 
%DUWK¶VVWDUWLQJSRLQWZDVLQWKHSUREOHPRIWKHKLGGen horizons of contemporary scientific, 
KLVWRULFDO GRJPDWLF DQG H[HJHWLFDO PHWKRG +LV SUREOHP ZDV WKDW LQ VXFK µPHWKRG¶ WKH
standpoint of the present is absolutised and fenced off from any claim which the past might 
make on the present. Once we grasp thaW WKLVZDV%DUWK¶VVWDUWLQJSRLQWWKHQZHFDQVHH
that his concern with the Sache of the Bible does not mean that we can be confident of a 
direct grasp of the content of Scripture without needing to take into account the cultural 
and historical tensions between Scripture and ourselves. I believe Barth means just the 
opposite: he means, as with Gadamer, that these tensions are to be taken seriously and not 
HYDFXDWHGE\WKHµHPSDWKHWLF¶DSSURDFKZKLFKUHPRYHVFODVKHVRIREMHFWLYHFODLPVVLPSO\
by suspending the question of objective agreement. 
 
6LPLODUO\ %DUWK¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW KH PXVW µDOPRVW IRUJHW WKDW KH LV QRW WKH DXWKRU¶ LV ,
EHOLHYHHTXLYDOHQWWR*DGDPHU¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDWLQUHDOLW\WKHUHLVRQO\one horizon between 
the past and present; but also, as with Gadamer, this is not a naïve assimilation of the past 
to the present or a neat coincidence of the concerns of the past with those of the present. 
Again, I believe Barth means just the opposite. He means to put an end to the peaceful co-
existence of the two horizons, which is the normal method of regarding the past horizon as 
something fundamentally alien and in need of interpretation before it can be made relevant 
to the present. 
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For me, the most compelling aspect of the parallels between Gadamer and Barth is to be 
IRXQG LQ %DUWK¶V UHIXVDO WR PDNH DQ LQGHSHQGHQW FRQFHUQ RXW RI WKH DXWKRU¶V RZQ
YLHZSRLQW$V,PHQWLRQHGDERYH*DGDPHUVWDWHGWKDWPDNLQJWKHRWKHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZD
specific factor in the process of understanding or interpretation means that we are making 
RXURZQSRLQWRIYLHZXQDVVDLODEOH,EHOLHYHWKDWWKLVFRUUHVSRQGVWR%DUWK¶VRZQSRVLWLRQ
DQG,ZRXOGOLNHQRZWRORRNDJDLQDW%DUWK¶VHDUO\GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK%XOWPDQQLQWKHOLJKW
of this question. 
 
%XOWPDQQDQG%DUWKWKHµ6SLULWRI&KULVW¶DQGWKHµRWKHUVSLULWV¶ 
 
:HDUHFRQFHUQHGWKHQZLWK%DUWK¶VGLIIHUHQFHIURP%XOWPDQQRYHUWKHVHFRQGHGLWLRQRI
Romans, at the time when they appeared to be in at least relative agreement. As I 
understand it, the crucial difference was that Bultmann did consider the particular, 
KLVWRULFDODQGLQGLYLGXDOµSRLQWRIYLHZ¶RI3DXODVDQLQGHSHQGHQWIDFWRUZKLFKQHHGHGWR
be taken into account in the process of interpretation. That is, Bultmann sought to take into 
account the actual opinions of Paul as something historically relative and to be 
distinguished from the real significance of what Paul has to say to us today. We should 
GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ WKH µRWKHU VSLULWV¶ ZKLFK VSHDN LQ 3DXO DV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI KLV
historical context, and the Spirit of Christ which we find in his words, and which is still 
binding on us today. We are able to make such a distinction because we ourselves have our 
own relation to the Spirit of Christ, to the real subject matter or Sache of the text; this is 
what makes us ablH WR VHH ZKHUH 3DXO¶V ZRUGV DUH LQ OLQH ZLWK WKH 6SLULW RI &KULVW DQG
where they diverge from this Spirit. 
 
%DUWK¶V UHVSRQVH WR WKLV LV LQVWUXFWLYH EHFDXVH LW LVKHUH WKDWKH VWDWHV WKH assumption of 
completeness. He calls this the relationship of faithfulness (Treueverhältnis). By this is 
meant the assumption that what Paul is saying is a unity, which means that the expositor 
VKRXOG ZRUN WR VKRZ KRZ WKH VHHPLQJO\ GLYHUJHQW DQG GLVSDUDWH HOHPHQWV RI 3DXO¶V 
thought or expression may form a coherent whole.26 What is striking here is that Barth 
                                                        
26
 µ7KHUHIRUHPy conclusion is that in no case can it be a question of playing off the Spirit of Christ, the 
³VXEMHFW PDWWHU´ >die Sache@ LQ VXFK D ZD\ DJDLQVW WKH ³RWKHU VSLULWV´ WKDW LQ WKH QDPH RI WKH IRUPHU
 157 
 
PDNHVQRFODLPWKDW3DXO¶VWKRXJKWRUH[SUHVVLRQVUHDOO\are a unity, whether as something 
he knows in advance or as something he has discovered though studying the text. What is 
involved is merely a methodological assumption.27 And it is very significant that when we 
turn to Gadamer, we find the same guiding assumption. Gadamer speaks specifically of an 
DQWLFLSDWLRQRUUDWKHURIDµIRUH-FRQFHSWLRQRIFRPSOHWHQHVV¶28 This fore-conception, which 
appears in Barth as well as in Gadamer, is clearly related to the task of being open to the 
complete truth RIZKDWLVVDLGDQGKDVQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKUHJDUGLQJWKHWH[WDVµFRQVLVWHQW
EXW IDOVH¶ RU FRQVLVWHQW IURP LWV RZQ SRLQW RI YLHZ - which would be a return to the 
Romantic conception.29  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
certain passages are praised, but certain others, where PaXOLVQRWVSHDNLQJ³IURPWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHU´DUH
EHOLWWOHG5DWKHULWLVDTXHVWLRQRIVHHLQJDQGPDNLQJFOHDUKRZWKH³6SLULWRI&KULVW´LVWKHFULVLVLQZKLFK
the whole finds itself. Everything is litera WKH YRLFH RI ³RWKHU´ VSLULWV DQG ZKHWKHU DQG LQ how far 
everything FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG DOVR LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH ³VXEMHFW PDWWHU´ DV WKH YRLFH RI WKH spiritus (of 
Christ) is the question by which the litera PXVWEHVWXGLHG¶µThe Epistle to the Romans: Foreword to the 
7KLUG(GLWLRQ¶S- emphases BaUWK¶V 
27
 This for me becomes clear in the way that Barth states that everything in the text can be understood as 
the varied other spirits; seeking to grasp them as a unity in relation to the Spirit of Christ is an assumption 
which does not follow from their intrinsic quality. One is not compelled to understand them as a unity, but 
VHHNLQJ WR JUDVS WKHP DV D XQLW\ LV DFRQGLWLRQRIJHQXLQHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ µThe Epistle to the Romans: 
)RUHZRUGWRWKH7KLUG(GLWLRQ¶SS-8.) 
28
 Conlin also makes a comparison EHWZHHQ %DUWK DQG *DGDPHU RQ WKH LVVXH RI WKH µIRUH-conception of 
FRPSOHWHQHVV¶µ$+HUPHQHXWLFDO7ULDQJOH¶SSIKRZHYHUVKHGRHVQRWPDNHKHUFRPSDULVRQRQWKH
EDVLV RI %DUWK¶V FRQFHSW RI Treueverhältnis. Characteristically, she distinguishes between Barth and 
*DGDPHURQWKHJURXQGVWKDW%DUWK¶VFRQFHUQZDVWKHRORJLFDOO\VSHFLILFS 
29
 *DGDPHU ZULWHV RI WKH µIRUH-FRQFHSWLRQ RI FRPSOHWHQHVV¶ DV µD IRUPDO FRQGLWLRQ RI DOO
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ«>:@KHQ ZH UHDG D WH[W ZH DOZD\V DVVXPH LWV FRPSOHWHQHVV DQd only when this 
assumption proves mistaken - i.e., the text is not intelligible - do we begin to suspect the text and try to 
GLVFRYHUKRZLWFDQEHUHPHGLHG«7KHIRUH-conception of completeness that guides all our understanding 
is, then, always determined by the specific content. Not only does the reader assume an immanent unity of 
meaning, but his understanding is likewise guided by the constant transcendent expectations of meaning 
WKDW SURFHHG IURP WKH UHODWLRQ WR WKH WUXWK RI ZKDW LV EHLQJ VDLG«,W LV RQOy when the attempt to accept 
ZKDWLVVDLGDVWUXHIDLOVWKDWZHWU\WR³XQGHUVWDQG´WKHWH[WSV\FKRORJLFDOO\RUKLVWRULFDOO\DVDQRWKHU¶V
opinion. The prejudice of completeness, then, implies not only this formal element - that a text should 
completely express its meaning - EXW DOVR WKDW ZKDW LW VD\V VKRXOG EH WKH FRPSOHWH WUXWK¶ Truth and 
Method, pp 293-4.) 
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The question must of course arise as to whether this assumption will falsify the material, for 
if the text does not form a unity, as must be the case to some extent, then the assumption 
that it does form a unity will surely obscure this fact. However, I think that Gadamer 
emphasises this as an assumption not to fore-close the question of whether the text is truly 
a unity, nor whether it speaks truth; rather, he is seeking to formulate what is involved in 
understanding as such. Grasping at least the possibility of the truth - indeed, the complete 
truth - of what is said is an important precondition for understanding. This is as opposed to 
assuming in advance that the author is proceeding from a historically limited perspective 
which would mean we hDYH WR GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ ZKDW SURFHHGV IURP WKH DXWKRU¶V
distinctive point of view and the real substance of what the author is saying. Of course, it 
must be the case that the author is proceeding from a historically limited point of view, but 
if we make this factor into a primary assumption, then we have curtailed the task of real 
listening and understanding, and have effectively immunised our own point of view from 
what the past may have to say to us.  
 
:H VHH *DGDPHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH DQWLFLSDWHG LQ %DUWK¶s comments that it is only when an 
anticipation of completeness with regard to the text actually fails that we should begin to 
ZULWHµDERXW¶3DXOZKLFK, WDNHWRPHDQFRQVLGHULQJ3DXOLQWHUPVRIµDQRWKHU¶LQGLYLGXDO
coming from a distinct point of view of his own. Barth clearly understands this last as a 
secondary, derivative situation, in which the primary effort of understanding has failed.30  
 
Now, considered in theological WHUPV %DUWK¶V SRVLWLRQ WKDW ZH PXVW PDNH D
methodological assumption of the complete truth of the biblical texts seems to have much 
in common with the orthodox doctrine of inspiration. Barth acknowledged that his 
approach did have a certain amount in common with the traditional doctrine; however, I 
believe that his approach is to be distinguished from orthodoxy because of the rôle of 
application in his hermeneutical orientation. 
 
                                                        
30
 µThe Epistle to the Romans )RUHZRUG WR WKH 7KLUG (GLWLRQ¶ S  µ, KROG WKDW LW LV LPSRVVLEOH IRU
anyone to do justice to any writer, to be able really to bring any writer to speak again, if he does not dare to 
assume that hypothesis, does not enter into that relationship of faithfulness to him. To speak about 
someone seems to me to be hopelessly condemned to speak past him, and to seal his gravHWLJKWHU¶ 
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Application as an integral part of understanding in Gadamer and Barth 
 
It seems clear to me that Barth and Gadamer had this in common: they both believed that 
application is an integral part of understanding.31 This is meant in the radical sense, that 
understanding only takes place to the extent that it is also application; where this factor is 
not taken into account, then the reading of the text is subject to distortion by hidden 
H[SHFWDWLRQV RI DSSOLFDWLRQ , KDYH ORRNHG DW WKLV DVSHFW RI %DUWK¶V KHUPHQHXWLFV LQ P\
previous chapter, and I would like to show now how it signifies a crucial clarification of 
what I have been saying about the anticipation of the complete truth of the text. 
 
:KDW , PHDQ LV WKLV WKH DVVXPSWLRQ RI FRPSOHWH WUXWK LV QRW D µWKHRUHWLFDO¶ DVVXPSWLRQ  
that is, it is not an assumption that the text is completely true in and of itself apart from the 
question of its application and its relevance to the present situation. Indeed, in a very real 
VHQVHLIZHZHUHWRUHJDUGWKHWH[WDVµFRPSOHWHO\WUXH¶LQLWVRZQLQWULQVLFFRQWHQWWKDWLV
considered in abstraction from its present application, then we would have missed the  
point of why we muVWUHJDUGLWDVµFRPSOHWHO\WUXH¶LQWKHILUVWSODFH7KHUHDVRQZK\ZH
regard it as completely true in the first place is because we wish to avoid projecting a 
distinct horizon of the past, separate from our own, which would enable us to distinguish 
betweHQ ZKDW LV µKLVWRULFDOO\ FRQGLWLRQHG¶ LQ WKH SDVW RQ WKH RQH KDQG DQG ZKDW LV RI
permanent significance on the other. As I have argued, such a distinction may simply  
reflect our own criteria of what is and what is not of permanent significance. And if we 
were to regard the text as completely true in the theoretical sense, as a quality the text has 
in itself, then we would again be projecting a distinct horizon for the text which is distinct 
from our own. If we were to make a basic distinction between what the text means in itself 
(theoretical understanding) and what the text can mean for today (practical application), 
                                                        
31
 2QWKLVJHQHUDOSRLQW,DPLQDJUHHPHQWZLWK&RQOLQZKRVWDWHVWKDWµ*DGDPHU¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQWKHIDFW
WKDW XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DOZD\V LQYROYHV DSSOLFDWLRQ LV DQDORJRXV WR %DUWK¶V FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW DSSURSULDWLRQ LV
interdependent with the first and VHFRQGPRPHQWVRIELEOLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶µ$+HUPHQHXWLFDO7ULDQJOH¶
Sµ$SSURSULDWLRQ¶KHUHUHIHUVWRWKHµWKLUGVWDJH¶RIELEOLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQapplicatioDQGWKHµILUVW
DQG VHFRQG PRPHQWV¶ UHIHU WR WKH VWDJHV RI REVHUYDWLRQ DQG UHIOHFWLRQ respectively (see part (C) of my 
fourth chapter). 
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then we would be falling back into the fallacy of making an ultimate distinction between the 
horizon of the past and the horizon of the present, with the consequent danger that we will 
subordinate the horizon of the past to the standpoint of the present. 
 
We may consider by way of illustration the fact that a contemporary representative of the 
orthodox doctrine of Scripture will normally regard the task of establishing what is there in 
the text in itself as something prior to the task of interpreting or applying the text for today. 
Indeed, he will often seek to vindicate the intrinsic truth of the text precisely by projecting a 
separate horizon for the text, and will state that a problematic aspect of the text can be 
VKRZQ WR EH WUXH RU YDOLG ZKHQ ZH FRQVLGHU WKH WH[W¶V PHDQLQJ IURP ZLWKLQ LWV RULJLQDO
horizon or situation as opposed to that of today. This is in effect a kind of empathy, in 
which the interpreter transposes himself into the horizon of the past by suspending the 
KRUL]RQRIWKHSUHVHQW,WLVQRWRIFRXUVHHTXLYDOHQWWRWKHµHPSDWK\¶DGYRFDWHGLQFULWLFDO
exegesis, which has no wish to vindicate the complete truth of Scripture. However, in 
respect of the question of application, the advocate of orthodoxy is in this case employing 
something closely analogous to the empathetic approach, and is also at risk of using criteria 
drawn from the present to distinguish between what was relevant only for the biblical time 
and what is still relevant today, so that in the process of application the text is subordinated 
to the present. 
 
Of course, this is hardly the whole story with regard to contemporary representatives of the 
orthodox position; to be accurate we have to recognise that they are actually deeply 
suspicious of making too many distinctions between what the text meant in its own time 
and what it means for today. To them, the assumption that the modern world presents a 
special task of interpretation distinct from what the text meant in its own time entails the 
µ/LEHUDO¶IDOODF\RISUHWHQGLQJWREHFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHWH[WEXWDFWXDOO\PDNLQJLWGLHWKH
death of a thousand modern re-interpretations. They would say that the projection of a 
horizon for the biblical text distinct from the modern world is a deceptive strategy which 
enables us to evade what the Bible commands us to do and believe. Notwithstanding my 
comments in the last paragraph, it may well appear that the contemporary orthodox view 
ILWV *DGDPHU¶V FULWHULRQ RI DVVXPLQJ WKDW XOWLPDWHO\ WKHUH LV UHDOO\ RQO\ RQH KRUL]RQ
between reader and text, and that, just like Gadamer, it recognises that projecting a distinct 
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KRUL]RQ IRU WKH ELEOLFDO WH[W KDV WKH HIIHFW RI SODFLQJ WKH µPRGHUQ¶ viewpoint beyond 
criticism. 
 
However, I believe that there is a crucial difference between the orthodox approach and the 
approach of Gadamer (and, I believe, there is a corresponding difference between the 
orthodox approach and that of Barth). In so far as the orthodox approach advocates the 
direct applicability of the text to modern situations, then there is a difference from Gadamer 
and Barth, who, in my view, do not believe in such direct applicability. This requires 
explanation. 
 
I think that on the one hand Barth shares with Liberal thought the assumption that when 
conservative exegesis emphasises the direct applicability of the text then it is covering up 
the actual tension between the text and our own world, but on the other hand he shares 
with conservative thought the assumption that Liberal exegesis represents an attempt to 
immunise the present horizon from the biblical text. I think I understand Barth correctly 
ZKHQ , VD\ WKDW IRU KLP DV DJDLQVW WKH µFRQVHUYDWLYH¶ DSSURDFK WKH ELEOLFDO WH[W LV not 
directly applicable to the present; if we think that it is directly applicable, then this means 
that we are unaware of how the present horizon (considered as distinct from the biblical 
horizon) is predetermining our reading. Again, as in Gadamer, I believe Barth takes the 
position that application is an integral part of understanding precisely in order to bring out 
the tensions between the horizon of the text and our own fully, and, as I said, to put an end 
to the peaceful co-existence of the two horizons. Put another way: there are two ways of 
neutralising the tension between the text and the present: one is to assume a natural 
continuity between the text and the present, which in effect assumes a single, continuous 
horizon without tension; the other is to recognise the distinction between the horizons but 
to surrender the attempt to bring them together in a single horizon. Barth - and, I believe, 
Gadamer - choose the harder road, in that they assume the existence of two horizons in 
tension with each other, but require that nevertheless they are fused into one, single, unitary 
horizon.32 
                                                        
32
 1RWHKRZ%DUWKZURWH WR+DUQDFN UHJDUGLQJ WKH UHVXUUHFWLRQRI&KULVW µ$QG, VKDOOJODGO\FRQIHVV WR
you that I would a hundred times rather take the side of the No, the refusal to believe which you 
proclDLP«WKDQ WKH DUWLILFHV RI D ³SRVLWLYH´ > RUWKRGR[@ WKHRORJ\ ZKLFK HQG XS E\ OHWWLQJ ZKDW LV
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However, there is a possible argument that it is Bultmann rather than Barth who does 
MXVWLFHWRWKHIXOOVXEWOHW\RI*DGDPHU¶VSRVLWLRQ)RUDVZHZLOOQRZVHH*DGDPHUGRes 
speak of the scholarly task of projecting a provisional past horizon, and it is arguable that 
%XOWPDQQ¶V DSSURDFK ZDV PRUH WUXO\ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI WKLV DVSHFW RI *DGDPHU¶V WKRXJKW
than was that of Barth. 
 
7KHSURMHFWLRQRIDµSURYLVLRQDO¶SDVWKRUL]RQ 
 
We have been considering the fact that Gadamer does not mean to cover up the tension 
EHWZHHQ WKH µWZRKRUL]RQV¶E\SRVWXODWLQJD VLQJOHFRQWLQXRXVKRUL]RQEHWZHHQSDVWDQG
present. On the contrary, he postulates a single horizon so that the tensions involved are 
not covered up or concealed. What we are concerned with here is that this leads to a 
relative acknowledgement of the productivity of the sense of historical distance which we 
find in historical-FULWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVµ7KHKHUPHQHXWLFWDVNFRQVLVWV in not covering up 
this tension by attempting a naive assimilation of the two but in consciously bringing it out. 
This is why it is part of the hermeneutic approach to project a historical horizon that is 
different from the horizon of the present. Historical consciousness is aware of its own 
RWKHUQHVV DQG KHQFH IRUHJURXQGV WKH KRUL]RQ RI WKH SDVW IURP LWV RZQ¶33 However, that 
this is only a provisional SURMHFWLRQ LV GHPRQVWUDWHG E\ *DGDPHU¶V IXUWKHU ZRUGV
µ3URMHFWLQJDKLVWRULFDOKRUL]RQ«LVRQO\RQHSKDVH in the process of understanding; it does 
not become solidified into the self-alienation of a past consciousness, but is overtaken by 
our own present horizon of understanding. In the process of understanding, a real fusing of 
horizons occurs - which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\VXSHUVHGHG¶34 
 
,I ZH DUH WR YLHZ %XOWPDQQ¶V XVH RI KLVWRULFDO FULWLFLVP LQ WKH OLJKW RI *DGDPHU¶V
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHKLVWRULFDOWDVNWKHQZHPXVWDVNZKHWKHU%XOWPDQQ¶VSURMHFWLRQRID
paVWKLVWRULFDOKRUL]RQEHORQJV WRWKHWUDQVLWLRQDOµSKDVHLQWKHSURFHVVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶
                                                                                                                                                                     
LQFRPSUHKHQVLEOHDSSHDUXQGHUFRQWURODJDLQDVHQWLUHO\FRPSUHKHQVLEOHDQGHYLGHQW«¶µ$Q$QVZHUWR
3URIHVVRUYRQ+DUQDFN¶V2SHQ/HWWHU¶S 
33
 Truth and Method, p 306. 
34
 Truth and Method, pp 306-7. 
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WREHµVLPXOWDQHRXVO\VXSHUVHGHG¶LQDIXVLRQRIKRUL]RQVRUZKHWKHUZKDWZHLQIDFWVHHLQ
%XOWPDQQLVWKHSURMHFWLRQRIDSDVWKRUL]RQZKLFKLVµVROLGLILHGLQWRWhe self-alienation of a 
SDVWFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ 
 
There can be no doubt that Barth understood Bultmann according to the latter alternative, 
DQG KH WKHUHE\ OXPSHG %XOWPDQQ WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKRVH ZKR ZHUH GRRPHG WR WDON µDERXW¶
Paul, and hence (as Barth put it) to talk past him and to seal his grave ever tighter. 
+RZHYHURQ WKHRWKHUVLGH%XOWPDQQFOHDUO\XQGHUVWRRG%DUWK¶VUHIXVDO WRPDNHVHULRXV
use of historical criticism as a failure to preserve the tensions between the past and present 
horizons, and as a retuUQ WR ZKDW *DGDPHU UHIHUV WR DV D µQDLYHDVVLPLODWLRQ¶RI WKH WZR
horizons - or, in theological terms, as a return to the orthodox doctrine of inspiration.35 
 
And so we would seem to have reached an impasse, in which the whole question turns on 
how Gadamer is to be interpreted and applied to the very different exegetical approaches of 
Barth and Bultmann. He himself at least did not explicitly favour one over the other.  
 
As a way beyond this impasse, I would like to open up again the question which I 
mentioned at the close of my last chapter - that is the question of to what extent Bultmann 
PD\ KDYH VRXJKW WR PRYH EH\RQG WKH µHPSDWKHWLF¶ WUDGLWLRQ LQ VXFK D ZD\ DV WR EH LQ
fundamental continuity or harmony with that tradition, rather than in basic criticism of that 
WUDGLWLRQ7RH[DPLQHWKLVTXHVWLRQPRUHFORVHO\ZHZLOOKDYHWRWDNHDORRNDW%XOWPDQQ¶V
explicit reflections on hermeneutics in his essay on the subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
35
 cf further A.C.Thiselton, The Two Horizons, pp 317-9; although Thiselton certainly does not criticise 
Barth for holding to the orthodox doctrine of Scripture, nevertheless he clearly thinks Barth falls short of 
GadaPHU¶V LQVLJKW LQ WKDW KH IDLOV WR PDLQWDLQ D WHQVLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH WZR KRUL]RQV RI SDVW DQG SUHVHQW
which works to the detriment of exegetical objectivity. Further, Conlin similarly argues that Barth is to be 
distinguished from Gadamer in that he, Barth, does not take into account the issue of historical distance 
µ$+HUPHQHXWLFDO7ULDQJOH¶S 
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%XOWPDQQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHHPSDWKHWLFWUDGLWLRQ 
 
Burnett argues that Bultmann never really moved beyond the empathetic tradition of 
KLVWRULFDO DQG WH[WXDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG SRLQWV WR %XOWPDQQ¶V HVVD\ µ7KH 3UREOHP RI
+HUPHQHXWLFV¶ WR VXEVWDQWLDWH WKLV36 Now, it is true that Bultmann regards himself as 
standing in the hermeneutical tradition of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Indeed, he writes: 
µ6R IDU DV 'LOWKH\ characterizes the relationship between author and expositor as the 
conditioning factor for the possibility of comprehension of the text, he has, in fact, laid bare 
the presuppositioQ RI DOO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ ZKLFK KDV FRPSUHKHQVLRQ DV LWV EDVLV¶37 This in 
itself shows how much Bultmann believed his position to be in line with the so-called 
empathetic tradition as we have portrayed it. However, we must also take into account the 
fact that Bultmann distanced himself from the empathetic tradition, in such a way as to 
PRGLI\ LW VLJQLILFDQWO\ 6SHFLILFDOO\ KH FKDOOHQJHG WKH µURPDQWLFLVW¶ HOHPHQWV LH WKDW WKH
relationship between the author and expositor should be understood in terms of an aesthetic 
µIHHOLQJ-ZLWK¶ RU SV\FKRORJLFDO DIILQLW\ ,QVWHDG KH DUJXHG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS VKRXOG EH
understood in terms of a relationship to the subject-matter (i.e. Sache) of the text.38 Since 
this is the same terminology as that used by Barth, we have to ask if Bultmann has re-
interpreted the empathetic tradition in such a way as to be in line with whatever 
hermeneutical insights we have ascribed to Barth, so that the reason for Barth and 
%XOWPDQQ¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWZRXOGKDYHWREHVRXJKWHOVHZKHUH 
 
However, it seems to me, after due consideration, that Bultmann does show continuity  
ZLWK WKH HPSDWKHWLF WUDGLWLRQ HYHQ LQ WKH VSHFLILF VHQVH RI µURPDQWLFLVP¶:HPD\ UHFDOO
that  LQ %XOWPDQQ¶V HDUO\ FULWLFLVP RI %DUWK KH VDLG WKDW WKHUHZHUH µRWKHU VSLULWV¶ZKLch 
spoke in the text - RWKHU WKDW LV WKDQ WKH µ6SLULW RI &KULVW¶ WKH ODWWHU SUHVXPDEO\
representing the true and enduring message of what Paul has to say to us today. At this 
early stage Bultmann did not state in detail how one was meant to distinguish between the 
6SLULW RI &KULVW DQG WKH µRWKHU VSLULWV¶ EXW ODWHU KH ZRXOG FRPH WR VSHDN RI WKH µRWKHU
VSLULWV¶ LQ WHUPV RI WKH false objectifications of the self-understanding which is being 
                                                        
36
 Burnett, Theological Exegesis, p 203. 
37
 µ7KH 3UREOHP RI +HUPHQHXWLFV¶ LQ %XOWPDQQ Essays Philosophical and Theological (London: SCM 
Press, 1955), p 240 (234-2HPSKDVLV%XOWPDQQ¶V 
38
 µ7KH3UREOHPRI+HUPHQHXWLFV¶SS-241. 
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expressed in Scripture. Now, these false objectifications which make up the ancient world-
view conflict with the objectifications which make up the modern (scientific) world-view. If 
we simply repeat the New Testament faith-statements, without interpretation, then we 
experience a clash of world-views. It then appears to us (wrongly) that what is being asked 
of us in accepting the content of the New Testament is that we accept the ancient world-
view. Bultmann sees this as a misunderstanding; the acceptance of the New Testament 
claim does not involve the acceptance of an ancient world-view, and indeed is not about 
µZRUOG-YLHZV¶ DW DOO ,Q RUGHU WUXO\ WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH 1HZ 7HVWDPHQW WH[W ZH KDYH WR
encounter it on a level which has nothing to do with world-views, whether in terms of 
accepting the world-view of the ancients, or even in terms of re-interpreting the faith-
statements in accordance with our own world-view. A world-view is always an external 
objectification of a particular self-understanding, and the encounter should take place only 
RQ WKH OHYHO RI µVHOI-understandLQJ¶ - ZKLFK LV DOVR GHVLJQDWHG DV µVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ RU µWKH
TXHVWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQH[LVWHQFH¶39 
 
Now if I briefly review my understanding of the empathetic tradition, I hope it will become 
clear where I think there is a resemblance of this tradition to BultmDQQ¶V SRVLWLRQ $V ,
understand it, the empathetic tradition seeks to interpret the texts in terms of the general 
IRUPVRIKXPDQH[SHULHQFHZKLFKDUHHQVKULQHGZLWKLQLW7KHµREMHFWLYH¶IRUPVZKLFKVXFK
life-experiences assume in the text appear to the interpreter as the product of alien, relative 
and dispensable historical influences. According to the empathetic tradition, the real 
meaning of the texts is disclosed only through participation in the inner life-experience of 
the author, and this can only be attained by critically distancing oneself from the alien 
historical influences which codetermine the objective formulations found in the texts. This 
corresponds to my discussion earlier in this chapter when I considered the 
romantic/empathetic conception of sharing in the subjectivity of the author, which requires 
                                                        
39
 On world-views or Weltanschauung (or Weltbild LQJHQHUDO VHH%XOWPDQQ µ7KH&ULVLV LQ%HOLHI¶ LQ
Bultmann, Essays, pp 7f (1-21); cf further Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters, p 82QµVXEMHFWLYLW\¶FI
µ7KH3UREOHPRI+HUPHQHXWLFV¶SS-RQµWKHTXHVWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQH[LVWHQFH¶VHHµ7KH3UREOHPRI
+HUPHQHXWLFV¶S µ>2@QO\ WKRVHZKRDUHVWLUUHGE\ WKHTXHVWLRQRI WKHLURZQH[LVWHQFHFDQKHDUWKH
claim which the text makHV¶ DOVR RQ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI µH[LVWHQFH¶ DV D KHUPHQHXWLFDO FULWHULRQ VHH
%XOWPDQQ µ7KHRORJLFDO ([HJHVLV¶ LQ 5RELQVRQ HG The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, pp 243ff  
(236-256).  
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the suspension of objective truth claims and the suppression of the tensions between the 
REMHFWLYH FRPPLWPHQWV RI WKH DXWKRU DQG UHDGHU 1RZ LW DSSHDUV WR PH WKDW %XOWPDQQ¶V
procedure closely resembles this general approach, in that he believes that we should 
UHPRYHWKHFODVKEHWZHHQWKHDXWKRUDQGUHDGHURQWKHOHYHORIµREMHFWLILFDWLRQ¶DQGEULQJ
out the possibility of encounter on the level of self-understanding or subjectivity. 
 
But then, on the other hand, in what respect does Bultmann differ from the empathetic 
tradition - RUPRUHSUHFLVHO\IURPWKHµURPDQWLFLVW¶HOHPHQWZLWKLQLW"%DVLFDOO\%XOWPDQQ
ZRXOGQRWKDYHDJUHHGWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRFFXUVWKURXJKµVKDULQJLQWKHVXEMHFWLYLW\RIWKe 
DXWKRU¶+HGLGQRWEHOLHYHLQWKHFRQFHSWRISV\FKRORJLFDODIILQLW\RUFRQJHQLDOLW\EHWZHHQ
the author and reader which would make this possible. He denied, in effect, that there was 
DQ\ VXFK µJHQHUDO KXPDQ QDWXUH¶ DV ZDV SRVLWHG E\ WKH URPDQWLF WUDGLWLon; instead, 
authentic self-understanding takes place only through concrete encounters. Put another 
way: in the romantic way of thinking, the essence of the past somehow lives on in the inner 
life of the present reader, and so to understand a past text on a more profound level, the 
reader needs only to draw on his own inner resources which are accessible through 
introspection or psychological analysis etc. Bultmann completely disagreed with this. 
According to him, the reader has no access to the past through his own inner life. This is 
because the real self exists only in encounters, and when anyone tries to reflect on his own 
inner life as something existing apart from such encounters, he has nothing but an empty or 
deceptive abstraction. 
 
I think the most FUXFLDO WKLQJ WR JUDVS DERXW %DUWK¶V UHVSRQVH WR %XOWPDQQ ZDV WKLV KH
consistently held that Bultmann belonged to that way of thinking which made the text into a 
predicate of the self-consciousness of the believer, and that when Christian or biblical faith 
statements are re-LQWHUSUHWHGDFFRUGLQJ WR%XOWPDQQ¶VPHWKRG WKHQDOO WKDW UHPDLQVLVDQ
RFFXUUHQFH ZLWKLQ WKH ERXQGV RI WKH EHOLHYHU¶V FRQVFLRXVQHVV LH DV LQ WKH URPDQWLF
conception). And so Barth believed that he could argue against Bultmann by emphasising 
the priority of the object of faith over the subjectivity or self-consciousness of the believer. 
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Bultmann naturally responded to this by saying that Barth had confused two philosophical 
approaches which were radically opposed to one another.40 
 
Although I am inclined to think that Barth was basically right on this issue, I do not intend 
to advance any definitive argument that this was the case. For my purposes, it is more 
LPSRUWDQW WR DWWDLQ D FODULILFDWLRQ DERXW WKH OLQN EHWZHHQ %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK WR historical 
FULWLFLVPDQGKLVXUJHQWFRQFHUQDERXWWKDWZD\RIWKLQNLQJZKLFKVXSSRVHVWKDWWKHµWUXH¶
sense of a past text - especially a biblical text - becomes accessible in and through the self-
consciousness of the reader or believer. Whether or not his understanding of Bultmann was 
FRUUHFW LW DW OHDVW LOOXVWUDWHV ZKHUH %DUWK¶V GLIILFXOW\ ZLWK KLVWRULFDO FULWLFLVP OD\ :LWK
respect to Bultmann, we may note that he (Bultmann) at least closely resembles the 
romanticist tradition as analysed by Gadamer, in that there is a split in subject and object 
whereby the content of a pre-critical text has to be understood as the external 
REMHFWLILFDWLRQRIDµVXEMHFWLYH¶VHOI-understanding.41 
                                                        
40
 %XOWPDQQFLWHV%DUWK¶VFULWLFLVPRIKLPDVIROORZVµ7KH\>WKHSURSositions of the Christian Confession] 
are doubtless all related to human existence. They make possible and give a foundation to the Christian 
understanding of them, and so they also become - in an altered form - definitions of human existence. But 
they are not so originally. Originally they define the being and the activity of the God who is different 
from man and who confronts man: of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. And so for that reason they are not 
UHGXFLEOH WR SURSRVLWLRQV DERXW WKH LQQHU OLIH RI PDQ¶ &' ,,, S  %XOWPDQQ UHVSRQGV µ7KH ODVW
VHQWHQFHEHWUD\VDFRPSOHWHPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWH[LVWHQWLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLV7KLVLVQRWWKH³LQQHU
OLIH´RIPDQDWDOOZKLFKFDQEHEURXJKWXQGHUREVHUYDWLRQZKLOHVHWWLQJDVLGHZKDW LVGLIIHUHQWIURPLt 
and what it encounters (whether environment, fellow-man or God) - say, from a view which has to do with 
the psychology of religion, but at all events not from an existential one. For the latter seeks to contemplate 
and to understand the real existence (in history) of man, who exists only in living connection with what is 
³GLIIHUHQW´IURPKLP- RQO\LQHQFRXQWHUV¶µ7KH3UREOHPRI+HUPHQHXWLFV¶SS-260.) 
41
 FI%XOWPDQQ¶VZRUGVLQFRUUHVSRQGHQFHZLWK%DUWKµ$WURRWWKH>WKHRORJLFDO@FRQWURYHUV\LVDOZDys with 
a specific human self-understanding. For the Reformation it was that which underlay Roman Catholic 
teaching and practice; for modern theology it is that which underlies the modern view of the world and 
man. The mistake of theology for more than two centuries was that it did understand the theme correctly, 
but it did not wrestle with the self-understanding of modern man, but with its scientific objectifications«¶
(Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters, p 91 - HPSKDVLVKLVFIDOVRµ1HZ7HVWDPHQWDQG0\WKRORJ\¶S
µ:HDUHFRPSHOOHGWRDVNZKHWKHUDOOWKLVP\WKRORJLFDOODQJXDJH>RIWKH1HZ7HVWDPHQW@LVQRWVLPSO\DQ
DWWHPSWWRH[SUHVVWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHKLVWRULFDOILJXUHRI-HVXVDQGWKHHYHQWVRIKLVOLIH«,IWKDWEHVRWKHQ
we can dispense with the REMHFWLYHIRUPLQZKLFKWKH\DUHFDVW¶$OWKRXJK,DPQRWSXUVXLQJWKHTXHVWLRQ
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%DUWK¶VYLHZRIWKHVSLULWOHWWHUGLVWLQFWLRQ 
 
%DUWK¶VUHODWLRQWRWKHHPSathetic tradition will be further clarified for us if we attend to his 
comments on the spirit/letter distinction as it is used in the interpretation of biblical texts or 
&KULVWLDQWUDGLWLRQ,QWKLVFRQWH[WµVSLULW¶GHVLJQDWHVWKHWUXHLQZDUGVHQVHRIWKe text, and 
µOHWWHU¶ UHSUHVHQWV LWV H[WHUQDO GLVSHQVDEOH IRUPXODWLRQV 7KLV GXDOLW\ FRUUHVSRQGV WR WKH
conceptuality of the empathetic tradition; this is especially evident when it is understood 
WKDW WKH µVSLULW¶ UHIHUV QRW RQO\ WR WKH LQZDUG VHQVH RI WKH text but also to the inward 
UHVRXUFHVRIRQH¶VRZQVHOIWKURXJKZKLFKRQHLVDEOHWRUHFRJQLVHDQGUHWULHYHWKHLQZDUG
sense of the text.42 
 
1RZ %DUWK WUDFHV WKLV IRUP RI WKH µHPSDWKHWLF¶ DSSURDFK EDFN WR WKH WKHRORJLDQ DQG
dramatist G.E.Lessing. He makes this connection in a section of the first part volume of the 
Dogmatics%DUWKH[SODLQV/HVVLQJ¶VYLHZDVIROORZV 
 
/HVVLQJ LVZHOODFTXDLQWHGZLWKDSURRIRI&KULVWLDQLW\WKURXJKKLVWRU\%XWLWPXVWEH³WKHSURRIRI
VSLULWDQGRISRZHU´43 That is, histor\GRHVQRWSURYHDQ\WUXWKIRUXVVRORQJDVLWLVWKH³FRQWLQJHQW
WUXWKRIKLVWRU\´PHUHO\UHSRUWHGWRXVE\RWKHUVDQGQRWWUXWK³IHOW´DQG³H[SHULHQFHG´E\RXUVHOYHV«
>4XRWLQJ/HVVLQJ@³5HOLJLRQLVQRWWUXHEHFDXVHWKHHYDQJHOLVWVDQGDSRVWOHVWDXJKWLW; they taught it 
because it is true. By its inner truth, scriptural traditions must be explained, and all the traditions in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in detail at this point, I would add the comment that further study of where Bultmann stands in relation to 
the empathetic tradition would need to take into account his comments on Dilthey and comparable writers 
such as B.Croce and R.G.Collingwood in his Gifford lectures entitled History and Eschatology 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957), especially pp 110-137. 
42
 As F.Watson explains, this letter/spirit distinction was in fact used explicitly in the empathetic 
(Romantic) tradition; he also observes how this is linked historically with the development of historical 
FULWLFLVP µ7KH (QOLJKWHQPHQW¶V LQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI WKH VFHSWLFDO WUDGLWLRQ ZLWKLQ LWV KLVWRULFDO-critical 
reVHDUFKFUHDWHVVSDFHIRUWKH5RPDQWLFFHOHEUDWLRQRIWKHOLEHUDWLRQRIWKHVSLULWIURPWKHOHWWHU¶Text and 
Truth, p 131.) Thus we see again the paradoxical combination of critical detachment with empathetic 
engagement which characterises the empathetic tradition. 
43
 %DUWK LV UHIHUULQJ WR /HVVLQJ¶V IDPRXV HVVD\ µ2Q WKH 3URRI RI WKH 6SLULW DQG RI 3RZHU¶ (QJOLVK
translation in /HVVLQJ¶V 7KHRORJLFDO :ULWLQJV edited by H.Chadwick (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1957), pp 51-6. 
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WKH ZRUOG FDQQRW JLYH LW LQQHU WUXWK LI LW GRHV QRW KDYH LW´44 «And Lessing obviously regards this 
inner, spiritual truth as something quite accessible to us and apprehensible by us. We can judge its 
SUHVHQFHLQYLUWXHRIRXURZQIHHOLQJDQGH[SHULHQFH7KLVLVZK\KHDSSHDOVIURP/XWKHU¶VZULWLQJV
WR/XWKHU¶VVSLULW«45 from the letter of the Bible to the spirit of the Bible«46 
 
Barth proceeds with the following comment: 
 
When we are able to eliminate our non-contemporaneity with Christ and the apostles by putting 
ourselves on the same soil as them or putting them on the same soil as us, so that, sharing in the 
same prophetic Spirit and having the same measure of inner truth in our own feeling, we can discuss 
ZLWK WKHP WKH JURVV DQG QHW YDOXH RI WKHLU ZRUGV«WKHQ WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH :RUG RI *RG LV
humanised in such a way that it is no wonder people prefer to use it comparatively rarely and in 
TXRWDWLRQPDUNV«For all our respect for the greatness and vitality of history, it is we the living who 
have right on our side and who thus finally fix and manipulate the norm and the conditions of this 
togetherness [with Christ and the apostles] . The present Church, however historically it may feel 
and think, speaks the last word as the heir and interpreter of history.47 
                                                        
44
 Referring tR/HVVLQJ¶VSXEOLFDWLRQVRI5HLPDUXV¶IUDJPHQWVFLWHGLQ/HVVLQJ¶V7KHRORJLFDO:ULWLQJV, p 
18). 
45
 5HIHUULQJWR/HVVLQJ¶VAnti-Goeze (cited in /HVVLQJ¶V7KHRORJLFDO:ULWLQJV, p 23). 
46
 CD I/1, p 146 (emphasis mine). (cf Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London: 
SCM Press, 1972), pp 254f.) 
47
 &',SHPSKDVLVPLQHFI&',Sµ«>:@HDUHFRPSOHWHO\DEVROYHGIURPGLIIHUHQWLDWLQJ
in the Bible between the divine and the human, the content and the form, the spirit and the letter, and then 
FDXWLRXVO\ FKRRVLQJ WKH IRUPHUDQGVFRUQIXOO\ UHMHFWLQJ WKH ODWWHU«:HDUHDEVROYHG IURPGLIIHUHQWLDWLQJ
the Word of God in the Bible from other contents, infallible portions and expressions from the erroneous 
ones, the infallible from the fallible, and from imagining that by means of such discoveries we can create 
for ourselves HQFRXQWHUVZLWKWKHJHQXLQH:RUGRI*RGLQWKH%LEOH¶(PSKDVLVPLQH6HHIXUWKHU%DUWK 
µ7KH:RUGLQ7KHRORJ\IURP6FKOHLHUPDFKHUWR5LWVFKO¶LQTheology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-
1928 (New York/Evanston: Harper Row, 1962), p 201 (200- µ'RHV WKH WUXWKRI*RGFRQIURQWPDQ
DOVR LQ KLVWRU\"«'RHV LW FRQYH\ D NQRZOHGJH ZKLFK PDQ FDQ LQ QR ZD\ FUHDWH DQG HVWDEOLVK IRU
KLPVHOI«EHFDXVHLWLVJLYHQKLPQRWE\KLVRZQ NQRZLQJ«EXWLVJLYHQWKURXJKKLVEHLQJNQRZQE\LWDQG
LQLW"«2ULVKLVWRU\UHYHODWLRQEHFDXVHDQGZKLOHLWSOHDVHVPDQVRWRFRQVLGHUKLVWRU\WRVHW*RGILUPO\
in the history and to have him there, firmly fixed? Has man access to the truth of God in history, as he has 
or thinks he has access to history in general, by interpreting history in the light of the truth which is within  
KLPVHOI«",QWKHILUVWFDVHKHOHWVKLPVHOIEHWROGWUXWK,QWKHVHFRQGFDVHKHWHOOVKLPVHOIZKDWWUXWKLV
while he takes a WRXU WKURXJKKLVWRU\¶)LQDOO\ VHH&',SZKHUH%DUWKZULWHVµ7KHDUJXPHQWRI
life cannot be played off against the authority of Scripture. Nor can the latter be questioned and assailed in 
the name of a struggle for the spirit as opposed to the letter. The reason for this is that Scripture is itself 
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In this passage, we see how Barth makes a connection between the empathetic tradition, 
ZLWK LWVHPSKDVLVRQ WKH µVSLULW¶RI WKHSDVWDQd the problem of subordinating the past to 
the perspective of the present. It may be objected that Barth does not refer here to the main 
exponents of the empathetic tradition mentioned so far, namely Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, and refers only to Lessing. And yet it is striking that Dilthey himself, in his 
biography on Schleiermacher, traces what we have been calling the empathetic tradition 
back to Lessing as its first exponent.48 
 
However, granted that Barth was opposed to understanding the text through a spirit/letter 
distinction, nevertheless I think he did attach vital significance to the problem of spirit and 
letter - that is, to the experience of a distinction between what we find comprehensible in 
the text and what we do not. For this break-up of the text into more and less 
comprehensible parts is a vital indicator of the fact that the text is not directly accessible 
and cannot be understood immediately in terms of the presuppositions of our own time.49 
As I argued at length in my last chapter, Barth believed that we can never simply step 
outside of our own presuppositions, and because of this Scripture (or, if I understand him 
                                                                                                                                                                     
VSLULW DQG OLIH« - the Spirit and life of the living God Himself, who draws near to us in its faith and 
witness, who need not wait until spirit and life are subsequently breathed into the document of His 
revelation in virtue of the acceptance it finds in the Church or the insight, sympathy and congeniality 
ZKLFKLWVUHDGHUVEULQJWRLW«¶ 
48
 W.Dilthey, Selected WritingsSZKHUH/HVVLQJDSSHDUVDVWKHILUVWSULQFLSDOH[SRQHQWRIWKHµLGHDO
RIJHQLXV¶ ZKLFK'LOWKH\H[SODLQVDVIROORZVµ7KLVQHZJHQHUDWLRQ>LHDIWHU/HVVLQJ@VHHVLQWKHLGHDORI
JHQLXV LW GHYHORSHG QRW PHUHO\ WKH VSHFLDO LQQHU EDVLV RI SRHWLF SRZHU«EXW WKH JHQHUDO EDVLV RI DOO
FUHDWLYH SRZHU«$OO WKH SRZHUV RI WKH VRXO PXVWZRUN WRJHther to reproduce the innermost being of the 
object; everything human must be revived by being understood at a depth only attainable by imagination 
and living empathy [Mitempfindung@«¶,WLVRIFRXUVHDOHJLWLPDWHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHU/HVVLQJVKRXOGEH
characterised as romanticist (and so as part of the empathetic tradition) or as Enlightenment rationalist; 
*0LFKDOVRQFRPPHQWVµ+HPD\DVFRPPHQWDWRUVDUHIRQGRIVD\LQJKDYHRQHIRRWLQQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\
romanticism, but in most respects Lessing is still DQ(QOLJKWHQPHQWUDWLRQDOLVW¶/HVVLQJ¶Vµ8JO\'LWFK¶D
Study of Theology and History (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1985), p 30.) However, 
from my point of view the antithesis between Enlightenment rationalism and romanticism should not in 
any case be drawn too sharply, as I will indicate in my final chapter. 
49
 FI &' , S  µ,Q WKH ELEOLFDO YLHZ RI WKH ZRUOG DQG PDQ ZH DUH FRQVWDQWO\ FRPLQJ XS DJDLQVW
presuppositions which are not ours, and statements and judgements we cannot accept. Therefore at bottom 
ZHFDQQRWDYRLGWKHWHQVLRQVZKLFKDULVHDWWKLVSRLQW¶ 
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correctly, any past historical text) is not directly accessible to us. When it appears to be 
directly accessible or comprehensible to us, then we are only doing unconsciously what 
Liberal or empathetic exegesis does more explicitly; that is, we are unconsciously reading 
our own priorities into the text - and this, of course, corresponds to the naïve assimilation 
of horizons which I referred to earlier in this chapter. The reason why people who read the 
Bible in this way do not feel any real tension with the text is, I believe, because it does not 
occur to them (or they are too impatient) to reflect on why some parts of the text mean 
more to them or seem more readily intelligible than others; it does not occur to them to 
reflect on whether this implicit or explicit prioritising really accords with the priorities 
LQWHQGHG E\ WKH DXWKRUV WKHPVHOYHV ,Q %DUWK¶V YLHZ /LEHUDO RU FULWLFDO exegesis has the 
advantage that it at least recognises that the biblical text cannot be directly incorporated 
into our contemporary modes of thought and cultural presuppositions; and in this sense 
FULWLFDO H[HJHVLV RI WKH /LEHUDO NLQG PD\ EH D OHJLWLPDWH µSUHSDUDWLRQ IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶
But it is not the understanding itself. 
 
As I have argued, when Liberal exegesis claims to have an understanding of the text, it 
does so by designating a sphere or line of continuity between the world of the text and our 
own world - ZKLFK,KDYHWHUPHGWKHµVSLULW¶RIWKHWH[WDVRSSRVHGWRWKHOHWWHUWKHOHWWHU
EHLQJ WKH PHUHO\ RXWZDUG IRUP RU REMHFWLYH IRUPXODWLRQ RI WKH µVSLULW¶50 Now - Barth 
obviously sought to disavow this distinction between the spirit and the letter. But this was 
not because he believed that there is more scope for continuity between the text and the 
reader than the Liberals allow. He meant, rather, that there is less scope for continuity. He 
meant that not only the outward form of the text, but even what the Liberals claim as the 
inner, spiritual continuity between the reader and the text does not entail any genuine 
continuity. That is, Barth agrees with the Liberal view against the conservatives that the 
text as it stands is not compatible with contemporary cultural presuppositions; but he 
                                                        
50
 FI 5XPVFKHLGW¶V DQDO\VLV RI $+DUQDFN¶V DSSURDFK WR KLVWRULFDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ µ,I LW LV DFFHSWHG WKDW
spirit is one, as it is by Harnack, then it is one and the same spirit which is operative in all historical 
SKHQRPHQDDQGLQXV«>$@OOFXOWXUDOLQGLYLGXDODQGVSLULWXDOIDFWRUVDUHFDXVHGE\RUFDQEHWUDFHGEDFN
to ideas, for ideas are spirit. Through the spirit a deep unity between all events and our own essence, our 
spiriWXDO OLIH LV HVWDEOLVKHG«¶ +05XPVFKHLGW Revelation and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVFI-&2¶1HLOOµ$GROIYRQ+DUQDFNDQGWKHHQWU\RIWKH*HUPDQVWDWHLQWRZDU
July-$XJXVW¶Scottish Journal of Theology 55 (2002), pp 15f (1-18).) 
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disagrees with the Liberal compromise which designates an inward sphere of the spirit in 
which there is a continuity between the text and the present. Hence there remains for Barth 
no direct connection or line of accessibility between the reader and the text. This is, I 
believe, why he was able to say to Bultmann that all LVµOLWHUD¶LQWKHWH[Wall LVµVWUDQJH¶WR
us;51 this is why he would say later that every aspect of the text is human, fallible and 
subject to error.52 This does not mean that the text is simply impossible to understand; it 
means, rather, that designating the inward, spiritual self as the locus of continuity is not the 
appropriate way for arriving at an understanding of the text. 
 
Ultimately, I thinN WKLV LVEHFDXVH LQ%DUWK¶VYLHZ WKLV LQZDUG VSLULWXDO VHOI LVQRWZKDW LW
seems to be. What we mean by this inner, spiritual self is in effect the sum of those 
judgements or ways of thinking which we cannot back up rationally, but which seem to us 
to be the necessary, self-evident presuppositions of rational thought and of moral and 
FLYLOLVHGEHKDYLRXU,EHOLHYHWKDW%DUWK¶VIRXQGDWLRQDOLQVLJKWZKLFKKHZDVWRZRUNRXWLQ
detail in his theology, was that these seemingly self-evident judgements are actually 
historically conditioned; they appear to be self-evident because we cannot see beyond them 
or get any critical distance from them, because our way of thinking is conditioned by them. 
But because we experience them as self-evident, we tend to regard them as belonging to 
the deep structure of humanity as such. Hence we believe that we have understood the past 
at a profound level when we attribute to it this deep structure of humanity; but in fact, all 
we have done is turned the past into a reflection of our own local prejudices. 
 
                                                        
51
 µThe Epistle to the Romans)RUHZRUGWRWKH7KLUG(GLWLRQ¶µ,ZLOOFHUWDLQO\QRWDUJXHZLWK%XOWPDQQ
which of us is the more radical, but I must still go a little further than he does and say that what speaks in 
the Letter to the Romans is QRWKLQJEXWWKH³RWKHUV´WKHYDULRXV³VSLULWV´ZKLFKKHDGGXFHVVXFKDVWKH
-HZLVK WKH SRSXODU &KULVWLDQ WKH +HOOHQLVWLF DQG RWKHUV«Everything is litera WKH YRLFH RI ³RWKHU´
VSLULWV¶S- HPSKDVLV%DUWK¶Vµ>:@KDW,FDQQRWXQGHUVWDQGLVWKHLQYitation which Bultmann issues 
WRPH«WRWKLQNDQGWRZULWHwith Paul, that is, first of all in the entirely foreign language of his Jewish-
popular-Christian-Hellenistic thought-world, and then suddenly, when this may get to be too much for me 
- as if something struck me as especially strange where everything is strange! - WRVSHDN³FULWLFDOO\´DERXW
DQGDJDLQVW3DXO¶S- last emphasis mine.) 
52
 CD I/2, pp 508-10. 
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Now, I think that the reason why Barth turned against the Liberal tradition was because in 
this tradition special attention was drawn to the inward, spiritual side of man as the locus of 
divine revelation, and as the point at which humanity is related to God. For if, as we have 
suggested, this inner spiritual side of man is not what it seems, but is simply made up of 
those judgements from which we are unable or unwilling to gain critical distance, then the 
consequence of the LibeUDO VFKHPH ZRXOG EH WKDW µ*RG¶ ZRXOG IXQFWLRQ DV WKH RQH ZKR
gives extra backing or legitimation to these ingrained, erroneous judgements. 
 
+HQFHZHFDQSODXVLEO\UHSUHVHQW%DUWK¶VSULPDU\LQVLJKWDVIROORZVWKDWZKLFKDSSHDUVWR
us to be our inner spiritual self, by which we are apparently able to intuit truths directly and 
self-evidently, turns out in reality to be an aggregate of judgements which only seem to be 
self-evident because we are unable to acquire critical distance from them, and which are 
especially dangerous precisely because we are unable to acquire critical distance from them. 
Starting from this insight and from this principle, Barth believed he was duty bound to 
make an assault on the prevalent theological approach which linked God and his revelation 
with this supposed inner self, which turned God into a further legitimation for such 
erroneous, uncritical judgements, and which served to tie the knot of self-deception even 
tighter. And the specific problem with which Barth was faced was, how do we now speak of 
*RGJLYHQWKDWWKHµLQQHUVHOI¶ZKLFKZDVWKRXJKWRIDVWKHSULPDU\OLQHRIDFFHVVWRKLP
has been shown to be a minefield of error and self-deception? 
 
As provisional evidence for this,53 I would refer again to what was arguably the principal 
LPSHWXV LQ WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V GLVWLQFWLYH WKHRORJ\ QDPHO\ KLV GLIILFXOW\ WKDW PDQ\
Germans claimed a pseudo-VSLULWXDOµZDUH[SHULHQFH¶DQGWKDWWKH&KULVWLDQVDPRQJWKHP
ZHUH DEOH WR FODLP WKHLU RZQ µZDU H[SHULHQFH¶ DV GLYLQHO\ DSSURYHG because of the 
established connection between the inner world of experience and divine revelation. 
 
I am indebted to Bruce McCormack for tracing the relevant genetic-historical context of 
%DUWK¶V WKHRORJLFDO GHYHORSPHQW ,Q SDUWLFXODU 0F&RUPDFN FLWHV %DUWK¶V OHWWHU WR
W.Herrmann in which he writes:  
                                                        
53
 0RUH GHWDLOHG HYLGHQFH IRU WKLV ZLOO EHGUDZQIURP%DUWK¶VHDUOLHUDQG ODWHUZULWLQJV LQ my next and 
final chapter. 
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(VSHFLDOO\ ZLWK \RX«ZH OHDUQHG WR DFNQRZOHGJH µH[SHULHQFH¶ DV WKH FRQVWLWXWLYH SULQFLSOH RI
knowing and doing in the domain of religion. In your school it became clear to us what it means to 
µH[SHULHQFH¶ *RG LQ -HVXV 1RZ KRZHYHU LQ DQVZHU WR RXU GRXEWV DQ µH[SHULHQFH¶ ZKLFK LV
completely new to us is held out to us by German Christians, an allegedly religious war 
µH[SHULHQFH¶«54 
 
,WKLQNWKDW0F&RUPDFNLVDEVROXWHO\ULJKWZKHQKHFRPPHQWVµ,WLVFOHDUIURPWhe drift of 
%DUWK¶VTXHVWLRQVWKDWKLVSULPDU\GLIILFXOW\DWWKLVSRLQWLQWLPHKDGWRGRZLWKZKDWKHVDZ
as a manipulation of religious experience to legitimate the most sinful and catastrophic of 
KXPDQ DFWLRQV¶55 We should also observe how, many years later in 1925, Barth would 
FULWLFLVH +HUUPDQQ¶V GHSHQGHQFH RQ µH[SHULHQFH¶ VD\LQJ WKDW µLW >H[SHULHQFH@ FDQQRW EH
LVRODWHG IURP WKH ZRUOG LQ WKH ZD\ +HUUPDQQ ZLVKHG«,W LV in the world and of the 
ZRUOG¶56 It is more than likely that this theological statemeQWFDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWR%DUWK¶V
VWUXJJOHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHRXWEUHDNRIWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DUDQG+HUUPDQQ¶VVXSSRUWRI
the German war effort. 
 
The question of revelation positivism 
 
I think we will find it illuminating if we frame this question in terms of the perennial 
SUREOHPRIWKHRORJLFDORUUHYHODWLRQSRVLWLYLVPLQ%DUWK¶VWKRXJKW57 This problem may be 
                                                        
54
 Dialectical Theology, p 113 - letter dated 4th Nov 1914 (citing from Karl Barth-Martin Rade: ein 
Briefwechsel, p 115). 
55
 Dialectical Theology, p 113. 
56
 µ7KH3ULQFLSOHVRI'RJPDWLFVDFFRUGLQJWR:LOKHOP+HUUPDQQ¶LQ%DUWKTheology and Church, pp 259-
60 (238-271) - HPSKDVLV%DUWK¶V 
57
 $VLVZHOONQRZQWKHWHUPµUHYHODWLRQSRVLWLYLVP¶Offenbarungspositivismus) was used by Bonhoeffer 
in criticism of Barth (see especially Letters and Papers from Prison (London: SCM Press, 31971 (1953)), p 
286). Simon Fisher has raised the question as to whether this is a coherent criticism of Barth given that 
various scholars have not reached a consensus as to exactly what Bonhoeffer meant by this criticism, and 
furthermore he states that it woulG EH QHFHVVDU\ WR XQGHUVWDQG %RQKRHIIHU¶V FULWLFLVP ZLWKLQ WKH
IUDPHZRUNRIKLV%RQKRHIIHU¶VRZQWKHRORJLFDOSURJUDPPH- which Fisher claims is by no means an easy 
undertaking given the fragmentary nature of his statements (Fisher, Revelatory Positivism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp 311f). I would therefore state that my use of the expression does not 
depend on a correct exegesis of Bonhoeffer but rather on the evident problem that Barth appears not to 
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summarised thus: Barth always appears to deny to us any genuine criteria for making a 
FULWLFDO GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ZKDW LVDJHQXLQH UHVSRQVH WR*RG¶V revelation and what is a 
merely human projection. Instead he asserts that it is only God in his freedom who 
determines when and where there has been a genuine response to his revelation. Barth 
asserts that there are no criteria accessible to our thought and experience which would 
enable us to distinguish between a genuine experience of God and a merely human 
projection. But then - and this is the problem of revelation positivism - Barth seems to be 
taking his stand on thin air, for (as I think Barth himself emphasised) we do not have any 
DFFHVVWR*RG¶VZLOORUUHYHODWLRQDSDUWIURPRXUWKRXJKWRUH[SHULHQFH 
 
But what if Barth recognised that the very criteria by which we distinguish between what is 
really a response to God and what is a human projection are themselves culturally 
SUHGHWHUPLQHG WKDW WKHVHµFULWHULD¶DUHERXQGXSZLWKWKHPDFKLQDWLRQVRIDYDVWQHWZRUN
of human power which, amongst other things, generates that particular kind of self-
deception whereby we persuade ourselves of the unalterable necessity of this power 
network, and, moreover, represent this recognition as the product of experience and mature 
wisdom? Specifically, according to the Liberal scheme, we can recognise what is a real 
experience of God (as opposed to what is a mere remnant of irrational barbarism) by 
defining it in connection with our highest insights of morality and reason. But what if our 
highest insights of morality and reason are not what they seem to be? What if they conceal 
as much as they reveal of the truth about our culture, its development and relation to the 
rest of the world? 
 
,I WKLV LV%DUWK¶VSRVLWLRQDQG,EHOLHYHZHKDYHJRRGUHDVRQIRUWKLQNLQJLWZDVWKHQZH
can understand why he would wish to deny any direct connection between the apparently 
self-evidHQW SULQFLSOHV RI FXOWXUH RU PRUDOLW\ DQG *RG¶V UHYHODWLRQ 3HUKDSV WKH FODVVLF
expression of the Liberal perspective against which Barth is reacting comes from the pen of 
+DUQDFN LQ RQH RI WKH µILIWHHQ TXHVWLRQV¶ KH DGGUHVVHV WR WKH GLDOHFWLFDO WKHRORJLDQV µ,I
God is definitely not all that is said of him in the development of culture and its   
                                                                                                                                                                     
provide any means for grounding or progressively confirming Christian faith statements etc. To put my 
own approach in context, I would say that the background to my understanding of the matter is to be found 
LQ 3DQQHQEHUJ¶V DQDO\VLV RI %DUWK LQ Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p 29 - cf the opening 
section of my second chapter). 
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NQRZOHGJHDQGPRUDOLW\KRZLVLWSRVVLEOHWRSURWHFWWKLVFXOWXUHDQGRQH¶VVHOILQWKHORQJ
UXQDJDLQVWDWKHLVP"¶58 %DUWK¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKLVTXHVWLRQLVWHOOLQJ 
 
7KH VWDWHPHQWV DERXW *RG ZKLFKDUHGHULYHG IURP³WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFXOWXUHDQG LWVNQRZOHGJH
DQGPRUDOLW\´ HJ WKHVWDWHPHQWVRI WKHZDU WKHRORJLDQVRIDOOODQGVPD\KDYHWKHLUVLJQLILFDQFH
DQGYDOXHDVH[SUHVVLRQVRISDUWLFXODU³UHOLJLRXVH[SHULHQFHV´HJRQH¶VH[SHULHQFHVGXULQJDZDU
DORQJVLGHWKRVHRISULPLWLYHSHRSOHVZKRGRQRWDV\HWNQRZVXFKKLJKHUYDOXHV$VWKH³SUHDFKLQJ
RIWKHJRVSHO´>UHIHUULQJEDFNWRDSUHYLRXVTXHVWLRQ@ these statements in any case do not come into 
consideration, aQG ZKHWKHU WKH\ ³protect´ FXOWXUH DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO ³IURP DWKHLVP´ UDWKHU WKDQ
derived as they are from polytheism, plant DWKHLVPPD\EHLQHDFKFDVHDQRSHQTXHVWLRQ«³7UXH
VWDWHPHQWVDERXW*RG´FDQRQO\EHPDGHDWDOOZKHUHRQHNQRZVKHLVSODFHGQRWRn some height of 
FXOWXUHDQGUHOLJLRQEXWEHIRUHUHYHODWLRQDQGWKHUHE\XQGHUMXGJHPHQW«59 
 
Perhaps some of what Barth says here is obscure, but I think it sufficiently clear that his 
response does support the general picture of his theology presented so far, especially 
concerning its counter-cultural origins and direction. I will in fact be looking in my next and 
final chapter at more detailed evidence for this which will be drawn from his earliest and 
latest writings. However, for the present, I will draw this chapter to a close by giving a 
VXPPDU\RIKRZ,XQGHUVWDQG%DUWK¶VDSSURDFKWRKLVWRULFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ7KLVZLOOVHUYH
as a provisional summary of the findings of my fourth and fifth chapters. 
 
%DUWK¶VDSSURDFKWRKLVWRULFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJLWVUHODWLRQWRKLVµFKULVWRFHQWULVP¶ 
 
%DUWK¶VDSSURDFK WRKLVWRULFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJFDQEHVXPPDULVHGDVD re-evaluation of the 
meaning of critical distance in relation to the past. That is, what is normally experienced 
as critical distance towards the past, above all in the sense of having developed to a 
superior level over the past, is in reality a failure of critical distance in relation to the 
presuppositions or perspectives of the present.60 I believe Barth was driven by an 
                                                        
58
 µ)LIWHHQ4XHVWLRQVWR7KRVH$PRQJWKH7KHRORJLDQV¶S 
59
 µ)LIWHHQ$QVZHUV WR3URIHVVRUYRQ+DUQDFN¶SHPSKDVHV%DUWK¶V7KHODVWVHQWHQFHLVLQIDFWLQ
UHVSRQVHWRDVXEVHTXHQWTXHVWLRQRI+DUQDFN¶V but clearly is continuing in the same vein. 
60
 cf The introductory comments on historical method in Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: 
µ:LOOLWUHPDLQFOHDUWRXVWKDWDWWKLVPRPHQW>RIRXURZQWKHRORJLFDOSUHVHQW@WKDWZKLOHWKHSUHVHQWFDQ
always be right over against the past, we can give no satisfactory answer to the question whether it is right 
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awareness of the deceptive element in the way we view past history, which is present even 
and especially when we believe we have attained to scholarly detachment, which is present 
even and especially when we attain to a more sophisticated analysis in terms of the need for 
an empathetic engagement with history. It was his awareness of this deceptive element 
ZKLFKPRWLYDWHGKLPWRFRQWHQGIRUDFULWLFDOGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQDµJHQHUDO¶RUµQHXWUDO¶YLHZ
of history and the Word of God. 
 
:HFDQDOVRVHHKRZWKLVUHODWHVWR%DUWK¶VVR-called christocentrism. It is necessary, at this 
point, to recall my arguments from earlier chapters concerning the soteriological thrust of 
%DUWK¶V FKULVWRORJ\ WKDW LV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH IXQGDPHQWDO VLJQLILFDQFH RI VLQ IRU KLV
FKULVWRORJ\$V,KDYHDUJXHG%DUWK¶VPDLQSXUpose was to take into account the problem 
of the hermeneutical dimension of sin in his presentation of the gospel of Christ. The 
problem is - what does it mean to proclaim salvation from sin in Christ, given that sin 
affects us most intensely at the level of self-HYLGHQW DZDUHQHVV" %DUWK¶V DUJXPHQWV
concerning the relation of Christ to world history can be understood as a resolve to take 
into account for Christian soteriology the self-deceptive element which inheres in our 
spontaneous or cultured awareness of history. For the modern requirement that the 
Christian gospel must accommodate itself to the claims of a general historical method, 
actually means that the gospel becomes accommodated to the sin of collective self-interest 
which is concealed within general historical method. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in actual fact? If that is forgotten, if in the intoxication of the moment the consciousness of being able to be 
right turns into the consciousness of actually being right, then our hearing of the voices of the past will be 
objectively wrong, however much it may be subjectively right. The one who is all too sure, illegitimately 
VXUH WKDW³ZHKDYHEURXJKW LW WRVRJORULRXVDFRQFOXVLRQ´FDQQRWDQGPD\QRWQRWLFHFDUHIXOO\³ZKDWD
ZLVHPDQWKRXJKWEHIRUHXV´:KHQWKDWKDSSHQVKHLVQRORQJHUUHVSRQVLEOHWRKLPEXWKDVFOHDUO\PDGH
KLPUHVSRQVLEOHWRKLPVHOI7KDWPDQQRZLQVRPHZD\VWDQGVEHIRUHKLVWKURQHRIMXGJHPHQW«+HLVQRZ
no longer allowed tRKDYHKLVRZQVD\EXWKDVWRSOD\DUROHFRUUHVSRQGLQJZLWKP\SRLQWRIYLHZ¶SS
19- ,W LV DOVR ZRUWK FLWLQJ %DUWK¶V FRPPHQW LQ WKH VDPH ZRUN RQ WKH RULJLQ RI WKH FULWLFDO VWXG\ RI
KLVWRU\µ>,@QWKDWFHQWXU\>LHWKHHLJKWHHQWK@EHJDQWKDWKLJKO\ SUREOHPDWLFDIIDLUZKLFKZHFDOOµFULWLFDO
VWXG\ RI KLVWRU\¶ %XW ZKDW HOVH FDQ WKLVPHDQEXW WKDW LWZDV LQ WKHHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\ WKDWPDQEHJDQ
axiomatically to credit himself with being superior to the past, and assumed a standpoint in relation to it 
whence he found it possible to set himself up as judge over past events according to fixed principles, as 
ZHOODVWRGHVFULEHLWVGHHGVDQGWRVXEVWDQWLDWHKLVWRU\¶VRZQUHSRUW"¶S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Barth tells us, in a way representative of his entire theological approach, that world history 
must not be regarded as being or containing a second reality or principle alongside that of 
the reality of salvation in Jesus Christ.61 NoZ WKLV PD\ DSSHDU WR EH D µFKULVWRPRQLVW¶
account of world history, in which Barth asserts the presence and dominance of Christ 
everywhere, without needing to take into account the diversity of human experience or 
reality. And yet, I do not believe that Barth wished to assert his proclamation of Christ 
against the actual diversity of human experience; rather, as a more urgent concern, he 
wished to take into account the persistently self-deceptive element in human experience. 
The point is that we do not have an innocent or self-evident awareness of world-history; we 
have only our own perspective on world-history, which is constructed in a process of 
cultural and collective self-interest. This is why Barth believed that when general world-
history is regarded as a second reality alongside the reality of salvation through Christ, 
when it is regarded as something which must be taken into account when we proclaim the 
gospel, then the gospel is accommodating itself to and associating itself with an alien 
principle. When Barth said that we need to believe in the victory and Lordship of Christ in 
the sphere of world-occurrence, then this was not the product of a Christ-centred 
enthusiasm, but a sober realisation that because of the self-deceptive and self-justifying 
element implicit in a general view of history, then the gospel is contradicting its own nature 
when it seeks to understand itself in the framework of a general history. For the gospel is 
meant to challenge human self-justification and is intended to announcH*RG¶VMXGJHPHQW
and salvation in relation to it. 
 
Now, the self-justifying character of contemporary culture, which inheres in its supposedly 
VFLHQWLILFYLHZRIKLVWRU\WDNHVWKHVSHFLILFIRUPRIUHJDUGLQJRQH¶VRZQWLPHRUFXOWXUHDV
the locus of true SURJUHVVRUHQOLJKWHQPHQWDOWKRXJKVWULFWO\WKHFRQFHSWRIµSURJUHVV¶LV
largely modern or even modern-European). But this means that one tends to regard the 
EDUEDULVPV RI RQH¶V RZQ FXOWXUH DV µUHJUHWWDEOH QHFHVVLWLHV¶ ZKHUHDV WKH EDUEDULVPV RI
                                                        
61
 HJ&',9Sµ(YHQLQUHODWLRQWRZKDWWDNHVSODFHZLWKRXW to the history of the cosmos as it is 
distinct but not separate from the history of the community of Jesus Christ, there can thus be no question 
of the real sway of any principle independent of the God who acts and is revealed in Jesus Christ, whether 
it be the autonomous rule of man, the overruling of fate or chance or of a freedom or necessity immanent 
in world-occurrence, or the control of any of the powers, forces or divinities which continually appear with 
their demands for fear, love, trust, and obedLHQFH¶ 
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previous ages or of other cultures are regarded as barbarisms pure and simple. Thus, 
SDUDGR[LFDOO\EXW\HWTXLWHQDWXUDOO\RQHFRPELQHVDEHOLHILQWKHµ(QOLJKWHQPHQW¶RIRQH¶V
own culture with a belief in the necessity of collaborating in its moral weaknesses or 
outright barbarisms.62 And so, when Barth states that there should not be a second principle 
alongside Christ in world history, what he essentially means is that the Christian gospel 
VKRXOG QRW DFFRPPRGDWH LWVHOI WR WKLV VXSSRVHG µSUDFWLFDO UHDOLVP¶ RI WKH  self-justifying 
GLVFRXUVHRIRQH¶VRZQFXOWXUH63 
 
In a sense, we have arrived again at the point at which I closed my third chapter. For there 
, ZDV DOVR FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH SUREOHP WKDW D IRFXV RQ WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW RI RQH¶V RZQ
culture may lead to an undue tolerance or even propagation of its characteristic barbarisms 
or injustices. In particular we were able to see this principle in the connection between the 
                                                        
62
 FIDYHU\HDUO\DGGUHVVRI%DUWK¶VGDWHGµ7KHVDPHKDSS\JHQWOHPDQRIFXOWXUHZKRWRGD\GULYHV
up so briskly in his little car of progress and so cheerfully displays the pennants of his various ideals, will 
tell you apprehensively tomorrow, if the matter comes up, that men are small and imperfect and that one 
PD\QRWLQGHHGGHVLUHDQGH[SHFWWRRPXFKIURPWKHP«¶µ7KH5LJKWHRXVQHVVRI*RG¶S$QGLQWKH
same address we see further comments on the strange co-existence of a self-image of enlightened morality 
DQG WKHWROHUDQFHRIYHU\XQPRUDOEDUEDULVPVµ,VLWQRWRXUYHU\PRUDOLW\ZKLFKSUHYHQWVRXUGLVFHUQLQJ
that at a hundred other points we are the more firmly fettered to that [unrighteous, self-seeking, capricious, 
world-@ZLOO"¶SDQGILQDOO\%DUWKFRPPHQWVWKDWWKHµULJKWHRXVQHVVRIWKHVWDWHDQGWKHODZ¶LVµ>Y@HU\
VXLWDEOH IRU TXLHWLQJ WKH FRQVFLHQFH¶ DQG DVNV ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR WKH ZDU µZHUH LW UHDOO\ SRVVLEOH IRU WKH
state to make men out of wild animals, would the state find it necessary by a thousand arts to make wild 
DQLPDOVRXWRIPHQ"¶ SS- ,ZLOO VD\PRUHDERXW WKH UHODWLRQEHWZHHQ%DUWK¶VHDUO\ZRUNDQGWKH
development of his later dogmatics in my concluding chapter. 
63
 See CD IV/3, pp 702-3, where Barth is asserting the claim of the total supremacy of Christ over against 
DGLYLVLRQ LQWRDWZRIROGFRQFHSWRILGHDOWKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFDOUHDOLVP%DUWKDVNVLURQLFDOO\µ>'@RHVQRW
[the] mission and task [of the Christian community] in the world consist in saying precisely this [twofold 
concept] to the world, and thus in singing again, and if possible commending, the old song of the tension 
or dialectic of the two principles or kingdoms and of the attitude to be desired on the part of man, the main 
accent being sometimes placed on the theological equivalent of an ideal and theoretical outlook, and 
sometimes on the theological equivalent of a realistic and practical? As if all the birds in their different 
ZD\VZHUHQRWYRLFLQJWKHVDPHVRQJIURPHYHU\URRI«'RHV>WKH&Kristian community] really think and 
say no more than that there is a higher and a lower, a theoretical and practical truth, that it is better in 
world history if men resolve and act accordingly, but that it is unavoidable and quite imperative that we 
should not lose sight of the other aspect, that we should take it very seriously, and that in this respect we 
should diligently avail ourselves of the wise counsel of our so-FDOOHGVWDWHVPHQDQGSROLWLFDOH[SHUWV"¶ 
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uncritical assertion of the values of Western democracy and the atrocities of the Vietnam 
War. There also we were concerned with the problem of the profoundly deceptive element 
which inheres in cultural self-awareness. And yet, I closed this chapter with the comment 
that, although this consideration may show the practical and political potential of the 
theological principles found in Christ and Adam, nevertheless this does not absolve us from 
WKHSUREOHPRIFRQVLGHULQJWKHYLDELOLW\RI%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVVSHFLILFDOO\DVDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
of the biblical text. 
 
In the subsequent chapters, I have not in fact considered whether the exegesis found in 
Christ and Adam actually corresponds with the meaning of Romans 5. As I said in my 
introduction, there can be no question of denying that Barth does frequently impose prior 
theological principles on the biblical text; and Christ and Adam is certainly no exception to 
this. The question can only be why he does this, and, above all for the purpose of this 
thesis, the question is what this implies for the objectivity of his interpretation. 
 
The basic idea I have sought to develop in my fourth and fifth chapters which have dealt 
VSHFLILFDOO\ZLWK%DUWK¶VKHUPHQHXWLFVDQGKLV UHODWLRQ WRELEOLFDOFULWLFLVPHVSHFLDOO\ WKDW
represented by Bultmann) is that the principle of collective self-deception affects not only 
contemporary judgements but also has a profound effect on our perception of past history. 
:KHQZHEHOLHYHZHKDYHDQµREMHFWLYH¶YLHZRISDVWKLVWRU\ WKHQZHDUHLQIDFWUHDGLQJ
into history the prejudices of contemporary culture, and therefore anything we may 
supposedly learn from the tradition or authority of the past simply becomes a reflection and 
further reinforcement of those prejudices. The consequence of this is that in our approach 
to history we cannot rely on what is normally understood as objective description. For in 
reality this would entail not the suspension of present prejudices but rather their 
FRQFHDOPHQW$FFRUGLQJO\ LQ%DUWK¶VYLHZZHFDQQRWGHSHQGRQREMHFWLYHGHVFULSWLRQLQ
our exegesis of past texts. We must incorporate our counter-cultural protest in the 
exegetical process itself. We must not allow that there is a past-in-itself which exists in 
abstraction from our cultural interests and corresponding responsibilities. 
 
At the opening of this chapter, I asked the question whether our comparison between Barth 
DQG*DGDPHUZRXOGKDYHIXQGDPHQWDOVLJQLILFDQFHIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\RU
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ZKHWKHU %DUWK¶V FKULVWRORJLFDO FRQFHQWUDWLRQ QHFHVVLWDWHV D IXQGDPHQWDO UHVHUYDWLRQ DQG
limit on any comparison between Barth and any secular philosopher. I hope it has become 
clear from what I have written that, in my view, this comparison does indeed have 
IXQGDPHQWDO VLJQLILFDQFH IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ +RZHYHU , ZLOO QRW
recapitulate or summarise my arguments for this here, as I think that this will be adequately 
addressed in the summary of my thesis as a whole, to which I now turn. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion and Synthesis 
 
General Summary 
 
,QWKHFRXUVHRIWKLVWKHVLVLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHSUREOHPRI%DUWK¶VXQQDWXUDODQGVHHPLQJO\
subjectivist exegesis, I have been occupied with identifying what I believe to be the 
philosophical or hermeneutical principle underlying his theology and exegesis. And I have 
argued that this principle is fundamentally anti-Cartesian. It is an attack on the 
epistemological norm of the generally or universally evident. In particular, I suggested that 
WKHFRQFHSWRIWKHµJHQHUDOO\RUXQLYHUVDOO\HYLGHQW¶ZKLFKLVLQWXUQEDVHGRQWKHLGHDORI
a universal subject, may contain a persistently self-deceptive character. I suggested that 
WKLVZDV%DUWK¶VEDVLFUHDVRQIRUUHIXVLQJWRJURXQGWKHVSHFLILFFODLPVRIWKHRORJ\RQWKH
principle of what is generally evident.  
 
, FRPSDUHG %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK KHUH WR 1LHEXKU¶V SULQFLSOH RI FROOHFWLYH VHOI-deception, 
according to which moral principles, which appear to have general or universal validity, 
can actually be motivated by collective self-LQWHUHVW+RZHYHU,VXJJHVWHGWKDW1LHEXKU¶V
thought was less hermeneutically sensitive than that of Barth, for Niebuhr still wished to 
ground his thinking on general moral principles observable in human nature. Barth, on the 
contrary, remained alert to the problem that all general moral principles, however 
seemingly self-evident, are vulnerable to the problem of collective self-deception. We saw 
the practical import of this question vividly illustrated in the disagreement between Barth 
and Niebuhr on the issue of anti-FRPPXQLVP DQG KRZ %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK ZDV DUJXDEO\
vindicated by the tragic events of the Vietnam War. 
 
In my fourth and fifth chapters I proceeded to elaborate on the thesis of Richard Burnett, 
QDPHO\ WKDW %DUWK¶V DSSURDFK WR KLVWRULFDO FULWLFLVP FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG LQ WHUPV RI D
fundamental critique of the then prevalent empathetic tradition. I further argued,  
especially in my fifth chapter, that there was a positive parallel between Barth and H.-
G.Gadamer. Gadamer also made fundamental criticisms of the empathetic tradition, as 
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represented especially by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and I believe that we have 
developed constructive and fruitful parallels between Barth and Gadamer in this respect. 
 
What I would like to do now is to look more closely at the relationship between the 
different parts of my thesis, in order to bring out the inner coherence of the ideas presented 
therein. I will begin with an examination of the relationship and similarity between 
µ&DUWHVLDQLVP¶ DQDO\VHG PDLQO\ LQ P\ VHFRQG DQG WKLUG FKDSWHUV DQG WKH HPSDWKHWLF
tradition, analysed in my fourth and fifth chapters. 
 
The similarity between Cartesianism and the empathetic tradition 
 
,WZLOODOUHDG\KDYHEHFRPHLQVRPHSDUWHYLGHQWWKDW,KDYHXQGHUVWRRG%DUWK¶VRSSRVLWLRQ
to the empathetic tradition in the framework of his anti-Cartesianism. If correct, this would 
show consistency in the development of my theoU\ DERXW %DUWK¶V EDVLF KHUPHQHXWLFDO
principle, for his opposition to the empathetic tradition would then be shown to be 
fundamentally related to his anti-Cartesian stance. Now, Gadamer certainly understood the 
empathetic tradition to represent a residual Cartesianism, and himself set his criticism of 
this tradition in an anti-Cartesian framework.1 However, it may be objected that the 
empathetic tradition was itself founded on anti-Cartesian principles. Hence we must now 
ask the question whether we can adeqXDWHO\XQGHUVWDQG*DGDPHURU%DUWK¶VRSSRVLWLRQWR
the empathetic tradition as an outworking of an anti-Cartesian foundation. 
 
For do not Schleiermacher and Dilthey base their idea of knowledge on engagement and 
involvement, in stark contrast to the cool dHWDFKPHQW RI 'HVFDUWHV¶ LVRODWHG LQGLYLGXDO"
For instead of a dispassionate detachment, Schleiermacher and Dilthey base their 
epistemology on involvement with life and on personal, inward feeling. The very concept 
of empathy means that the object of knowledge in history becomes accessible through re-
OLYLQJ WKH KLVWRULFDO UHDOLW\ LQ RQH¶V RZQ H[SHULHQFH KHQFH RQH XQGHUVWDQGV KLVWRU\ E\
being inwardly moved rather than through any methodical detachment. 
 
                                                        
1
 See especially Truth and Method, pp 237f. 
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However, I have followed Burnett and also Gadamer in holding that the empathetic 
approach, far from being an effective criticism of Cartesian detachment, actually represents 
a consolidation of it. In particular, the emphasis on the inner, subjective continuity 
between past history and present understanding of history simply underlines the 
discontinuity (and hence detachment) which exists on the level of objective understanding. 
As we have seen, that which is uncongenial to present cultural understanding - or 
prejudices - LV WDNHQ WR EH DQ µH[WHUQDO REMHFWLILFDWLRQ¶RI WKH LQQHU VSLULWXDO VXEMHFWLYH
aspect of the past, and this inner, spiritual aspect of the past happens also to correspond to 
the inner being of the present. Thus, we in the present may even congratulate ourselves on 
having understood the past in a deeper sense, on having distinguished between the primary 
and secondary, between the inner, spiritual aspects of the past and their external 
expressions; and yet we have attained nothing other than the imposition of our own 
prejudices on the past. At the root of this is the self-evident assumption of the superiority 
of present culture over the past, in that the past cannot compete with the present; and in 
FRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKLVODVWSRLQW,DUJXHGWKDW%DUWK¶VRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHHPSDWKHWLFWUDGLWLRQ
is accordingly linked directly to his counter-cultural criticism. The significance of this will 
appear more clearly later in this chapter. 
 
Fundamentally, what the Cartesian and the empathetic traditions hold in common is this: 
they fail to recognise that the spontaneous self-awareness of the individual is 
predetermined and relativised by historical and social factors.2 It is certainly true that 
'LOWKH\¶VDLPZDVWRRYHUFRPH'HVFDUWHVDQGRWKHUVE\JURXQGLQJWKHVHOI-awareness of 
the individual in life relations rather than in isolated reflection. This was intended to rescue 
the individual consciousness from a rationalist distortion which took no account of the 
living context of the individual.3 And yet, as I shall now seek to explain in terms of 
*DGDPHU¶VFULWLTXH'LOWKH\¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHVHOI-awareness of the individual was still tied 
to the Cartesian perspective at the deepest level. 
 
                                                        
2
 So Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp 239-40, where Cartesian method and Romantic hermeneutics are 
VDLGWREHFRPSDUDEOHLQWKDWWKH\WDNHµQRDFFRXQWZKDWVRHYHURIWKHKLVWRULFDOQDWXUHRIH[SHULHQFH¶  
3
 See especially Dilthey, Selected Writings, p 162, which SURYLGHVDSRZHUIXOVXPPDU\RI'LOWKH\¶VRYHUDOO
programme in this regard, although Descartes is not specifically mentioned at this point. 
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*DGDPHU¶VIXQGDPHQWDOFULWLFLVPRI'LOWKH\FRQFHUQHGKLVEHOLHIWKDWWKHLQWHUSUHWHULQWKH
present is able to understand a past historical figure or author because the interpreter and 
the author are both historical beings. Dilthey relied on the supposed fact that the one who 
is seeking to understand history is also the one who makes history. And so it is this 
homogeneity of historian and historical personage/author which makes understanding of 
KLVWRU\SRVVLEOH*DGDPHU¶VFULWLFLVPRIWKLVSULQFLSOHLVWKDWRQDIXQGDPHQWDOOHYHOLWIDLOV
to recognise the true nature of the involvement of the contemporary interpreter in history. 
Dilthey assumes that because the interpreter is personally involved in history, then he has a 
NLQG RI LQQDWH DZDUHQHVV RI KLVWRU\ $QG \HW LQ *DGDPHU¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKLV SHUVRQDO
involvement in history entails not only (and perhaps not even mainly) an awareness of 
history; rather, it involves what we may call an entanglement with history, and to that 
extent this awareness is predetermined (and hence limited) by history. Because of this, the 
involvement of the interpreter in history does not reveal but at least partially conceals the 
WUXH QDWXUH RI SDVW KLVWRU\ IURP KLP 'LOWKH\¶V SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH FRQWUDU\ UHWDLQV WKH
Cartesian illusion of an essential detachment of the individual from history, and a 
corresponding a-historical vantage point over history.4 
 
7KHREMHFWLRQRI7KLVHOWRQ'LOWKH\¶VGHYDOXDWLRQRILQWURVSHFWLRQ 
 
Now, A.C.Thiselton objects to this criticism of Dilthey by Gadamer, claiming that Dilthey 
himself denied that there was any such detachment of individual self-awareness from 
history. In particular, Dilthey claimed that the self cannot know itself in isolation, but in 
RUGHUWRNQRZLWVHOIPXVWJRRXWRILWVHOIDQGPDNHDµGHWRXU¶WKURXJKWKHEURDGHUVRFLDO
and historical environment of texts and institutions. In particular, Thiselton cites 'LOWKH\¶V
SURJUDPPDWLFVWDWHPHQWµ1RWWKURXJKLQWURVSHFWLRQEXWRQO\WKURXJKKLVWRU\GRZHFRPH
WRNQRZRXUVHOYHV¶5 
 
Now, it is certainly true that Dilthey mistrusted the results of immediate introspection, for 
the simple reason that such results were not subject to scientific control. In order to 
                                                        
4
 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp 222f. 
5
 Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, p 61; Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften VII: Der 
Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den GeisteswissenschaftenS µ'HU0HQVFKHUNHQQW VLFKQXU LQ
GHU*HVFKLFKWHQLHGXUFK,QWURVSHNWLRQ¶ 
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UHFRJQLVHWKHIXOOFRPSOH[LW\DQGVXEWOHW\RI'LOWKH\¶VSRVLWLRQZHVKRXOGUHFRJQLVHWKDW
he does not JLYHDEVROXWHSUHFHGHQFHWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLPPHGLDWHH[SHULHQFHRIKLVRZQ
inner life, as a vantage point from which all other things and all other selves may be 
known. Rather, we should recognise that Dilthey aimed at a balance between the 
LPPHGLDF\RI µOLIH¶H[SHULHQFHGE\ WKH LQGLYLGXDODQG WKHJHQHUDOLVLQJFODLPVRIVFLHQWLILF
control or objectivity.6 HenFH LQVWHDG RI LQWURVSHFWLRQ KH HPSKDVLVHG WKH µIL[HG¶
expressions of life (fixierte Lebensäußerungen) such as writing, institutions or law, which 
can be returned to again and again for observation, and hence in a relative way are subject 
to scientific control.7 I think the crucial point here is that Dilthey was concerned not with 
isolated individuals but rather with the common LQQHU OLIH LH µFRPPRQ KXPDQ QDWXUH¶  
in which a multiplicity of individuals participate. This common inner life of humanity  
needs external expressions or external objectifications to attain its commonality; for apart 
from language fixed in writing or broader social and historical structures, each individual 
would simply be isolated and there would be no communion between individuals across 
time and space. In the final analysis, our awareness of the inner life of others, and  even 
                                                        
6
 µ+XPDQ VWXGLHV KDYH LQGHHG WKH DGYDQWDJH RYHU WKH QDWXUDO VFLHQFHV WKDW WKHLU REMHFW Ls not sensory 
appearance as such, no mere reflection of reality within consciousness, but is rather first and foremost an 
inner reality, a coherence experienced from within. Yet the very way in which this reality is experienced 
within us raises the gravest GLIILFXOWLHV DV WR LWV REMHFWLYH DSSUHKHQVLRQ«[A]ny inner experiencing, 
through which I become aware of my own disposition, can never by itself bring me to a consciousness of 
my own individuality. I experience the latter only through a comparison of myself with other people; at 
WKDWSRLQWDORQHGR,EHFRPHDZDUHRIZKDWGLVWLQJXLVKHVPHIURPRWKHUV«>2@XULQVLJKWLQWRWKHH[WHQW
QDWXUHDQGOLPLWVRIRXUSRZHUVUHPDLQ>V@DWEHVWLQFRPSOHWH¶'LOWKH\WKHQSURFHHGVWRUHGUHVVWKHEDODQFH
by emphasising the imSRUWDQFHRIRQH
VRZQOLIHRUH[SHULHQFHIRUNQRZOHGJHµ%XWWKHH[LVWHQFHRIRWKHU
people is given us only from the outside, in sensory events, gestures, words and actions. Only through a 
process of reconstruction [Nachbildung] do we complete this sense perception, which initially takes the 
IRUPRILVRODWHGVLJQV:HDUHWKXVREOLJHGWRWUDQVODWHHYHU\WKLQJ«RXWRIRXURZQVHQVHRIOLIH¶'LOWKH\
µ7KH5LVHRI+HUPHQHXWLFV¶SHPSKDVLVPLQH 
7
 HJ µ(YHQ WKH PRVW DWWHQWLYH FRQFHQWUDWLRQ >RQ DQRWKHU¶V LQQHU OLIH@ FDQ GHYHORS LQWR DQ RUGHUO\ DQG
systematic procedure - one by which a measurable degree of objectivity can be reached - only where the 
H[SUHVVLRQ RI OLIH KDV EHHQ IL[HG VR WKDW ZH FDQ UHWXUQ WR LW DJDLQ DQG DJDLQ¶ 'LOWKH\ µ7KH 5LVH RI
HeUPHQHXWLFV¶S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our awareness of our own inner life, will degenerate into sheer subjectivism and 
arbitrariness if it is not mediated through these externally fixed expressions and 
institutions.8 
 
,VWLOO WKLQNKRZHYHU WKDW*DGDPHU¶VSRLQW LVZHOOPDGH LQVSLWHRI WKHIDFW WKDW'LOWKH\
does seem to take into account the vital rôle of social and historical structures in the 
process of self-understanding. For it seems to PH WKDW LQ 'LOWKH\¶V VFKHPH WKH LQZDUG  
life which inheres in individuals remains basically in control of the external structures 
which it generates. These external structures effectively serve individual life by allowing    
it to transcend the narrowness of isolation, and by allowing a shared inner life or common 
KXPDQ QDWXUH WR XQIROG \HW ZH FDQ VHH WKDW DFFRUGLQJ WR WKLV VFKHPH WKHVH µH[WHUQDO
REMHFWLILFDWLRQV¶DUHDOZD\V LQ WKH VHUYLFHRI WKH LQQHU OLIHDQGKHQFHZLOOQHYHUGRPLQDWH 
or overwhelm it , WKLQN *DGDPHU¶V SRLQW LV WKDW WKH H[WHUQDO VWUXFWXUHV RI VRFLHW\ DQG
history, even though they may be set up or created by an aggregate of individuals, still in 
practice transcend all specific individuals and are therefore far more powerful and 
determinative factors in the makeup of individual consciousness than Dilthey allowed. 
Hence I believe that the comparison between Dilthey and Cartesianism still holds, namely 
that Dilthey does not take appropriate account of the impact of the social and historical 
context on individual consciousness.9 This, in the end, is why Cartesian thought and 
                                                        
8
 'LOWKH\ H[SUHVVHV WKLV YLYLGO\ LQ KLV FRQFHSW RI µREMHFWLYH PLQG¶ objektiver Geist HJ µ%\ WKLV
[objective mind] I mean the manifold forms in which what individuals hold in common have objectified 
themselves in the world of the senses. In this objective mind the past is a permanently enduring present for 
us. Its realm extends from the style of life and the forms of social intercourse to the system of purposes 
which society has created for itself and to custom, law, state, religion, art, science and philosophy. For 
even the work of genius represents ideas, feelings and ideals commonly held in an age and environment. 
)URPWKLVZRUOGRIREMHFWLYHPLQGWKHVHOIUHFHLYHVVXVWHQDQFHIURPHDUOLHVWFKLOGKRRG«7KHFKLOGJURZV
up within the RUGHUDQGFXVWRPVRIWKHIDPLO\ZKLFKLWVKDUHVZLWKRWKHUPHPEHUVDQGLWVPRWKHU¶VRUGHUV
are accepted in this context. Before it learns to talk it is already wholly immersed in that common 
PHGLXP¶Selected Writings, p 221; cf pp 191f.) 
9
 The crucial paVVDJHRI*DGDPHUZKLFK7KLVHOWRQFULWLFLVHVUXQVDVIROORZVµ6LQFHKH>'LOWKH\@VWDUWHG
IURP WKH DZDUHQHVV RI ³H[SHULHQFHV´ (UOHEQLVVH KH ZDV XQDEOH WR EXLOG D EULGJH WR WKH KLVWRULFDO
realities, because the great historical realities of society and state always have a predeterminate influence 
RQDQ\³H[SHULHQFH´6HOI-reflection and autobiography - 'LOWKH\¶VVWDUWLQJSRLQW- are not primary and are 
therefore not an adequate basis for the hermeneutical problem, because through them history is made 
private once more. In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
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Dilthey share a similar a-historical concept of a universal, common human nature which 
transcends all historical and social difference - or, what amounts to the same thing, they 
share an ideal of objectivity which presupposes an inward detachment, transcending all 
local social and historical differences.10 
 
We will return below to the implications of this for understanding Barth; for although 
Barth was not specifically interested in Dilthey, nevertheless I believe that these issues 
EHWZHHQ 'LOWKH\ DQG *DGDPHU SURYLGH DQ LPSRUWDQW FOXH IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ %DUWK¶V
relationship to Liberal theology. But for now I will return to the general plan of integrating 
the different parts of my thesis; in particular, I will seek to demonstrate the relation 
between my treatment of R.Niebuhr in my second and third chapters, and my treatment of 
H.-G.Gadamer in my fourth and fifth chapters. 
 
The combination of Gadamer and Niebuhr as a point of contact with Barth 
 
As mentioned above, I have made use in this thesis of a certain parallel between Barth and 
Niebuhr; however, I have also argued that the parallel is limited because Barth showed a 
more profound awareness of the hermeneutical dimension of the problem than we find in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way through 
WKH IDPLO\ VRFLHW\DQGVWDWHLQZKLFKZHOLYH¶Truth and Method, p 276.) Certainly, when we compare 
WKLVSDVVDJHZLWK'LOWKH\¶VZRUGVTXRWHG LQ WKH ODVWIRRWQRWHZHZLOOQRWHFORVHVLPLODULWLHVEHWZHHQWKH
WZRZULWHUV¶YLHZRIWKHVRFLDODQGKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[WRIKXPDQVXEMHFWLYLW\EHFDXVHRIWKLVZHPay well 
wonder how fundamental the difference between Dilthey and Gadamer really is. I would claim that the 
difference, indeed opposition, is that for Dilthey the public realities of history and society are secondary 
(i.e. determined) and the inner/private life is primary (i.e. determinative), whereas for Gadamer the public 
realities of history and society are primary (i.e. determinative) and the inner life is secondary (i.e. 
determined). The concrete significance of this will appear more clearly below. 
10
 TKH FORVH FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ &DUWHVLDQ REMHFWLYLVP DQG 'LOWKH\¶V YLHZ RI KLVWRULFDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
IRUPV D FHQWUDO SDUW RI *DGDPHU¶V FULWLFLVP RI 'LOWKH\ *DGDPHU FOHDUO\ EHOLHYHG WKDW 'LOWKH\ ZDV
ultimately tied to the abstracting, generalising method of thHQDWXUDO VFLHQFHV LQVSLWHRIKLV 'LOWKH\¶V
attempt to disentangle himself from it (Truth and Method, pp 234f). Thiselton notes this issue in 
FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK 'LOWKH\¶V EHOLHI LQ D XQLYHUVDO KXPDQ QDWXUH Interpreting God, p 60). However, given 
that ThiVHOWRQ SUDLVHV 'LOWKH\¶V FRQFHUQ ZLWK WUDQV-individual social and historical realities (texts and 
LQVWLWXWLRQVZHVKRXOGQRWHWKDWLWLVSUHFLVHO\RQWKLVSRLQWZKHUH'LOWKH\¶VWKLQNLQJLVFORVHO\ERXQGXS
with his view of a universal or common human nature (see Interpreting God, pp 61-2). 
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Niebuhr. I have found that drawing parallels between Barth and Gadamer has been helpful 
IRUHOXFLGDWLQJWKLVODVWSRLQW$QG\HWRQWKHRWKHUKDQG,ILQGWKDW1LHEXKU¶VFRQFHSWVRI
collective self-deception and collective self-interest give us a focus for working out the 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRI*DGDPHU¶VSRVLWLRQ- a focus which does not receive as much emphasis in 
the thought of Gadamer himself. I believe that there is a natural confluence between the 
position of Gadamer (that our subjectivity or self-awareness is determined by factors of 
ZKLFK ZH KDYH QR LPPHGLDWH DZDUHQHVV DQG 1LHEXKU¶V FRQFHSW RI FRUSRUDWH VHOI-
deception. For corporate self-deception expresses very nicely the consequences of the 
situation that the self-understanding of the individual is predetermined by the historical and 
social factors which are concealed within (and therefore from) that self-understanding. 
Thus, from my point of view, Gadamer and Niebuhr may be regarded as mutually 
corroborating and mutually complementary. 
 
However, the most significant consequence of this for my purposes is the point of contact 
LWDIIRUGVIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ%DUWK¶VRZQWKRXJKW7RUHSHDWP\SUHYLRXVFRQFOXVLRQVWKH
FRPELQDWLRQRI*DGDPHUDQG1LHEXKU¶VLQVLJKWVZKLFK,KDYHVNHWFhed suggests what may 
be termed a recognition of the hermeneutical dimension of sin. That is, the self-awareness 
of the individual is distorted by the structures of collective self-deception which precede 
and pre-IRUP LW $V , KDYH DUJXHG DW OHQJWK %DUWK¶s theology was grounded on the 
question: what does it mean to say that Christ saves us from our sin, when we take into 
account this hermeneutical dimension of sin? %DUWK¶VRSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH µJHQHUDOO\YDOLG¶
can also be understood from this starting point, for the limited self-awareness of the 
individual, circumscribed as it is by collective sin, asserts itself through claiming a general 
validity, affirming that its individuality is an instance of a general or universally valid 
human nature  - which, we have seen, occurs in both Cartesianism proper and in the 
seemingly anti-Cartesian position of the empathetic tradition.11 
                                                        
11
 ,QWKLVFRQQHFWLRQZHFDQWDNHQRWHRI%DUWK¶VFRPPHQWVRQLGHRORJ\LQThe Christian Life, pp 224-5, 
worth quoting here at length in that they show how Barth understands human sin specifically as the 
tendency of man WRYLHZKLVRZQLPPHGLDWHSHUFHSWLRQVDVKDYLQJXQLYHUVDOYDOLGLW\DQGUHOHYDQFHµ0DQ
has the remarkable ability to grasp in the form of concepts his conscious perceptions of his own inner life, 
that of his fellow men, and finally that of the whole of the outside world. He can put these together in 
GHILQLWHSLFWXUHV«>HWF@«6RIDUVRJRRG%XWVXSSRVLQJWKDWLWLVWKHPDQZKRKDVIDOOHQIURP*RGZKR
makes use of this wonderful ability, this power of spirit! In this spirit of his, which makes itself 
independent of the living Spirit of God, there will then arise at once, and at the decisive point, a distinctive 
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7KLVH[SODLQVZK\DFFRUGLQJWR%DUWK¶VYLHZLW LV LPSRVVLEOHWRKDYHWUXHNQRZOHGJHRI
self or the world apart from the revelation of Christ.12 This is (as I argued at length in my 
second and third chapters) because the self-knowledge of humanity is distorted through 
sin, and requires the salvation from sin which is announced in Christ in order to know 
itself. This is also, in my view, why Barth refuses to analyse or ground the truth of the 
Christian gospel in terms of a general framework of religion.13 This, according to my 
understanding, is because (according to Barth) truths which appear to have general validity 
are also vulnerable to profound distortion. 
 
+HQFH,ZRXOGDUJXHWKDWZHFDQPDNHVHQVHRI%DUWK¶VDSSDUHQWUHVWULFWLRQWRDSDUWLFXODU
theological principle when we understand this restriction as a determination to work out 
                                                                                                                                                                     
QXPEQHVV KDUGHQLQJ DQG ULJLGLW\«7KLV FRPHV DERXW DV KH WKLQNV KH FDQ DQG VKRXOG DVFULEH WR WKH
presuppositions and sketches he has achieved by this remarkable ability, not just a provisional and 
WUDQVLWRU\EXWDSHUPDQHQWQRUPDWLYLW\QRW MXVWRQH WKDW LV UHODWLYHEXWRQH WKDWLVDEVROXWH«+HDOUHDG\
measures and evaluates others only from the standpoint of whether they are supporters of this ideology, or 
ZKHWKHU WKH\ PLJKW EHFRPH VXFK«Its glory has already become for him the solution not only to the 
personal problem of his own life but to each and all of the problems of the world.¶HPSKDVLVPLQH 
12
 HJ&',9Sµ7RNQRZPHQLVWRVHHDQGXQGHrstand that, as surely as Jesus Christ died and rose 
again for all, the grace of God has reference and is promised and addressed to all. To know men, to be 
aware of them, in this critical and comprehensive way is to know the world as it is. For the world as seen 
in all its distinctions, antitheses, and inner contradictions and yet as seen in relation to Jesus Christ and 
therefore originally and definitely with God, is the world as it really is. The world as seen and understood 
in any other way is not the world as it is; it is a mere picture of the world projected idealistically, 
positivistically, or existentially, scientifically or mythologically, with or without a moral purpose, 
pessimistically or lightheartedly, yet always with an unhealthy naivety and one-sidedness. The world 
thinks that it knows itself when it draws and contemplates a book of such pictures, whereas in truth, or 
rather in the most radical untruth, it misses its own reality and is simply groping about in the dark as it 
turns these various pDJHV«¶FIDOVR&',9S 
13
 HJ &' ,9 S  µ,W LV IRU WKLV UHDVRQ WKDW GLVDVWURXV PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ QHFHVVDULO\ UHVXOWV ZKHQ
interpretations are attempted which assume that [the Christian community] is to be reduced to a common 
denominator [as ³&KULVWLDQLW\´@ ZLWK VXFK DQDORJRXV SKHQRPHQD DV ,VODP RU %XGGKLVP RU HYHQ
Communism, and considered together, and perhaps conceived in historico-critical terms, probably under 
the master conception of religion, as either a link in historical development or the particular actualisation 
RIDJHQHUDOSRVVLELOLW\¶ 
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the consequences for theology of a specifically philosophical or hermeneutical principle. 
%DUWK¶VDWWHPSWWRZRUNRXWKLVHQWLUHWKHRORJ\RQWKHEDVLVRI*RG¶VUHYHODWLRQLQ&KULVW
is grounded in and predetermined by this philosophical or hermeneutical principle. His 
theology is grounded in a recognition that the self-understanding of the world and 
humanity is distorted by sinful self-interest; his purpose is radically and fundamentally to 
UHVWDWHWKHJRVSHOLQYLHZRIWKLVVSHFLILFDOO\µKHUPHQHXWLFDO¶DVSHFWRIWKLVVHOI-interest. 
 
I think that possibly the most IXQGDPHQWDOO\ LOOXPLQDWLQJ ZD\ RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ %DUWK¶V
theology would be to say that it is driven by the need to avoid compromise - that is, to 
avoid compromise of the gospel with the world and with worldly values. And yet, I do not 
believe that Barth has any independent or autonomous interest in avoiding such 
compromise for its own sake, as if he were zealously concerned for the purity of the  
gospel as such. On the contrary, the real reason why he seeks to avoid compromise with 
general concepts based on natural human self-awareness is that he recognises that these 
general concepts are intrinsically determined by the negative and deceptive forces of 
human history. Human history as such represents a compromise of positive moral 
principles with evil. This is, I believe, directly equivalent to our previous observations 
concerning how human Enlightenment always entails severe compromises with  
µUHJUHWWDEOH QHFHVVLWLHV¶ - the latter being in reality the characteristic injustices and 
barbarisms of our own culture.14 And yet, these compromises are not made consciously, 
                                                        
14
 FI%DUWK¶VHDUO\DGGUHVVµ7KH5LJKWHRXVQHVVRI*RG¶LQZKLFKKHZULWHVµ:HKDYHEHIRUHXVWKH
fiendishness of business competition and the world war, passion and wrongdoing, antagonism between 
classes and moral depravity within them, economic tyranny above and the slave spirit below. We may 
indeed argue about these things and prove to ourselves and others quite shrewdly that they all have their 
necessary reasons. We may imagine ourselves thus becoming inwardly free from them. But we do not 
escape the simple fact that we suffer from them. The unjust will which imbues and rules our life makes of 
LW ZLWKRUZLWKRXWRXUVDQFWLRQDZHOWHULQJ LQIHUQR«:HPD\ WHPSRUDULO\GHFHLYHRXUVHOYHVDERXW >Whis 
unjust will]. We may temporarily come to an understanding with it. Obviously it will never do so with 
XV«%XW PDQ\ WLPHV WKH IHDUIXO DSSUHKHQVLRQ VHL]HV XV WKDW XQULJKWHRXVQHVV PD\ WULXPSK LQ WKH
HQG«$QG WKH LPSRVVLEOH UHVROYHVXJJHVWV LWVHOI - make peace with it! Surrender yourself to the thought 
WKDWWKHZRUOGLVKHOODQGFRQIRUP7KHUHVHHPVQRWKLQJHOVHWRGR¶S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but actually precede and distort our capacity for perception and understanding at the 
deepest level.15 
 
I have suggested repeatedly that the reason why Barth claimed that human nature and sin 
itself can only be known through Christ is that our awareness of our nature and of sin are 
themselves distorted by sin - and hence we need redemption from sin in order to arrive at 
such self-knowledge.16 And yet, this should not be understood to mean that the Christian 
has attained to (or has been granted) a state in which he or she has been redeemed from 
sin, and hence now has true knowledge of self, sin and the world. This would be to 
eliminate the eschatological element - that is, the extent to which the Christian has not yet 
been redeemed from sin. I do not think Barth ever underestimates this factor.17 His point is 
that Christians ought to recognise that Christ has in principle conquered the evil forces in 
the world as such, even though this is subject to an important eschatological reservation, 
namely that the full revelation of this victory has yet to appear. However, Christians often 
behave as if Christ were not victor in the world as such, and thus arrange various 
FRPSURPLVHVRUµV\QWKHVHV¶ZLWKLWEHWZHHQWKHµLGHDO¶RIWKHLUIDLWKRU*RG¶VVDYLQJDFW
DQGWKHµUHDO¶RUKXPDQZRUOGDURXQGWKHP18 
                                                        
15
 :HFDQVHH%DUWK¶VLGHDRIWKHVWUXFWXUHRIFRPSURPLVHEHLQJFRQFHDOHGZLWKLQKXPDQDZDUHQHVVLQDQ
illuminating passage found in CD IV/3. Here Barth is making use of the opposing concepts of the good 
FUHDWLRQRI*RGRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGRIWKHQHJDWLYLW\RIµQRWKLQJQHVV¶RQWKHRWKHU7KHSRLQWLVWKDWPDQ
seeks to bring these together in a dialectical synthesis where they ought to be regarded as antithetical: 
µ7KH\ >KXPDQ EHLQJV@ FRXQW XSRQ ERWK >SULQFLSOHV@ ZKHUH ZLWK DSSURSULDWH VHULRXVQHVV DQG WR WKH
exclusion of the other, they ought to count only upon the one, and therefore, with a consistency appropriate 
to a mere intruder, not to count upon the other. Hence it is not the glorious or shameful acts, but their 
compromises, which give to their history its distinctive aspect from the human standpoint. Their eye is 
VKLIW\«,WVTXLQWVDVDJRRGH\HQHLWKHUZRXOGQRUFRXOG¶&',9 p 696 - my emphasis.) 
16
 HJ&',9S µ$VWKHRQHZKRFRPPLWVVLQPDQLVKLPVHOIWRWDOO\DQGUDGLFDOO\FRPSURPLVHG
Where this is a true knowledge of sin, it can only be as an element in the knowledge of God, of revelation, 
and therefore of faith, for which he cannot in any way prepare himself. Man is corrupt even in his self-
XQGHUVWDQGLQJHYHQLQWKHNQRZOHGJHRIKLVFRUUXSWLRQ¶ 
17
 e.g. CD IV/3, pp 917f. 
18
 In my fifth chapter I drew attention to a section of CD IV/3, in which Barth writes of the compromise 
EHWZHHQ WKH WZR SULQFLSOHV RI WKH µWKHRORJLFDO HTXLYDOHQW RI DQ LGHDO DQG WKHRUHWLFDO RXWORRN¶ DQG WKH
µWKHRORJLFDO HTXLYDOHQW RI D UHDOLVWLF DQG SUDFWLFDO¶ &' ,9 S  ,Q WKH IROORZLQJ SDJHV %DUWK
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(YLGHQFHIURP%DUWK¶VHDUO\WKRXJKW 
 
, EHOLHYH WKDW ZH FDQ VHH WKH VHHGV RI %DUWK¶V PDWXUH SRVLWLRQ LQ PDQ\ RI KLV HDUOLHU
writings and addresses. In particular, I believe that we can find the fundamental ideas of 
%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\IURPZKLFKKHGLGQRWVWUD\EXWZKLFKKHVLPSO\ZRUNHGRXWLQGHWDLOLQ
his Dogmatics, in his early essays and reflections on the figures of Friedrich Naumann, 
&KULVWRSK %OXPKDUGW WKH µ\RXQJHU¶ %OXPKDUGW DQG 3DXO $OWKDXV19 A brief review of 
these reflections will enable us to relate his theology more closely to the question of the 
relation and distinction between the subjective and objective poles which we were 
considering earlier in this chapter and, indeed, have been considering throughout this 
thesis. 
 
What these early essays show, for me, is the political and counter-cultural origins of 
%DUWK¶VVXVSLFLRQRIWKHIUHTXHQWO\PDGHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHLQQHUVSLULWXDORQWKHRQH
hand and the outer/worldly on the other. This corresponds exactly to the distinction 
EHWZHHQ WKH µLGHDO¶ RI &KULVWLDQ IDLWK DQG WKH µUHDO¶ FRQGLWLRQV RI WKH µRXWVLGH¶ ZRUOG  
which I mentioned previously; as we shall see, it corresponds also to the distinction 
                                                                                                                                                                     
continues to write vividly of this comproPLVH HJ S  µ,Q WKH VHDUFK IRU D VXSHULRU SULQFLSOH
transcending and dissolving the antithesis of God and man in world-occurrence, the Christian community 
would then have found a place above the antithesis, and therefore a synthesis and reconciliation, in which 
human confusion, which has itself originated in such a synthesis, would be supremely established and 
affirmed and therefore definitively justified and sanctified. Christ Himself would then have been brought 
into agreement or harmony with Belial (2 Cor 615¶1RWHWKHZRUGVµwhich has itself originated in such a 
synthesis¶- this means that Barth regards the compromise of the gospel with the world as a continuation of 
the compromise which goes on within the world itself quite apart from the church - i.e. the compromise he 
GHVLJQDWHVDV µKXPDQFRQIXVLRQ¶6HH IXUWKHURQ WKHFRPSURPLVHEHWZHHQWKH&KXUFKDQGWKHZRUOGLQ
The Christian Life, SZKHUH%DUWK WDONVDERXW µWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDFRQFRUGDWEHWZHHQWKHLJQRUDQFH
and knowledge of God in the human life of the Christian as such. If there were such a concordat, this 
would mean that he would have to respect two principles and norms, that he would have to exist in two 
spheres, that he would have to serve two masters, a greater and a smaller, perhaps, or a primary and 
secondary, or even, perhaps, an inner and an outer«¶HPSKDVLVPLQHWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHDQWLWKHVLV
RIµLQQHUDQGRXWHU¶ZLOOEHFRPHIXUWKHUDSSDUHQWEHORZ 
19
 µ3DVW DQG )XWXUH )ULHGULFK 1DXPDQQ DQG &KULVWRSK %OXPKDUGW¶ LQ The Beginnings of Dialectic 
Theology, pp 35-µ%DVLF3UREOHPVRI&KULVWLDQ6RFLDO(WKLFV$'LVFXVVLRQZLWK3DXO$OWKDXV¶LQThe 
Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, pp 46-57. 
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betZHHQ VXEMHFWLYH DQG REMHFWLYH (VVHQWLDO WR %DUWK¶V WKRXJKW LV KLV SDVVLRQDWH FRQFHUQ
about the structure of deceptive compromise which underlies all such distinctions. His 
SRLQW VHHPV WR EH WKDW ZKHQ ZH DFNQRZOHGJH DQ µRXWHU¶ RU µUHDO¶ ZRUOG WR ZKLFK WKH
claims of the Christian faith are only indirectly applicable, then we are in fact arranging an 
illegitimate compromise with the realities of the outer world when we ought to be 
protesting against them. 
 
In the early Barth, we find the view that a retreat to an inner world of conscience means 
QRWDGHHSHU&KULVWLDQVSLULWXDOLW\DOOLHGZLWKPDWXUHUHDOLVPDERXWWKHµZD\RIWKHZRUOG¶
rather, it means a deceptive justification of the way of the world with its hardened political 
structures which are placed beyond effective criticism by this very division of inner 
(spiritual) and outer (worldly). Of the later Friedrich Naumann Barth critically writes: 
µ1DXPDQQZDVEDFNZKHUHKHKDGVWDUWHG - with the God who acts inscrutably, with the 
religion of the soul which may seek comfort and power in the world, but does not seek 
victory over WKH ZRUOG¶20 By contrast, Blumhardt (who clearly influenced Barth 
profoundly) clung to a  
 
hope for a visible and tangible appearing of the lordship of God over the world (in contrast to the 
VLPSOH DQG VR RIWHQ EODVSKHPRXV WDONLQJ DERXW *RG¶V RPQLSRWHQFH KRSH IRU UDGLFDO KHOS DQG
deliverance from the former state of the world (in opposition to that soothing and appeasing attitude 
which must everywhere come to a halt before unalterabOHµUHODWLRQVKLSV¶KRSHIRUDOOIRUPDQNLQG
LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH VHOILVK FRQFHUQ IRU RQH¶V RZQ VDOYDWLRQ >das eigene Seelenheil] and to all the 
attempts to raise up religious supermen and aristocrats); hope for the physical side of life as well as 
for the spiritual, in the sense that not only sin and sorrow, but also poverty, sickness and death shall 
one day be abolished (in contrast to a purely spiritual ideal of the so-FDOOHGµUHOLJLRXV-PRUDO¶OLIH21 
                                                        
20
 µ3DVWDQG)XWXUH)ULHGULFK1DXPDQQDQG&KULVWRSK%OXPKDUGW¶S 
21
 µ3DVWDQG)XWXUH)ULHGULFK1DXPDQQDQG&KULVWRSK%OXPKDUGW¶SS-2. In addition to Blumhardt, we 
FDQ DOVR VHH KHUH WKH LQIOXHQFH RI WKH UHOLJLRXV VRFLDOLVW DXWKRU +HUPDQQ .XWWHU ZKR ZURWH µ:H FDQ
XQGHUVWDQG³FRQVHUYDWLYH´&KULVWLDQLW\ZKHQLWGHIHQGVDV\VWHPWhat has accomplished so much. But that 
it [Christianity] will not recognize the world-renewing power of the spirit that has animated it, that it 
distinguishes so anxiously between inner and outer, here is painful proof of its poverty and its 
JRGOHVVQHVV«7Ke same God who works in the inmost hearts of men, shall He not also change the outward 
DVSHFWRIPDQ¶VOLIH"+HZKRGULHVXSWKHURRWRIVLQLQWKHKHDUW«VKDOO+HQRWDOVRXVH+LVSRZHUZKHUH
VLQ IORXULVKHV«LQ WKH LQGXVWULDO ZRUOG"¶ They Must: or God and the Social Democracy (Chicago: Co-
operative Printing Company, 1908), p 78 - HPSKDVLVPLQHµ<RXVSHDNRIWKH³LQQHU´OLIHEHFDXVH\RXDUH
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,Q WKLV ZH VHH WKHEDVLF IUDPHZRUNRI%DUWK¶V VXVSLcion of the distinction between inner 
and outer; the retreat to an inner world essentially means that the outer world remains 
XQFKDQJHG WKDWZHDUH IRUFHG WRKDOWEHIRUH µXQDOWHUDEOH UHODWLRQVKLSV¶7KLVSDWWHUQFDQ
EH VHHQ HYHQ PRUH FOHDUO\ LQ %DUWK¶V UHsponse to Althaus. Barth notes how Althaus 
advocates a direct relation to God and to the gospel through the inner VHOIRUµVSLULW¶EXWLV
UDWKHU PRUH µUHDOLVWLF¶ RU UDWKHU SHVVLPLVWLF DERXW DSSO\LQJ *RG¶V UHYHDOHG ZLOO WR WKH
external realities of political life. In response, Barth asks:  
 
[W]here does Althaus, who is so sober in relation to the political realization of the will of God, get 
the certainty with which he asserts its psychological realization? Surely it is not the case that the 
spirit of the SHUPRQ RQ WKH 0RXQW DQG -HVXV¶ FRPPDQGPHQW WR ORYH DUH WKLQJV WKDW DUHSRVVLEOH
attainable, and feasible spiritually [seelisch] but not politically and socially? There is surely no 
difference: The inner life, even the religious, even the Christian religious life, stands under the 
same judgement under which Althaus (and we agree with him) sees the outward life«22 
 
Barth sums up as follows: 
 
,FRQIHVVWKDW>$OWKDXV¶@ERRNKDVJUHDWO\VWUHQJWKHQHGP\GHHSPLVWUXVWRIWKHVLQLVWHUFRQQHFWLRQ
between Lutheran inwardness and Lutheran worldliness.23 
 
1RZLWLVVXUHO\LPSRVVLEOHWRPLVVKHUHDFRQQHFWLRQZLWK%DUWK¶VFULWLFLVPRIHerrmann 
and his theological reliance on experience and the inner life (discussed in my fifth chapter). 
And what I find most striking is thDWZHILQGDFORVHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ%DUWK¶VFULWLFLVP
of the writers Naumann and Althaus, and our general analysis of the problem of the focus 
on subjectivity found in the empathetic tradition. For there we saw that the emphasis on 
inwardness and subjectivity means in effect that the objective or external receives an 
indirect legitimation. As I argued at length in my last chapter, the point is that a reliance on 
inward experience (or aesthetic categories) means in effect that the external 
                                                                                                                                                                     
LQ GDUNQHVV DQG \RXU RZQ ³LQQHU OLIH´ LV GDUNQHVV <RX KDYH QR SRZHU WR WUDQVIRUP WKH H[WHUQDO
ZRUOG«EHFDXVH\RXGRQRWNQRZWKHOLYLQJ*RG¶They mustSFI%DUWKµ7KH&KXUFKEHWZHHQ(DVW
DQG:HVW¶S 
22
 µ%DVLF3UREOHPVRI&KULVWLDQ6RFLDO(WKLFV¶SODVWHPSKDVLVPLQH 
23
 µ%DVLF3UREOHPVRI&KULVWLDQ6RFLDO(WKLFV¶SHPSKDVLVPLQH 
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presuppositions of our culture are placed beyond criticism. These presuppositions may be 
µRQO\¶H[WHUQDOEXW WKH\DUHWKHSUHVXSSRVLWLRQVZKLFKFUHDWHDQGVXVWDLQWKHVRFLDORUGHU
in which we live, and to that extent a retreat to the inward, subjective sphere is 
irresponsible. The institutions which grant us our freedom and restrict that of others may 
EH UHODWLYHO\ GHYDOXHG DV µH[WHUQDO REMHFWLILFDWLRQV¶ RI WKH WUXH LQZDUG OLIH EXW IURP
%DUWK¶VSRLQWRIYLHZWKH\DUHDOVRWKHUHE\VDQFWLILHGUHFRJQLVHGDVRQO\DUHODWLYe evil and 
not as the radical evil which they really are. I believe we can see Barth applying precisely 
this pattern of criticism to Althaus and Naumann, when he sees a connection between their 
retreat to an inner world and a compromise with and justification of the external forces of 
history and culture. 
 
,WLVYHU\VWULNLQJWKDWZHFDQWUDFH%DUWK¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQLQQHUDQG
outer to the period even before the outbreak of the First World War; indeed, we find it as 
far back as October  LQ%DUWK¶VILUVWDQGPRVWIDPRXVDGGUHVVWRWKHORFDO6DIHQZLO
Arbeiterverein, just three months after the beginning of his pastorate.24 McCormack 
REVHUYHVWKDWLQWKLVDGGUHVV%DUWKLPSOLFLWO\FULWLFLVHV+DUQDFN¶VWHDFKLQJH[SUHVVHGLQKLV
book What is Christianity?), namely that the gospel is simply a matter of the soul and 
could be related to individual acts of charity but could not in any direct sense be 
externalised in terms of change to the social or economic order.25 McCormack also cites 
the foOORZLQJIURPRQHRI%DUWK¶VVHUPRQVRI 
                                                        
24
 µ-HVXV &KULVW DQG WKH 0RYHPHQW IRU 6RFLDO -XVWLFH¶ LQ * +XQVLQJHU HG Karl Barth and Radical 
Politics, pp 19-45. 
25
 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, pp 89f; Harnack, What is Christianity? (Oxford: Williams and 
Norgate, 2  S  µ7KH *RVSHO LV DERYH Dll questions of mundane development; it is 
FRQFHUQHGQRWZLWKPDWHULDOWKLQJVEXWZLWKWKHVRXOVRIPHQ¶Sµ7KH*RVSHOLVDVRFLDOPHVVDJH
solemn and overpowering in its force; it is the proclamation of solidarity and brotherliness, in favour of the 
poor. But the message is bound up with the recognition of the infinite value of the human soul, and is 
contained in what Jesus said about the kingdom of God. We may also assert that it is an essential part of 
what he there said. But laws or ordinances of injunctions bidding us forcibly alter the conditions of the age 
LQZKLFKZHPD\KDSSHQWREHOLYLQJDUHQRWWREHIRXQGLQWKHJRVSHO¶,QDOOIDLUQHVVZHPXVWUHFRJQLVH
WKHFRPSOH[LW\RI+DUQDFN¶VSRVLWLRQIRUKHGLGQRWFODLPWKDWWKHJRVSHOFRXOGQRt in any way be related 
to socialist struggle; he merely claimed that this could not be a part of the essence of the gospel. However, 
ZHVKRXOGQRWH WKDW -&2¶1HLOO LQDUHFHQWDUWLFOHDUJXHVIRUDLQWHJUDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ+DUQDFN¶V
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,W LVQRWRQO\ µZH¶ WKDW LV WRVD\RXUVRXOVRXU LQQHUDQGSHUVRQDO OLIHZKLFKPXVWEHFRPH OLJKW
Rather, the world must become light; everything around us must become light. We must not 
separate the two frRP RQH DQRWKHU 8QEHOLHI LV KLGGHQ LQ WKLV VHSDUDWLRQ«<RX PD\ QRW VD\ DQG
think, I do want the light to apply to me personally and will strive to be subject to the will of God 
even in the small things. But what does it matter to me whether self-interest and stupidity and 
animal instinct rule outside, in the world of commerce in public morality, in politics great and 
small? Let it be so! so long as I save my soul in this evil world.26 
 
I mention this because in my previous chapters I have drawn attention to BDUWK¶VVWUXJJOH
ZLWK +HUUPDQQ VSHFLILFDOO\ ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH U{OH RI µLQZDUG H[SHULHQFH¶ DV D 
justification of the war. However, in the light of the evidence just cited, I certainly would 
QRW VD\ WKDW %DUWK¶V VXVSLFLRQ RI WKH µLQQHU OLIH¶ RULJLQDWHV IURm his disillusionment with 
Herrmann with regard to the war; but I would still say that he relates this prior framework 
to his struggle with Herrmann.27 7KLV ZDV RQO\ QDWXUDO JLYHQ +HUUPDQQ¶V HPSKDVLV RQ
UHOLJLRXV H[SHULHQFH DQG WKH µLQQHU OLIH¶ ,QGHHG LW is particularly striking that this basic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
spiritual/privatHYLHZRIUHOLJLRQDQGKLVU{OHLQWKHRXWEUHDNRIWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DUµ$GROIYRQ+DUQDFN
and the entry of the German state into war, July-$XJXVW¶SSI 
26
 Dialectical Theology, p 96 (Barth, Predigten 1913 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1976), pp 71-2). 
Perhaps even more striking is another sermon of 1913 to which McCormack refers, namely that on the 
FOHDQVLQJ RI WKH WHPSOH 0F&RUPDFN HPSKDVLVHV WKH IDFW WKDW %DUWK GUDZV DWWHQWLRQ WR -HVXV¶ anger as 
HYLGHQFH IRU%DUWK¶VFRQIOLFWZLWKWKHZRUOGDURXQGKLP\HW0F&RUPDFNGRHVQRWQRWH%DUWK¶VXVDJHLQ
WKHVDPHVHUPRQRIWKHGXDOLW\EHWZHHQLQQHUDQGRXWHUµ1XQHWZDV:HLWHUHV'DVVFKHLQEDUÄußerliche 
an jener Handlung Jesu im Tempel. Ja, das Übel, das er dort antraf und das ihn so zornig machte, war  
etwas Äußerliches, und mit einem äußerlichen Mittel, nämlich mit einer Geißel aus Stricken, hat er es 
EHNlPSIW¶ Predigten 1913 S  µ:LU &KULVWHQ YRQ KHXW]XWDJH VROOWHQ QRFK YLHO PHKU OHUQHQ
abzukommen von dem halb ängstlichen, halb bequemen Gedanken, das Christentum sei bloß eine Gemüts- 
XQG6HHOHQVDFKHXQGQLFKWDXFKGLH0DFKWGLHGDVlXHUH/HEHQGLH³:HOW´ZLHZLUVDJHQXPJHVWDOWHQ
PX¶S 
27
 FI %DUWK¶V TXHVWLRQ WR +HUUPDQQ LQ KLV OHWWHU RI th Nov 1914, which I think clearly has in mind the  
LQQHURXWHU IUDPHZRUN µ,VW LQ GHP FKULVWOLFKH *RWWHVHUOHEQLV HLQH JUXQGVlW]OLFKH XQG QRUPDWLYH
Stellungnahme zu den Erscheinungen des sozialen und nationalen Lebens enthalten, oder ist es indifferent 
für Gut und Böse, sobald die individuelle Verantwortlichkeit des Einzelnen zurücktritt? Soll der ethische 
Monismus Calvins gelten, oder der ethische Dualismus Luthers, Naumanns uQG7URHOWVFKV"¶Karl Barth-
Martin Rade: ein Briefwechsel, p 115.) 
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SULQFLSOH LQ %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ LV VR GHHS-rooted, in that it can be traced back to the first 
months of his Safenwil pastorate.28 
 
,Q IDFW , EHOLHYH WKDW WKH PRVW HVVHQWLDO SULQFLSOH LQ %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ IURP LWV HDUOy 
Safenwil phase to his latest writings, is to be found in his recognition of the immense 
power of the external forces of culture and history, specifically regarding the fact that they 
hold sway even over the individual who believes that he transcends them in his inward 
H[SHULHQFH,KDYHJLYHQHYLGHQFHIRUWKLVIURP%DUWK¶VHDUOLHVWZULWLQJVDQGDGGUHVVHVDQG
here I would also draw attention to the following passage taken from the posthumously 
published fragment of the Dogmatics entitled The Christian Life:  
 
World history, being the history of man and humanity, of Adamic humanity which has fallen from 
God, is also the history of innumerable absolutisms of different kinds, of forces that are truly and 
SURSHUO\ PDQ¶V RZQ EXW WKDW KDYH ZRQ D FHUWDLQ DXWRQRP\, independence and even superiority in 
relation to him. There they are, powerful enough in and in spite of their impotence to be too much for 
the one who can and should be their lord and [powerful enough] to take him to task, to master him 
who should master them, influencing, determining and controlling his thought and speech and also 
KLV SXUSRVHV DQG HQWHUSULVHV IRU KLPVHOI DQG LQ KLV FRPPRQ OLIHZLWKRWKHUV«7KH\DUHQRW MXVW WKH
VXSSRUWV EXW WKH PRWRUV RI VRFLHW\ 7KH\ DUH WKH VHFUHW JXDUDQWHH RI PDQ¶V JUeat and small 
FRQYHQWLRQV FXVWRPV KDELWV WUDGLWLRQV DQG LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KH\ DUH WKH KLGGHQ ZLUHSXOOHUV LQ PDQ¶V
great and small enterprises, movements, achievements, and revolutions. They are not just the 
potencies but the real factors and agents of human progress, regress and stagnation in politics, 
economics, scholarship, technology and art, and also of the evolutions and retardations in all the 
personal life of the individual. It is not really people who do things, whether leaders or the masses. 
                                                        
28
 FI:LOIULHG+lUOH LQKLVDUWLFOHHQWLWOHGµ'HU$XIUXIGHU93 Intellektuellen und Karl Barths Bruch mit 
GHU OLEHUDOHQ 7KHRORJLH¶ S  +lUOH VWDWHV WKDW %DUWK¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR /LEHUDO WKHRORJ\ ZDV DOUHDG\
broken at this point, in 1911, when he (Barth) polemicised against a religion of pure inwardness. I believe 
McCormack is right that Härle has overstated his case (Dialectical Theology, p 79). On the other hand, I 
think that Härle was perhaps basically right to claim that the most important theological decisions were 
made in or around the year 1911; although I would disagree with his conclusion that the reaction of 
%DUWK¶V/LEHUDOWHDFKHUVWRWKHZDUZDVQRWDGHFLVLYHLQIOXHQFHLQKLVWKHRORJLFDOGHYHORSPHQW+lUOHPD\
be right that Barth later overstated the impact of the public pro-war declaration which his Liberal teachers 
signed. But there is still plenty of evidence that their reaction to the war (which Barth knew of quite apart 
from their public declaration) exercised a decisive effect on his attitude towards Liberal (i.e. Marburg) 
WKHRORJ\ HJ LQ %DUWK¶V letter to Herrmann dated 4th Nov 1914 - Karl Barth-Martin Rade: ein 
BriefwechselSDOVR%DUWK¶V OHWWHU WR7KXUQH\VHQGDWHGth Sept 1914  - Revolutionary Theology, p 
26). 
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ThrougK PDQNLQG¶V IDXOW WKLQJV DUH LQYLVLEO\ GRQH ZLWKRXW DQG DERYH PDQ even above the human 
individual in all his uniqueness, by the host of absolutisms, of powers that seek to be lordless and that 
make an impressive enough attempt to exhibit and present themselves as such.29 
 
1RZKHUHLQWKHILQDOSKDVHRI%DUWK¶VJUHDWOLIHZRUNZHILQGDYHU\SRZHUIXOVWDWHPHQW
of the principle of collective self-deception. This principle is that history is driven by 
concealed powers of sin which predetermine all external historical realities, and which 
extend also to the personal life and awareness of the individual. These are the social and 
                                                        
29
 Barth, The Christian Life, p 216 (emphasis mine). We can compare this directly with an excerpt from a 
VHUPRQFLWHGE\0F&RUPDFNµ,VKXPDQLW\QRWOLNHDSHUVRQZLWKDIHYHUWRVVHGKHUHDQGWKHUHE\
the powers of self-seeking, greed, pride and hatred? Are these not the powers which dictate the laws which 
govern our businesses, our political life, and our social life? And do we not all sense how these laws also 
JRYHUQ RXU VRXOV KRZ DJDLQ DQG DJDLQ ZH WKLQN DQGGR WKRVH WKLQJVZKLFKZHNQRZRXJKWQRW WREH"¶
(Dialectical Theology, p 95; Predigten 1913, p 68.) We may also take note of the following parallel 
between The Christian Life and Predigten 1913. In The Christian Life %DUWK ZULWHV RI µ0DPPRQ WKH
ORUGOHVVSRZHURIPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVWKDWKROGVDEVROXWHVZD\RYHUPDQ«0RQH\LVDIOH[LEOHEXWSRZHUIXO
instrument which, supposedly handled by man, in reality follows its own law. In a thousand ways it can 
establish some opinions and even convictions and suppress others. It can also create brutal facts. It can 
FDXVHWKHPDUNHWWRULVHDQGWKHQWRIDOODJDLQ«,WFDQVHUYHSHDFH\HW pursue cold war even in the midst of 
peace. It can make ready for a bloody war and bring it about. It can bring provisional paradise here and the 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJ SURYLVLRQDO KHOO WKHUH«¶ S   ,Q Predigten 1913  ZH UHDG µ'HU 0DPPRQ«LVW GHU
Fürst, der aOOH:HOWXQWHUVHLQHP6]HSWHUKDW«(UZLQNWXQGGLH*HLVWHUHUZDFKHQGLH)HIDQJHQDQ]X
laufen, die Hände zu arbeiten, die Räder drehen sich, eine Welt kommt in Bewegung. Er winkt ab, und an 
die Stelle des Lebens tritt Totenstille. Er leitet die Entwicklung der Völker. Er befiehlt hier einen blutigen 
.ULHJXQGYHUKLQGHUWGRUWHLQHQDQGHUQ¶ S7KHDOPRVWYHUEDOSDUDOOHOLVYHU\VWULNLQJDQGZHFDQ
note also that in the 1913 sermons Barth expounded the concept of self-deceptive compromise in 
connecWLRQ ZLWK µ0DPPRQ¶ µGLH /JH GLH *RWW XQG GHP 0DPPRQ PLWHLQDQGHU GLHQHQ ZLOO«¶
Predigten 1913, S)LQDOO\ZHPD\WDNHQRWHRIWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJHIURP%DUWK¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHFDVH
RIWKHFRPPXQLVW(DVWDJDLQVWWKHFDSLWDOLVW:HVWLQµ7KH&KXUFKEHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW¶VHHP\
third chapter), pp 133-µ7RZKRPGRWKH\DOORZHDOOHJLDQFHLQWKHODVWUHVRUW- your papers and parties 
DQGXQLRQVIURPZKLFK\RXJHW\RXUVXSSRVHGO\IUHHRSLQLRQV«":KHUHHOVHEXWLQWKHJUHDWEDQNVDUHWKH
wires pulled [die Drähte gezogen] on which you dance in your imagined freedom; who else but the banks 
decide in the last resort whether you are able to work or not, to earn or not to earn, and therefore to live or 
not to live? Is not any means good enough for you when you are carrying on your partly wilful, partly 
deluded fight for the dominion of this god of yours; any kind of war, and in peace-time any kind of 
FLYLOLVHGEUXWDOLW\DQGIUDXGDQ\PDFKLQDWLRQ«"¶&RPSDUHDERYH The Christian LifeSµ7KH\DUH
the hidden wirepullers [Drahtzieher@HWF¶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cultural forces for which man is ultimately responsible but from which he is no longer able 
to escape and of which he is, in most cases, no longer even conscious. This principle, 
which I believe to be the IXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHRI%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\FDQEHVWDWHGLQWZR
closely inter-related parts: first, the self-awareness of the individual is predetermined by 
trans-individual factors, whLFKUHPDLQFRQFHDOHGIURPWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-awareness; and 
second, these factors are what we would call sinful - that is, having their origin in human 
responsibility, in the various forms of human selfishness, and being ultimately destructive in 
their effect. 
 
,W PD\ ZHOO EH REMHFWHG WR WKLV IRUPXODWLRQ WKDW , KDYH IDLOHG WR GR MXVWLFH WR %DUWK¶V
determination to ground his theology on a theological or christological basis. This question 
cannot be answered comprehensively at this point, but in what follows I would like to give 
some indication of how we may approach the question; in particular, I think this question 
LV GLUHFWO\ UHODWHG WR WKH LVVXH RI %DUWK¶V development in his later writings towards a 
greater christological concentration. Specifically, it could be argued that I am abstracting 
%DUWK¶VHDUOLHUZRUNDQGUHDGLQJLWLQWRKLVODWHUZRUN,ZLOOQRZWDNHDPRUHGHWDLOHGORRN
at this objection. 
 
Objection: early and late Barth 
 
7KH REMHFWLRQ ZKLFK PD\ EH UDLVHG DJDLQVW P\ SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI %DUWK¶V theology can be 
formulated as follows. Although I have demonstrated a certain common thread in his 
counter-cultural attitude and concepts from his earliest to his latest writings, nevertheless 
surely there is a crucial difference which I have ignored, namely the development of 
%DUWK¶V FKULVWRORJLFDO FRQFHQWUDWLRQ ZKLFK LVSRZHUIXOO\SUHVHQW LQKLV ODWHUZULWLQJVEXW
relatively muted in his earlier writings. 
 
In response to this question, I think it would help us to grasp what is at stake here if I 
express it within the framework of the issue I have highlighted. What I mean is: it could be 
FODLPHGWKDW,KDYHLGHQWLILHGDQLPSRUWDQWFRPPRQWKUHDGLQ%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\LQWHUPVRI
his counter-cultural criticism; however, what I have failed to see is that in his later 
theological development he came more and more to see that he could not rely on an angry 
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counter-cultural critique. He could not rely on only clearing away the debris. Instead, he 
recognised that if we are to have the confidence not to compromise or to establish a 
µFRQFRUGDW¶ZLWK WKH VLQIXO UHDOLW\RI WKHZRUOG WKHQZHPXVW UHFRJQLVHWKDWSULRU WRDOO
RXURZQHIIRUWV-HVXV&KULVWKDVWKHYLFWRU\RYHUWKHZRUOG+HQFHLQ%DUWK¶VODWHUZRUN
he developed a more positive doctrine of Christ, and, in so far as this involved a focus on 
&KULVW¶VYLFWRU\RYHUWKHGDUNQHVVUDWKHUWKDQRQWKHGDUNQHVVLWVHOIWKLVXOWLPDWHO\OHGWRD
more positive understanding of the world and of culture in general.30 
 
For me, the basic question here is whether this apparent discontinuity (or substantive 
development) between his earlier and later theology weakens or even destroys the parallels 
I have cited from the different phases of his theology. It is my view that it does not, or at 
least does not do so necessarily. For even in the later works, when the positive reality of 
&KULVW¶VYLFWRU\LVSHUKDSVHPSKDVLVHGPRUHVWURQJO\QHYHUWKHOHVVLWUHPDLQVWKHFDVHWKDW
%DUWK¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDW LWmeans to claim Christ as Saviour is primarily shaped by 
his view of sin as self-deceptive compromise with the existing orders. I think this is 
apparent, for example, in the following passage from CD IV/2: 
 
«>,@QWKLVRQVODXJKW>GLUHFWHGDJDLQVWWKHZRUOG@LWLVDPDWWHURI*RG¶VGHVWUXFWLRQDFFRPSOLVKHGLQ
the existence of the Son of Man, of all the so-FDOOHG³JLYHQIDFWRUV´DOOWKHVXSSRVHGQDWXUDORUGHUV
all the historical forces, with which the claim of absolute validity and worth have obtruded themselves 
DVDXWKRULWLHV«EHWZHHQ*RGDQGPDQEXWDOVREHWZHHQPDQDQGKLVIHOORZV«:hen they are posited 
DEVROXWHO\SRVVHVVLRQVZKLFKDUHVLJQLILFDQWO\GHVFULEHGDVWKH³PDPPRQRIXQULJKWHRXVQHVV´LQ/N
169) and worldly honour, the force which defends them, the family with its claims and even the law of 
                                                        
30
 e.g., we have noted that Barth writes of the compromise between the knowledge and ignorance of God 
in The Christian Life %XW ZH VKRXOG DOVR QRWH KRZ LQ WKLV FRQQHFWLRQ KH VWDWHV µ,I DV WKH OLYLQJ
community of Jesus Christ and its living members we cannot escape a final profound disquiet in face of the 
fact of the juxtaposition of light and darkness which dominates our present, this is because the total and 
final sanctifying of the name of God and the removal of the juxtaposition has already been revealed to us 
E\ WKH:RUG«DVVRPHWKLQJWKDWKDVWDNHQSODFHDOUHDG\LQWKHZRUNRI-HVXV&KULVW7KLVVDQFWLI\LQJRI
WKHQDPHRI*RGWKDWKDVDOUHDG\WDNHQSODFHSHUIHFWO\LQ-HVXV&KULVW«VWDQGVLQRXUZD\IRUELGGLQJus to 
FRPHWRWHUPVDQGEHFRQWHQWZLWKWKHGHVHFUDWLRQRI*RG¶VQDPHLQRXUSUHVHQWDVZLWKRXWWKLVYHWRZH
ZRXOGZDQWWRGRDQGPLJKWGR«¶SS-6HHDOVR+XQVLQJHUZKRFRQWUDVWV%DUWK¶VFRXQWHU-cultural 
criticism with that of Kierkegaard, evidentO\ WKLQNLQJ WKDW .LHUNHJDDUG¶V FULWLFLVP LV VHOI-grounded and 
KHQFHPHUHO\QHJDWLYHZKHUHDV%DUWK¶V WKRXJKW LVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DFRQILGHQFHLQWKHYLFWRU\RI&KULVW
over negative cultural forces (How to Read Karl Barth, pp 259-260, referring to CD IV/3, pp 120-1). 
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a religion (and worst of all a religion of revelation) are all gods which are first set up by man, which 
DUHWKHQZRUVKLSSHGLQSUDFWLFHDQGZKLFKILQDOO\GRPLQDWHKLP«,WLVQRWPHQRUDQ\RQHPDQZKR
FDQPDNHWKHEUHDNZLWKWKHVHJLYHQIDFWRUVDQGRUGHUVDQGKLVWRULFDOIRUFHV«,WLVWKe kingdom, the 
revolution of God which breaks them, which has already broken them. Jesus is their Conqueror.31 
 
My point here is that, although Jesus is named as the one who alone is victorious over sin, 
nevertheless the specific meaning and content of this YLFWRU\LVGHILQHGLQWHUPVRI%DUWK¶V
distinctive insight as to what sin actually entails. It appears to me that this passage 
underlines rather than contradicts my basic thesis that Barth intended to restate the gospel 
in view of what I have called the hermeneutical dimension of sin, the latter being the 
problem that individual thought and action are overwhelmed by the sin concealed in the 
broader structures of history and society. I would say there is a direct and integral 
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ%DUWK¶VVWDWHPHQWKHUHWKDWµ>L@WLVQRWPHQRUDQ\RQHPDQZKRFDQ
PDNHWKHEUHDNZLWKWKHVHJLYHQIDFWRUVDQGRUGHUVDQGKLVWRULFDOIRUFHV¶DQGKLVVWDWHPHQW
LQ WKHSUHYLRXVTXRWDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKHµORUGOHVVSRZHUV¶ WKDWµWKURXJKPDQNLQG¶VIDXOW
things are done invisibly without and above man, even above the individual in all his 
XQLTXHQHVV«¶ ,QERWKFDVHVZKDW LVDW VWDNH LVKXPDQLW\¶VKHOSOHVVQHVV LQIDFHRI WKHVH
trans-LQGLYLGXDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGIRUFHV,W LVXQGHQLDEO\WKHFDVHWKDW&KULVW¶VVDYLQJUHDOLW\
and action cannot be deduced from the problem Barth is engaged with; but I myself think it 
HTXDOO\ XQGHQLDEOH WKDW KLV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI &KULVW¶V VDYLQJ DFWLRQ LV DW OHDVW GHFLVLYHO\
shaped through his engagement with this problem. 
 
I also think it important to pursue how, immediately after the passage just quoted, Barth 
SURFHHGV WR GUDZ RXW WKH SUDFWLFDO FRQVHTXHQFHV RI -HVXV¶ YLFWRU\ IRU &KULVWLDQ
discipleship. For here again the distinction between inner and outer comes to the fore: 
 
If we are disciples, we are necessarily witnesses of this fact [i.e. that Jesus is Conqueror]. We are 
awakened by Him from the dream that these forces are divine, or divinely given actualities, eternal 
RUGHUV«,IZHDUH+LVGLVFLSOHVZHDUHIUHHGE\+LPIURPWKHLUUXOH«7KHZRUOd which sighs under 
these powers must hear and receive and rejoice that their lordship is broken. But this declaration 
cannot be made by the existence of those who are merely free inwardly«+LVGLVFLSOHVFDQQRWEH
content with a mere theory about the relatiYLVDWLRQRIWKRVHIDOVHDEVROXWHVDPHUH«LQZDUGIUHHGRP
LQUHODWLRQWRWKHP«>,@WLVDGHQLDORIWKHFDOOWRGLVFLSOHVKLSLIWKH\HYDGHWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIDFWV
                                                        
31
 CD IV/2, pp 543-4. 
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DQGDWWLWXGHVLQZKLFKHYHQH[WHUQDOO\DQGYLVLEO\WKH\EUHDNIUHHIURPWKHVHDWWDFKPHQWV«7KHUe 
FDQEHQRTXHVWLRQ«RIDVRDULQJDQGWUDQTXLOOLVLQJP\VWLFLVPRIZRUOG-renunciation and freedom 
and conquest in which the obligation to the godless and hostile orders already broken in Christ is 
not only maintained but if anything validated and sanctifiHG«1R LW LV LPSRUWDQW RQO\ DV LQ
REHGLHQFHWRWKH2QHZKRGHPDQGVLWLWLVDQLQGLFDWLRQRI+LVDWWDFNDQGYLFWRU\«>7KHGLVFLSOHRI
Jesus] must and will run the risk of being an offence to those around him - and in so far as he sees 
with their eyes, to KLPVHOI«,WLVQRWDPDWWHURIVDYLQJKLVRZQVRXOLQWKHDWWDLQPHQWRIDSULYDWH
EHDWLWXGH+HORVHVKLVVRXO«LIKHZLOOQRWDFFHSWWKHSXEOLFUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZKLFKKHDVVXPHVZKHQ
he becomes a disciple of Jesus.32 
  
I have quoted this passage at length to dHPRQVWUDWHWKDW%DUWK¶VGRJPDWLFFRQFHSWRIWKH
victory of Christ is inextricably linked to his earlier ideas, going back to 1913 and indeed 
earlier, when he protested against the interiorising and spiritualising of Christian faith as a 
covert legitimation RIH[LVWLQJµH[WHUQDO¶RUGHUV:HFDQHYHQVHHDGLUHFWSDUDOOHOZLWKWKH
VHUPRQ RI  TXRWHG DERYH LH µVR ORQJ DV , VDYH P\ VRXO LQ WKLV HYLO ZRUOG¶33 It 
cannot be denied that there are considerable developments in dogmatic conceptuality 
between the sermons of 1913 and CD IV/2 about forty years later. Nevertheless, I would 
propose that even in the later work the truly vital element, which gives content and 
direction to his Christ-centred soteriology, is structurally continuous with the socio-
political criticism found in his earlier work. 
 
)XUWKHU5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI%DUWK¶V7KHRORJ\KLVGHYHORSPHQWDZD\IURP
socialism 
 
,W ZRXOG ULJKWO\ EH VDLG WKDW DQ\ VXFK FODLP DERXW %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ PXVW DOVR WDNH LQWR
account the fact that at some point he began explicitly to distance himself from the 
religious socialist movement and also from socialism as such. But, in spite of this factor, I 
ZRXOGVWLOOPDLQWDLQWKDW%DUWK¶VODWHUGHYHORSPHQWVUHPDLQHGGHSHQGHQWRQWKHLQIOXHQFH
of socialism on hLVHDUO\ WKRXJKW,QIDFW%DUWK¶VPRYHPHQWDZD\IURPVRFLDOLVPFDQEH
seen - paradoxically - as a more radical application of the fundamental principle of 
socialism as he understood it. 
                                                        
32
 CD IV/2, pp 544-5 (emphasis mine). 
33
 Predigten 1913 S  7KH RULJLQDO *HUPDQ LV UHVSHFWLYHO\ µ:HQQ LFK QXU PHLQH 6HHOH UHWWH LQ GHU
E|VHQ:HOW¶DQGµ(VJHKWMDIULKQQLFKWGDUXPLQ(UZHUEXQJHLQHV3ULYDWHQ+HLOVVHLQH6HHOH]XUHWWHQ¶ 
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I think that what Barth learned from socialism in general and from religious socialism in 
particular was this: the existing orders of state and society can perpetuate themselves by 
GHFHLYLQJ WKHSRSXODFHRI WKHLUµSUDFWLFDOQHFHVVLW\¶,QWKLVZD\SHRSOHDWYDU\LQJOHYHOV
become persuaded that the existing orders simply cannot be changed; that the reformation 
or revolution of existing conditions might be desirable in theory but not achievable in 
practice. The value of socialism was that it challenged such assumptions about this 
deceptively maintained distinction between theory and practice.34 
 
+RZHYHU%DUWK¶VSUREOHPZDVWKDWERWKVHFXODUVRFLDOGHPRFUDF\DQGUHOLJLRXVVRFLDOLVP
themselves had a tendency to stop short of their own better principles and to succumb to a 
pragmatic spirit - that is, they also tended to behave as if there were an ultimate   
distinction between theory and practice, and accordingly to make illegitimate  
compromises with the existing orders. Barth argued that although one must admittedly 
make distinctions between what one would like to achieve in theory and what one is able 
to achieve in practice, nevertheless this distinction must never be treated as normal or as 
                                                        
34
 I am not certain if Barth learnt the suspicion of the terms µWKHRU\ DQG SUDFWLFH¶ IURP WKH UHOLJLRXV
socialists, although I am certain that the concept LV FOHDUO\ YLVLEOH IRU H[DPSOH LQ +HUPDQQ .XWWHU¶V
pioneering work They Must - and, as previously noted, the concept is expressed by Kutter in terms of the 
SDUDOOHO µLQQHURXWHU¶GLVWLQFWLRQ ,QDQ\FDVHZH ILQG WKDW LQ%DUWKXVHGDFULWLFLVPRIDGHFHSWLYH
theory/practice distinction in defence of socialism as such - which shows that Barth did understand 
VRFLDOLVPDVFKDOOHQJLQJWKHVWDQGDUGWKHRU\SUDFWLFHGLVWLQFWLRQ7KHUHOHYDQWSDVVDJHLVIRXQGLQ%DUWK¶V
open letter to Herr Hüssy, a capitalist entrepreneur who had written an open letter to Barth in criticism of 
a socialisWVSHHFKDQGWKHIROORZLQJLVWKHUHOHYDQWSDUWRI%DUWK¶VUHSO\µ=XP6FKOXQRFKHLQ:RUWEHU
Ihre Phrase, daß zwischen Theorie und Praxis HLQ8QWHUVFKLHGEHVWHKH«6LHZROOHQGDPLWVDJHQGDPDQ
die Praxis mit der Theorie möglichst ungeschoren lassen solle. Dieser Wunsch ist in Ihrem Munde höchst 
begreiflich. Wie Sie mit der Praxis meinen, das ist der Privatnutzen, und was ich mit der Theorie meine, 
das ist die Gerechtigkeit. Sie tun sehr klug daran, dem Privatnutzen die Gerechtigkeit möglichst vom 
LeibH]XKDOWHQXQGJHZLVVHIDWDOH%LEHOVSUFKHDOV³DOWXQGGHVKDOEQLFKWPHKU]HLWJHPD´]XHUNOlUHQ
Aber wir wollen es abwarten, wessen Licht länger brennt, dasjenige Ihrer Klugheit, die die Theorie von 
der Praxis trennt, oder dasjenige des Sozialismus und der Bibel, die an die Stelle des Privatnutzens die 
*HUHFKWLJNHLW VHW]HQ¶ .DUO %DUWK µ$QWZRUW DXI GHQ RIIHQHQ %ULHI GHV +HUUQ : +VV\ LQ $DUEXUJ¶ LQ
Barth, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1993), 416 (411-417).) 
Also of interest here is the way Barth relates the distinction between theory and practice to making the 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH%LEOH¶VRZQWLPHDQGZKDWLVUHOHYDQWIRUWRGD\VHHIXUWKHUEHORZ 
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ultimate. Put another way, one must never grow accustomed to the distinction between 
theory and practice. For this has the effect of blunting the sharp edge of protest against the 
existing order, and it was its tendency in this direction which made Barth dissatisfied with 
socialism as he encountered it. According to Barth, one must never lose the sense of 
tension, contradiction even, between what one would like to achieve in theory and what 
one is able to achieve in practice. One must never, so to speak, trim the ideal to fit the 
reality.35 
 
1RZ,EHOLHYHWKDWLWZDVWKLVLVVXHZKLFKZDVLQWKHEDFNJURXQGRI%DUWK¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDW
the action of God must never be identified with any human action; this sense of tension, 
DPRXQWLQJ DOPRVW WR FRQWUDGLFWLRQ UHIOHFWV %DUWK¶V VHQVH RI KRZ RQH PXVW DOZD\V 
PDLQWDLQWKHVHQVHRI WHQVLRQEHWZHHQWKHLGHDOKHUHWKHµHWHUQDO¶µLQILQLWH¶RUWKHDFWLRQ
                                                        
35
 6HH%DUWK¶VFULWLTXHRI UHOLJLRXVVRFLDOLVPUHSUHVHQWHGby Die Hilfe (journal edited by F.Naumann), in 
 µ>$@ SROLWLFV ZKLFK UDLVHV WKH QHFHVVDU\ FRQFHVVLRQV DQG FRPSURPLVHV WR WKH GLJQLW\ RI JHQHUDOO\
valid ultimate ideas is very different from a politics which, to be sure, also makes concessions and 
comprRPLVHV IRU WKH VDNH RI LPPHGLDWH JRDOV«EXW LQ GRLQJ VR FRQVWDQWO\ PDNHV LW NQRZQ WKHVH DUH
SURYLVLRQDOLWLHV IRU ZKLFK ZH GR QRW IRU D PRPHQW KDYH DQ\ HQWKXVLDVP«,W LV RQH WKLQJ WR EHFRPH
accustomed to the world of relativities, finally becoming completel\VDWLVILHGDQG«DWKRPHLQWKHPDV
those who have no hope. It is another thing altogether, in the midst of this world of relativities, to be 
incessantly disquieted and full of longing, fundamentally revolutionary vis-à-vis WKDWZKLFKH[LVWV¶&LWHG
McCormack, Dialectical Theology, pp 108- UHIHUULQJ WR µDie Hilfe ¶Die Christliche Welt 28 (15 
Aug 1914), p 776 (774- $OVR QRWH %DUWK¶V OHWWHU WR 7KXUQH\VHQ LQ  UHJDUGLQJ WKH 6RFLDO
'HPRFUDWV µ3HUKDSV LW ZLOO LQWHUHVW \RX WR NQRZ ZKDW , KDG WR say to the Social Democrats in 
Küngoldingen yesterday. In the discussion one man said very pleasantly that what I had described to them 
was indeed the mind of Jesus and his disciples, but did I not know of another, easier way for them in view 
of the imperfection of the world and of humanity?! A trade-unionist instructed me concerning the 
LPSRVVLELOLW\ RI ³ZDLWLQJ´ DQG WKH QHFHVVLW\ RI WKH SUROHWDULDQ EDWWOH 2XU GLIILFXOW\ LQ DGGUHVVLQJ WKH
Social Democrats became clear to me once more: either one strengthens them in their party loyalty by 
SURYLGLQJDUHOLJLRXVIRXQGDWLRQ«RURQHWULHVWROHDGWKHPRXWEH\RQGWKHPVHOYHVDQGWKHUHE\«RQHOD\V
upon them a burden which is too heavy for many of them to bear. In spite of everything, the latter is the 
right thing WRGR«¶Revolutionary Theology, p 27 - letter dated 7th December 1914; cf CD I/1, pp 72-5.)  
Finally, we should take note of the following passage from several years later, in 1922, where Barth is 
ZULWLQJRIGUHDPVRIDQLGHDO8WRSLDQIXWXUHµ+DSS\KHDt least who gives himself no illusions over his 
own ability to realize what he sees there, who does not underestimate the distances, falsify the high words, 
and in order to fit the ideal to his limited possibilities trim and shorten it«+DSS\LQDZRUGWhe man 
who at least goes down with colors flying, without capitulation or compromise, true to himself and to what 
KHGHVLUHV¶µ7KH3UREOHPRI(WKLFV7RGD\¶SS-3 - emphases mine.) 
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of God himself) and what humans are able to achieve in practice. I mention this especially 
EHFDXVH-QJHOGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWR%DUWK¶VWHUPWKHµUHYROXWLRQRI*RG¶ZKLFKDFFRUGLQJWR
Barth must not be identified with any human action. Jüngel uses this fact to argue that 
Barth had thereby distanced himself from a political or socialist emphasis in theology; but 
LI P\ VXJJHVWLRQ LV ULJKW WKDW %DUWK¶V XVDJH KHUH LV GHWHUPLQHG E\ D more radical 
application of what he had learned from socialism, then this may mean WKDW %DUWK¶V
theocentric emphasis is more closely related to his socialist involvement than Jüngel 
recognised.36 
 
It needs to be said that these reflections are very far from a comprehensive summary of the 
SUREOHPVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK%DUWK¶VWKHRORJLFDOGHYHOopment. But for me they provide a clear 
indication of how his later developments may be more firmly rooted in his socialist 
beginnings than is immediately evident. I will leave this question now and draw this thesis 
to a close by summing up what we have learned with regard to our original question, 
QDPHO\WKHTXHVWLRQRI%DUWK¶VµXQQDWXUDO¶H[HJHVLV 
 
&RQFOXVLRQµWKHXQKRO\GRFWULQHRIWKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFH¶ 
 
,Q P\ YLHZ KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH SUREOHPV RI %DUWK¶V unnatural exegesis has enabled us to 
bring certain questions into focus. In the first place, it has meant that we cannot pass over 
the question of whether his exegetical conclusions and the theology based on them are 
actually grounded in the scriptural passages themselves. Indeed, I believe that as a 
condition of serious scholarship we have to begin DWWKHSRLQWZKHUHZHDGPLWWKDW%DUWK¶V
theology is not based on the texts in question, and conversely that he does in fact read his 
                                                        
36
 (-QJHO µ%DUWK¶V 7KHRORJLFDO %HJLQQLQJV¶ LQ Karl Barth: a Theological Legacy, p 101 (53-104), 
referring to the 1st edition of Romans µ,W LV FOHDU WKDW %DUWK¶V XVH RI WKH SROLWLFDO PHWDSKRU RI WKH
³UHYROXWLRQRI*RG´DVMXVWDPHWDSKRUZDVFRQVFLRXVO\LQWHQGHGWRREOLWHUDWHLWVSROLWLFDOSitz im Leben. 
This is most clearly expressed in his subsequent use of the metaphor against itself, when he asserts that the 
UHYROXWLRQ RI *RG LV ³DOVR D UHYROXWLRQDJDLQVWZKDW LV WRGD\FDOOHG UHYROXWLRQ´¶ ,ZRXOGDUJXH WKDW WKH
tension between the revolution of God and human revolution (viz. humanly practicable revolution) has its 
EDFNJURXQGLQ%DUWK¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQHHGWRPDLQWDLQDUDGLFDOWHQVLRQDVRSSRVHGWRDQDFFHSWHG
or comfortable distinction) between theory and practice or between the ideal and the real in the political 
DUHQD 7KDW LV WKH EDFNJURXQG WR WKH µUHYROXWLRQ DJDLQVW ZKDW LV WRGD\ FDOOHG UHYROXWLRQ¶ LV WKH UDGLFDO
UHMHFWLRQRIDQ\µUHDOLVWLF¶RUµSUDFWLFDO¶FRPSURPLVHVZLWKRUFDSLWXODWLRQVWRWKHH[LVWLQJRUGHU 
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theological presuppositions into the texts. And, as I stated provisionally in my first chapter, 
I think that this difficulty has forced us to consider the relationship between what has been 
FDOOHG %DUWK¶V theological exegesis and what would reasonably count as exegetical 
objectivity.  
 
As I also explained in my opening chapter, I find it in principle inadequate simply to use a 
VWXG\ RI %DUWK¶V H[HJHVLV WR KLJKOLJKW WKH SULRU WKHRORJLFDO FRPPLWPHQWV RU GRJPDWLF
interest which are presupposed in his exegesis. For, assuming we understand objectivity in 
the normal sense as a critical distancing from subjective presuppositions, then it appears 
LQHVFDSDEOHWKDWIRUDVORQJDVZHFODLP%DUWK¶VH[HJHVLVLVGHWHUPLQHGE\DWKHRORJLFDORU
dogmatic interest, then it will not be possible to show how his exegesis is related to 
anything we would rHFRJQLVH DV µREMHFWLYH¶ RU µFULWLFDO¶ LQ WKLV VHQVH ,W LV QHFHVVDU\ WR
acknowledge this if his oft-TXRWHGVORJDQµPRUHFULWLFDO WKDQWKHFULWLFV¶ LVWREHDQ\WKLQJ
more than a slogan. If we do not recognise this, we will be severing his exegesis not only 
from the hidden assumptions of critical exegesis, but also from a hermeneutically informed 
exegesis which is profoundly aware of the danger of hidden assumptions. For it is 
impossible to engage seriously in hermeneutically informed exegesis if our dogmatic or 
theological presuppositions are fixed in advance. As I indicated in my opening chapter, it is 
tempting to exculpate Barth on the grounds that only according to a procedure such as his 
would we be able to maintain a vital connection between scriptural exegesis and 
contemporary faith or preaching. And yet such an approach will only function for as long 
as we fail to notice the glaring difference, indeed contradiction, between a critical 
awareness of presuppositions on the one hand and a prior, unalterable fixing of dogmatic 
presuppositions on the other. 
 
Others who have held to my position on this have normally repudiated Barth as an exegete 
DQGWKHRORJLDQDQGWKRVHZKRKDYHQRWKHOGWKLVSRVLWLRQKDYHVHHQLWDV%DUWK¶Vstrength 
(or at least an unavoidable fact) that his thinking is ultimately incommensurable with 
generally accessible exegesis and hermeneutics. My approach has been to undertake the 
SHULORXVH[SHULPHQWRIWUDFLQJ%DUWK¶VGRJPDWLFSUHVXSSRVLWLRQVEDFNWRDSULQFLSOHZKLFK 
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is in fact commensurable with critically and hermeneutically conscious exegesis and biblical 
interpretation. This principle, which I believe underlies even his dogmatic presuppositions, 
concerns the impact of corporate or cultural self-deception on the immediate awareness of 
human beings. More specifically, this means that Barth opposes the construction of a realm 
RI µWKHRU\¶ RU RI WKH µLQQHU OLIH¶ ZKLFK FDQ EH GHPDUFDWHG DQG IHQFHG RII IURP WKH
SUDFWLFDOLWLHV RI WKH µH[WHUQDO¶ ZRUOG )RU WKHUH LV QR VXFK UHDOP RI LQZDUGQess, no such 
theoretical or ideal realm which is free from the impact of the external factors of society 
DQG KLVWRU\ ,W LV WKRVH ZKR EHOLHYH LQ VXFK D VSKHUH RI LQZDUGQHVVRU µLQZDUG IUHHGRP¶
who are thereby most strongly enslaved to these varied and insidious external factors. 
 
:H KDYH IROORZHG %XUQHWW¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW %DUWK¶V KHUPHQHXWLFV LV DSURWHVWDJDLQVW WKH
empathetic tradition, derived from Schleiermacher and prior to him, from Lessing, with its 
emphasis on the structured distinction between inner and outer (or inward subjectivity and 
H[WHUQDOREMHFWLILFDWLRQV,ZRXOGFODLPWKDW,KDYHWDNHQ%XUQHWW¶VDUJXPHQWIXUWKHUDQG
WUDFHGWKHRULJLQRI%DUWK¶VKHUPHQHXWLFVEDFNWRKLVVXVSLFLRQRIWKHpolitical function of 
the inner/outer distinction, that is, to his protest against the way this distinction functions 
to legitimate the existing social and political orders. My view is that, because of his 
suspicion of the way this inner/outer distinction functions in the political sphere, Barth 
acquired a corresponding suspicion of the distinction between inner and outer as it 
operates in scriptural interpretation (or, more generally, in historical understanding and 
hermeneutics). In my fifth chapter we looked in detail at how the distinction between inner 
and outer corresponds to the distinction between spirit and letter in Liberal and romantic 
hermeneutics. And the corresponding distinction between theory and practice, which we 
examined most especially in my fourth chapter, corresponds to the distinction between 
what the author meant in his own time and what he means for today, or, alternatively, to 
the distinction between our theoretical reflection on the biblical text and our practical 
DSSOLFDWLRQ RI LW , SURSRVH WKDW %DUWK¶V RSSRVLWLRQ WR DOO VXFKGLVWLQFWLons can be traced 
back to his protest against their political function or implications. 
 
With reference to the last point (viz. theory and practice), we may recall my analysis  of 
%DUWK¶V µWKUHH VWDJHV¶RIELEOLFDOH[HJHVLVQDPHO\REVHUYDWLRQUHIOHFWLRQand application. 
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In summing up his analysis of the three stages of exegesis in CD I/2, Barth writes as 
follows: 
 
If [the biblical text] is envisaged only as a so-called theory into which our practice has to breathe the 
necessary life, it has not been properly seen at all. And our observation and reflection on Scripture 
have been not merely useless but false. False scriptural exegesis at the two first stages usually 
betrays itself and is avenged at the third stage in the fact that our attitude to Scripture now assumes 
WKHGXDOLVWLFIRUPRIWKLVXQKRO\GRFWULQHRI³WKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFH´«37 
 
1RZ,ZRXOGDUJXHWKDWWKHEDFNJURXQGWRWKLVFRPPHQWLV%DUWK¶VFRQFHUQRYHUWKHZD\
that the distinction between theory and practice functions in the political sphere in 
legitimating the existing orders. The consequence of this is that we need to have a very 
FDUHIXOO\ QXDQFHG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI %DUWK¶V DSSDUHQW WXUQ IURP SROLWLFV WR D VFULSWXUDOO\
EDVHG WKHRORJ\ )RU %DUWK¶V WXUQ WRZDUGV 6FULSWXUH ZDV QRW ZKDW ZH ZRXOG QRUPDOOy 
understand as such; it was not a decision to be concerned with Scripture in itself and as 
such.38 It was, rather, a protest against the existing order and against the way that 
Scripture, through apparently sophisticated critical interpretations, becomes assimilated to 
the pragmatic assumptions of contemporary culture. As I put this in my fourth chapter, 
Barth was not motivated by an exalted view of the biblical text, but rather by a radical 
suspicion of the contemporary world view. The question is how it is possible for Scripture 
to speak a word to us which is not simply assimilated to the framework of deceptively 
self-evident assumptions which constitute our culture and which subversively determine 
DOORXUWKRXJKWDQGIHHOLQJRXUWKHRULVLQJDQGRXUµLQQHU OLIH¶ 
 
I will close now with some comments on possible directions for further research along the 
lines indicated in this thesis. 
 
                                                        
37
 CD I/2, p 737. 
38
 2Q%DUWK¶VµWXUQWRWKH6FULSWXUH¶VHH(-QJHOµ%DUWK¶V7KHRORJLFDO%HJLQQLQJV¶SZKHUH-QJHO
FLWHV %DUWK¶V FRPPHQW WR 7KXUQH\VHQ µ,I RQO\ ZH KDG EHHQ FRQYHUWHG WR WKH %LEOH earlier, so that we 
ZRXOGQRZKDYHVROLGJURXQGXQGHURXUIHHW¶6HHRevolutionary Theology, p 45.) Jüngel clearly sees this 
DV IXUWKHUHYLGHQFH IRU%DUWK¶V WXUQ IURPSROLWLFV WRDVWULFWO\ WKHRORJLFDOEDVLVEXWDV ,KRSH LVFOHDU ,
UHJDUG WKLV DV D IDOVH DQWLWKHVLV LQ WKDW %DUWK¶V SULPDU\ LQWHQWLRQ LV WR SURWHVW DJDLQVW WKH IUDPHZRUNRI
contemporary cultural presuppositions, and the way Scripture is incorporated into them. 
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First of all, I would say that I am very much aware that there are certain overarching 
WKHPHV LQ %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ ZKLFK ZKLlst very prominent in his theology, nevertheless 
have not been directly addressed in the present thesis. These would need to be addressed 
LI P\ RYHUDOO DSSURDFK WR %DUWK¶V WKHRORJ\ ZHUH WR EH PRUH WKRURXJKO\ VXEVWDQWLDWHG
Especially I have in mind scholastic themes such as his adoption of Chalcedonian 
christology and his Trinitarianism. However, this is beyond the scope of the present 
WKHVLVZKLFKKDV IRFXVHGRQ%DUWK¶VGRFWULQHRI6FULSWXUHDQGRQWKHWKHRORJLFDO LVVXHV
which have arisen immediately from our examination of this doctrine.39 
 
Secondly, I believe that Barth scholarship should adopt a more differentiated and 
KLVWRULFDOO\ FRQWH[WXDOLVHG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI %DUWK¶V QHJDWLYH VWDWHPHQWV RQ WKH XVH RI
philosophical or hermeneutical principles in theolRJ\)RU LQP\YLHZ%DUWK¶VQHJDWLYH
                                                        
39
 As a brief example of how I might advance the argument beyond the scope of this thesis: I would admit 
that the Trinitarian DVSHFWRI%DUWK¶VWKRXJKWLVFOHDUO\HVVHQWLDOWRWKHDUFKLWHFWXUHRI%DUWK¶VDogmatics, 
although I would still question the extent to which Trinitarianism belongs to the essence of his thought 
DQGGHYHORSPHQW%HDULQJ LQPLQG WKDWP\DSSURDFKWR%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\KDVIRFXVHGRQWKHLVVXHRIWKH
trans-individual structures of sin which predetermine human subjectivity, I would point to the following 
SDVVDJHDVP\VWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUVKRZLQJKRZP\DSSURDFKZRXOGDSSO\WRKLV7ULQLWDULDQLVPµ,WLVKDUG
to see how the distinction of the mode of being of the Son of God from that of the Father - and the same 
must be said of the Holy Spirit - can be denied without speculatively changing and weakening the 
VHULRXVQHVV RI *RG¶V ZUDWK DJDLQVW VLQ RI WKH RSSRVLWLRQ EHWZHHQ RULJLQDO PDQ DQG IDOOHQ PDQ RI WKH
world of creation and our world of sin and death, into a mere tension within a totality which is known to us 
and can be surveyed by us«7KXV6FKOHLHUPDFKHUUHJDUGHGVLQTXDQWLWDWLYHO\DVDPHUHODFNDQGKHWKHQ
ORJLFDOO\YLHZHGUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ«DV WKHFURZQLQJRIFUHDWion, and again, consistently, he  interpreted the 
Trinity modalistically«It may also be said conversely that such disasters will inevitably happen in the 
doctrine of creation and reconciliation if the necessary safeguards are not provided by a sound doctrine of 
WKH 7ULQLW\¶ &' , S  - emphasis mine.) Here, at what I would claim is a pivotal point in the 
construction of the Trinitarian basis of the Dogmatics, Barth is clearly concerned with the impact of sin on 
WKH VWDQGSRLQW RI WKH µNQRZLQJ VXEMHFW¶ His intention is that the rupture caused by sin should not be 
regarded as a mere tension within an unbroken totality accessible to human consciousness; and hence, by 
implication, his view is that sin precedes and transcends human consciousness. For this and other reasons, 
, ZRXOG VXJJHVW WKDW WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI %DUWK¶V 7ULQLWDULDQ WKRXJKW ZDV VXERUGLQDWH WR KLV primary 
intention of incorporating within Christian theology the principle of the trans-individual and trans-
subjective dimension of sin - the prinFLSOHWKDWµWKURXJKPDQNLQG¶VIDXOWWKLQJVDUHLQYLVLEO\GRQHZLWKRXW
and above man, even above the human individual in all his uniqueness, by the host of absolutisms, of 
SRZHUVWKDWVHHNWREHORUGOHVV«¶The Christian Life, p 216. - quoted above). 
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statements were not directed against all that could be understood as philosophical or 
hermeneutical principles; in their context, such statements were directed specifically 
against the Cartesian-Romantic nexus of thought which prevailed within the philosophy 
preceding his time and which he believed was being extended into the existentialist 
SKLORVRSK\RIKLVRZQWLPH&RQYHUVHO\DQGSRVLWLYHO\,EHOLHYH%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\FDQDQG
should be understood as an attempt to revise and reinterpret Christian theology and faith 
in terms of an identifiable hermeneutical or philosophical principle - namely, the impact of 
corporate self-deception on immediate consciousness and perception. 
 
Finally, I would say that if my general thesis were substantiated or accepted, then I believe 
it would have a significant contribution to make to the urgent and vexed question of how 
ZHPD\ZLWKRXWDQDFKURQLVPDSSURSULDWH%DUWK¶VWKHRORJ\IRUPDQ\FRQWHPSRUDU\LVVXHV
and controversies. I hope it LV EURDGO\ HYLGHQW WKDW LI %DUWK¶V PRVW IXQGDPHQWDO FRQFHUQ
was with the impact of self-GHFHSWLRQ RQ SHRSOH¶V LPPHGLDWH FRQVFLRXVQHVV DQG VHOI-
awareness, then this brings his thought much closer to the hermeneutical concerns of much 
of contemporary thought. It is my tentative hope that the general position advocated in this 
thesis would go some way towards healing the rift which I believe exists, and exists 
unnecessarily, between the best of Barth studies and so much that is positive and 
constructive in the broader field of contemporary scholarship. 
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